Ombudsman section: lessons from devolution

Abstract

One of the benefits of devolution is that it allows for experimentation, with different areas of the UK freed from Westminster/Whitehall control to identify new solutions to problems of governance. Under the devolution arrangements this relative freedom to develop new methods and approaches is one that applies to much of the administrative justice system. Indeed, in a previous edition of this journal, a review of regulatory arrangements in Scotland was analysed that demonstrated very well this potential for experimentation (Crerar 2007, 7; Kirkham 2009). This review has occurred in advance of similar efforts elsewhere in the UK and the lessons learnt in Scotland should help and influence those debates when they occur.

Keywords:

• devolution
• administrative justice system
• regulatory arrangements

Notes

 1. Although by statute separate offices, in practice the work of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Health Service Ombudsman for England has been unified under the one office-holder and has been rebranded the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.

 2. Excluding complaints about the Code of Conduct, the PSOW received 1381 new complaints in 2009/10 (PSOW 2010, 12).

 3. For a full analysis on the background to the introduction of the PSOW see Seneviratne (2006).

 4. In his latest annual report, the PSOW does not detail this figure, but it is recorded that the office did not investigate 893 (62%) of the 1442 complaints dealt with during the year. From the work of other ombudsman offices it can be assumed that the vast bulk of these were complaints that were either submitted to the ombudsman too early or were outside the office's jurisdiction. The scale of this figure is remarkably similar to equivalent results in other ombudsman institutions both in the UK and abroad.

 5. This similarity looks likely to include a role of the ombudsman office in receiving complaints about breaches of the Code of Conduct for local government members. In addition it is possible that the NIO will continue investigating conduct complaints against members of the Assembly.

 6. See the Commissioner for Complaints (Northern Ireland) Order 1996, SI 1996 No. 1297 (NI 7), article 16(1) and 17(1). This power has not been used since 1985 (White 1994).

 7. The current Northern Ireland Ombudsman has also expressed the opinion that the existing power for the office to investigate public sector employment issues should be removed to bring it into line with other schemes (COFMDFM 2010, 3).

 8. See Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002 s. 22, and Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 s. 33.

 9. Specific powers to issue advice and guidance on good administrative practice are provided in the relevant legislation, e.g. Local Government Act 1974 s. 23(12A).

10. For instance, see Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Watch, http://www.scottishombudsmanwatch.org/

11. See the SPSO website for details: http://www.spso.org.uk/how-complain/complaining-about-spso/challenges-casework-decisions and http://www.spso.org.uk/how-complain/complaining-about-spso (accessed 8 July 2010).