Conflict and Consensus in Germany's Bi-cameral System: A Case Study of the Passage of the Agenda 2010

Abstract

The chances for the second Schröder government's Agenda 2010 reforms to be enacted were slim as the government lacked a majority in the Bundesrat and the reforms met with hostility in the governing parties, the trades unions and parts of the electorate. Nevertheless, the reforms were passed in 2003. Building on a veto-player framework, the present case study demonstrates that highly contested policy reforms such as the Agenda 2010 can be passed even if the number of veto players is high, when the legislative status quo is unattractive for the parties; the government is successful in employing its agenda-setting powers; the timing in the electoral cycle is favourable; and the opposition lacks cohesiveness.

Notes

¹ For a brief analysis see Sturm.

² See, for example, the seminal analysis by Katzenstein.

³ On 23 May 2004, federal president Horst Köhler insisted in his widely quoted acceptance speech (following his election to the highest office in the Federal Republic) that economic and social policies in Germany needed fundamental change. The text of the speech can be found at http://www.bundespraesident.de/Reden-und-Interviews-,11057.95138/Ansprache-von-Horst-Koehler-vo.htm?global.back=/-%2c11057%2c0/Reden-und-Interviews.htm%3flink%3dbpr_liste%26link.sDateV%3d23.05.2004%26link.sDateB%3d23.05.2004 (accessed 28 June 2006). In many ways his speech echoed a similarly urgent plea for policy reform made by one of his presidential predecessors, Roman Herzog, in a speech on 26 April 1997. This speech can be accessed on http://www.bundespraesident.de/dokumente/-,2.15154/Rede/dokument.htm (accessed 28 June 2006).

⁴ See federal chancellor Angela Merkel's Bundestag speech on the major policy goals of the new government on 30 November 2005 (http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklaerungen-,12484.926301/regierungserklaerung/Regierungserklaerung-von-Bunde.htm; accessed 28 June 2006) and the debate following this government declaration. (The text of the Bundestag debate can be downloaded from http://www.Bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp/2005/16004a.zip; accessed 28 June 2006.) Similar criticisms can be found in journalistic accounts (see, for example, Darnstädt) and academic studies (for example, Green and Paterson; Schmidt-Jortzig).

⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 44. Sitzung, 30 June 2006 (http://dip.Bundestag.de/btp/16/16044.pdf).

⁶ For a brief account in English see Welsh.

⁷ See Kropp; Niedermayer (119–30); Saalfeld (70–76).

⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 84. Sitzung, 19 Dec. 2003 (http://dip.Bundestag.de/btp/15/15084.pdf). The bills usually associated with the Agenda 2010 were not the only examples of reform progress: Despite a lack of control of the Bundesrat, the federal government had been successful in getting its tax and pension reforms passed in 2000 and 2001, whereas the reform of immigration law and federalism failed. See Kropp (256).

⁹ Websites of the German federal president, federal government, Chancellor's Office, Ministry of Economics and Employment, the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the major political parties.

¹⁰ The following newspapers were systematically searched for information on the relevant actors’ policy preferences and negotiation strategies: The Economist, The Financial Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt. The article will be relatively parsimonious as far as references to specific newspaper articles are concerned, unless there are verbatim quotes. This seems appropriate as all events and processes are in the public domain and can be checked against a variety of sources.

¹¹ For brief surveys with further references see Adomeit; Koch and Walwei; Kropp (247–56); Seifert; Sturm; for a “history” of the reforms during the first Schröder government (1998–2002) see various contributions to Gohr and Seeleib-Kaiser.

¹² For a brief account of different “institutionalisms” see Peters.

¹³ His model can account for time-varying elements in the interactions between veto players (modelled as changes in the attractiveness of the status quo), but Tsebelis’ empirical work does not focus on these dynamic aspects.

¹⁴ In the German case, progress has already been made by authors such as Zohlnhöfer (“Partisan Politics”). See also Bawn; König and Troeger.

¹⁵ See, for example, “Regierungswechsel”.

¹⁶ For a recent pertinent analysis of higher education policy see Wiesner.

¹⁷ For an example of this type of argument see Grosser.

¹⁸ For empirical evidence see Klingemann and Volkens as well subsequent work of the Party Manifesto Group (Budge et al.).

¹⁹ See, for example, the excellent survey by Schmidt (“Impact” 175–83).

²⁰ For a discussion see Ganghof and Manow (12–20).

²¹ This simplification is preferable for presentational purposes, but does not make any difference for the general argument.

²² For a summary see Schmidt (“Impact”).

²³ Schmid.

²⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 4. Sitzung, 29 Oct. 2002, http://dip.Bundestag.de/btp/15/15004.pdf (accessed 28 June 2006).

²⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 84. Sitzung, 19 Dec. 2003 (http://dip.Bundestag.de/btp/15/15084.pdf).

²⁶ Schröder's reforms were extremely unpopular with organised labour and some SPD core voter groups on the left. For these groups the reforms went too far in reducing welfare provision. On the right there was criticism that the reforms did not go far enough. In addition, Schröder faced a second legislative chamber with an opposition majority and had won the 2002 election by the narrowest of margins.

²⁷ The increased use of expert commissions was analysed, amongst others, by Murswieck (121–26).

²⁸ In May 2006, the state premiers of Baden-Württemberg and Northrhine-Westfalia (Oettinger, Rüttgers, both CDU) criticised the reforms as “patchwork”. A member of the SPD National Executive Committee (Schreiner) called for them to be scrapped, because they had failed to reduce unemployment. The Department of Employment expressed its concern about the administrative costs arising from the implementation of the policy.

²⁹ For brief accounts see Lehmbruch (162–72) and Zohlnhöfer (“Partisan Politics”).

³⁰ It is “mixed” in the sense that its composition cuts across the government–opposition divide in the Bundestag.

³¹ König (486).

³² See Chandler et al.; Heller (793); Sieberer.

³³ Dästner (35).

³⁴ Heinelt and Weck (50); Bandelow and Schubert (122).

³⁵ See Zohlnhöfer (“Einfluss” 58–64).

³⁶ See, for example, Green.

³⁷ See, however, Laver.

³⁸ See, for example, the critique by Patzelt (“Chancellor Schröder's Approach”) and the widely quoted article by the president of the Federal Constitutional Court, Hans-Jürgen Papier. For a more general analysis see Benz.

³⁹ This strategy is described by Murswieck (118–21).