Political strategy and climate policy: a rational choice perspective

Abstract

Rational choice models are employed to explain both the formation of states' domestically derived negotiation positions on climate change and the dynamics of these international negotiations. This analysis leads to the identification of a number of promising political strategies: taking steps to enlarge the membership of environmental non-governmental organisations; assessing whether the resources of these organisations would be more effectively spent on campaign contributions rather than other activities; using organisations such as the World Bank to assist developing countries to strengthen civil society in these countries; stepping up information campaigns; re-balancing abatement costs between the EU and the US; and making abatement more efficient by introducing an international emissions cap and trade scheme.

Keywords:

• climate change
• rational choice
• political economy
• climate policy

Notes

1. It is not clear whether a system can be designed that is not in conflict with WTO rules (Jordan-Korte and Mildner 2008). Even if it were possible to design such a system there would still be a rationale for considering the international level based on the first two points.

2. It has been suggested that Nordhaus takes an extreme view and that Stern or Cline, for example, are more representative. However, it has been acknowledged by Cline (2004) and has been demonstrated for the Stern Review by Nordhaus (2008) that the differences in results are driven by the choice of a low discount rate. Weitzman (2007, p. 707) argues that ‘[c]oncerning the rate of pure time preference, Stern follows a decidedly minority paternalistic view (which, however, includes a handful of distinguished economists) that for social discounting selects the lowest conceivable value … according to the a priori philosophical principle of treating all generations equally – irrespective of preferences for present over future utility that people seem to exhibit in their everyday savings and investment behaviour’.

3. No other peer-reviewed runs of the RICE model are available to the best of my knowledge.

4. This is one aspect of the lobbying literature; lobbying can also be seen as influencing the policy maker's support function by mobilising the public and thus make the policy maker aware of public opinion (for a short review see Binder and Neumayer 2005, pp. 529–530).

5. The true state of the world can under some condition also be revealed if the SIG does not endure costs (see Grossman and Helpman 2001).

6. Note that it is the average voter rather than the median voter due to the two-dimensional setup with uncertainty (see Grossman and Helpman, pp. 71–72).

7. It is worth noting though that they do not have actual membership levels and thus have to employ a proxy: number of ENGOs per capita (Binder and Neumeyer 2005, pp. 530–531).

8. Opinion polling at the time found that a majority of people was in favour of implementing Kyoto (Lisowski 2002, p. 114).

9. A benefit-to-cost ratio >1 indicates that the benefits are larger than the costs.

10. It is unlikely, however, that the optimal policy suggested by Nordhaus and Boyer can be fully achieved, as they themselves suggest (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p. 123).