German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative

ABSTRACT

Ever since the beginning of the European integration process, Germany’s role within the EU has been a contentious topic in political and intellectual debate. Following German unification, this has been further exacerbated by various crises. On the one hand, many have expressed concerns about power politics aimed at establishing a ‘German Europe’ or a ‘European Germany’, as Thomas Mann declared in 1953. On the other hand, voices across Europe have criticised Germany for its lack of more forceful power politics. At the same time, German leaders have repeatedly pledged to assume greater responsibility after being accused of showing insufficient commitment, no doubt borne out of pacifist sentiments, reflecting the dark shadow of Germany’s history. In this paper, we examine not only how the coalition government under Chancellor Olaf Scholz that came into office in 2021 has articulated a tacit and increasingly explicit claim for leadership, but also how the Chancellor has transformed his narrative in line with the ‘Zeitenwende’ following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We argue that the key to understanding Germany as a driving force is its remarkable shift from a federalist narrative to an adapted geopolitical, security-driven master narrative covering a broad set of policy fields.

Introduction: Germany’s claim for leadership

Ever since the European integration process began and even more so following German unification and confrontation with different crises, the Federal Republic of Germany’s role in international politics has been highly controversial. Germany has been described inter alia as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ (Bulmer and Paterson 2013), ‘alleged hegemon’ (Schoeller and Falkner 2022), a ‘status quo power’ (Becker 2022) and prior to that ‘Europe’s central power’ (Wallace 1995) or ‘Zentralmacht’ (Schwarz 1994). In relation to its weak military endowment, the expression soft ‘civilian power’ (Maull 1992) has also been used.

In recent years a chorus of voices across Europe has increasingly criticised the lack of a more forceful power policy in light of numerous crises faced by the EU. Responding to accusations of weak engagement driven by pacifist attitudes, German leaders have again and again promised to demonstrate more responsibility. Reflecting on the ‘change of eras’ (Epochenbruch), German Federal President Steinmeier declared that ‘leadership is expected from us, leadership in the interest of Europe’ (2022). Referencing extensive literature covering this issue (Schild 2020; Van Esch 2017), we ask how the tacit and increasingly explicit claim for leadership was articulated in the form of (different) narratives by the emerging new government coalition in autumn 2021 and how it changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine with the Zeitenwende, as expressed by Chancellor Scholz in his government declaration (Scholz 2022c) and subsequent speeches.

The coalition agreement of autumn 2021 which emphasised that ‘as the largest member state we will exercise our specific responsibility in a serving understanding for the EU as a whole’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 130) acts as our comparative yardstick. We then examine in detail how the leadership narrative outlined in this coalition agreement evolved in subsequent expressions by Chancellor Scholz following the proclaimed Zeitenwende. This features different governmental declarations by Olaf Scholz proclaiming the Zeitenwende and particularly his key August 2022 speech in Prague (Scholz 2022d). This was considered extremely pertinent in that it offered a design for the basic principles of German European policies perhaps as a belated answer to Macron’s 2017 Sorbonne speech.

It is argued that the vision of Chancellor Scholz concerning Germany’s role and ambitions for the EU is of specific relevance here. We observe a remarkable shift from a normative, federalist narrative to a geopolitical, security-driven master narrative encompassing a broad set of policy fields. In terms of strategy for the construction of Europe we observe a change from federalist pronouncements in the spirit of Spinelli during autumn 2021 (coalition agreement) to a ‘forms follows function’ (Scholz 2022d) strategy driven by problem-solving instincts in the spirit of Monnet.

To illuminate the changes from 2021, while not neglecting some elements of continuity, this article analyses the Zeitenwende and its entanglement with relevant narratives caused by a geopolitically driven change of views. As mentioned earlier, the coalition agreement from 2021 is taken as our comparative yardstick.

German Leadership: Conceptual Approaches and German Particularities

As Angela Merkel concluded her 16-year tenure as German Chancellor in the autumn of 2021, a new coalition emerged which committed to governing as a ‘progress coalition’, in line with the 2021 agreement (Koalitionsvertrag 2021). The incoming Chancellor Olaf Scholz had served as finance minister in the previous government coalition under Angela Merkel. Thus, Scholz’s familiarity extended not only to the German public, but also to European partners.

Although Angela Merkel had always shied away from openly proclaiming her ‘leadership’, leadership expectations on Germany from European partners have increased in the last decade. This happened for a variety of reasons; Germany’s economic strength; the crisis-management functions of the European Council paired with Angela Merkel as a political leader; and the ‘rumbling’ Franco-German engine (Beichelt and Bulmer 2020, 106). Despite these calls, Germany has been characterised as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ in the past (Bulmer and Paterson 2013).

Looking back to the performance of Chancellor Kohl and later Chancellor Merkel, such a claim might be justified if we glance at German actions that inspired certain historic EU decisions, for instance on the European Stability Mechanism in the Euro crisis as well as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Germany’s international engagement was met with mixed reactions. In particular, the way that Germany handled both the Euro and refugee crises generated significant opposition in Southern and Eastern member states (Beichelt and Bulmer 2020, 108). The explicitly stated leadership claims within the 2021 coalition agreement and subsequent political statements by Chancellor Olaf Scholz thus might mark a distinct empirical shift into a new era where leadership assertions are openly articulated.

Leadership, defined as ‘an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behaviour of others toward a certain goal over a certain period of time’ (Underdal 1994, 178), involves the use of power without enforcing individual goals on other actors as a hegemon would. Consequently, leadership needs to be understood as ‘a collective and reciprocal interaction among (multiple) leaders and their followers’ (Müller and Van Esch 2020). Only if actors see the historical necessity or even compulsion, will they take action (Schneider 1977). As a result, leadership is deemed successful if the leader can help to ‘create and achieve shared goals’ (Nye 2008, 55), which clearly requires careful consideration of the demands and offers necessary to find agreement on this basis. Leaders need to offer their partners certain useful resources to deal with challenges on the agenda, namely by investing in a common good. In the EU, budgetary offers have often been a major stimulant in steering the EU forward – or at least out of a crisis, as exemplified by the Macron/Merkel initiative in May 2020 to deal with the socio-economic problems of the Covid-19 pandemic (Wessels, Schramm, and Kunstein 2022).

Leaders need to win their partners’ respect. At the same time followers must accept guidance, including hard and soft forms of agenda setting as well as package deals which must not generate any feelings of being dominated. The German-French leadership pairings of Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand as well as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron have apparently made history-making decisions that fulfilled these kinds of role expectations. The Franco-German duo also proved its leadership in the post-Brexit EU (Krotz and Schramm 2021). Thus, the German narrative on its leadership role depends to a considerable extent on its French partner (Schild 2013).

Alternatively, leadership can draw its legitimacy from the ‘power of ideas’ (Schild 2020, 1076). Previous works have scrutinised the distinct ‘vision’ held by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl regarding the European Monetary Union (Dyson 1998) and have characterised Angela Merkel as a ‘conviction leader’ (Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2019). Van Esch identifies ‘the ideological bond between leaders and followers’ as one of four vectors from ‘legitimate leadership’ (Van Esch 2017). The vector works upon ‘visions of utopia’, meaning that the leader has great mobilising power by crafting aspirational stories (Van Esch 2017). This ideational power comes along with the strategy of persuasion and successful promotion of arguments (Müller and Van Esch 2020, 1062; Schild 2020).

However, narrating ideas can imply hegemonic traits. The concept of hegemony, as outlined by Gramsci (1971), revolves around an ability to shape consensus, the achievement of which calls for presentation of the hegemon’s interests as being aligned with those of the larger community. The notion of a ‘master narrative’ implies that history is crafted by hegemonic power (Gramsci 1971). In contrast to leadership, hegemony thus implies a stronger focus on the implementation of the hegemon’s interests. This process establishes shared perceptions of social order, emphasising the performative nature of master narratives. Any success in guiding narratives is dependent on real-world implementation, which is dependent on the situational context.

As shown above, research has extensively addressed German leadership and its hegemonic traits. We adopt a distinctive perspective by analysing Germany’s self-ascriptive leadership claims and resultant style, employing narrative analysis (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013) as our methodological framework.

Strategic Narratives and Leadership Claims

Examining Germany’s self-ascriptive leadership claims, as reflected in the coalition agreement and various articulations by Chancellor Scholz, is essential given the ongoing debate surrounding German hegemony and the requests and claims for leadership. Hence, our analysis aims to assess the leadership claims made before and after the Zeitenwende, rather than to evaluate Germany’s overall leadership performance. Our methodological approach of narrative analysis offers insights into how Germany, personified by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, constructs leadership claims within a context of the Zeitenwende. Finally, leadership narratives reveal what goals the Chancellor is pursuing for the EU and what role Germany should play in shaping the Union’s development.

Politicians and decision-makers use strategic narratives to weave together different factors, aiming to create a sense of reality (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 2). Narratives follow a temporal structure (past-present-future) and a sense-making structure (the plot) which establishes causal links. Consequently, narratives do not tell the whole story, but are based on a ‘perception pattern’ (Schneider 1977, 20ff.). They mirror a selective part of the general discourse which combines specific elements to transpose a reading of what is happening, why it happened and what will result from it. Actors use selected parts of history to argue for a specific behaviour or line of action (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 5f.).

In international relations, narratives provide insight into the various structures between different actors. Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) divide strategic narratives into three forms which might empirically overlap:

• – system narratives establish the framework for a state, elucidating the significance of each actor, whilst detailing their roles and characteristics (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 177). These narratives make large claims about the international system’s structure and how to move within it.

• – identity narratives focus on the character and identity of individual actors.

• – policy or issue narratives emphasise particular policy domains such as energy and the economy. Political actors employ these narratives strategically not only to ‘legitimize preferred policies’ (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013), but also to tell us how they aim to increase their influence and manage their followers’ expectations (Hertner and Miskimmon 2015).

Successful narratives often exhibit constructive ambiguity and internal tensions, allowing for flexible adoption over time and across different issues (Gadinger, Jarzebski, and Yildiz 2014, 9f.). In the process of communication, agents exercise their powers of interpretation. Consequently, narratives, which are shaped and disseminated by political actors, determine the political space of action. Fictionality is also crucial for the longevity of a narrative, as its constructive ambiguity enables compatibility with various viewpoints and enhances its persuasive power (Gadinger, Jarzebski, and Yildiz 2014). The Zeitenwende-leadership narrative strategically designates 24 February 2022, the day Russia invaded Ukraine, as a pivotal date which fundamentally reshaped the course of events. As a result, subsequent actions, such as notions of peace and power, are understood and interpreted in relation to this turning point.

We use narrative analysis to study the leadership claims comparing the coalition agreement with different speeches by Olaf Scholz. We understand leadership claims as stemming from European partners’ increasing calls for leadership and build our analytical framework based on a structured template of plot, problem definition and political objectives to organise the narratives. These components are contextualised with additional secondary literature on Germany’s self-understanding and historical decisions. We have carefully analysed political texts according to our structured template as a means of assessing the nature of this leadership, shedding light on ambitions for developing the EU in conjunction with Germany’s self-imposed leadership style. Accordingly, the leadership claim expresses a particular style, namely what German leadership entails in terms of role and functioning, offers and demands towards European partners and ideational aspirations of Europe’s reform process. The leadership style is embedded in a larger strategic narrative about why Germany needs to take on leadership and the goals of this leadership.

Based on this analytical framework, in the following section, we start by analysing the narrative of leadership in the coalition agreement. Following the famous dictum of former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, who, when asked which forces and factors were most important in his political career, allegedly answered ‘events my boy, events’, many observers would downgrade the importance of many lines from the autumn 2021 coalition agreement as providing guidelines for concrete action. Thus, the 177 pages could be seen in historical hindsight as a text for archives to study party programmes and, in view of the envisioned European role, as a dream or a well-intended utopia beyond any reality. However, the three coalition partners’ agreement serves as a foundation for decision-making throughout all policy areas and, consequently, can be regarded as the comparative yardstick for any post-February 2022 leadership narratives.

The next section further examines key government documents and speeches by Olaf Scholz up to May 2023 by focusing on the Zeitenwende-leadership discussion. The empirical material includes the German Chancellor’s key speeches in which he aims to define and outline his vision of the Zeitenwende, implying his idea of German leadership within the EU and his political ambitions for the EU as a polity. Policy statements from the Chancellor have different functions. On the one hand, they serve as statements to illuminate the major guidelines and programmatic decisions based on his ‘policy-making power’ (Richtlinienkompetenz) (Korte 2002), with the Chancellor using policy statements to initiate and steer the debate in a certain direction. On the other hand, the Chancellor personifies government policy and hence his statements are taken up by EU-wide media, which makes them an instrument of public communication (Korte 2002). As Scholz has given such speeches within a 15 months time frame, we can see a certain amount of continuity and change. Furthermore, Scholz has mostly used important events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine or Europe Day, and particular outlets, such as the journal Foreign Affairs, to outline his Zeitenwende-leadership narrative.

Narratives are directed towards a specific audience, albeit the audience is not necessarily homogenous. In the particular field of EU politics and policies, narratives resonate within the EU’s multilevel system towards various audiences meaning that ‘high-level political leaders are simultaneously involved in multiple leader-follower relations’ (Van Esch 2017). Both, leadership and the success of a narrative, can thus be very differently evaluated depending on the followers chosen. The German government’s potential followers and those of Olaf Scholz as Chancellor not only include the German public, the government coalition and party members as well as opposition parties, but also other European leaders in the European Council (Van Esch 2017). Each intervention has been held in a different setting, ranging from the German Bundestag to Charles University in Prague, the international political journal Foreign Affairs to the European Parliament. Relevant political documents demonstrate the Chancellor’s intention of sending a message to these different audiences. Consequently, the analysis includes reactions by European partners, but we also take a brief look at reactions within the governing coalition, which, as a first-time coalition of three parties – SPD (social-democrats), Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (the Greens) and the FDP (the liberals) – is struggling to create a coherent political framework. The German Chancellor thus needs to reconcile in his speeches to the different needs of potential followers at national and European levels.

The Coalition Agreement: Narratives of Leadership Ambitions

The coalition agreement’s title ‘Dare more progress – alliance for freedom, justice and sustainability’ reflects claims by the authors that they are stimulating genuine change in Germany and the EU. After years of political stagnation under the grand coalition, this coalition agreement promised a progressive step into Germany’s future, applying not only to a more resolute climate policy or gender equality, but also concerns about Germany’s ambitions for the EU.

The coalition agreement came up with an ambiguous formulation for Germany’s role in the EU, proclaiming that ‘as the biggest member state we will take up our specific responsibility for the EU as a whole’, modified by the phrase ‘in a servant role’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 130). The leadership claim is equally based on Germany’s role as fourth largest economy in the world and is further defined by the notion that Germany will ‘act in European self-understanding and in cooperation with international partners’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021).

The agreement’s opening articulations draw upon a longstanding German identity narrative that highlights the EU’s fundamental importance for Germany, a vision initially mapped out by Germany’s first post-war Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (1965, 45). Adenauer aimed to establish Germany as an equal partner in Europe and to regain full sovereignty. Aligning with this historical perspective, the coalition agreement states that, ‘The great challenges of our time can only be accomplished (…) together in a strong European Union’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 6). Hence, the Ampel coalition aims ‘to increase the strategic sovereignty of the European Union’, emphasising the need for a ‘strong European Union’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 7). The coalition’s use of the term ‘strategic sovereignty’ echoes French President Macron’s notion of ‘European sovereignty’ (Bora and Lequesne 2023, 11). These fundamental commitments from the coalition agreement postulate that functional pressures lead to an uploaded and upgraded understanding of the EU’s importance for Germany: ‘An EU which is more democratically reinforced, more capable of action and more strategically sovereign is the foundation for our peace, prosperity and freedom’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 131).

These expressions document that the coalition parties follow a so-called ‘problem-solving instinct’ (Wessels 2021), which all Federal Republic of Germany governments have embraced over time. In analysing their tasks ahead, the member states’ political leaders, as ‘masters of the treaty’ (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2023), realise once again that the EU and also international instruments will have to be used to deal with the most important issues on the political agenda (Bartenstein and Wessels 2023). Thus, European integration is crucial for modernising and stabilising the state, perhaps even ‘to rescue the nation state’ (Milward 2000).

Demands on Germany’s EU Partners: Disunited by Shared Values?

In its coalition agreement, the newly elected German government set out various demands addressed at its European partners. They have since been taken up in the following governmental declarations and speeches by Chancellor Scholz who has largely contributed to a continuing formulation of the leadership narrative. More specifically, we see three main demands:

Firstly, the EU as a community of values is presented as a matter of high importance in the rule of law subchapter. This states that the three parties ‘will effectively protect the values of Union in Art. 2 TEU’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 132). Secondly, the government will continue to invest in finding a joint approach towards migration and refugee policies (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 141), aiming at a ‘fundamental reform of the European Asylum system’. Thirdly, we see hesitant formulations of the traditional German commitment to ‘a real common security and defence policy’. To increase efficiency regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), this document includes German proposals from recent years to replace treaty provisions from the CFSP’s unanimity rule with qualified majority voting (QMV) (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 135), which would need a treaty revision. A concession is implied by the Ampel coalition’s awareness that Germany will not impose its leadership role under QMV that would be balanced by ‘developing a mechanism to involve also smaller member states in this approach’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 135).

Germany’s Offers: Limited and Unambitious?

We can identify three main offers in the coalition agreement relating to: strategic sovereignty; the common foreign and security policy; as well as fiscal and monetary policies.

The postulated aim of strategic sovereignty is ‘to establish the capacity to act in the global context’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 132). This coalition agreement thus offers European partners the promise of economic stability and prosperity which provides the EU with industrial and economic power in crisis-ridden and transformative times, hence underlining Germany’s role as the EU’s economic powerhouse (Matthijs 2016, 141).

However, the defence of strategic global interests is not mentioned in this general narrative. Any expenditure for international action, including that for NATO defence and development cooperation, was set at 3 per cent (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 144). The then new government thus followed earlier promises to increase its defence spending, thereby underlining its commitment to NATO.

Regarding financial policies, the agreement posits that ‘Germany must as model and pioneer fulfil its role as anchor of stability for Europe’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 159). This is in line with past decisions, as Germany headed for European monetary integration based on ‘sound money principles’ (Bulmer 2014, 1260). The new government promises to be more flexible in its use of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) without agreeing to demands for a fundamental reform of the SGP and the use of payments in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MAFF). The main parts of this chapter seem, though, to move away from these traditional narratives of fiscal discipline without offering any fundamental revision.

Reforming the EU: A Narrative of an Ideational Leadership Towards a European Finalité?

In addition, this coalition agreement represents a genuine federalist narrative for the EU’s constitutional framework and institutional architecture: ‘The conference for the future of Europe should lead to a convention which should draw up a constitution and lead to a ‘federal European state’ (Bundesstaat)’ (131). This normative federal narrative is deeply rooted in early post-war debate and heavily influenced by the Spinelli heritage and programmes from the Union of Federalists (Müller 2021). Besides proposals for such a radical transformative act towards a federal state, the coalition agreement supports certain traditional proposals on parliamentarisation including the right of initiative (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 131). Despite such promises, the coalition agreement puts forward a practically overlooked remark on differentiation stating that ‘where necessary to go ahead with single member states’ (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, 104), a core Europe approach which has been avoided by the German government since mid-2010.

With the coalition agreement’s key assertions on leadership and Germany’s overarching goals for the EU in mind, we now delve into the emerging narrative of Zeitenwende. It examines shifts and consistencies in comparison to the coalition agreement, shedding light on changes that have taken place in relation to the leadership narrative.

The Zeitenwende in View of a Changed Zeitgeist

When Russia launched its war against Ukraine in February 2022, conventional belief systems about Russia and Europe’s stable security architecture became deeply challenged. Seemingly insurmountable principles of foreign policy were at a stroke overturned by Chancellor Scholz’s governmental statement proclaiming that this war symbolised a ‘watershed era’ (Zeitenwende) for Germany and Europe (Scholz 2022c). Scholz gave the speech at the German Parliament three days after Russia started the war in Ukraine arguing that ‘the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before’ (Scholz 2022c). In response to Putin’s vision of the ‘19th-century great powers’ (Scholz 2022c) system, Germany now needed to develop its strengths.

Most attention was paid to Scholz’s promise to increase defence spending by EUR100 billion, thus doubling the Bundeswehr’s regular annual budget. Scholz proclaimed that ‘a country of our size and our significance within Europe’ should be able to ‘optimally equip’ its soldiers (Scholz 2022c). Although this was perceived as a turning point in German foreign and defence policy, the budget was still criticised as insufficient by failing to reach NATO’s 2 per cent target for defence spending, thus only a limited offer to European partners in terms of security. Another key concern of Scholz’s speech addressed Germany’s energy security, pledging not only to move past Russian dependencies, but also to promote renewable energy sources.

The Zeitenwende is attributed ‘to the whole of Europe’ (Scholz 2022c), thereby making sovereignty a central aim for empowering the EU. Accordingly, the unity between member states must be preserved, as demonstrated by the sanctioning packages. The quest for unity entails that member states should ask not only ‘what benefits can I gain from Brussels’, but also ‘what is the best decision for the Union?’ (Scholz 2022c). In this sense, ‘Europe is a framework for action’ (Scholz 2022c) to overcome the challenges of our time, an idea which takes up the established narrative plot of acting together for a stronger Union, thus reflecting the current Zeitgeist of a crisis-ridden EU.

In Scholz’s narrative, this call for strength and unity does not mean a cessation of dialogue with Russia, but a necessity to keep ‘open channels of dialogue’ (Scholz 2022c.). This approach, which is embedded in Germany’s foreign policy tradition of Ostpolitik, has been accepted in the past by EU partners and allies making Germany an ‘assertive hegemon’ (Siddi 2020). This narrative is rooted in Germany’s past identity narrative which stresses its responsibility to look for peaceful solutions to conflicts in the tradition of Willy Brandt (Schmidt 2014, 340f.). According to Scholz, this view should not become an exception in history, but Germany is obliged to secure peace, make solidarity work in the EU, strengthen NATO and cooperate ever more closely with its allies.

In June 2022, Scholz reaffirmed to the German Parliament that the ‘Zeitenwende was never only a status description’, but a ‘mandate to act’ for Germany, Europe and the international community (Scholz 2022b). As a consequence, Germany started to invest massively in security, thus keeping up the German security promise for Europe proclaiming Zeitenwende as the German government’s new foreign policy doctrine. Scholz repeated that in these uncertain times, ‘no country in the world can stand alone against such a development’ (Scholz 2022b), which illustrates this European narrative’s continuity as the solution for national problems, thereby matching its emphasis in the coalition agreement.

Following this argument, Scholz emphasises that the EU must become a geopolitical actor, thus ultimately breaking the German taboo by utilising geopolitics. Indeed, Scholz embraced the term, which has quickly become fashionable on the EU stage with the ‘geopolitical Commission’ and the European Council’s push towards increasing the EU’s capacity to act (Haroche 2023). Primarily this is crucial in countering Putin’s efforts to ‘divide our continent into zones of influence, into great powers and vassal states’ (Scholz 2022b). To increase the EU’s capacity to act, Germany will propose measures in areas such as migration policy, defence policy, technological sovereignty and democratic resilience. According to Scholz, the most important goal is to ensure European unity by ending the ‘egoistic blockades of European decisions by individual member states’ (Scholz 2022b), which implies moving away from national vetoes, thus creating a stronger voice in this world of competing major powers. These claims form the basis of a new geopolitical, power-driven master narrative (see Table 1 for an overview of all documents and speeches).

Table 1. Strategic narratives of leadership.

	Identity narrative: Leadership style	Issue narrative: Policy goals	System narrative: International order
Coalition agreement 10/2021	Servant leadership	European Federal State Strategic sovereignty	Great challenges of our time
Zeitenwende speech 2/2022	EU as scope of action Commitment to maintain Europe’s security, to defend Europe	European Sovereignty	Putin’s vision of nineteenth century great powers
Governmental declaration, 6/2022	Zeitenwende as ‘mandate to act’ for Germany	Geopolitical Europe Increase EU’s capacity to act	Putin wants to divide the continent
Prague keynote speech 8/2022	Germany as bridge / central power	Geopolitical Europe Strengthen the EU: ‘weltpolitikfähig’ European sovereignty	Putin’s war against Ukraine EU’s need to reform
Foreign policy journal 12/2022	Bridge builder Advocate for multilateral solutions	EU as world’s largest internal market with stable democracies Geopolitical actor	Multipolar world order Russia and China as influential actors Shattered European peace order
Europe Day 5/2023	–	Geopolitical EU to proactively shape its own future Competitive and prosper	Survival between giants Russia as unifying force for EU

Source: own compilation.

The Zeitenwende claim triggered an unprecedented foreign policy debate in Germany, denoting the end of special German-Russian relations by shifting focus towards defending liberal democracies. The Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how quickly the Ampel needed to adapt to the ‘new reality’ (Mehrer 2022). Initially, there were mixed feelings within the coalition about the speech, as coalition partners were unaware of its details. However, it quickly gained internal support, with Green German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock underlining Germany’s specific responsibility as the EU’s strongest economy, which as such calls for stronger leadership and assurances regarding the security of Eastern European neighbours (Tagesschau 2022). Green Economic Minister Robert Habeck repeated the country’s willingness ‘to exercise a servant leadership role’ in the context of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine (Fokus 2022). However, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Chair of the Defence Committee in the German Bundestag and member of the liberal party FDP, described any claim to leadership in connection with the war in Ukraine as deficient, given that Germany was failing to take the first steps in supplying weapons and was therefore not offering any leadership role (Handelsblatt 2022). The Social Democratic party leader Lars Klingbeil not only emphasised that ‘Germany must claim to be a leading power’ (Klingbeil 2022), but also advocated for a ‘cooperative leadership style’ (Klingbeil 2022), more specifically being ‘aware of your role. Not ducking away, engaging with others. Never being arrogant, but acting thoughtfully, convincingly and consistently’ (Klingbeil 2022). Klingbeil places Europe at the centre of his argument, aligning with the established narrative of a sovereign Europe being absolutely necessary for the nation state.

However, does the Zeitenwende speech indicate a turning point for followers in German leadership narratives? Although German decision-makers recognised a rising demand from its partners for German leadership (Oltermann 2022), the country was also particularly challenged given its past foreign policy and economic choices towards Russia. European partners have been more hesitant about what to expect from Scholz’s narrative, but appreciated Germany’s shift in foreign policy (Rutte 2022). In France, there was relief about the speech as it was hoped that Germany would eventually no longer structure its foreign policy on trade interests, but embrace the French vision of ‘Europe puissance’ (Bourlanges 2022).

Leadership for a Geopolitical Europe

Scholz used the beginning of Czechia’s presidency in August 2022 to deliver a keynote address in Prague, elaborating both on his vision of Zeitenwende and concept for a geopolitical EU. The venue was chosen not only in recognition of the incoming Czech Presidency, but also as a sign of appreciation towards the perspective of Central and Eastern European member states who were disappointed by the initial German approach towards Russia in light of the war. The Chancellor started the speech by underlining the severity of the situation: ‘This is about our future, which is called Europe. That Europe is being challenged today as never before’ (Scholz 2022d). Concerning the European future, Scholz claims that since ‘together we have the best possible chance of shaping the twentyfirst century in our own sense, in the European sense – as a European Union of 27, 30 or 36 states with more than 500 million citizens’ (Scholz 2022d), EU enlargement towards the East will contribute to the continent’s stability. Drawing upon the long-standing notion of Germany as Europe’s central power (cf. Hamilton 1991, 130f.), Scholz expressed a strong commitment from the heart of Europe to bridging ‘East and West, North and South in Europe’ (Hamilton 1991). In this spirit of unity, he does not want to build an EU of ‘exclusive clubs’ but ‘an EU of equal members’ (Scholz 2022d) as it is ‘Germany's responsibility for Europe that we work out solutions together with our neighbours’ (Scholz 2022d). This sovereignty-enabling approach is further illustrated by Scholz’s reform proposals. Member states should not refrain from carrying through reforms, even treaty changes if necessary, as the EU needs to adapt according to the political dictum of ‘form follows function’ (Scholz 2022d).

Firstly, Scholz requested (again) a transition to QMV in foreign and fiscal policies. He argues that smaller states should not fear this change, as there will be a transition period, starting with sanctions. This is necessary to make Europe ‘weltpolitikfähig’ (Scholz 2022d). ‘Weltpolitikfähigkeit’ – originally coined by former Commission President Juncker – reflects a notion of possessing the capacity to act that is seen as jeopardised by decision-makers (Costa and Barbé 2023).

Secondly, the Chancellor aims to strengthen European sovereignty by increasing autonomy in specific areas, assuming more responsibility for security as well as enhancing cooperation to promote shared values and interests globally. To achieve these goals, Scholz focuses on positioning ‘Europe (as) a world leader in technology’ (Costa and Barbé 2023), such as Green Hydrogen solutions aiming for ‘a climate-neutral European Union by 2050’ (Costa and Barbé 2023). To support this vision, a robust capital market and a stable financial system are essential. These proposals indicate that the German government is utilising the EU as a means of enhancing growth and prosperity, feeding on its status as the Union’s economic powerhouse (Matthijs 2016, 141; Wendler 2017, 582).

Thirdly, Scholz highlights the importance of European unity by acknowledging two major past conflicts in migration and financial policy. In financial policy, he calls for clear rules that foster trust, while at the same time enabling solidarity. As growth is necessary, investments in national economic transformations should be facilitated, requiring the development of European budget rules, thus recalling Germany’s emphasis on ‘sound money principles’ (Bulmer 2014, 1260).

Scholz’s underlining of a geopolitical EU gained broader support from the European social democrats. In a joint article, SPD party leader Lars Klingbeil, former Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin and Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez all expressed their willingness to support a geopolitical emphasis, calling for a strong Europe and stressing the need for EU enlargement (Klingbeil, Marin, and Sánchez 2022). This was hailed in France as a need to ‘break free of the red lines’ (Boutelet 2022), providing more substance to the vision of a geopolitical Europe. However, the Prague speech did not receive universal acclaim within the EU at the time. Some governments expressed criticism and concern regarding potential power shifts in crucial policy areas. For instance, Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki strongly criticised France’s and Germany’s political influence in the EU. According to Morawiecki, unanimity protects each member state regardless of its economic weight or political power, serving as a ‘safety valve that protects the EU from the tyranny of the majority’ (Morawiecki 2022). By citing Germany’s past policy choices towards Russia, Morawiecki aimed to delegitimise any leadership claims by Germany, thus illustrating fears of German ‘domination’ (Hamilton 1991, 128). Instead of reforming the EU as envisioned by Scholz, Morawiecki seemed to take ‘two steps back’ by advocating for a ‘Europe of nations’ (Morawiecki 2022).

In spite of critical voices from other governments, in December 2022 Scholz published an article in Foreign Affairs with the title ‘The Global Zeitenwende – How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era’, thereby reinforcing his narrative of the Zeitenwende characterised as ‘an epochal tectonic shift’ (Scholz 2022a), scaled up to an international level which portrays Russia and China as dominant actors. In this world, Germany’s role is to do ‘everything it can to defend and foster an international order’ (Scholz 2022a) serving as ‘the guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be, a bridge builder within the European Union and an advocate for multilateral solutions to global problems’ (Scholz 2022a). This bridge builder reference takes up the identity narrative of Germany at the centre of Europe, having served as a mediator between East and West during the Cold War and now as a symbol of European consolidation after German unification (Hamilton 1991). The narrative also aligns with a notion that international order assures ‘democracy, security and prosperity’ (Scholz 2022a), with Scholz emphasising Germany’s responsibility in light of its dark past.

The chancellor argued that Russia’s attack on Ukraine illustrates the end of an era as Putin defied the ‘principles of international law’ and ‘shattered a European and international peace architecture’ (Scholz 2022a). The Zeitenwende has prompted significant shifts in German foreign policy decisions, including providing arms to conflict zones and developing enlargement towards the Western Balkans as a renewed political priority. Similar to his Prague speech, Scholz paints the picture of a glorious future for the EU, envisioning ‘an EU with over 500 million free citizens, representing the world’s largest internal market, that will set global standards (…)’ (Scholz 2022a). However, EU member states must continue as strong democracies, founded on the rule of law, as they are the ‘antithesis of his (Putin’s) imperialistic and autocratic kleptocracy’ (Scholz 2022a). This certainly reads as a broad hint to Poland and Hungary. Yet again, he calls for the elimination of individual vetoes to ‘do away with selfish blocking tactics in its decision-making processes’ (Scholz 2022a). QMV should be used in foreign policy and taxation as ‘the EU expands and becomes a geopolitical actor’ (Scholz 2022a).

On 9 May 2023, Olaf Scholz was invited to deliver a speech at the European Parliament in celebration of Europe Day (Scholz 2023), in which he emphasised that the EU must proactively shape its future in today’s multipolar world. He advocated transformation, referring to a ‘geopolitical European Union’ (Scholz 2023), emphasising not only the importance of enlargement, reforms and forward-thinking approaches, but also a need to conclude trade agreements quickly. Drawing inspiration from former SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, Scholz quoted, ‘The unification of Europe is (…) a question of survival between the giants and in the fractured world of young and old nationalisms’ (Scholz 2023). By stressing these words, Scholz emphasised that the war initiated by Russia served as a unifying force for the EU. He concludes that ‘a geopolitical Europe can be founded on this experience’ (Scholz 2023). To establish a geopolitical EU, Scholz outlined a set of tasks including closer integration of defence efforts, the development of an integrated European defence economy, the need for enlargement and wider use of QMV.

These proposed policy measures exhibit the expected intersection of continuity and change. While they are not radically distinct from those outlined in the coalition agreement, it is the approach to achieving these objectives that sets them apart. Instead of relying on a federalist narrative, Scholz candidly advocates for a reformed EU that takes into account geopolitical considerations and security threats. A pivotal turning point is being provided by the enigmatic Zeitenwende, which serves as a promising opportunity to put through Germany’s political aspirations while maintaining a high degree of political continuity. In this narrative, the chancellor presents a functionalist and geopolitically astute EU that must maintain competitiveness and prosperity in an ever-changing global context. Scholz recognises that drastic treaty reforms may not be required to achieve these goals. Instead, he offers a more compelling geopolitical master narrative to enhance the EU’s efficiency and political influence.

Conclusion: A German Leadership Narrative Towards a Geopolitical Europe?

This paper has sought to compare different claims for leadership over time and follow the Zeitenwende narrative. It can be seen that this most significant Zeitenwende facilitates the Chancellor’s ideational power by steering the process of moving away from a normative, federal integration narrative, forged by the three governing parties’ coalition agreement, towards a geopolitical, power-driven master narrative.

The EU’s federal narrative, which was prominently set up in the coalition treaty, has now vanished completely from political discourse. Scholz has instead used the foreign policy-related geopolitical master narrative not only to advance the EU as a political project, but also to provide sufficient protection to withstand global turmoil, emphasising his political dictum ‘form follows function’. The Zeitenwende has served as a spur for EU enlargement and the associated reform of unanimity voting. Scholz’s vision of a geopolitically resilient and strong EU is embedded in the system narrative of a multipolar world order and rival powers in which the EU needs to pursue its interests strategically and defend its values that are intrinsically bound with a rule-based international order. However, in practical terms, Germany has as yet made only limited offers for its European partners regarding security and defence. Moreover, even more reticence has been demonstrated in financial matters, with the resulting failure to supply a convincing common good argument clearly enough, thereby contributing to somewhat cautious reactions from member states.

By abandoning the controversial federal narrative, the Chancellor was able to utilise the constructive ambiguity of the term Zeitenwende to explain his narrative for change on national, European and international stages. The Zeitenwende-leadership narrative is rooted in two old paradigms of Germany’s position in the EU. On the one hand, Germany carries a particular responsibility as Europe’s central power to find solutions for peace and to guarantee security in Europe due to its dark past. On the other hand, Scholz uses Germany’s position as the EU’s economic powerhouse to legitimise the country’s ambitions to gain more European sovereignty in the future, in other words, the coalition agreement’s basic arguments. The Chancellor sets out his political vision of a reformed and enlarged EU that is sufficiently powerful and robust in these turbulent times. To reach these goals, the Zeitenwende references have initiated a different leadership style than that formulated in the coalition agreement. The notion of executing a ‘servant leadership’ is no longer mentioned, but has evolved towards the self-ascription of a ‘cooperative bridge builder’ to drive a strong and united EU forward. Scholz did not shy away from using the term leadership, which clearly sets him apart from his predecessor Merkel’s utilisation of ‘responsibility’ (Wendler 2017, 580).

Throughout his speeches, Scholz leverages Russia’s behaviour, highlighting the contrasting nature of democracies and autocracies to bolster his argument. While we may not yet fully grasp the consequences of this war on the process of European integration, Scholz’s geopolitical approach and the concurring reform proposals can be attributed to this context (cf. McNamara and Kelemen 2022, 1920). However, does the notion of geopolitics indicate a taboo-breaking turn to power politics or is it merely an empty signifier to advance the government’s political goals? We observe that Scholz not only underlines EU enlargement towards the Balkans and beyond as well as the self-ascription of ‘bridge builder’, signalling the concept’s geographic components, but he also defines the world according to spheres of influence ascribed by the multipolar world order (cf. Bach and Peters 2002). While geopolitical-based enlargement holds the potential to alleviate any fatigue associated with EU efforts over the past two decades, it is crucial to ensure that fast-track enlargement does not compromise democratic standards, as this would fundamentally alter the EU’s nature as a union founded on shared values. Scholz’s vision of geopolitical enlargement remains noticeably vague on how this delicate balancing act should be managed.

Furthermore, the proposed reform of unanimity voting, which has been repeatedly advocated since it was mentioned in the coalition agreement, poses certain risks. In the past, Germany has not only been criticised for lecturing other member states on ‘what is right’, but also for acting as a hegemon to advance its interests and failing to enlist the support of other member states in various circumstances, as illustrated by Germany’s stance on austerity policies, the refugee crisis and its energy policy decisions. From this perspective, Germany has failed to prove its role as a cooperative bridge builder. Using the term geopolitics does not imply that Germany has learned to base its interests on more than national economic considerations, which might negatively affect its credibility. In this context, pushing through majority voting within the Council may be risky. Consultation and consensus-seeking should inspire the desire for German leadership in accordance with the ‘consensus-model of democracy’ (Lijphart 1999, 42). Otherwise, European solidarity is at risk.

Additional studies are certainly required to analyse how much German public opinion embraces the geopolitical master narrative and how the EU partners perceive Germany’s leadership role. Furthermore, further research is warranted to assess whether the German government’s actions in Brussels align with its leadership claims or are primarily driven by narrow national interests, potentially undermining its overall commitment to the EU.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the editors and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We would like to thank Roland Parr for his expert editorial support.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Germany [grant number 01UG2109A].

Notes on contributors

Aline Bartenstein

Aline Bartenstein is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg. She holds a PhD from the University of Cologne. Her research interests include EU integration, the interplay of crises and European solidarity, EU energy and climate policy, and EU borders. She has published in European Security and Global Social Policy.

Wolfgang Wessels

Wolfgang Wessels holds the Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in political science and is the Director of the Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies (CETEUS) at the University of Cologne. He has been awarded the ‘Lifetime Achievement in Contemporary European Studies’ by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) as well as the Jean Monnet Award ‘European Prize for Lifelong Learning/European Studies’ in Gold.