National Identities and Mass Belief Systems on Foreign and Security Policy in Germany

Abstract

The article analyses how German citizens' national identities are linked to their belief systems regarding foreign and security policy. Previous research has pointed out that citizens' belief systems are not unconstrained, but organised hierarchically. Especially domain-specific predispositions have been shown to structure policy attitudes. Against the backdrop of the prominence national history is granted in public discourse, the article argues that in Germany national identities influence both predispositions and attitudes concerning foreign and security policy. Using data from a representative telephone survey of German adults, a structural equation model is used to test this hypothesis. The results show that different types of national identities have distinct effects on domain-specific predispositions and attitudes towards the German participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Matthias Mader is a research associate at the University of Bamberg. His research interests focus on the causes and effects of public opinion on foreign and security policy.

Jana Pötzschke is a research associate at the University of Mannheim. Her research interests combine attitudes on foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, and political psychology.

Notes

1. See for example R. Baumann and G. Hellmann, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: “Total War”, the “Culture of Restraint” and the Quest for Normality’, German Politics 10/1 (2001), pp.61–82; E. Langenbacher, ‘Still the Unmasterable Past? The Impact of History and Memory in the Federal Republic of Germany’, German Politics 19/1 (2010), pp.24–40; K. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of Germany Security Policy 1990–2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); R. Wittlinger and M. Larose, ‘No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy’, German Politics 16/4 (2007), pp.481–95.

2. Wittlinger and Larose, ‘No Future for Germany's Past?’, p.492.

3. P.E. Converse, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in D.E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontents (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp.206–61. We use the term ‘belief system’ because it is a collocation in public opinion research. When referring to the elements of a belief system we prefer the term ‘cognitive element’ to underline the elementary character of the concept. See R.C. Luskin, ‘Measuring Political Sophistication’, American Journal of Political Science 31/4 (1987), pp.856–99. We also want to avoid confusion, since in another strand of research ‘belief’ has been more narrowly defined as a factual conviction. See M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

4. ISAF is an UN-mandated and NATO-led peace enforcing mission in Afghanistan. In the autumn of 2010, the period in which the survey data we analyse here was gathered, Germany was the third largest troop contributor with about 4,400 soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. To date it is the most extensive military engagement the Bundeswehr has participated in; see S.B. Gareis, ‘Militärische Auslandseinsätze und die Transformation der Bundeswehr’, in T. Jäger, A. Höse and K. Oppermann (eds), Deutsche Außenpolitik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011), pp.148–70. In the following, we will use the terms ‘attitudes towards the ISAF mission’ and ‘attitudes towards the German army's participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan’ interchangeably.

5. A ‘predisposition’ is defined as a cognitive structure at the general level that is durable and accessible. In contrast, we use the term ‘attitude’ to refer to a summary evaluation of a specific object at a given time. For a similar distinction between predisposition and attitude see M.R. Alvarez and J. Brehm, Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American Public Opinion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). For more on the concept of predisposition see e.g. J. Hurwitz and M.A. Peffley, ‘How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model’, The American Political Science Review 81/4 (1987), pp.1099–120; for more on the concept of attitude see e.g. R.H. Fazio, ‘Attitudes as Object-Evaluation Associations of Varying Strength’, Social Cognition 25/5 (2007), pp.603–37.

6. On the general relevance of national identities for public opinion on international relations see R.K. Herrmann, P. Isernia and P. Segatti, ‘Attachment to the Nation and International Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace’, Political Psychology 30/5 (2009), pp.721–54. For research showing how the dynamics of national identity salience influence shifts in public opinion see S.L. Althaus and K. Coe, ‘Priming Patriots: Social Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Public Support for War’, Public Opinion Quarterly 75/1 (2011), pp.65–88; C.D. Kam and J.M. Ramos, ‘Joining and Leaving the Rally: Understanding the Surge and Decline in Presidential Approval Following 9/11’, Public Opinion Quarterly 72/4 (2008), pp.619–50.

7. See e.g. T. Blank and P. Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test With Representative Data’, Political Psychology 24/2 (2003), pp.289–312; C.J. Cohrs, ‘Patriotismus – Sozialpsychologische Aspekte’, Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 36/1 (2005), pp.3–11.

8. Converse, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, p.207.

9. See e.g. C.S. Taber, ‘Information Processing and Public Opinion’, in D.O. Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.433–76.

10. For a discussion of range and organisation as attributes of belief systems see especially Converse, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’; Luskin, ‘Measuring Political Sophistication’; M.A. Peffley and J. Hurwitz, ‘A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint’, American Journal of Political Science 29/4 (1985), pp.871–90.

11. For a discussion of hierarchical structures as attributes of belief systems see e.g. S. Feldman, ‘Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values’, American Journal of Political Science 32/2 (1988), pp.416–40; Peffley and Hurwitz, ‘A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint’.

12. H. Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.255.

13. See for example R. Abdelal, Y.M. Herrera, A.I. Johnston, and R. McDermott, ‘Identity as a Variable’, Perspectives on Politics 4/4 (2006), pp.695–711; L. Huddy, ‘Group Identity and Political Cohesion’, in Sears et al. (eds), Oxford Handbook on Political Psychology, pp.511–58.

14. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’, p.290.

15. Various names have been proposed for these two types. Patriotism has also been called positive patriotism, constructive patriotism, and civic national pride. Nationalism has also been called pseudo-patriotism, blind patriotism, and national chauvinism. While the labels vary, the core meaning of these concepts is very similar. See Cohrs, ‘Patriotismus – Sozialpsychologische Aspekte’.

16. For conceptual discussions see e.g. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’; Cohrs, ‘Patriotismus – Sozialpsychologische Aspekte’; L. Huddy and N. Khatib, ‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement’, American Journal of Political Science 51/1 (2007), pp.63–77. For extensive empirical tests for construct and measurement equlivalence across countries see e.g. E. Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP: 34 Countries in a Comparative Perspective’, Political Analysis 17/1 (2009), pp.64–82.

17. Hurwitz and Peffley, ‘How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?’, p.1104.

18. R.O. Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’, International Journal 45/4 (1990), pp.731–64. Multilateralism can also be conceptualised to include other or additional dimensions. One of these refers to the active use of international organisations and negotiations to solve conflicts, another to certain standards the coordination process has to meet; for a discussion of these aspects see e.g. T.G. Ash, ‘Germany's Choice’, Foreign Affairs 73/4, pp.65–81; J.G. Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, in J.G. Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.3–47. Lack of data prohibits an inclusion of citizens’ postures concerning these additional dimensions in our analysis.

19. See e.g. W.O. Chittick and A. Freyberg-Inan, ‘The Impact of Basic Motivation on Foreign Policy Opinions Concerning the Use of Force: A Three-Dimensional Framework’, in P. Everts and P. Isernia (eds), Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.31–56; Hurwitz and Peffley, ‘How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?’; R.C. Rathbun, ‘Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad: Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51/3 (2007), pp.379–407.

20. Z. Juhász, ‘German Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the Early 1990s’, in P. Everts and P. Isernia (eds), Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp.57–85; P. Isernia and P. Everts, ‘Partners Apart? The Foreign Policy Attitudes of the American and European Public’, Japanese Journal of Political Science 5/2 (2004), pp.229–58.

21. Herrmann et al., ‘Attachment to the Nation and International Relations’.

22. See e.g. Fazio, ‘Attitudes as Object-Evaluation Associations of Varying Strength’, p.608.

23. This is a statement of degree; compared with other countries, German decision makers and the public have remained critical of the use of military force as a policy instrument. See R. Baumann and G. Hellmann, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: “Total War”, the “Culture of Restaint” and the Quest for Normality’, German Politics 10/1 (2001), pp.61–82; J.S. Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’, International Organization 53/4 (1999), pp.765–803; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force.

24. We acknowledge the German Research Foundation (DFG) for providing financial support for this research within the Project ‘Attitudes on Foreign and Security Policy in the US and Germany: a Comparison at the Mass and Elite Level’.

25. Missing data due to non-response was only a minor problem (don't know/refused answers vary between 0.43% and 6.12%). All missing values were assumed to be at random. We replaced the missing values using multiple imputation. As predictor variables we used items that tap into respondents’ personalities, universal values, and foreign and security policy attitudes.

26. The original German version of the questionnaire is available upon request.

27. See e.g. Blank and Schmidt, ‘National Identity in a United Germany’; Davidov, ‘Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in the ISSP’.

28. To measure these predispositions we tapped into different sub-dimensions of the theoretical concepts. Reliability is therefore relatively low (Cronbach's alpha = 0.33 and 0.36 respectively).

29. Two of these items – beliefs about initial rightness/wrongness of the decision to go to war and beliefs about the likely success – were introduced by Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler as causal factors of war support, rather than as indicators for the attitudes toward the war itself. See C. Gelpi, P.D. Feaver and J. Reifler, ‘Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq’, International Security 30/3 (2006), pp.7–46. This claim – that initial support and expectations of success are conceptually distinct from general war support – has been called into question by Berinsky and Druckman. See A.J. Berinsky and J.N. Druckman, ‘The Polls – Review: Public Opinion Research and Support for the Iraq War’, Public Opinion Quarterly 71/1 (2007), pp.126–41. For our analysis, the question of generality is key to deciding how to treat this issue. In relation to our mid-level concepts, it seems unproblematic to interpret all three indicators as situated on a lower, more concrete level. Thus, we can sidestep the question whether these items should be interpreted as indicating one concept or as representing three separate concepts, i.e. whether it is fruitful to further analyse what goes on at the lowest level of hierarchically structured belief systems. In addition, reliability test (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73) and factor analysis (one factor with factor loadings of 0.80, 0.81 and 0.83) qualify this strategy as justifiable as well.

30. As is recommended for structural equation modelling, we additionally allow for covariances between the latent variables of the same hierarchical level. See B.M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with MPLUS: Basic Concepts, Applications, and Programming (New York: Routledge, 2012). No restrictions on factor loadings and variances of error terms were specified.

31. We ran another model with controls for gender, age, education, and region (east/west) as antecedents of the psychological concepts. While there were only minor fluctuations in the coefficients of interest, the estimation output clearly identified this modified model as inadequate. We therefore report the findings of the better fitting model.

32. An RMSEA (root mean squared error of approximation) smaller than 0.05 is considered indicating a very good fit, so are CFI (Comparative Fit Index) values higher than 0.95; see Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with MPLUS; L. Hu and P.M. Bentler, ‘Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Structure Analysis: Conventional Criteria versus New Alternatives’, Structural Equation Modeling 6/1 (1990), pp.1–55.

33. To facilitate interpretation, we recoded all variables to a 0–1 range. Higher values indicate a more substantial change in the dependent variable than lesser ones. E.g. the coefficient of b = 0.07 for the effect of patriotism on nationalism means that a change in the patriotism score from 0 to 1 would result in an attitude towards the ISAF mission that is 0.07 points higher than before.

34. See e.g. L. Huddy, S. Feldman and C. Weber, ‘The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 614/1 (2007), pp.131–53; J. Pötzschke, H. Rattinger and H. Schoen, ‘Persönlichkeit, Wertorientierungen und Einstellungen zu Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in den Vereinigten Staaten’, Politische Psychologie 2/1 (2012), pp.4–29.

35. See e.g. M.A. Baum and T.J. Groeling, ‘Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War’, Political Behavior 31/1 (2009), pp.157–86; M. Mader and H. Schoen, ‘Alles eine Frage des Blickwinkels? Framingeffekte und Bevölkerungsurteile über einen möglichen Bundeswehreinsatz in Libyen’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 20/1 (2013), pp.5–34.