A (New) East–West-Divide? Representative Democracy in Germany 30 Years after Unification

Abstract

Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the public and scientific debate about the state of unification has regained considerable momentum. The debate stresses in particular the persistent, returning, and even deepened East-West differences which refer to central elements and promises of representative democracy. However, it is a controversial and so far unanswered question whether and in which way this poses a challenge to the legitimacy and functioning of representative democracy in Germany. Therefore, this Special Issue focuses on the representative democracy by concentrating on its central dimensions, actors, and institutions (citizens, political parties and parliaments, and elites). The introduction outlines the three key questions which are addressed by the contributors regarding (1) to the status of unification in longitudinal and in cross-sectional perspective, (2) the causes and determinants for ongoing differences and divides between East and West, and (3) the implications for representative democracy in Germany. Moreover, it summarises the results of the contributions and discusses research desiterata for future research on the state of unification and representative democracy in Germany.

Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, public and academic debates about the state of unification have regained considerable momentum. In contrast to the conclusions drawn at previous anniversaries that identified both convergence and regional disparities between Eastern and Western Germany (e.g. Lang, Mushaben, and Wendler 2017; Croissant 2015; Holtmann 2020; Dalton and Weldon 2010; Thumfart 2007), the current debate stresses the persistent, returning, and even deepened differences and focuses on the state of representative democracy in East and West. The results of recent elections have re-ignited a discussion about a profoundly ‘divided’ voting behaviour between East and West. And in light of the remarkable success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the state elections in Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Saxony as well as at the federal election of 2021, it has been discussed whether the AfD has become a party that – alongside the LINKE – claims to be an advocate of East German regional identity and interests (e.g. Arzheimer 2021; Weisskirchner 2020; Klärner and Osigus 2021). Furthermore, in terms of political culture (and despite converging tendencies) there are still substantial differences in central political attitudes (e.g. Tausendpfund 2018; Pickel and Pickel 2020). Surveys also indicate a lower level of perceived responsiveness among East German citizens combined with lower levels of trust in government, parties, and politicians (e.g. Decker et al. 2019). Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been indications of East–West differences in political attitudes (Grande et al. 2021; Küppers and Reiser 2021) and protest against Covid containment policies (Plümper, Neumayer, and Pfaff 2021). In addition, East Germans are still not proportionately represented in Germany’s elites. This is increasingly perceived as a problem among East Germans and thus has also symbolic relevance (e.g. Bluhm and Jacobs 2016; Foroutan et al. 2019; Kollmorgen 2020a).

While there was intense research in the 1990s on the processes of transformation and the status of unification between East and West, the interest in this topic faded away in the 2000s and 2010s. However, in light of the current developments and indications of an ongoing and even intensified East–West-divide, the topic has regained academic and public awareness (e.g. Schweiger 2019; Weisskirchner 2020; BMI 2020; Kollmorgen 2015). This Special Issue argues that the current developments and persistent East–West differences regarding political attitudes, parties, and elites are highly relevant for representative democracy in unified Germany. In addition, the formerly divided Germany allows us to investigate how different political regimes, continuing differences between East and West, and the process of transformation all influence representative democracy today. We explore which factors explain persistency and change over time. In sum, this Special Issue takes stock of the state of unification and its implications for representative democracy thirty years after unification by focusing on three fundamental guiding questions:

The first guiding question is: What is the status of unification, both in longitudinal and in cross-sectional perspective? We examine how the central institutions and actors of representative democracy have developed from an East–West-perspective. In line with the literature, we focus on convergence, divergence, and persistent difference as the central longitudinal trends. In the 1990s, the dominant expectation regarding the transformation processes in politics, economy, and society was that there would be convergence of Eastern Germany towards Western Germany, East–West disparities would diminish, and thus Eastern Germany would rapidly become ‘modernised’ (e.g. Zapf 1994). In contrast, the second phase of transformation research also expected specific developments in Eastern Germany (e.g. Merkel 1994; Eisen and Wollmann 1996; Gabriel 1997; Falter, Gabriel, and Rattinger 2000).

The second question is: What are the causes and determinants of ongoing differences and divides between East and West? In recent research, East–West differences with regard to representative democracy are traced back to a ‘cumulation of dimensions’ (Miethe 2019; see also Weisskirchner 2020; Pickel and Pickel 2020). In particular, two dimensions are interconnected and perceived as crucial for representative democracy. A socio-economic dimension alludes to structural inequality in society and unequal living conditions in East and West, such as the ongoing differences in income, pensions, tax revenues, wealth, as well as the specific impact of migration and demographic change in Eastern German (rural) regions (BMWi 2021). Recently, these topics have been addressed more critically, e.g. in the media, by regional politicians, and in demonstrations. However, the empirical figures, which reflect persistent differences (BMWi 2021, 56–57), continue to be obscured by the ‘pan-German myth of meritocracy’ (Miethe 2019, 49), focusing attention on the current status as a benchmark between East and West and pushing the profound transformation processes and their effects on the economy and society in Eastern Germany out of the limelight. According to Foroutan et al. (2019), this focus on actual figures reveals a persistent Western German ignorance of problems and sensitivities in the East, which Miethe (2019) describes as a Western German ‘dominance culture’. Therefore, this cultural dimension seems particularly important in the context of research into the causes of persistent, or even intensifying, signs of East–West German divergence.

It is worth emphasising that when referring to the cultural dimension, reference is not only made to differences in socialisation between citizens in Eastern and Western Germany. In fact, as expected, these seem to be gradual blurring, especially in the generation born after 1990, 30 years after unification (Conradt 2015). But reference can and should also be made to actual cognition and feelings. In fact, today, more than half of East Germans have feelings of collective deprivation and marginalisation which is also reflected in perceptions of East Germans as ‘second-class citizens’ (Kollmorgen 2015; Miethe 2019, 61; Pickel and Pickel 2020; Reiser et al. 2018; Weisskirchner 2020).

The third guiding question is: What are the implications of the potential East–West-divide for representative democracy in Germany? While the current developments appear to support a prominent and in some aspects even increasing East–West divide, it is controversial and a so far unanswered question as to whether and in which way this poses a severe challenge to the legitimacy and functioning of representative democracy in Germany (e.g. Giebler, Horvath, and Weßels 2020; Pickel and Pickel 2020). This question is of highest relevance for German democracy since the exemplified differences refer to the central elements and promises of representative democracy.

These three guiding questions will be analysed empirically by focusing on the central actors and institutions of representative democracy, namely, the citizens as the central legitimising actors, political parties (namely those represented in the Bundestag and the Länder parliaments) as intermediaries in the core democratic institutions, and elites as representatives in different spheres of society (politics, economy, culture, etc.). In the following, we briefly integrate the different perspectives of the authors and link them to current debates on democracy and German unification in order to draw a holistic picture on the status of representative democracy in Germany 30 years after unification.

Looking at Representative Democracy in East and West Germany from three Perspectives

The first section of this Special Issue focuses on the citizens as central actors in representative democracy. Since German unification implied unifying two different political cultures with different political traditions and histories, inner unity and ‘the wall in people’s head’ were widely discussed topics in the 1990s. In particular, political culture research analysed intensively the beliefs and attitudes of citizens towards democracy and its institutions (e.g. Dalton and Weldon 2010; Pickel and Pickel 2020; Conradt 2015; Campbell 2012). Since congruence between political structure and political culture is seen as essential for political stability (Almond and Verba 1963), a democratic political culture had been perceived as central to the democratic system (Conradt 2015).

Political culture research in Germany revealed both convergence in central beliefs and attitudes, such as abstract support for the principal idea of democracy, but also difference and divergence, e.g. regarding trust in institutions and political support (e.g. Dalton and Weldon 2010; Gabriel 1997). In order to explain these differences three approaches have been applied.

The socialisation hypothesis assumes that differences in the political attitudes and beliefs between East and West would disappear due to processes of political socialisation and generational change (Fuchs, Roller, and Weßels 1997; Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck 2002; Conradt 2015; Dalton and Weldon 2010). The situation hypothesis refers to the importance of economic and structural conditions for political attitudes (e.g. Pollack 1997, 2000). It was expected that as a result of worse conditions in Eastern Germany differences in political attitudes would be persistent. The third approach, which gained relevance over recent years, stresses the role of Eastern identity and feelings of collective deprivation for continuing differences (Holtmann 2020; Pollack 2000; Pickel and Pickel 2020; Reiser et al. 2018; Kollmorgen 2015).

While political attitudes and beliefs were intensively researched in the period of transition, the interest in political culture declined during the subsequent periods and only recently regained popularity. The two contributions in this section build on this research by taking up a longitudinal perspective and by adding new perspectives to the research.

Susanne Pickel and Gert Pickel focus on the long-term development of political culture and its determinants in Eastern and Western Germany. They show that while key political attitudes have converged between Western and Eastern Germany differences in satisfaction with democracy continue to be significantly lower in Eastern Germany. In light of these persistent differences, they test four different explanatory approaches. Next to the socialisation and situation hypotheses they also refer to the identity thesis and cultural deprivation as explanations. Their analysis reveals that socioeconomic and socio-structural inequalities between Eastern and Western Germany cannot explain the persistent lower level of support. Instead, cultural-identity feelings such as the perception of disadvantages as East Germans, feelings of relative deprivation, and a lack of recognition contribute to this lower level of support for the current political system. They argue that these feelings, however, arise from negative experiences and objective disadvantages of East Germans during the period of transformation until today, which serve as proof that feelings of collective disadvantage are justified.

Daniela Braun and Eva-Maria Trüdinger examine political trust as one central element of political culture and a central precondition for the functioning of representative democracy. The longitudinal analysis of the degree of political trust from 2002 to 2018 confirms previous findings (e.g. Denters, Gabriel, and Torcal 2007) that despite some convergence over time, East Germans still display lower levels of trust in democratic institutions. Similar to Pickel and Pickel’s results, the East–West differences have not converged but are still as prevalent as in earlier years. However, Braun and Trüdinger also investigate the quality of political trust between citizens and democratic institutions and their social and psychological foundations. In contrast to the level of trust, interestingly, they do not find an East–West-divide regarding the quality of political trust. In particular, the foundations of political trust are very similar, since social trust is equally important for Eastern and Western German citizens. In addition, they show that political trust is influenced to a similar degree by social trust and government performance in West and East.

The second section of the Special Issue focuses on the central role of political parties as central actors in representative democracy. While the focus of research in the first ten to 15 years after unification was initially on the question of convergence in voting behaviour and party structures in Eastern Germany towards the characteristics known for Western Germany (Niedermayer 2018; Reiser and Holtmann 2006), more recent research has broadened the analysis. Research regarding voting behaviour and political parties analyses, among other things, to what extent differences in the socialisation of citizens in Eastern and Western Germany are (still) decisive (Abedi 2017; Pesthy, Mader, and Schoen 2021). Other aspects examined are to what extent an entrenched perception of deprivation is explanatory, especially in Eastern Germany (Brachert, Holtmann, and Jaeck 2020; Weisskirchner 2020) and what role external influences such as the regional (Arzheimer 2016; Abedi 2017), individual, and group-related consequences of globalisation play in reinforcing the differences in voting behaviour (Arzheimer 2016; Brachert, Holtmann, and Jaeck 2020).

Following from these observations, it has been argued that an all-German party system has not (yet) emerged even 30 years after unification (e.g. Niedermayer 2018). Rather, the party systems continue to be characterised by persistent differences, whereby the Eastern German (regional) party system today is marked by a higher degree of polarisation and greater electoral success of DIE LINKE and the AfD. In this context, an ‘asymmetric’ convergence (Abedi 2017) has been noted, since the party alignment of voters in Western and Eastern Germany has been steadily converging since unification. While former or long-standing voter ties to certain political parties are increasingly dissolving in Western Germany, such ties are gradually solidifying in Eastern Germany, namely to more radical or extreme parties such as DIE LINKE and the AfD (Abedi 2017, 470; Yoder 2020), the latter now representing a large parliamentary group in the Bundestag.

The three articles in this section of the Special Issue take up these current debates and complement them by focusing on voter polarisation, on party system change in Eastern and Western Germany, and on the role of party behaviour in the German Bundestag.

Based on the widespread finding in the literature of a regionally different polarisation of the party landscape in Eastern and Western Germany (cf. Niedermayer 2018; Arzheimer 2016; Abedi 2017), Jörg Hebenstreit asks whether the electorate is becoming increasingly polarised and whether this development is particularly pronounced in Eastern Germany. The author takes an innovative methodological approach to measure voter polarisation and ideological preferences; he employs both voters’ self-assessment on the right-left scale, and policy items connected with the GAL-TAN dimension. Based on this approach, contrary to the widespread assumptions in the literature, Hebenstreit cannot find manifest differences of East and West voters’ attitudes. Instead, the results indicate convergence between East and West and a tendency towards an ideological unification of the German electorate.

Aiko Wagner tackles the question of convergence at the level of the party systems in East and West since 1990. Based on macro- and micro analyses, the author reveals that there is change, but that this change is very different in Eastern and Western Germany. The contribution argues that temporal development must be taken into account when considering the party system in different dimensions (fragmentation, volatility, swing voters, voter turnout, polarisation). Wagner shows empirically a differentiated picture: In the first decade after unification, a trend towards convergence and parallel institutionalisation could indeed be observed. However, during the last 20 years, parallel developments of dealignment and partial party system de-institutionalisation took place in Eastern and Western Germany. While the author finds more convergence than divergence, the results also point to entrenched differences, for example, in the party preferences of voters and the vote shares of the specific parties in East and West. According to Wagner, the decreased stability of the German party system implies a need for further research on the consequences for the legitimacy of representative democracy in Germany.

Michael Koß scrutinises the impact of reunification on the Bundestag as the central representative institution. He shows that the Bundestag continued its path-dependent development as a working legislature after 1990. By focusing in particular on the role of parties’ behaviour, he analyses parties’ control of the legislative agenda and their willingness to obstruct this agenda. While all parties including DIE LINKE have abstained from exploiting procedural loopholes, the AfD is the first party in the Bundestag to obstruct systematically legislative business for its own purposes. Taking up a historical institutionalist perspective, Koß argues that, even if this behaviour so far only has led to a path-dependent procedural reform, it produces a threat to legislative democracy in the German parliament.

The topic of the third section is elites in representative democracy. Following unification, Eastern Germany witnessed an elite change which was more radical and intense than in other post-communist states (Salheiser 2012; Kollmorgen 2020b). Putnam (1976) has argued that elite integration is central to political stability, effectiveness, and the functioning of democracy. Since the political attitudes and socialisation of the new post-communist elites differed significantly from West German elites, the structural and normative integration of the elites had been seen as challenge for democratic transformation (Higley and Burton 2006; Bürklin and Rebenstorf 1997). However, research revealed rather fast processes of convergence with regard to normative integration (e.g. common basic values, and political attitudes towards democracy; see Best, Jahr, and Vogel 2011), structural integration (e.g. social background and career patterns; see Ohmura et al. 2018; Hartmann 2013), and legislative behaviour (Schöne 1999; Patzelt 2000; Rohrschneider 1996; Davidson-Schmich 2006). Despite some (persistent) differences in attitudes and career patterns between East and West (Vogel 2018), the prevalence of a unified elite in Germany (Hoffmann-Lange 2001, 206) has been depicted.

A second topic within the 1990s debate was the massive elite import of West Germans into leadership positions in different sectors in Eastern Germany (Welzel 1997; Derlien 1997). Since East Germans remain strongly underrepresented in elite positions, the topic has received renewed significance and scientific awareness (Bluhm and Jacobs 2016; Coffé and Reiser 2018; Kollmorgen 2020b; Vogel and Zajak 2020). This underrepresentation is increasingly seen as an indication of the marginalisation of East Germans, and used as a narrative for the perceived collective deprivation of East Germans (Kollmorgen 2015). However, little is known yet regarding the mechanisms explaining the persistent underrepresentation of East Germans in the elites and the impact on representative democracy. The three articles in this section contribute to this debate by focusing on these mechanisms and implications from different perspectives:

The contribution by Melanie Kintz analyses the descriptive representation of East Germans in leadership positions in the German Bundestag in a longitudinal perspective from 1994 to 2013. Although the political sector tends to be the most accessible for East Germans, Kintz shows that they remain – with the exception of DIE LINKE who continues to strongly represent East Germans in their leadership positions – underrepresented in parliamentary leadership positions. The analysis based on different explanatory approaches shows that functional arguments such as a lack of necessary qualifications cannot explain underrepresentation due to a convergence of social background, qualifications, and career paths of MPs from East and West Germany. In contrast, both a low supply of East Germans in the Bundestag and the existence of a bias towards the recruitment of East Germans leads to their underrepresentation in leadership positions. Based on these findings Kintz argues that the continuing underrepresentation poses a challenge to substantive representation and the legitimacy of representative democracy in Germany.

Sylvia Veit looks at the long-term effects of the elite transfer from West to East in the 1990s by focusing on the administrative elites at the regional level. This is of particular importance since the public sector has been a field of very high Western German elite imports. The longitudinal analysis (2000–19) reveals a persistent underrepresentation despite a clear increase of the share of East Germans during the two decades analysed. In line with previous findings and also with the analysis of Melanie Kintz for the political sector, social background, career paths, and party politicisation have increasingly adapted to Western German patterns. Therefore, Sylvia Veit argues that the persistent underrepresentation of East Germans cannot be justified by a lack of qualifications and functional considerations. Instead, she suggests that these long-term effects of elite import can be explained by the domination of West Germans in administrative elite networks in Western and Eastern Germany.

While both Melanie Kintz and Sylvia Veit focus in their articles on explanations for underrepresentation, Lars Vogel explores the consequences of underrepresentation for representative democracy. In particular, the contribution asks whether citizens’ perception and evaluation of the descriptive underrepresentation influences political support for regime and institutions. Based on a new representative survey, it shows that the clear majority of the citizens in East and West perceive underrepresentation of East Germans and evaluate it negatively. A survey experiment reveals that the main linkage between the perception of underrepresentation and political support are concerns about a lack of legitimacy and increased feelings of deprivation. The article thus also contributes to the research on political culture by showing how perceptions of descriptive underrepresentation and collective deprivation contribute to the lower levels of political support for democracy in Eastern Germany.

Convergence, Divergence, Stalemate? Representative Democracy in Germany 30 Years after Unification

What implications do the central findings of the contributions have for representative democracy in Germany? What is the status of unification and what are the main explanations for persistent differences? Is the perspective on East and West still relevant 30 years after unification, in particular in relation to other perspectives and challenges to democracy? And what are new conceptual and empirical questions for the research on the status of unification?

In terms of the first question on the current status of unification, all contributions confirm previous findings that there have been convergent developments between Eastern and Western Germany over the past 30 years. In line with previous research, the analyses (e.g. the contributions of Pickel and Pickel, Braun and Trüdinger, Kintz, and Veit) also show that convergence has not occurred as quickly as originally expected and that it was not necessarily one-directional. However, the current long-term analyses show that some persistent differences between East and West are still as prevalent as in earlier years or even have recently diverged: Attitudes among citizens in Eastern and Western Germany still differ significantly with regard to satisfaction with democracy, political support, and trust (see contributions of Pickel and Pickel, Braun and Trüdinger, and Vogel), which are important indicators for the legitimacy of the democratic system. This applies also to the different – and currently even diverging – voting behaviour in East and West and to the persistent underrepresentation of East Germans in the elites (see contributions of Wagner, Kintz, Veit, and Vogel).

With regard to the second question most authors argue in line with the current literature that persistent differences are not solely or primarily factual (e.g. material, economic, social) in nature. Instead, they point to the ‘cumulation of dimensions’ (Miethe 2019). Several contributions refer to the importance of the cultural dimension and in particular, the widespread feelings of collective deprivation as East Germans and of perceptions of belittlement in Eastern Germany to understand current debates and developments (see contributions of Pickel and Pickel, Braun and Trüdinger, Kintz, Veit, and Vogel).

The multidimensional focus of the Special Issue gives new insights into this cumulation, the causal mechanisms, and links between the different facets of and challenges for representative democracy: The contributions of Pickel and Pickel and of Braun and Trüdinger on political culture show that the lower satisfaction with democracy in Eastern Germany can be explained by feelings of collective disadvantage which arise from negative experiences and objective disadvantages of East Germans. This corresponds with the results of the three articles on elites (see contributions of Kintz, Veit, and Vogel) which find that the persistent underrepresentation of East Germans in elite positions cannot be explained by functional arguments but rather by long-term effects of elite transfer, a ‘bias against East Germans in the recruitment’ (Kintz) and the Western dominance in ‘elite networks’ (Veit). The perception of underrepresentation in turn, as Vogel demonstrates, decreases political support, and hence helps to explain persistent differences in political culture. In addition, feelings of disadvantages have been picked up by DIE LINKE and the AfD which claim to be advocates of Eastern German regional interests. This contributes not only to the explanation of East–West differences in voting behaviour and regional party systems (see the contributions by Hebenstreit, and Wagner), but can also be reinforced against the backdrop of party-political instrumentalisation (especially by the AfD) as Koß shows at the example of the German Bundestag.

Overall, the contributions show that East–West continues to be an important category for the study of democracy in Germany. At the same time, however, the articles also point to other influences and challenges for representative democracy: On the one side, there are processes of globalisation, European integration, and integration which influence representative democracy (see the contribution of Hebenstreit, see also Lang, Mushaben, and Wendler 2017). On the other side, we see challenges of representative democracies in many Western countries, such as the rise of illiberal and populist parties and increasing political polarisation (see the contribution of Wagner, see also Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017) and the weakening of democratic institutions by political actors (see the contribution of Koß, see also Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019). Other challenges include increasing political polarisation (Carothers and O'Donohue 2019) as well as declining public trust in political leaders and democratic institutions (Algan et al. 2017). As the contributions reveal, the East–West dimension is partly overlaid and influenced by these general challenges and developments.

What do these results mean for representative democracy in Germany 30 years after unification? What insights does this Special Issue provide with regard to this third question? Overall, based on their analyses on citizens, parties, and elites, the authors of this Special Issue do not see the East–West-differences as a fundamental threat to the stability, effectiveness and legitimacy of the representative democracy (cf. for example contributions of Pickel and Pickel, Braun and Trüdinger, Wagner, Kintz, and Veit). And indeed, differences between regions are not per se problematic. In particular, Germany as a federal state is characterised by regional diversity and different regional identities which are also perceived as an important facet of German democracy. However, at the same time, the German constitution formulates in article 72 the obligation for equivalent living conditions in Germany, hence also in East and West.

From this perspective, the persistent socio-economic East–West differences in combination with (perceived) cultural differences – in particular the persistent feelings of collective deprivation in Eastern Germany – are, as several authors of this Special Issue argue, a (potential) challenge for representative democracy since they might impact the legitimacy of the political system (Easton 1965; Lipset 1960). The challenge for representative democracy seems to be increased when certain actors, e.g. extreme parties like the AfD, try to exploit these perceptions for their own purposes (see the contribution of Koß).

Next to these challenges to representative democracy, the contributions also reveal that there is a need for conceptual reflections on the categories of East and West. 30 years after unification, both public discourse and empirical research still refer mainly to the two categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’. While in the first period after unification, the definition of East and West German has been quite clear-cut, these categories are getting increasingly blurred and difficult to define. This can be derived from the contributions to the Special Issue as an overarching cognition which is e.g. reflected in different reference points and operationalisations discussed and used in this Special Issue:

The first reference point is the region. While the region as a geographical area is straightforward used for the analysis of institutions, regional party systems, and elections (see the contribution of Wagner), it is more heterogeneous in relation to citizens: While some use the current place of residence (e.g. the contribution of Hebenstreit), others refer to East Germans according to the place of birth (e.g. the article by Vogel). The second definition refers to the background. In particular, place of birth and primary socialisation have been used as an indicator for being East German within elite research. For instance, Kollmorgen (2015) defines all persons as East Germans who have been born in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) before 1976 and have been socialised there until 1989. This perspective is based on the assumption that (early) socialisation is central to the development of attitudes and values which are rather stable afterwards despite social and geographical mobility (Gebauer, Salheiser, and Vogel 2018). However, since members of the elites are increasingly born also after 1976, others (see the contributions of Kintz, and Veit in this Special Issue, see also Bluhm and Jacobs 2016; Kollmorgen 2015) have extended the definition to all who are born in the GDR or in the Eastern Länder of unified Germany and have been socialised in an ‘East German’ context, e.g. by their parents as the main socialising agents. Accordingly, it has been argued that East German experiences and identifications can be handed down in families and by agents of socialisation even without living directly in Eastern Germany (Lettrari, Nestler, and Troi-Boeck 2016; Matthäus and Kubiak 2016). Hence, the definition refers to an East German background, which might not be directly linked to the place of socialisation and/or place of living. This definition implies that people who moved to Western Germany after 1990 are still considered as East German even though they might have lived the majority of their lives in Western Germany – and vice versa.

The third type of definition refers to the identity as East Germans (e.g. Kubiak 2018). While it has been argued that there has been no East German identity before 1989/90, there are indications for a formation of an East German identity during and after the process of transformation (Ganzenmüller 2020; Conradt 2015). Hence, the defining criteria is whether people identify themselves as East Germans. According to current studies, a significant share of persons articulates an East German identity (e.g. Gabriel et al. 2015; Vogel and Zajak 2020; BMI 2020). This share has not decreased in reach and intensity during the last decades and shows that the group of people having an East German identity is not restricted to those having lived experiences in the GDR and personal experiences in the process of transformation, respectively (Kaase and Bauer-Kaase 1998). Recent studies reveal that also younger people feel strongly attached to Eastern Germany. The formation of an East German identity is seen as a reaction to experienced discrimination due to their East German-ness and experiences of collective deprivation (Foroutan and Kubiak 2018; Holtmann 2020; Pickel and Pollack 1998; Engler and Hensel 2018; Kubiak 2018; Kollmorgen and Hans 2011).

These different approaches and definitions based on region, origin, and identity pose a challenge for both conceptual clarification and empirical research. While it can be argued that there is a large overlap between those living currently in Eastern Germany, those being born and socialised in the GDR, and those feeling attached to Eastern Germany (see also the contribution of Vogel), there is an increasing group of people who do not fit in this dichotomy of East and West: An increasing part of people living in Eastern Germany has not lived in the GDR and has not experienced the transformation. Other have been socialised both in the GDR and in unified Germany (‘Wendekinder’ or ‘Third Generation Ost’, see Lettrari, Nestler, and Troi-Boeck 2016). In addition, there is an increasing part of the population who have personal experiences in both East and West (Statistisches Bundesamt 2020). This includes those who were born and socialised in Eastern Germany but migrated to the West during the last three decades, and also those who moved to Eastern Germany during the last three decades, e.g. as a result of the elite import right after unification, but also in order to study and work there. According to the Federal Office of Statistics’ data, between 1991 and 2019, almost 3,900,000 people moved from Eastern to Western Germany, and just over 2,600,000 moved from Western to Eastern Germany (see Tagesschau 2021). In order to capture their specific experiences and backgrounds, some use hybrid terms such as ‘Wossi’ by combining ‘Wessi’ (West German) and ‘Ossi’ (East German).

Overall, in light of the developments during the last three decades it cannot be expected that East–West differences will just disappear as a result of generational change as it had been expected in the 1990s. This points to a continuing importance of the East–West dimension in German democracy. At the same time, it also must be argued that 30 years after unification the clear-cut dichotomy between the categories of East and West is becoming increasingly inappropriate and not able to capture the dynamics and status of unification. Therefore – and this can be understood as a research desideratum of this Special Issue – it seems reasonable to integrate more systematically those who were born after reunification and those who have personal experiences and connections to both regions in the future investigation of possible effects of a (potential) East–West divide on representative democracy in Germany.

Even though the East–West-perspective is expected to continue to be relevant for representative democracy in Germany, a second research desideratum is to take up a more regionalised perspective. It has been stressed (Pickel 2011; Mannewitz 2015) that the sole focus on East–West might conceal existing regional differences and heterogeneities. For instance, Pickel (2011, 388) has argued that aggregated attitudinal differences between Eastern and Western Germany might also be artefacts. Instead, the differences might (also) be traced back to North–South differences, social-structural or regional differences. Hence, there are indications that East–West comparisons are under complex and do not allow to capture both a heterogeneous Eastern and a heterogeneous Western Germany (Mannewitz 2015). Thus, future research should shift the perspective from a sole interregional comparison between East and West to more differentiated (intra-)regional comparisons. This would allow to better understand (potential) divides between East and West but could also open new avenues in the analysis of challenges for representative democracy in the federal system of Germany.

Acknowledgment

This Special Issue presents the outcome of the conference 'Democracy in Germany 30 Years after Unification', organized by the Research Groups ‚Regierungssystem und Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland‘, ‚Policy-Analyse und Verwaltungswissenschaft‘ and ‚Lokale Politikforschung‘ of the DVPW (German Political Science Association) at the University of Jena in 2020. We would like to thank all participants of this conference, the editors of German Politics, and the reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marion Reiser

Marion Reiser is a professor of political science at the University of Jena (Germany), and holds a PhD (University of Goettingen) and a Habilitation (University of Frankfurt) in political science. She was previously a professor at the University of Lüneburg, and held positions at the universities of Frankfurt, Hamburg and Halle (Saale). Her research interests cover political parties, elites, representation and subnational politics.

Renate Reiter

Renate Reiter is a senior fellow at the Chair of Political Science III: Policy Analysis and Environmental Policy at the FernUniversität of Hagen (Germany) where she leads the research projects MIGEP and KommZuEU. She holds a PhD (University of Osnabrück) in political science. She was previously a substitute professor at the University of Leipzig, and held positions at the Freie Universität Berlin and the University of Potsdam. Her research interests cover public policy and administration, welfare state institutions and subnational politics.