Good Neighbourliness in a Tense Neighbourhood: German—Polish Relations, 1990 to the Ukraine Crisis

Abstract

The German—Polish relationship developed strong, deep roots over the two and a half decades since the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the unification of Germany. The Ukraine crisis revealed, or rather was a stark reminder that, Germany and Poland have different perspectives about Russia’s relationship to Europe, its impact on the region’s security, and how best to guarantee that security. Whereas Germany sought to cultivate a special relationship with Russia in the late 1990s, Poland saw a need to Europeanise relations with Russia. Elections in Poland in 2015 directed further attention to the country’s differences with Germany and the EU. Despite their occasionally divergent foreign and security policy perspectives, however, both countries have practical reasons to work toward strengthening European foreign and security policy cooperation.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jennifer Yoder is the chair of the Government Department at Colby College where she has taught since 1996. Yoder’s courses include introductory courses on European Politics and German Politics and more advanced courses on Memory and Politics, the Transformation from Communism, the European Union, and on Political Ideologies and Revolutionary Movements in Europe. Her senior seminar focuses on German Foreign Policy. Yoder is the author of two books: From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elite and Crafting Democracy: Regional Politics in Post-Communist Europe. Her latest book project analyses the EU’s heritage policy and its efforts to contribute to a collective European memory. Her articles have appeared in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, German Politics and Society, German Politics, German Studies Review, East European Politics and Societies, Europe—Asia Studies and Regional and Federal Studies.

Notes

1 See Basil Kerski, Die Dynamik der Annährung in den deutsch—polnischen Beziehungen: Gegenwart und Geschichte einer Nachbarschaft (Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press, 2011); Dieter Bingen et al. (eds), Erwachsene Nachbarschaft: die deutsch—polnischen Beziehungen 1991 bis 2011 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011); and Rafał Ulatowski, ‘German—Polish Relations. Political and Economic Aspects’, UNISCI Journal 40 (Jan. 2016), pp.43–56.

2 The trialogue began in 2009 at the foreign ministerial level. Trialogue initiatives have developed in a number of fora at various levels. Trilateral cooperation at the level of foreign ministers began in 2009 and was pivotal in developing a visa-free regime for residents of the Kaliningrad area in Russia and two regions in Poland in 2010.

3 Koalitionsvertrag, p.18, available from http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf (accessed 15 June 2016).

4 Ibid.

5 Quoted by Jurek Skrobala, ‘Stuck in the Middle: Polish Intellectuals Sound the Alarm on Russia’, Spiegel Online, 4 Dec. 2014, available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/culture-leaders-in-poland-report-growing-fear-of-russia-a-1006372.html (accessed 15 June 2016).

6 Marcin Goettig, ‘Election puts Polish Ties with Germany, EU at Risk’, Reuters, 22 Oct. 2015, available from http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-election-eu-idUKKCN0SG0ES20151022 (accessed 15 June 2016).

7 For an in-depth analysis of German—Polish relations during and after the cold war, see Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff. Germany’s Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic: Ostpolitik Revisited (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2004; ProQuest Ebook Central), available from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/colby/detail.action?docID=182747 (accessed 9 Jan. 2018).

8 See the foundation’s website for further information about its work: http://fwpn.org.pl/en/foundation/about-us (accessed 14 June 2016).

9 See Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East-Central Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

10 I borrow the term ‘secondary foreign policy’ from Martin Klatt and Birte Wassenberg, ‘Secondary Foreign Policy: Can Local and Regional Cross-border Cooperation Function as a Tool for Peace-building and Reconciliation?’, Regional and Federal Studies 27/3 (2017), available from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13597566.2017.1350652 (accessed 9 Jan. 2018).

11 The Guardian, ‘Germany and Poland: How Closely to the Countries Compare?’, 9 Oct. 2014, available from http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/09/germany-and-poland-how-closely-do-the-two-countries-compare (accessed 15 June 2016). See also Ulatowski, ‘German—Polish Relations’, pp.51–4. Ulatowski notes that the structure of the bilateral trade has changed; whereas Poland used to export agricultural products, textiles and commodities, it now exports more high added value products, like Germany, including cars.

12 For more on the ECOC designation, see the official website: http://www.wroclaw2016.pl/about-ecoc (accessed 15 June 2016).

13 Witold M. Goralski (ed.), Poland—Germany 1945—2007: From Confrontation to Cooperation and Partnership (Warsaw: Polish Institute for International Affairs, 2007), p.320.

14 Ibid., p.342.

15 Reported by Piotr Buras, The Polish—German Split: A Storm in a Teacup? (European Council for Foreign Relations), 14 April 2015, available from http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_polish_german_split_a_storm_in_a_teacup311660 (accessed 15 June 2016).

16 Absichtserklärung zu einer Deutsch-Polnischen Heereskooperation, available from http://www.bmvg.de (accessed 29 Oct. 2014).

17 Alessandro Scheffler Corvaja, ‘Beyond Deterrence: NATO’s Agenda after Warsaw’, Facts and Findings: Prospects for German Foreign Policy, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 224 (Oct. 2016), p.2, available from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_46589-544-2-30.pdf?161005142126 (accessed 9 Jan. 2018).

18 Ibid., p.6.

19 Matthew Karnitsching and Jan Cienski, ‘Warsaw’s EU Spat Stalls German—Polish Engine’, Politico, 14 Jan. 2016, available from http://www.politico.eu/article/warsaws-eu-spat-stalls-german-polish-engine-poland-government-media-law/ (accessed 15 June 2016).

20 According to Ryszarda Formuszewicz, ‘Polish—German Relations: Good, Better, Sidelined’, IP Journal of the DGAP, 31 Jan. 2013, available from http://ip-journal.dgap.org.en/article/23234 (accessed 15 June 2016).

21 The film was funded by the Smolensk Foundation and is based on the so-called ‘Macierewicz investigation’ of the crash, which implies that Russia was directly involved in the crash. See Radio Poland, ‘Smolensk Film to Hit Cinemas in 2016?’, 20 Nov. 2015, available from http://www.thenews.pl/1/11/Artykul/229640,Smolensk-film-to-hit-cinemas-in-2016 (accessed 15 June 2016).

22 Jacek Lubecki, ‘Poland in Iraq: The Politics of the Decision’, The Polish Review 50/1 (2005), pp.69–92.

23 Jennifer A. Yoder, ‘From Amity to Enmity: German—Russian Relations in the Post Cold War Period’, German Politics and Society 33/115, No. 3 (Autumn 2015), pp.49–69.

24 Poland has watched closely as Lithuania embarks on a course away from Russian energy sources. It is moving away from Russian gas to Norwegian liquid natural gas and away from Russian energy-supplied electricity to a grid that will connect Lithuania to Sweden. In response, the Russian navy has entered Baltic waters, causing alarm in the region. See the New York Times, 10 June 2015, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/world/europe/intrusions-in-baltic-sea-show-a-russia-challenging-the-west.html (accessed 15 June 2016).

25 Agreement on the pipeline was reached and signed in 2005, to extend from Vilborg (in Leningrad province) to Greifswald, Germany. Sikorski made the Molotov—Ribbentrop Pipeline remark in 2010.

26 ‘Eastern European Countries Complain about Pipeline Deal’, Deutsche Welle, 27 Nov. 2015, available from http://www.dw.com/en/eastern-eu-countries-complain-about-pipeline-deal/a-18879865 (accessed 15 June 2016).

27 Ulrike Geurot and Konstanty Gebert, ‘Why Poland is the New France for Germany’, 17 Oct. 2012, available from http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/68895 (accessed 15 June 2016).

28 ‘The Poles on Polish—German Relations and Germany’s Role in Europe: Summary of the Report, Agnieszka Łada, Barometr Polska-Niemcy 2012. Polacy o roli Niemiec w Europie i stosunkach polsko-niemieckich’ (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2012), available from http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/filemanager/pdf/Mainconclussionswithpictures2.pdf (accessed 15 June 2016).

29 Andrzej Sakson, ‘The Ambivalent Imagine of Poland in Germany’, Institute for Western Affairs Poznań, Bulletin no 101, 16 Nov. 2012, available from http://www.iz.poznan.pl/news/537_101%20eng.pdf (accessed 15 June 2016).

30 Jacek Kucharczyk et al., ‘Politics and Everyday Life: A German View of Poland and Russia. Main Conclusions’, Institute of Public Affairs, n.d., available from http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/mainconclusions.pdf (accessed 15 June 2016).

31 Christina Hebel, ‘All in the Family: Chancellor Merkel’s Heritage Pleases Poles’, Spiegel Online, 15 March 2013, available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/all-in-the-family-poles-pleased-to-learn-of-polish-heritage-of-angela-merkel-a-889207.html (accessed 15 June 2016).

32 See the speech ‘Poland and the Future of the European Union’, delivered by Radesław Sikorski, Foreign Minister of Poland in Berlin on 28 Nov. 2011 (emphasis added), available from http://www.mfa.gov.pl/resource/33ce6061-ec12-4da1-a145-01e2995c6302:JCR (accessed 15 June 2016).

33 Andrzej Turkowski, ‘The Polish—German Tandem’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 17 Nov. 2011, available from http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa+46059 (accessed 15 June 2016); Guerot and Gebert, ‘Why Poland is the New France for Germany’; Judy Dempsey, ‘Why the German—Polish Rapprochment Matters for Europe’, Carnegie Europe Strategic Europe, 4 July 2013, available from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa+52300 (accessed 15 June 2016).

34 Geurot and Gebert, ‘Why Poland is the New France for Germany’.

35 For more on the evolution of the post-Cold War German policy towards Russia, see Yoder, ‘From Amity to Enmity’.

36 See ‘A New Vision for Europe’, New York Times, 18 Sept. 2012, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/opinion/a-new-vision-of-europe.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 June 2016).

37 Quoted in Turkowski, ‘The Polish-German Tandem’.

38 For more on Poland’s foreign and security policy, see Jan Cienski, ‘The Polish Tiger’, Foreign Policy, 27 May 2011, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/27/,the-polish-tiger/ (accessed 15 June 2016); Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Romania and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Douglas L. De Witt, ‘Polish Foreign and Security Policy: Dilemmas of Multinational Integration and Alliance Cohesion, 1989–2005’, Master’s Thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2005; and ‘Playground turned Player’, The Economist, 28 June 2014, available from http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21604688-poland-carries-new-clout-international-stage-playground-turned-player (accessed 15 June 2016).

39 Buras, The Polish—German Split.

40 Daniel Keohane, ‘Two Sides of Europe’s Defense Coin’, Carnegie Europe, 2 Nov. 2017, available from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74603 (accessed 5 Jan. 2018).

41 For more on the Eastern Partnership and Poland’s experience in ‘uploading’ its policy preferences to the European Union, see Karolina Pomorska, ‘Are We There Yet? From Adaptation to Europeanisation of Polish Foreign Policy’, Paper presented for the EUSA 12th Biennial International Conference, Boston, 3–5 March 2011. See also Andrea Gawrich and Maxim Stepanov, ‘German Foreign Policy toward the Visegrad Countries: Patterns of Integration in Central Europe’, DGAPanalyse, 17 Sept. 2014.

42 Beverly Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Dieter Dettke, Germany Says No: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009); John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Christian Schweiger, ‘The “Reluctant Hegemon”: Germany in the EU’s Post-Crisis Constellation’, in K.N. Demetriou (ed.), The European Union in Crisis (Cham: Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2015), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-08774-0.pdf (accessed 25 Jan. 2018).

43 ‘Warsaw: Polish Perceptions of German Foreign Policy’, European Council on Foreign Relations, available from http://www.ecfr.eu/events/event/warsaw_polish_perceptions_of_german_foreign_policy (accessed 15 June 2016).

44 Rick Lyman, ‘Poles Steel for Battle, Fearing Russia Will March on Them Next’, New York Times, 14 March 2015.

45 Pew Research Center, ‘NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid’, 10 June 2015, p.4.

46 Ibid., pp.10 and 18.

47 For the ‘Conclusions’ of the Review 2014, see German Foreign Ministry, available from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Review2014/Schlussfolgerungen_node.html (accessed 15 June 2016).

48 Jan Techau, ‘The Steinmeier Review of German Foreign Policy’, Blogpost at Carnegie Europe, 19 March 2015.

49 Lilia Shevtsova, ‘Humiliation as a Tool of Blackmail’, The American Interest, 2 June 2015, available from http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/02/humiliation-as-a-tool-of-blackmail/ (accessed 15 June 2016).

50 http://www.zeit.de/politik/2014-12/aufruf-russland-dialog; http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/gegen-aufruf-im-ukraine-konflikt-osteuropa-experten-sehen-russland-als-aggressor/11105530.html (accessed 15 June 2016).

51 De Witt (in ‘Polish Foreign and Security Policy’, p.12) notes that, ‘Those Poles that are interested in politics are more attuned to domestic developments and much less interested in the foreign policy of their government or the foreign policy votes of their adopted party’.

52 Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Kamil Frymark, ‘Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A Political or a Humanitarian Mission?’, OSW, Centre for Eastern Studies, 163, 18 Feb. 2015, p.3, available from http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_163.pdf (accessed 15 June 2016).

53 Ibid. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Frymark cite Wolfgang Ischinger in Internationale Politik 1 (Jan.—Feb. 2015).

54 Piotr Buras, ‘Has Germany Sidelined Poland in Ukraine Crisis Negotiations?’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Aug. 2014.

55 Lally Weymouth, ‘Talking with Poland’s Foreign Minister about the Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s Next Moves’, The Washington Post, 18 April 2014, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/talking-with-polands-foreign-minister-about-the-ukraine-crisis-and-russias-next-moves/2014/04/17/f1811e84-c5ad-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html?utm_term=.cc9b78ad46db (accessed 15 June 2016).

56 As a result of the Ukraine crisis, Germany suspended meetings at several levels with Russian counterparts. For example, the Petersburg Dialogue was cancelled in 2014, though it resumed the following year. Polish—Russian linkages were also severed and have been much slower to resume. For more on the Petersburg Dialogue, see Jennifer A. Yoder, ‘Dialogues, Trialogues, and Triangles: The Geometry of Germany’s Foreign Policy of Trust-Building’, German Politics, published online 1 Dec. 2016, available from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644008.2016.1250888 (accessed 25 Jan. 2018).

57 Judy Dempsey, ‘The EU’s Blindness about Eastern Europe’, Carnegie Europe, 28 May 2015, available from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=60229 (accessed 15 June 2016).

58 This point is made by Piotr Buras in his description of Poland’s process of de-Europeanisation, in ‘Europe and its Discontents: Poland’s Collision Course with the European Union’, European Council on Foreign relations, 7 Sept. 2017, available from http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR230_-_EUROPE_AND_ITS_DISCONTENTS_-_POLANDS_COLLISION_COURSE_WITH_THE_EU_.pdf (accessed 9 Jan. 2018).