The Bali roadmap: Climate change, COP 13 and beyond

Halfway through the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a major earthquake shook Bali. Perhaps it was a sign of what was to come. By the close of the conference a week later, the Earth's geopolitical axis had shifted slightly. The Bush administration discovered that – despite unparalleled US military and economic power – its legitimacy and capacity as a global hegemon had been constrained by the force of international censure. This revelation, when it came, surprised US negotiators and others as well.

Held in the Balinese resort village of Nusa Dua, COP 13 ran from 3 to 15 December 2007 and included nine days of meetings of scientific and expert groups followed by four days of ‘high level’ ministerial talks leading to its conclusion. It was attended by some 10,800 participants, including six heads of state, 3,500 government officials from 187 nations and 5800 registered participants from the UN and environmental, development, business and other NGOs, and some 1,500 members of the media.

The conference followed a tightly intertwined dual track which included the work of COP 13 and, nested within this, a ‘second’ conference – known as the Third Conference of the Parties – serving as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 3), which formally excluded non-ratifying parties such as the United States.

The COP's main task was to define the path by which a post-2012 climate regime could be established – including emissions reduction targets to succeed those of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period (2008–12). Either the convention's parties would agree to a process to conclude by 2009 (in time to establish targets that would enter into force by the second commitment period, 2013–20) or the underlying architecture of the protocol, and perhaps the climate treaty itself, would be jeopardised.

The elephant in the room – the US at Bali

Although the Kyoto Protocol was supported by the Clinton-Gore administration when it was agreed in 1997, its targets were repudiated by a hostile Republican Congress. Shortly after his election, in 2001, President Bush similarly rejected the protocol. His administration then repeatedly sought to destroy it both by refusing ratification and by discouraging other states from doing so (Depledge 2005).

Even after the protocol finally came into force in 2005, the Bush administration continued to thwart progress towards the negotiation of new global emissions targets and other instruments relevant to the ‘post’ Kyoto period. It rejected emissions reduction targets, instead favouring (weak) energy intensity targets both domestically and internationally, arguing that mandatory emissions reduction targets for developed countries alone were unfair if other major developing nation emitters such as China and India remained unburdened (Eckersley 2008).

At earlier COPs, participation by the United States in preliminary negotiations around the content of a post-2012 agreement had been strongly resisted by the EU and by green NGOs. Many continued to believe the Bush administration was prepared to stall or wreck the Bali Action Plan, just as it had successfully obstructed and undermined the work of previous meetings.

Yet the US remained the ‘elephant in the room’, as Al Gore called it. Because of the importance of the US as the planet's second largest aggregate emitter (after China), some now believed the effectiveness of an agreement about the development of future targets would be reduced without immediate US support. And so, at Bali, a serious effort was made by the EU and other parties to draw the US back into the negotiating fold despite the Bush administration's intransigence. The hope was that, come 2009, the new administration – Democrat or Republican – would be more progressive.

Even given the problems potentially caused by US non-involvement, one must question the logic of this inclusion. Predictably, renewed engagement gave US negotiators the power to weaken the conference's main communiqué, the Bali Action Plan or ‘roadmap’.

The Bali Action Plan is intended to define the parameters and timelines for future negotiations up to 2009, the generally agreed deadline for new targets for developed countries: the stronger and more precise its guidance, the more productive subsequent discussions are likely to be. The US negotiators at Bali successfully removed three critical paragraphs from the draft plan and relegated oblique reference to their content to a technical footnote to the preamble, with the latter merely recognising that ‘deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention’ (Bali Action Plan 2007).

The deleted paragraphs referred to the need for global emissions to peak in the next ten to 15 years and then be reduced to very low levels; a collective aggregate target, for developed nations, of between 25 and 40 per cent below 1990 levels to be achieved by 2020; and the need to reduce global emissions by half or more by 2050 in order to stabilise atmospheric concentrations at the level indicated as safe by the IPCC. These key points (based on findings of the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report) had already been broadly accepted at an earlier international climate meeting in Vienna in August 2007. Their removal significantly weakened the text of the Bali Action Plan, which is formally regarded as the authoritative conclusion of the COP.

In addition, the US insisted on including text emphasising the need for developing countries to take on binding commitments. This predictably provoked a fight between the US and developing countries, and also between major developing countries themselves. It is plausible to assume that the Bush Administration actually hoped to see the roadmap destroyed or diverted by such a battle and the UNFCCC itself weakened by failure.

For a while, the Bali conference seemed destined for collapse. Scheduled to end at midday on Friday 14 December, the final plenary became log-jammed and acrimonious. It ran until 3.00 a.m. that night and resumed at 8.30 a.m. the next day. By midday on Saturday 15 December it was deep in crisis. India still sought to amend a paragraph to emphasise that support from developed countries also needed effective assessment and verification.

Meanwhile, China, aggrieved at being overlooked in the rush towards an unsatisfactory outcome, flexed its muscles and demanded a formal apology for poor process from Yvo de Boer, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC. De Boer, sleep-deprived and exhausted, stalled for a moment, apologised and then left the plenary stage humiliated and in tears. The chair of the session and president of the conference, Indonesian Environment Minister Rachmat Witoelar, also apologised. The session and the conference were beginning to spin out of control. The plenary was briefly adjourned.

It took desperate interventions – ones that placed the prestige of the host nation, Indonesia, and that of the United Nations on the line – to break the deadlock. First Indonesian President Yudhoyono appealed to the conference to recognise ‘its moral duty’ to future generations. Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reminded the conference of the grave scientific realities of global warming. The developing country titans set aside their differences. The EU accepted India's proposal.

At this stage, the US had no further options but to lay its final card on the table. It overplayed its hand. At 1.0 p.m. on Saturday, having gambled unsuccessfully on the developing countries failing to agree to the US's demands and therefore stalling the conference, and now counting on support from its allies, Paula Dobriansky, head of the US delegation, indicated the US would not agree to the text, arguing that developing countries had failed to take sufficient responsibility for their contribution to the problem of global warming. She was booed and jeered.

Then the political tilt began. First, South Africa, formal spokesperson for the G-77 bloc, pointed out that it was the developing countries that had shifted ground most, agreeing to new measures and commitments beyond the convention's expectations, while the developed country bloc had not. A cascade of comments from developing countries followed, each more pugnacious than the last. Tuvalu, representing the Association of Small Island States, spoke powerfully of what they had to lose – everything – if no plan, or a weak plan, emerged. The EU and speakers representing African and Asian countries reinforced the message.

Supportive interventions were noticeably absent from the US's climate allies in the Umbrella Group – the bloc formerly known as JUSCANZ (Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and now also including, among others, Norway and Russia. Only Japan took the floor, with a beautifully crafted, deliberately opaque and unhelpful comment. Australia said nothing, perhaps torn between the need – in its new role as a supporter of the Kyoto Protocol – to avert the threat to the protocol and the treaty, the Rudd government's disinclination to challenge the US-Australian alliance overtly and its position in the Umbrella Group.

The crescendo of criticism culminated when Kevin Conrad, representing Papua New Guinea, wryly reflected on an earlier comment by US delegate Jim Connoughton that the US was willing to lead. Conrad bluntly stated that ‘There is an old saying: if you can't lead then get out of the way. United States, if you cannot lead us, then get out of the way and let those that would, do so.’ Dobriansky sat, ashen-faced, through the sustained applause that followed. Then, at 1.30 p.m., she indicated that she again wanted the floor. The US would accept consensus. Applause and cheers followed. The main communiqué of the Bali mandate, although diminished, was all but agreed.

From this point, the conference moved relatively swiftly to its conclusion. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (the AWG) was formed specifically to develop the Bali roadmap among those countries that were parties to the Kyoto Protocol, including the vast majority of participants in the convention except the United States. This was the group that, under the guidance of Secretary de Boer, drafted the conference's secondary communiqué, the ‘Review of work programme, methods of work and schedule of future sessions’ for parties to the protocol. Given the gutting of language on targets in the Bali Action Plan, the content of the AWG's statement assumed considerable importance.

The AWG text proceeded to the final plenary with two ‘options’ undecided. The first merely referred to clauses agreed in Vienna but without elaborating them. This would have supported and confirmed the mutilated main communiqué. The second option, however, included all the language on targets that had been removed from the main communiqué. Its passage was now critical as the AWG statement could provide strong supplementary guidance to almost all parties to the COP.

As the Ad Hoc Working Group did not include the United States, the US was dependent on its allies inside the AWG to block inclusion of the material dropped from the COP text. They failed – or rather, refused – to deliver. The second option was half-heartedly opposed by Canada and Russia. Canada was first to withdraw its objection. Russia, isolated, then reduced its original objections to just one about phrasing of a single sentence, a face-saving ploy quickly resolved during a brief adjournment. Australia waited almost to the end, only intervening after many other countries to also express its ‘strong support’ for option two. The final AWG text therefore includes specific phrases about targets and objectives that will guide all major emitters – other than the US – in their future deliberations (Bali Action Plan).

By the COP's end, a slight geopolitical shift had occurred. China had joined the EU as a champion of action against global warming. Its delegation, larger than at previous meetings, scientifically well briefed and cooperative rather than obstructive, seemed to have recognised that it could inhabit the vacuum created by the absence of US moral leadership. While the EU proposed strong targets, China provided support and led the G-77 bloc in recognising the need for commitment to early action – although without committing to future emissions reduction targets.

The Bush Administration's delegation, on the other hand, was isolated as never before. When Connoughton said ‘the US is willing to lead’, he was pursued around the conference by a gaggle of sceptical, mocking members of the international youth delegation but no one else. This isolation is, no doubt, temporary but it is also stark for a nation that had staked its claim as an alternative pole of political authority in the climate domain. Still, at the end of the day, the US had achieved its aims, weakened the COP result and loosened the noose around its neck for the time being.

Bali outcomes and directions

Prior to Bali, most countries referred to four ‘building blocks’ – mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing – as essential components of a post-2012 agreement. There were four main outcomes among the COP's 28 decisions. The first set of outcomes relate to the agreement to negotiate towards mitigation targets to be decided at COP 15 by 2009. The COP formally accepted the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report, re-emphasising the degree to which these negotiations are intended to be guided by the most authoritative and comprehensive scientific advice.

The second outcome related to funds for adaptation – a long-standing concern of developing countries. The COP agreed that funding of adaptation projects undertaken through the Kyoto Protocol's clean development mechanism (CDM) would be managed in the interim by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), under the authority of the COP/MOP. The Adaptation Fund will come into being during the first commitment period (2008–12) and be financed through a 2% levy on CDM projects. The fund is presently worth about €37 million and could increase to around €80–300 million in the period 2008–12. This funding level is, however, woefully inadequate to the task. Billions rather than millions of euros are needed for adaptation and mitigation in key developing countries, using technology transfer.

The third area of progress was around the ‘reduction of emissions from deforestation in developing countries’ (REDD). Although the discussions around REDD became bogged down in definitional debates about the scope of activity (deforestation through to other forms of land and forest degradation) and the nature of funding transfers to tackle the problem, by the conference's conclusion a programme had been agreed: the relevant expert group will continue work on definitions and assessment of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. This will help in the implementation of CDM actions potentially supported by the World Bank's new $300 million forest fund, and another up to $200 million to assist carbon credit projects based around halting deforestation.

Fourth, there was slight progress around the issue of technology transfer, with agreement on the development of related institutional arrangements, on the development of performance indicators relating to the effectiveness of technology transfer and on financing.

Separately, some 200 side events involving dozens of open, informal meetings disseminated information about emissions trading, technological change and new scientific data about the pace of warming and its consequences. Many were about the groundswell of action towards targets, trading and technological innovation in the United States, China and the European Union. It became clear that in the United States there is a growing crisis of legitimacy in domestic climate policy and a deepening chasm between the stance of the Bush administration and initiatives taken independently by states, local government and industry. In China, the likely devastating impacts of global warming have been met with strong domestic policy: legal and regulatory shifts to encourage the uptake of renewable energy technologies, and a move towards future commitments to limit emissions.

Joining the party – Australia at Bali

The conference opened with applause for Australia, acknowledging that Kevin Rudd – elected merely a week before and in power only three days – had signed the instrument of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as his first act in government, ending a decade of Australian climate policy inaction and hostility to multilateralism under the Howard government (Christoff 2005). This was the COP's other minor seismic shudder.

During his election campaign, Rudd had promised leadership on climate change domestically and on the international stage. He had identified climate change as one of a handful of prominent issues that clearly differentiated Labor from the Howard coalition government. Yet the Australian delegation was hesitant throughout the COP, at times negative, and misunderstood the importance of substantive, rather than merely symbolic, action at Bali. By failing to support the EU, China and other developing countries, Australia bolstered the United States' efforts to exclude the strong text that others sought in the Bali Action Plan. Nevertheless, during the final plenary, Australia did finally support the IPCC-based target band and, in doing so, helped cement this in the AWG text.

The road to Hell, paved with good intentions?

The Bali Action Plan is a path towards the crucial COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in 2009. But it is only a rough and narrow goat-track, strong on intentions but weak on substance and leading along a cliff edge, rather than a clearly defined road to meaningful outcomes. Given the urgency of the message of the latest IPCC reports, Bali's outcomes were mainly bureaucratic and lacked courage and definition.

In the words of members of the Global Youth Climate Network who addressed the conference, the argument at Bali had been over targets that climate science had already shown to be inadequate. They had expected better and more. Nevertheless, the AWG text does mention the negotiating band of minus 25–40% and provides guidance for all but the United States. And the Bali roadmap does acknowledge, in general terms, the need for deep cuts to emissions and the need for negotiations to be informed by ‘the best available science’.

The critical task over the next two years is not merely to agree on the scientifically appropriate aggregate emissions reduction target for 2020. It is also to agree on an equitable formula for apportioning the burden of emissions reduction among developed countries (and, in future, developing ones) on the basis of capacity and responsibility, without resort to the purely political haggling that determined targets at Kyoto in 1997.