Angela Merkel's Path to Power: The Role of Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership

Abstract

Angela Merkel's rise to power within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is surprising. Both common sense and political science theory tell us that the goal of political parties is to win elections, yet Merkel's purported lack of charisma and her inability to forge a connection with voters were well known prior the CDU's choosing her to run for Chancellor in 2005. Merkel's successful career can only be understood by studying the internal party dynamics of the CDU and Merkel's leadership approach. Merkel owes her initial rise to prominence within the CDU to her ability to help the party satisfy a variety of informal internal party quotas. Once in power, she primarily followed the party manager approach to leadership, balancing tensions among various internal party groups while avoiding affiliating herself with any group in particular. Without understanding the CDU's internal dynamics and Merkel's leadership technique, Merkel's rise to power is inexplicable.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the German Studies Association annual meeting, Pittsburgh, 28 September–1 October 2006. I would like to thank Louise Davidson-Schmich, Alisa Gaunder, Mark Vail, Kevin Wiliarty and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

1. Stern, 26 September 2002.

2. Joyce Marie Mushaben, ‘Deconstructing Gender in German Politics: The “Extreme Make-Over” of Chancellor Angela Merkel’, Paper presented at the annual conference of the German Studies Association, Pittsburgh, 28 September–1 October 2006, p.3.

3. Myra Marx Ferree, ‘Angela Merkel: What Does it Mean to Run as a Woman?’, German Politics and Society 24/1 (2006), pp.93–107.

4. Ibid., p.100.

5. Ibid., pp.104–5.

6. Angelika von Wahl, ‘Women and Political Representation in Germany: The Not-So-Unlikely Rise of Angela Merkel’, Paper presented at the annual conference of the German Studies Association, Pittsburgh, 28 September–1 October 2006.

7. Mark R. Thompson and Ludmilla Lennartz, ‘The Making of Chancellor Merkel’, German Politics 15/1 (2006), pp.99–110. For another take on Merkel's rise focusing on Kohl's patronage, crisis and political learning see Werner Reutter, ‘Who's Afraid of Angela Merkel? The Life, Political Career, and Future of the New German Chancellor’, International Journal, 61/1 (2005), pp.214–26.

8. Thompson and Lennartz, ‘The Making of Chancellor Merkel’, p.103.

9. Ibid.

10. Merkel's status as a political outsider – because she is female or because she is from the East or both – is usually seen as a disadvantage. In addition to Thompson and Lennartz, see Jackson Janes and Stephen Szabo, ‘Angela Merkel's Germany’, Current History 106/698 (2007), pp.106–11.

11. Otto Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.117–200.

12. Sigmund Neumann, ‘Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties’, in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp.395–421.

13. Sarah Elise Wiliarty, ‘Bringing Women to the Party: The German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as a Corporatist Catch-All Party’, doctoral thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2002.

14. www.cdu.de/partei/102.htm.

15. For more information on the transformation of the East CDU, see Ute Schmidt, Von der Blockpartei zur Volkspartei? Die Ost-CDU im Umbruch, 1989–1994 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997).

16. Frank Bösch, Macht und Machtverlust: Die Geschichte der CDU (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002), pp.134–35.

17. These structural changes also served to reinforce Helmut Kohl's power within the party. See ibid., p.134.

18. Ibid., p.142.

19. Frank Bösch, Die Adenauer-CDU: Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei, 1945–1969 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), p.307.

20. The CDU was also looking for younger people and Merkel was only 36.

21. For more on party managers, see Clay Clemens, ‘The Chancellor as Manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU and Governance in Germany’, West European Politics 17/4 (1994), pp.28–51, and Clay Clemens, ‘Party Management as a Leadership Resource: Kohl and the CDU/CSU’, German Politics 7/1 (1998), pp.91–119. See also Christopher K. Ansell and Steven M. Fish, ‘The Art of Being Indispensable: Noncharismatic Personalism in Contemporary Political Parties’, Comparative Political Studies 32/3 (1999), pp.283–312. Ansell and Fish present a type of leadership they call ‘non-charismatic personalism’ which bears striking resemblance to Clemens's party manager approach. They argue that this type of leadership is most likely to emerge in parties that have both territorial and ideological cleavages, certainly true of the CDU.

22. Padgett and Ansell call this talent ‘robust action’. See John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, ‘Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici’, American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993), pp.1259–319. The CDU has generally governed in coalition with other parties. Certainly Helmut Kohl used this balancing technique to maintain his coalition with the CSU and the FDP. See Clemens, ‘The Chancellor as Manager’ and Ansell and Fish ‘The Art of Being Indispensable’. I do not discuss Merkel as Chancellor here so I do not attempt to analyze her use of this leadership approach with the SPD.

23. Janes and Szabo note Merkel's non-ideological, incremental approach to policy making, but they attribute this approach to her earlier career as a physicist. Janes and Szabo, ‘Angela Merkel's Germany’, p.106. Both Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl used a similar approach to leadership, however, without training in the natural sciences.

24. Bösch, Die Adenauer-CDU, p.59.

25. These are the critical advances in Merkel's career. One additional moment might have been chosen – when Kohl picked Merkel to be Minister of Environment in his 1994 cabinet. In some ways, that was a lateral move because it did not increase her power. On the other hand, it removed Merkel from what might be called a ‘women's ghetto’. The Environmental Ministry is also a higher profile Ministry than Women and Youth. Putting a former physicist in charge of the Environmental Ministry inevitably highlighted her past as a scientist and probably served to increase perceptions of her competence.

26. Jennifer A. Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Postcommunist Elites (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), pp.110–11.

27. Jacqueline Boysen, Angela Merkel: Eine Karriere (Berlin: Ullstein, 2005), pp.139–40.

28. Nicole Schley, Angela Merkel: Deutschlands Zukunft ist weiblich (Munich: Knaur Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), p.32. Actually Merkel fulfilled a fourth ‘quota’ because of her youth.

29. Wolfgang Stock, Angela Merkel: Eine politische Biographie (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 2005), p.68.

30. Author's interview with Women's Ministry staff member Udo Kollenberg, Bonn, 14 August 1998.

31. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 September 1991.

32. Schley, Angela Merkel, p.33.

33. Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.156.

34. Author's interview with Women's Ministry staff member Udo Kollenberg, Bonn, 14 August 1998.

35. Bösch, Macht und Machtverlust, p.147.

36. AP German, 22 October 1998.

37. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 October 1998.

38. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 October 1998.

39. Bösch, Macht und Machtverlust, p.195.

40. AP German, 30 September 1998.

41. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 October 1998.

42. Stern, 8 October 1998. Petra Roth, mayor of Frankfurt and another prominent CDU woman, also called for more women in the new CDU leadership. See Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 October 1998.

43. Joanna McKay, ‘Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?’, German Politics 13/1 (2004), p.69.

44. Ute Molitor and Viola Neu, ‘Das Wahlverhalten der Frauen bei der Bundestagswahl 1998: Kaum anders als das der Männer’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 2 (1999), p.254.

45. Ibid., p.256.

46. Ursula Feist and Hans-Jürgen Hoffmann, ‘Dokumentation und Kurzanalysen: Die Bundestagswahlanalyse 1998: Wahl des Wechsels’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 2 (1999), p.237.

47. Ibid., p.238.

48. Ludger Helms, ‘Is there Life after Kohl? The CDU Crisis and the Future of Party Democracy in Germany’, Government and Opposition 35/4 (2000), p.421.

49. Ibid., p.421.

50. Stock, Angela Merkel, pp.142–43.

51. Helms, ‘Is there Life after Kohl?’, p.421.

52. Associated Press World Stream German, 16 February 2000.

53. Gerhard Langguth, Angela Merkel (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), pp.200–201. Merkel had already written the article when she called Karl Feldmeyer, an editor at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, to offer it to him. Within five minutes, she had faxed it to him. The article was clearly Merkel's initiative.

54. Merkel's actions following the party financing scandal can be explained with another strand of literature on policy making. Kingdon has noted the importance of ‘policy windows’ in passing new legislation. See John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). A scandal or a crisis is one way a policy window can open. He argues that new policies are brought to the top of the political agenda primarily when a policy window opens. The party financing scandal could be considered such a policy window. Building on Kingdon's research, Gaunder notes that policy entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful in getting their preferences implemented when they are willing to take risks. Alisa Gaunder, Political Reform in Japan: Leadership Looming Large (London: Routledge, 2007). While this literature applies to policy making rather than career advancement within a political party, the parallels are clear. Merkel took a risk in criticising Kohl, but this risk allowed her to take advantage of the window of opportunity opened by the CDU's funding scandal. Her risk paid off and she was able to become party chair.

55. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.144.

56. Langguth, Angela Merkel, pp.204–5.

57. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.143.

58. Boysen, Angela Merkel, p.218.

59. Neue Züricher Zeitung, 19 February 2000.

60. McKay noted the likely limits of the benefits to Merkel of internal party structure. McKay, ‘Women in German Politics’, p.75.

61. For an opposing view on the possible advantages of an early declaration of the desire to run for Chancellor see Bösch, Macht und Machtverlust, p.155.

62. Ibid., p.155.

63. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.226.

64. Ibid., p.225.

65. Ibid., p.228.

66. Ibid., p.229.

67. Stock, Angela Merkel, p.174.

68. Experience is an important quality in Chancellor candidates and people who fulfil the CDU's internal balancing requirements have an easier time gaining experience within the party.

69. Langguth, Angela Merkel, p.238.

70. tageszeitung, 1 June 2004.

71. Der Spiegel, 23 October 2004.