A Dual Centre? Executive Politics under the Second Grand Coalition in Germany

Abstract

This article analyses executive politics under the second Grand Coalition in Germany with a particular emphasis on the role of the Chancellor and her Office. It applies a principal–agent framework to examine how the two parties in government affected the power relations within the executive. Next to external features such as the coinciding G8 and EU presidency as well as the global financial and economic crisis, particular institutional features structuring these delegation relationships, i.e. the partisan composition of the government and the rules for cabinet decision-making, account for the dynamics in executive politics during the second Grand Coalition. Initially, the traditional prerogatives of a German Chancellor were restricted and two hubs for executive coordination emerged for directing cabinet members from both government parties. The G8 and EU presidency in 2007 weakened the parties' influence and enabled the Chancellor and her Office to centralise executive politics. When the global financial and economic crises hit Germany in 2008, executive politics shifted towards a concentration of power at the Chancellery and the Ministry of Finance, also balancing the interests of both catch-all parties in government to engage in crisis management.

Notes

E.g. A. Schäffer, ‘Mit sich im Reinen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 Oct. 2005, p.3.

E. Holtmann, ‘Die Richtlinienkompetenz des Bundeskanzlers – kein Phantom?’, in E. Holtmann and W.J. Patzelt (eds), Führen Regierungen tatsächlich? Zur Praxis gouvernementalen Handelns (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), p.75.

See K. Dyson and T. Saalfeld, ‘Actors, Structures and Strategies: Policy Continuity and Change under the Grand Coalition (2005–09), German Politics 19/3–4 (2010).

See the contributions to C. Egle and R. Zohlnhöfer (eds), Die Große Koalition 2005–2009. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010).

R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive’, in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp.11–37.

K. Niclauß, Kanzlerdemokratie. Regierungsführung von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004); see also R. Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership in Germany: Dispertion of Power or "Kanzlerdemokratie"?’, in R. Rose and E.N. Suleiman (eds), Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980).

See the contributions to T. Poguntke and P. Webb (eds), The Presidentialization of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

H. Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington (Washington: Brookings, 1977); R. Mayntz and F. Scharpf, Policy-making in the German Federal Bureaucracy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975).

J.P. Olsen, Towards a European Administrative Space? ARENA Working Paper 02/26 (Oslo: ARENA, 2002).

T. Larsson and J. Trondal, After Hierarchy? The Differentiated Impact of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers on Domestic Executive Governance, ARENA Working Paper 06/22 (Oslo: ARENA, 2005); A. King, ‘Chief Executives in Western Europe’, in I. Budge and D. McKay (eds), Developing Democracy (London: Sage, 1994), pp.150–62; J. Mittag and W. Wessels, ‘The “One” and the “Fifteen”? The Member States between Procedural Adaptation and Structure Revolution’, in W. Wessels, A. Maurer and J. Mittag (eds), Fifteen into One? The European Union and its Member States (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp.413–54.

Heclo, A Government.

M. Egeberg, ‘European Government(s): Executive Politics in Transition?’, West European Politics 31/1 (2008), pp.235–57.

These are often discussed as ‘leadership’, see e.g. J. Blondel, Political Leadership. Towards a General Analysis (London: Sage, 1987). Also Elgie's typology of executive politics refers to individual explanatory features; see R. Elgie, ‘Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Regimes’, Political Studies 45/2 (1997), pp.217–31.

H. Bäck, P. Dumont, H.E. Meier, T. Persson and K. Vernby, ‘Does European Integration Lead to a Presidentialization of Executive Politics? Ministerial Selection in Swedish Post-War Cabinets’, European Union Politics 10/2 (2009), pp.226–52; H. Bäck, T. Persson and H.E. Meier, ‘Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs. The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments’, Journal of Legislative Studies 15 (2009), pp.10–34.; K.M. Johansson and J. Tallberg, ‘Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change’, West European Politics 33/2 (2010), pp.208–36.

W.C. Müller, ‘Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work’, European Journal of Political Research 37/3 (2000), pp.309–33 (see pp.321, 311–12); K. Strøm, ‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research 37 (2000), pp.267–70; K. Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation’, in K. Strøm and W.C. Müller (eds), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.67.

These concepts originated in economics and were applied in political science initially to congressional-bureaucratic relationships in the US, e.g. M.D. McCubbins and T. Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms’, American Journal of Political Science 28/1 (1984), pp.165–79; B.R. Weingast, ‘The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal–Agent Perspective (With Application to the SEC)’, Public Choice 44 (1984), pp.147–91; M.D. McCubbins, R.G. Noll and B.R. Weingast, ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3/2 (1987), pp.243–77; R.L. Calvert, M.D. McCubbins and B.R. Weingast, ‘A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion’, American Journal of Political Science 33/3 (1989), pp.588–611; A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins, ‘Representation or Abdication? How Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed’, European Journal of Political Research 37/3 (2000), pp.291–307; K. Bawn, ‘Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures’, American Political Science Review 89/1 (1995), pp.62–73.

D.R. Kiewiet and M.D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation. Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

M.A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’, International Organization 51/1 (1997), p.108.

Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, p.27; D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

J. Blondel and M. Cotta, Party and Government. An Inquiry Into the Relationship Between Governments and Supporting Parties in Western Liberal Democracies (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.249–54; L. De Winter and P. Dumont, ‘Parties into Government: Still Many Puzzles’, in R.S. Katz and W. Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage, 2006), pp.175–88; Müller, ‘Political Parties’.

This article uses ‘prime minister’ as equivalent term for heads of government in parliamentary systems.

R.B. Andeweg, ‘Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process between Cabinet and Ministers’, European Journal of Political Research 37/3 (2000), pp.377–95; Müller, ‘Political Parties’, p.325.

Andeweg, ‘Ministers as Double Agents’.

Müller, ‘Political Parties’, p.328. This observation holds also for candidates discussed after general elections and prior cabinet inauguration who are screened but not necessarily selected, see J. Fleischer and M. Seyfried, ‘Playing the Candidate Puzzle: Coalition Negotiations on Candidate Selection in Germany, 1983–2009’, Paper presented at the PCPM Brown Bag Seminar, University of Potsdam, June 2010.

Müller, ‘Political Parties’, p.329; L. De Winter, ‘The Links between Cabinets and Parties and Cabinet Decision-Making’, in: J. Blondel and F. Müller-Rommel (eds), Governing Together. The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp.153–78; M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle, ‘Cabinet Government in Theoretical Perspective’, in M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle (eds), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.285–309; J. Blondel and M. Cotta (eds), Party and Government (London: Macmillan, 1996).

Andeweg, ‘Ministers’, p.382.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 386; Müller, ‘Political Parties’, p.329.

J.D. Huber, ‘Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research 37/3 (2000), pp.409–10.

A.K. Dixit, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-cost Politics Perspective (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); A.K. Dixit, ‘Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations’, American Economic Review 87/2 (1997), pp.378–82; Huber, ‘Delegation’, pp.402–3; M.F. Thies, ‘Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments’, American Journal of Political Science 45/3 (2001), pp. 580–98; J.E. Lane, Comparative Politics: The Principal–Agent Perspective (London: Routledge, 2008), p.8.

Andeweg, ‘Ministers’, p.380.

Laver and Shepsle, ‘Cabinet Government’; Huber, ‘Delegation’, pp.401–2.

N. Johnson, State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Executive at Work, 2nd edn (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983), p.110; R. Mayntz, ‘West Germany’, in W.J.L. Plowden (ed.), Advising the Rulers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p.4.

Formally, they are appointed and dismissed by the Federal President. This provision is regulated in the Basic Law (Art. 65 GG) and the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government (§ 1.1 GOBReg).

W.E. Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and his Party: Political Leadership in the Federal Republic’, West European Politics 4/2 (1981), p.14.

In fact, the Chancellor suggests candidates to the Federal President for formal appointment (Art. 64 GG).

E.g. G. Bannas, ‘Die Koordinationskanzlerin’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 Oct. 2005, p.2.

U. Jun, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Großen Koalition: Regierungsbildung in Deutschland 2005’, in H. Batt and J. Tenscher (eds), 100 Tage Schonfrist. Politik in Deutschland zwischen Bundestagswahl 2005 und Landtagswahlen 2006 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), p.36; From the eight offices remaining for the CDU/CSU, only the Ministry of Defence was characterised as one of the most salient portfolios, see A. Murswieck, ‘Von Schröder zu Merkel – eine Frage des (Regierungs-) Stils? Zu den Machtressourcen der Bundeskanzlerin in einer Großen Koalition’, in J. Tenscher and H. Batt (eds), 100 Tage Schonfrist: Bundespolitik und Landtagswahlen im Schatten der Großen Koalition (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), p.204.

T. Beichelt, ‘Over-Efficiency in German EU Policy Coordination’, German Politics 16/4 (2007), p.424.

The first position resulted from the splitting of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour into two ministries, the second because the ChefBK was given the rank of a cabinet minister rather than one of administrative state secretary.

The office of the Deputy Chancellor is not formalised, although the Grundgesetz entails a substitution rule in case the Chancellor is absent (Art. 69.1 GG). According to convention, the Foreign Minister usually acts as Deputy Chancellor, although there was an exception when Jürgen Möllemann, the then Minister for Economic Affairs, acted as Deputy Chancellor between 1992 and 1993. The term Vice-Chancellery, which refers to the distinct role of the Deputy Chancellor's own ministry within the executive, was occasionally used under previous governments, but gained its highest popularity among journalists, academics, and practitioners during the second Grand Coalition.

Murswieck, ‘Von Schröder’, p.204.

R. Sturm, ‘Übergang oder Aufbruch? Die Perspektiven des neuen Regierungsbündnisses’, in E. Jesse and R. Sturm (eds), Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2005. Voraussetzungen, Ergebnisse, Folgen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2006), p.330; U. Thaysen, ‘Regierungsbildung 2005. Merkel, Merkel I, Merkel II?’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 37/3 (2006), p.597.

W. Schreckenberger, ‘Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Mehrheitsfraktionen: Koalitionsgespräche und Koalitionsrunden, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 25/3 (1994), p.331.

See W. Pfister, Regierungsprogramm und Richtlinien der Politik (Bern: Lang, 1974); K. von Beyme, Die großen Regierungserklärungen der deutschen Bundeskanzler von Adenauer bis Schmidt (München: Hanser, 1979); K. König, ‘Formalisierung und Informalisierung im Regierungszentrum’, in H.-H. Hartwich and G. Wewer (eds), Regieren in der Bundesrepublik – Formale und informale Komponenten des Regierens (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1991), pp.209, 216; Mayntz, ‘Executive Leadership’, p.146; T. Saalfeld, ‘Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement’, in W.C. Müller and K. Strøm (eds), Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.51.

U. Thaysen, ‘Regierungsbildung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Daten zum Start der Regierung Merkel 2005/2006’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 37/3 (2006), pp.470–80.

Jun, ‘Auf dem Weg’, p.40. Here, one may observe a similarity to the first Grand Coalition when the administrative state secretary at the Ministry of Justice, Horst Ehmke, contributed strongly to the SPD's profile within the executive.

Expert interviews, former BKAmt senior official, 20 Nov. 2009, BMF senior official, 5 Nov. 2009. Since the 1950s when Länder governments from SPD and CDU met in the Bundesrat building in room A and B respectively, the SPD-led Länder are traditionally called ‘A-Länder’ and the CDU/CSU-led Länder are called ‘B-Länder’.

G. Bannas, ‘Wenn es auf Gesichtswahrung ankommt. Thomas de Maizière ist Minister im Kanzleramt – aber Machtzentren gibt es viele in der Großen Koalition’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 March 2006, p.4.

Murswieck, ‘Von Schröder’, p.207.

Bannas, ‘Wenn es auf Gesichtswahrung ankommt’.

T. Knoll, ‘Das Bundeskanzleramt – Funktionen und Organisation’, in K.H. Schrenk and M. Soldner (eds), Analyse demokratischer Regierungssysteme (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), pp.201–20.

Federal Budget 2005, 2007.

Murswieck, ‘Von Schröder’, p.211.

Expert interview, former BKAmt senior official, 20 Nov. 2009.

T. Beichelt, ‘Over-efficiency’, p.429; M. Große Hüttemann, ‘Die Koordination der Europapolitik’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B10 (2007), p.42.

R. Sturm and H. Pehle, ‘Die Europäisierung der Regierungssysteme’, in O.W. Gabriel and S. Kropp (eds), Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich, 3rd edn (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), p.174.

In conjunction with the respective chairman; see R. Sturm and H. Pehle, Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem: Die Europäisierung von Institutionen, Entscheidungsprozessen und Politikfeldern in der Bundesrepublik, 2nd edn (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005), pp.43–5; T. Beichelt, Deutschland und Europa (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009), p.230.

This term is meanwhile ‘Brussels speech’, signifying that a EU member state abstains the vote because its government could not formulate a policy position.

D. Dinan, ‘Governance and Institutional Developments: Ending the Constitutional Impasse’, Journal of Common Market Studies 46/1 (2008), p.75; D. Kietz and A. Maurer, ‘Handlungsanreize und Handlungsbeschränkungen der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. Eine Bilanz des deutschen Vorsitzes im Lichte des Reformvertrags’, in D. Kietz and V. Perthes (eds), Handlungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. Eine Funktionsanalyse des deutschen Vorsitzes im ersten Halbjahr 2007, SWP-Studie, No. 2007/S 24, p.104; A. Maurer, ‘The German Council Presidency: Managing Conflicting Expectations, Journal of Common Market Studies 46/1 (2008), pp.51–9; F. Wendler, ‘Politischer Stilwechsel und fortgesetzte Normalisierung: Eine Bilanz der Europapolitik der Großen Koalition’, in Egle and Zohlnhöfer (eds), Die Große Koalition 2005–2009.

Expert interview, former BKAmt senior official, 20 Nov. 2009.

R. Beste, J. Fleischhauer, H. Knaup, R. Neukirch, R. Pfister and G. Steingart, ‘Die neue Merkel-Show’, Der Spiegel 42/2006, pp.22–3.

P. Becker, ‘Lissabon in Berlin und Brüssel – Die Lissabonstrategie unter deutschem Vorsitz’, in Kietz and Perthes (eds), Handlungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, p.10.

Ibid.

A. Maurer, ‘Rückbau, Raubbau, Wiederaufbau. Die Arbeiten zum Verfassungsvertrag’, in Kietz and Perthes (eds), Handlungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, p.30.

Maurer, ‘Rückbau’, pp.31–2; D. Schwarzer, ‘Die Berliner Erklärung – Testlauf für die Verhandlungen zum Verfassungsvertrag?’, in Kietz and Perthes (eds), Handlungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, p.23.

In practice, they were discussed and decided during those EU-AL sessions chaired by the Foreign Office; see Becker, ‘Lissabon’, p.13.

S. Dröge and O. Geden, ‘Weitreichende Grundsatzentscheidungen für eine integrierte Energie- und Klimapolitik’, in Kietz and Perthes (eds), Handlungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, p.50.

He managed the SPD general election campaign in 1998 and had previously served as SPD party secretary.

Dröge and Geden, ‘Weitreichende’, p.51.

M. Theurer, H. Mußler and H. Paul, ‘Rettungslösung für Hypo Real Estate um 23 Uhr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 Oct. 2008, p.16.

N. Luttmer and M. Schrörs, ‘Vom Comandante zum Komparsen’, Financial Times Deutschland, 21 April 2009; P. Blechschmidt, G. Bohsem, S. Braun, N. Fried and S. Höll, ‘Das Gesetz der Geschwindigkeit’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/19 Oct. 2008, p.3; M. Dettmer, D. Kurbjuweit and C. Reiermann, ‘Zocken im Morgengrauen’, Der Spiegel, 17 Aug. 2009, p.63.

BT-Drs. 16/12547 [2009], Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der FDP ‘Dienstleistungsaufträge der Bundesregierung im Rahmen der Finanzmarktgesetzgebung’, 31 March 2009, Berlin.

Expert interview, BMF senior official, 5 Nov. 2009.

‘Guttenberg legt Gegenkonzept zur Enteignung vor’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 March 2009, p.13.

E. Lohse, ‘Das verlorene Lachen des Michael Glos’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 15 Feb. 2009, p.2.

C. Hulverscheidt, ‘ Steinmeier überholt Merkel’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 Nov. 2008, p.7.

A. Mihm, K. Mrusek and M. Schäfers, ‘ Vom Krisentreffen zur konzertierten Aktion’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 Dec. 2008, p.12.

The most prominent of these measures was the so-called ‘environment incentive’, commonly known as ‘car scrappage scheme’ (Abwrackprämie) which was adopted by other governments afterwards; ‘Abwrackprämie in Großbritannien’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 April 2009, p.12.

R. Beste, J. Fleischhauer, H. Knaup, R. Neukirch, R. Pfister and G. Steingart, ‘Die neue Merkel-Show’, Der Spiegel, 12 Jan. 2009, p.22.