Prisoner welfare, human rights and the North Rhine-Westphalian prison ombudsman

Abstract

Despite prisons being a particularly human rights sensitive area, the work of prison ombudsmen has so far not been analysed for its influence on prisoner welfare. This article identifies prison ombudsmen as human rights facilitators and compares institutions existing in the UK and Germany. Particular focus is placed on the work of the North Rhine-Westphalian prison ombudsman. The author argues in favour of equipping prison ombudsmen in particular with own-motion powers of investigation. A future application of prison ombudsmen as national preventive mechanisms under OPCAT is suggested.

Keywords:

• prison ombudsman
• human rights
• own-motion powers of investigation

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express her gratitude to the two anonymous referees and the section editor for their helpful comments. The author gratefully acknowledges her scholarship from the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung that awarded funds of the German Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung to the research underlying her doctoral thesis that informed this article.

Notes

 1. For this point and the following see Whitty (2011, p. 129).

 2. For the relevance of cross-fertilisation processes to the spread of prison ombudsmen, please compare further Carl (2013).

 3. See The Michigan Legislative Council (2009).

 4. Canada and the US are not alone in their tradition of ‘specialist ombudsman systems’. Albeit the JVB is the only prison ombudsman in Germany, Germany has a very long although possibly not commonly known specialty ombudsman tradition featuring ombudsmen for the military, data protection, etc. For details please see Carl (2013) and Schlaffer (2006, p. 87).

 5. Until 2012 known as the British and Irish Ombudsman Association.

 6. For details on the classification of ombudsmen please see Carl (2012a, p. 203ff.).

 7. For the PPO and PONI please see: Seneviratne (2012b, p. 343).

 8. Section 4 of AV d. JM vom 13. Dezember 2010 (4400 – IV. 396).

 9. For the claim see Seneviratne (2012b, p. 350) with further references.

10. Germany sports only a limited number of ombudsmen overall, including the German Military Ombudsman, regional Laender ombudsmen in Rhineland-Palatinate, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Schleswig-Holstein and the Free State of Thuringia as well as some regional data protection commissioners; c.f. Carl (2013).

11. Section 4 of AV d. JM vom 13. Dezember 2010 (4400 – IV. 396).

12. For this point and the following see Seneviratne (2012b, p. 352ff.).

13. For the UK, see Woolf and Tumim (pp. 19ff., 26).

14. Sections 1 and 3 of the AV d. JM vom 13. Dezember 2010 (4400 – IV. 396). North Rhine-Westphalia is currently considering enacting a new prison law that may include a statutory basis for the JVB.

15. As evidenced by the protocols of the plenary debates at the time: Plenarprotokoll 14/93 Section 12 to Drs. 14/6866 from 27 May 2008, p. 11076; for details on the cross-fertilisation processes leading to the creation of the JVB see Carl (2013).

16. Section 6 of the AV d. JM from 13 December 2010, 4400 – IV. 396

17. Section 7 of the AV d. JM from 13 December 2010, 4400 – IV. 396

18. AV d. JM from 14 March 2007, 4400 – IV. 396 and AV d. JM from 13 December 2010, 4400 – IV. 396.

19. JVB (2011, pp. 27–33) describes the process and pp. 318–355 depict the new guidelines.

20. JVB (2011, pp. 235–312). Although ombudsmen traditionally cannot enforce recommendations, acceptance rates are usually good, c.f. Seneviratne (2012b, p. 347ff.).

21. c.f. §7 I of the German penal law and §6 of the accompanying administrative regulations. JVB (2011, pp. 255–257).

22. AV d. JM from 8 February 2008, 4551 – IV.23 makes no mention of HIV and thus also excludes Hepatitis and other infections.

23. Landtag NRW, Drs. 15/1324.

24. Here and in the following: JVB (2011, p. 251).

25. Landtag NRW, Drs. 15/3494.

26. AV d. JM from 3 May 2012, 4551 – IV.23.

27. This course of action has recently been depreciated by the German Bundestag. In Drs. 17/11136 from 23 October 2012 the Ministry of Justice argues that any transmission of infection status creates a false security where the handling of untested inmates is concerned.

28. Frankfurter Rundschau (2010).

29. This disregards MPs, which are considered ineffective c.f. Rowat (1993, p. 130ff.) and Wener (1983, p. 12).

30. Also in favour of designating prison ombudsmen as NPM: Rotthaus (2008, p. 373).

31. See also Nationalstelle zur Verhütung von Folter (2013). Whether the ‘Nationalstelle zur Verhütung von Folter’ fulfils the minimum requirements of an NPM has previously been questioned by Feest (2007, p. 308).

32. C.f.HM Inspectorate of Prisons (2013).