Explaining the lack of enforcement power possessed by the ombudsman

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council for their project award ‘Public Services Ombudsmen and Administrative Justice: Models, Roles Methods and Relationships’ (RES‐000‐22‐2133), from which this article is derived. The project is being jointly undertaken by the author in partnership with Brian Thompson and Professor Trevor Buck.

Notes

1. See, for instance, the various anti‐ombudsman websites that have now been set up largely by aggrieved complainants, http://www.ombudsmanwatch.org; http://www.scottishombudsmanwatch.org

2. In practice, the office of the PO and the HSO for England operates as one institution, the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman, and is headed by the same individual, currently Ann Abraham.

3. There are three local government ombudsmen in England who are regionally based. They report their investigations individually but report annually as a collective organisation.

4. One unfortunate feature of ombudsmen is that from year to year they change their reporting arrangements, which makes it more difficult to undertake accurate comparisons. In this regard it is noticeable that in their 2007–2008 Annual Report the LGO did not include details on those investigations that resulted in the need for further reports or public statements to be made. This is a regrettable omission.