Outline History of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Independentists): An Emancipatory Communism 1918–1925

Abstract

This article examines an aspect of the Russian and East European Revolutions that has been largely overlooked by historians. That of the Independentist Ukrainian Marxists who challenged both the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian nationalists in their quest for an independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Originating in Ukrainian Social-Democracy, the Nezalezhnyky (Independentists) anticipated many of the ideas of the communist oppositions' who sought to reassert the libertarian goals of the revolution. Struggling first within the Ukrainian Peoples Republic then the Ukrainian SSR, their campaign had international ramifications and gained the support Bela Kun's Soviet Hungary. In 1919, commanding a section of the Red Army the Nezalezhnyky led a pro-soviet rebellion larger and far more serious than the Kronstadt uprising. Organised as the Ukrainian Communist Party, between 1919–1925 they were the last legal-opposition party in the USSR. In the face of harassment they were the only communists to explicitly advocate a theory of permanent revolution and developed a concept of proletarian hegemony. They opposed NEP as return to capitalist advocating soviet democracy and a self-governing of Ukraine. The history and ideas of these Marxist's provides a new insight into the fate of the Russian, Ukrainian and East European revolutions.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the following colleagues for the valuable assistance in the research and editing of a number of texts cited in this article and particularly of the Memorandum of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Volodymyr Ishchenko, Borys Pozdnyakov, Roman Pishchalov, Natalia Onyshchenko from Kyiv and Hal Rakovsky in the USA.

Notes

¹ From 1937–1991 Soviet Ukraine was known in Ukrainian as - Ukrayins'ka Radyans’ka Sotsialistychna Respublika, and in Russian as Ukrainskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (USSR).

² In the face of the opposition of the All-Union Politburo a separate historiography of the ruling Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine took shape. On the one hand this historiography was marred by a trait of ascribing to this party “the entire previous history of all revolutionary movements (workers’, peasants’, etc)”, while on the other hand it broached the question of the “independent origins and evolution of the KP(b)U and also of a separate history of the Ukrainian working and peasants classes, Ukrainian revolutionary movement and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917–1921” (Jurij, 1953). The driving force behind this was the Ukrainian element of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (KP(b)U) at whose initiative the All-Ukrainian Committee for the Study of Party History (Istpart) of the Central Committee was founded in January 1922 (Lawrynenko XIII).

³ Butsenko; Medvedev; Avdiyenko. There were accounts of the rise of Ukrainian Social Democracy, most notably the works of Yosyf Hermaize, a former member of the USDRP and Secretary of the historical section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN), under M. Hrushevsky. His most notable work was Narysy z istorii" revoliutsiinoho rukhu na Ukraini, Kyiv, 1926. He emphasised the distinctive qualities of the Ukrainian movement. This was to prove the key text on the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) and beginnings of Ukrainian Social Democracy, he was unable to complete his study. Hermaize was subjected to a campaign of denunciation by the leading KP(b)U historian Matvi Yavorsky who polemicised against his alleged Ukrainian exclusiveness and failure to take account of Russian influences.

⁴ Chyrko “Krakh ideolohii ta polityky natsionalistychnoi partii ukapistiv”.

⁵ Vynnychenko Vidrodzheniia natsii; Halahan “Likvidatsiya UKP”.

⁶ Khrystiuk Pavlo Zamitky i materiialy do istoriï ukraïns’koï revoliutsiï 1917–1920.

⁷ Maistrenko Borotbism.

⁸ Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya Chapter IX.

⁹Stachiw; Borys; Mace; see also Hunczak. In fact no Ukrainian communists at the time defined themselves “national communists”; both the UKP and the Foreign Group of the UKP explicitly rejected the term as one they ascribed to chauvinist traits in the communism of the imperialist states Russia and Germany. This refutation of “national communism” is argued by Levynsky (“Sotsiialistychna revolutsiia i Ukraina”), and by Andriy Richytsky and H. Lapchinsky in a letter from the TsK UKP of 30 April 1921 (Richytsky and Lapchinsky).

¹⁰Adams 93.

¹¹Bojcun “The Working Class”; Kowalewski; see also Bojcun “Approaches to the Study of the Ukrainian Revolution”.

¹² Visotskii Ukrainski sotsial-demokrati ta eseri.

¹³ Bachinsky Dokumenti Trahichnoii Istorii Ukraini.

¹⁴ This was a reassertion of the Soviet paradigm of historiography of the revolution, with articles by Lyubovets; Richytskiy; Skripnik.

¹⁵ As part of manoeuvres in the Ukrainian parliament there was a rumour that certain oligarchs were going to organise a Communist Party under the name of Ukrainian Communist Party, a throwback to the communist party independent of the Bolsheviks.

¹⁶ Lyst TsK Vikonomy Kominternu Pro Vzayemovidnostini Mizh UKP i KP(b)U, 27 August 1924 (Bachinskyi 523).

¹⁷ This was espoused by figures as such as Isaak Mazepa and Panas Fadenko, the moderate leaders of the émigré group of the USDRP, continued by historians of the national school, key texts being: Stachiw, Borys, Hunczak, Mace.

¹⁸ Himka 140–41.

¹⁹ While Georgii Plekhanov has been credited with being the “father of Russian Marxism”, he was in fact neither the first Marxist theorist nor the first to popularise Marx's ideas in the Russian Empire. That was Mykola Ziber, a member of the Hromada of Kyiv: with Ziber we find the genesis of the Ukrainian Marxist tradition. The embryo of organised Marxism was already developing in the activity of Ziber and Serhii Podolynsky the precursor of Ukrainian Marxism when they set up a study group on Marx's economics in 1870.

²⁰ Rosdolsky Nonhistoric Peoples 13 n. 48.

²¹ Serhii Podolynsky's vision articulated a vision of a future socialist order of “communal self-government” which would “transfer land to the peasant communes and of the factories to the workers artels”. Roman Serbyn, In defense of an independent Ukrainian socialist movement: Three letters from Serhii Podolynsky to Valerian Smirnov', Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 1982. p.20. Similarly Marx had emphasised that the peasant commune could be saved by serving as a “point of departure” within a communist revolution in Russia, the success of which was conditional upon a corresponding “proletarian revolution in the West”. Given such a linkage Russia could avoid going through the vicissitudes of capitalism. Marx, First Draft of Letter To Vera Zasutich, March 1881; Marxist Internet Archive: http://www.marxiste.org/archive/marx/works/1881/03/zasulich1.htm This was in contrast to Plekhanov's economic determinist antagonism to the peasant commune and statist and authoritarian conception of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”.

²² Mykola Porsh wrote in 1907: “Workers’ parties in Russia and abroad demand that land, water resources and all the natural deposits should be alienated from the large owners and passed into communal use. They propose to create communal, cooperative or municipal economy instead of the wasteful and detrimental capitalist order. The people would greatly benefit from this communal property” (96). Mykola Porsh, Pro Avtonomiyu Ukrainy, Kyiv, Prosvita, 1907, p.96.

²³ Podolynsky participated in the International Working Mens Association; the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party and USDRP participated in the Second International and the Zimmerwald movement.

²⁴ The antagonism of the Russian Social Democracy towards Ukrainian socialism was deep rooted. It can be traced to the very inception of both movements in the nineteenth century. Indeed it brought Engels into conflict with Plekhanov, when he failed to support Ukrainian national rights. This revealing conflict arose in 1890 over Engels's essay, “The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsardom”. Plekhanov replied criticising Engels for his consideration of Ukrainians as a nation. Engels had come to believe that one positive outcome of the overthrow of Tsarism would be that “Little Russia [Ukraine] will be able to choose its political connections freely”. The following year Plekhanov published O Bezvykhodnosti Uukrainskago Sotsializma v Rossii. It depicted the Russian conquest of Ukraine as an economic necessity and the Ukrainian movement as utopian with no historical basis: “The abolition of serfdom, universal conscription, the development of commerce and industry, … the influence of urban life and civilization—these are the factors that have definitively merged the rural population of Ukraine, even linguistically, … into a sphere of influences shared with Russia” (cited in Rosdolsky Nonhistoric Peoples 189).

²⁵ There is no complete study of the Ukrainian question in these debates. Works which cover this period include: V. Levynsky, L'internatonale socialiste et les peuples opprimes, Vienna, 1920, A. Karpenko, Lenin's Theory of The National Question And Its Contradictions, META, 2 No. 3–4, 1979, M. Yurkevich, ‘A Forerunner of National Communism: Lev Yurkevych (1885–1918), Journal of Ukrainian Studies. 7:1, spring 1982. Lenin's Struggle For Revolutionary international, Monad, 1986, Lev Rybalka (Yurkevych) ‘Rosiiski marksysty i ukrainskyi rukh’, Dzvin 7–8. 1913.

²⁶ The Social Democratic Workers Party of Austria (SPO) congress at Brno stated that Austria was to be transformed into a democratic federative state of nationalities (Bauer Question of Nationalities, London, 2000, 422). The founding programme of the USDRP demanded the “right of every nation to cultural and political self-determination” and that Russia be transformed into a “Democratic Republic” with broad “local and territorial self-government for the whole population of the state” in which there would be “equal rights of all languages at schools, courts, local administrative and government institutions” (Stalittia, 94–101).

²⁷ Bauer himself wrote an analysis, “Ukrainian Social Democracy” in the Polish socialist paper Naprzód 9 Jan. 1912.

²⁸ Symptomatic was the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) where Mykola Mikhnovsky, prioritising independence, led a split in 1902, his ideas being branded “zoological nationalism”. The RUP fractured again in 1905, with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union or Spilka led by M. Melenevsky-Basok forming an autonomous section of the RSDRP (Mensheviks). The Spilka saw the national question as an auxiliary issue. Though initially successful Spilka was relegated to the role of peasant organisers and suggested it became an All-Russian section (see Boshyk).

²⁹ Haslo No. 3, 1903 (cited in Boshyk 171).

³⁰ The Agrarian Program of the French Workers Party was republished as an RUP pamphlet with an introduction by D. Antonovych in 1903, Agrarna programa Frantsuzkoi robitnychoi Partii, Biblioteka Haslo, Chernivtsi, 1903. Werner Sombarf's Socialism and the Social Movement, was republished by Moloda Ukraina in Lviv, Galicia in 1899.

³¹ Lev Yurkevych, Peredmova, Volodymyr Levynsky, Narys Rozvytki Ukrainskoho Rukh v Halychnyia, Dzvin, Kyiv (1914).

³² Rybalka (Yurkevych) “L’Ukraine Et La Guerre”.

³³ Draper 1–33. Draper described the fundamental historical division in the socialist movement between forms of “socialism from above” conceived of a socialism handed down to the masses by an elite as opposed to being realised by the masses themselves, organised in democratic organs under their own control.

³⁴ Rybalka “L’Ukraine Et La Guerre” 22.

³⁵ This was cited in the report to the conference of the Second International, in Copenhagen at which Yurkevych attended as the USDRP delegate (see Bericht der Ukrainischen Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiter-Partei 5).

³⁶ The USDRP CC reported: “A central task will be to develop our national class politics opposed to the Ukrainian bourgeois national movement and opposed to these intellectuals in the party which have sympathy for this Ukrainian bourgeois national movement” (Bericht der Ukrainischen Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiter-Partei 13). Yurkevych was instrumental in the expulsion of Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) from the USDRP.

³⁷ Yurkevych bemoaned: “The Ukrainian Marxist intelligentsia has almost no interest in a workers’ press. Our generation, carelessly and without perspectives of its own, has gotten involved in Ukrainian bourgeois affairs. Its path and that of the Ukrainian workers’ movement have parted ways apparently forever” (Rybalka “Paki I paki” 277).

³⁸ The majority of USDRP leaders opposed the war, a minority adopted a pro-Russian or a pro-Austrian orientation and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was formed by Melenevskyi and the former General Secretary of the USDRP Andrii Zhuk.

³⁹ See Rosdolsky “Do istorii Soiuzu vyavolennia Ukrainy”.

⁴⁰ P. Diatliv, a Central Committee member of the USDRP, wrote to Levynsky defending his anti-war stance being espoused by Yurkevych: “Thus, your statement that the views of Borotba are the personal views of ‘Mr. Rybalka’ [Yurkevych] is contrary to the fact. … But you, comrade, as a person familiar with the programme and tactics of our party, undoubtedly know that the views of Borotba really correspond to the USDRP traditions” (Doroshenko 62).

⁴¹“War or Revolution?” Borotba No. 4, September 1915, 3–6.

⁴² Rybalka “L’Ukraine Et La Guerre” 54.

⁴³ Yurkevych had secured broad support including in the RSDRP, his sympathisers included Leon Trotsky, Maniulsky, and the left group Vperyod.

⁴⁴“Furthermore we connect with the Bolsheviks in their decisive fight against social patriotism. The endeavors of the Mensheviks to cover up the pestilence of social patriotism, which during the war was revealed in all its shocking nakedness in the whole Socialist International, only presents an echo of world opportunism—and we have to declare war on this if we want to save socialism from a new intellectual catastrophe. Whoever claims that the Bolsheviks are the tendency of ‘splitters’ just because they stand for the curing of the International from the infection of patriotism, has either not grasped the huge significance of the current crisis of world socialism, or are themselves infected with this patriotic disease.” (“Russian Social Democracy and Us” Borotba No. 2, April 1915, 3).

⁴⁵ Rybalka “Russkie Sotsialdemokrat”. Republished in Russian and Ukrainian, edited by Ivan Maistrenko (Munich: Sucanist, 1969). All quotations are from the English translation by Myroslav Yurkevich, “The Russian Social Democrats and the National Question”. Rybalka “Russian Social Democrats” 59.

⁴⁶ Rybalka “Russian Social Democrats” 77.

⁴⁷ Rybalka “Russian Social Democrats” 78.

⁴⁸ Yurkevych had particular influence on the Retrograd and Moscow USDRP Committees who republished articles of Borotba in their journal Nashe Zhyttya.

⁴⁹ Doroshenko 37.

⁵⁰ The USDRP grew significantly in 1917; in early May the USDRP claimed it was “transforming itself into a mass workers’ organisation”; by the end of 1917 it claimed 40,000 members (Robitnycha Hazeta 6 May 1917, cited in Bojcun “Working Class” 279).

⁵¹ Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 2 102.

⁵² Porsh, 31.

⁵³ Lyst TsK Vikonomy Kominternu Pro Vzayemovidnostini Mizh UKP i KP(b)U, 27 August 1924 (Bachinskyi 524–5).

⁵⁴.V. Vynnychenko, Rozlad i pohodzhennia (cited in Rudnytsky 419).

⁵⁵ It is worth recording that the USDRP played a pivotal role in the February Revolution in Petrograd.

⁵⁶ Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 1 102.

⁵⁷ Richytsky “Memorandum” 45–66.

⁵⁸ Vynnychenko Vidrodzheniia natsii Vol. 1 251–2.

⁵⁹ Porsh complained that: “At first the Central Rada was a bloc of parties united around the slogan of autonomy and federation. When our party entered the Rada, it replaced its class orientation with a national one. Some of our comrades said quite plainly that until we achieve the goal of unity there can be no class struggle in the Central Rada … As far as I am concerned, Ukrainian Social Democrats had no right compromising on class interests in deference to general, national ones” (Robitnycha Hazeta 4 October 1917). According to Vynnychenko this was not simply due to their sociology, or opportunism but that they acted as “democrats, republicans and national revolutionists rather than socialists” (Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 2 89–90).

⁶⁰ Raya Dunayevskaya identified a similar problem in the anti-colonial revolutions after 1945: “The greatest obstacle to the further development of these national liberation movements comes from the intellectual bureaucracy which has emerged to ‘lead’ them. In the same manner the greatest obstacle in the way of the working class overcoming capitalism comes from the Labor bureaucracy that leads it” (Dunayevskaya 15).

⁶¹ Robitnycha Hazeta 7 April 1917.

⁶² Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 2 91.

⁶³ Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 2 183.

⁶⁴ Nashe Zhyttya [Our Life] 24 March 1917. That Ukrainian Social Democrats were outlining this perspective in late March is of historical importance; very few projected these ideas until the return of Lenin with his April Theses. When he presented it he was virtually isolated within the [Rossiyskoya Sotsial-demokraticheskaya Rabochaya Partiya-Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks) RSDRP(b)]. Ironically among the first people he took his opinions to were the soldiers of the USDRP influenced Izmailovsky Regiment on 10 April.

⁶⁵ The principle resoultions adopted by the Fourth Congress of the USDRP was drafted by Mykola Porsh, the congress itself was influenced not only by the traditional left leaders but the new generation of militants such as Neronovych and Richylsky. The report and resolutions of the congress were published in Robitnycha Hazeta – Organ of the Bureau of the Central Committee and Kyiv Committee of the USDRP. 1, 3, 5 and 7 October 1917.

⁶⁶Ibid. Robitnycha Hazeta 1, 5 and 7 October 1917.

⁶⁷ These problems of the revolution were highlighted in the writings of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhray in Do khvyli, Saratov, 1919 (Mazlakh and Shakhray). This became a key text of the pro-autonomy/independence currents of Ukrainian communism during the revolutionary years.

⁶⁸ The Third Congress of the UPSR stated that: “the national side of the revolution begins to threaten the further successful development of the socio-economic class struggle” warning that the Central Rada could lose the support of the peasants and workers in Ukraine which will also threaten the national gains of the revolution (Khrystiuk, 65).

⁶⁹ In seven out of ten of Ukraine's largest cities the councils of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies supported the Central Rada as the legitimate governing organ. Evidence suggests the majority of the approximately 320 urban councils were ready to build an independent Ukraine, evidencing a clear evolution in working class opinions on the national question. This support for re-election was particularly strong in towns in the northern gubernyas and in Kyiv, Kremenchuk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Kherson, Katerynsoslav, Odessa and Mykolaiv soviets. See Hamretsky.

⁷⁰ In their campaign for the re-election of the Rada through a congress of soviets, the Bolsheviks did not seek unity with like-minded Ukrainian socialists, nor secure support from the soviets that had already backed such a congress. Instead it was called by the RSDRP Kyiv Committee. See Prymak.

⁷¹ An exception to this was the Poltava Committee of the RSDRP (Bolsheviks) who were engaged in negotiations with the USDRP and sought a revolutionary socialist regroupment in Ukraine.

⁷² The USDRP predicted the worst of the right wing UPSR: “the revolutionary situation is marked now by a transition to the stage of anarchy, after which it will pass to reaction and entirely other elements that are far from the proletariat will stand at the helm of the state. At this moment our party cannot be responsible for the devious policy of the SRs” (Robitnycha Hazeta 16 January 1918).

⁷³ Those delegates disaffected by the events in Kyiv walked out and made their way to the rival Congress of Soviets of the Donbas, Kryvyi Rih area being held in Kharkiv on 9 December 1917. Subsequent Soviet historiography would recognise this event as the First All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets. Though mainly consisting of RSDRP(b) and Russian Left-SRs; it also included UPSR and USDRP delegates. A split took place in the USDRP based on a tendency known as the USDRP(Left), headed by Medvedev and Neronovych. See Butsenko (121–2).

⁷⁴ Evheniya Bosch was born in 1879 in Kherson province; in 1901 she joined RSDRP and became a Bolshevik. Heading their Kyiv committee, she was politically close to the left-wing of the RSDRP and sided with Pyatakov and Bukharin against Lenin on the national question. She resigned her post in protest at the Brest-Litovsk Peace. She suffered from illnesses, which forced her to suicide in late 1924. Her books include: Nationalnoye pravitelstvo l sovetskoya vlast na ukraina [The National Government and Soviet Power in Ukraine] (1919) and God borby, Borba za vlast na Ukraina saprelya 1917 g do netskoi okkupatsii [Years of Struggle: The Fight for Power in Ukraine from April 1917 to German Occupation] (1925; republished in 1990).

⁷⁵ Sakhray [V. Skorovstansky] a former USDRP organiser and minister wrote: “When open, armed struggle with the Central Rada began, Bolsheviks from all parts of Ukraine … were of one mind in proposing that a Soviet centre should be established in Ukraine as a counterweight to the Central Rada, and not one responsible member of this party ventured to protest against the promulgation and creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic. On the contrary, in complete agreement with the programmatic demand of the right of every nation to self-determination, they openly or at least tacitly stood on its [the Republic's] ground. The will of the Ukrainian nation emerged, the Ukrainian people separated into a Republic in federative union with other parts of Russia. Well and good! We in this Republic will wage a war not against the Ukrainian People's Republic, not against the Ukrainian people, not in order to strangle it. No! This will be a struggle for power within the Ukrainian People's Republic—this will be a class struggle …” (Skorovstansky 110–11).

⁷⁶ There was a retreat from the Kharkiv Congress of Soviets’ decisions with an array of splinter Soviet republics. Real power was revealed to be not the soviet government but the military forces of Soviet Russia. Shakhray, a minister, complained: “What kind of Ukrainian government is this when its members do not know and do not want to know the Ukrainian language? They have no influence in Ukrainian society. No-one has even heard their names before. What kind of ‘Ukrainian Minister of the Army’ am I when all of the Ukrainised divisions in Kharkiv will not obey me and defend Soviet power and I am compelled to disarm them? The only military support we have in our struggle against the Central Rada is the army Antonov brought into Ukraine from Russia, an army moreover that looks at everything Ukrainian as hostile and counterrevolutionary” (cited in Bojcun “Working Class” 327).

⁷⁷ On 9 March 1918 Colonel von Stolzenberg told his High Command: “It is very doubtful whether this government, composed as it is exclusively of left opportunists, will be able to establish a firm authority” (Fedyshyn 96).

⁷⁸ Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 3 24.

⁷⁹ Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom III p.18.

⁸⁰ There was also a shift in working class opinion on the national question, with significant support for an independent Ukraine. This was confirmed by the Second All-Ukrainian Workers Congress on 13 May 1918; despite a non-Ukrainian majority it agreed to a united struggle with the peasantry for an independent Ukrainian Peoples Republic, sentiments further expressed at the All-Ukrainian Conference of Trade Unions, again largely non-Ukrainian in composition (Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom III p.18; Bojcun “Working Class” 373).

⁸¹ The Directory members were: Vynnychenko, as Chairman, Petliura, F. Shevets of the Peasant Union, P. Andriievsky, Independent Socialists, and A. Makarenko representing the rail workers trade union.

⁸² The Nezalezhnyky counted a number of prominent figures in its ranks: Mykhaylo Tkachenko, their main theorist, had been Minister of Internal Affairs of the Central Rada; Volodymyr Chekhivsky, the Head of the Council of Ministers of the revived UNR government. The other leading theorist was Andriy Richytsky; he was one of the editors of the USDRP central organ Robitnycha Gazeta in 1917. Mykhaylo Avdiyenko was the most active practical figure, originally from the strong Petrograd USDRP organisation where he was soldier; later in Kyiv he was close to Vynnychenko. Another prominent member was Antin Drahomyretsky, a Kyiv functionary and Yurko Mazurenko; he was in command of the USDRP Revolutionary Committee and in 1917 played a key role in blocking the passage to Petrograd of Kornilov.

⁸³ Khrystiuk Vol. IV Chapter III 52.

⁸⁴ When the Dniprovska Division entered Kyiv on the defeat of Skoropadsky it was under red banners and slogans of “All power to the Soviets!” and “All land to the peasants”. Fearing they would make an attempt to take power, Petlyura transferred them from the city (Petrichenko).

⁸⁵ Ukrainian People's Socialist Republic December 1918 (Robitnycha Hazeta, 7 January 1919, Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom. IV, pp. 55–56).

⁸⁶ Ukrainian People's Socialist Republic December 1918 (Robitnycha Hazeta, 7 January 1919, Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom. IV, pp. 55–56).

⁸⁷ The KAPD was the dissident Communist Workers Party of Germany. Pannekoek made this point about the dictatorship of the communist party in “Der neue Balnquisismus”.

⁸⁸ An illustration was Colonel Bolbochan, the former Hetmanate commander of the Zaporozhian Division, who was appointed the Directory's commander in chief in Left-Bank Ukraine. Bolbochan instituted a reign of terror against the resurgence of the agrarian revolution and the workers’ councils (Baker “Peasants, Power and Revolution in the Village” 167–8).

⁸⁹ Assessing what had arisen in the UNR, “Andr. Mykh” of the Nezalezhnyky wrote: “Whatever was alive and popular in it has passed to the masses where it works. But remnants of the nationalist bourgeoisie and intelligentsia cling to the blue and yellow banner, arrange buffoonery, meetings to the sound of church bells, prayer services and other attributes of national sentimentalism, which only serve to discredit the popular movement and its leaders. Our task and the task of the Directory at the present moment is to break completely with remnants of the national front” (Robitnycha Hazeta, December 1918, pp. 55–56).

⁹⁰ Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV, p.69.

⁹¹ Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV, p.69.

⁹² Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV, p.69.

⁹³ The discussions that Porsh held with Mazepa on their own do not explain such a volte-face by Porsh. One can only surmise that the experience of the Bolshevik rule in Ukraine had seriously disillusioned Porsh, as it had others. It was his last speech to a USDRP audience in Ukraine after which he was dispatched as UNR ambassador to Germany. In January 1921 he began to adopt a more sovietophile politics; he made a speech at a student meeting calling on the émigrés to recognise the Soviet Ukrainian government and return to the Ukraine. Porsh applied to return to the Ukraine himself in 1922 and in January 1923 the Ukrainian Politburo decided to allow him to return though he never took up the offer. He started to drift away from political activity and suffered a tragic death in Germany in 1944.

⁹⁴ Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 3 242.

⁹⁵ Chervony Prapor 22 January 1919.

⁹⁶ Chervony Prapor 22 January 1919.

⁹⁷ Chervony Prapor 22 January 1919.

⁹⁸ Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV p.13.

⁹⁹ Chervony Prapor 22 January 1919.

¹⁰⁰ Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV, pp. 49–54.

¹⁰¹ Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV 12.

¹⁰² There is speculation that it was without Lenin's knowledge that the Red Army advanced into Ukraine in late December 1918 (Adams 82–5).

¹⁰³ Mazurenko Dokymenti Trahichnoi Istorii Ukrayini 248–53.

¹⁰⁴ An act complemented by Red Army commander Antonov also lobbying Moscow against an agreement stating there was “nobody in Ukraine with whom we should negotiate” (Stachiw 258).

¹⁰⁵ Mazurenko's efforts are considered to have been sabotaged by the new head of the Directory of the UNRS. (Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 3 279–80).

¹⁰⁶ Most successfully in Left-Bank Ukraine in Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Katerynoslav guberniya the Directory was overthrown. On the Right Bank attempted risings occurred in Volhynia, Zhytomyr and in the Obruch district where the Otamanshchyna responded with pogroms. In Vynnychenko's estimation in the territory under their control: “There was neither punishment, nor justice, nor trials, nor control over these criminals and enemies of the revolution and the national movement. The whole system of military authority was constructed and consciously based, by the chief otamany, on the principle that there would be no control” (Vynnychenko Vidrodzheniia natsii Vol. 3 188).

¹⁰⁷ Petrichenko.

¹⁰⁸ Chervony Prapor 6 February 1919.

¹⁰⁹ Chervony Prapor Kharkiv 11 July 1920.

¹¹⁰ The announcement was signed by the head of the committee Bubnov and the following members: P. Syrodenko, P. Dehtiarenko, M. Maior, V. Cherniavsky, H. Volkov, H. Myhailychenko, P. Liubchenko, I. Kachura, A. Chekhsis, I. Frenkel, and M. Avdiienko (Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom IV, p.81).

¹¹¹ Chervony Prapor 6 February 1919.

¹¹² Adams 25–64.

¹¹³ Pyatakov's best-known work on the national question is “The Proletariat and the ‘Right of Nations of self-determination’ in the Era of Finance Capital”, written under the name of “P. Kievsky” published in 1916 with Lenin's reply “A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism”.

¹¹⁴ Key texts are Rakovsky (ed. Fagan) and Broué. Neither of them actually engages critically with the policy of Rakovsky in Ukraine in 1919.

¹¹⁵ Chervony Prapor 6 February 1919.

¹¹⁶ Mazlakh and Shakhray 1115–17.

¹¹⁷ Tkachenko, Borotba Vienna No. 7–8 April 1920, p.3.

¹¹⁸ Chervony Prapor 9 March 1919.

¹¹⁹ Chervony Prapor 15 February 1919.

¹²⁰ Adams 125.

¹²¹ Workers’ councils existed only in the large towns, in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Katerynoslav, Poltava, Chernihiv, and then only in an advisory capacity.

¹²² There were major debates between Nezalezhnyky and supporters of “statisation” in the congresses of the chemical workers union, trade and industrial office workers, the tobacco workers, the metal workers, printers, the miners union, sugar refinery workers and the All-Ukrainian Teachers Union (Bojcun “Working Class” 446–9).

¹²³ Remington 167.

¹²⁴ Chervony Prapor 28 February 1919.

¹²⁵ Mazurenko 248–53.

¹²⁶ Riddell Founding the Communist International 98.

¹²⁷ KP(b)U Third Congress was held 1–6 March 1919; Adams 218–19.

¹²⁸ Maistrenko Borotbism 124–5.

¹²⁹ Manifest Vremennogo Raboche Krestianskogo Pravitel'stva Ukrainy, 1 December 1918 (cited in Mazlakh and Shakhrai 27).

¹³⁰ According to Balabanoff, first Secretary of the Communist International and a friend of Rakovsky's sent to assist him in Kyiv, “the Bolsheviks had set up an independent republic in the Ukraine. In actuality that section of it in which Soviet rule was established was completely dominated by the Moscow regime” (Balabanoff 234).

¹³¹ Khrystiuk IV.

¹³²“The Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky do not recognise the government; the Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky incite the workers and peasants against the government; the Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky agitate against helping starving Soviet Russia with grain from Ukraine; the Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky inflame national hatred; the Ukrainian Nezalezhnyky insist on drawing the rural proletariat into revolutionary construction and oppose the proletariat” (Khrystiuk IV).

¹³³ Chervony Prapor 3 April 1919.

¹³⁴ Mazurenko 248–53.

¹³⁵ Chervony Prapor 3 April 1919.

¹³⁶ This had been long recognised; Karl Radek had said on 20 October 1918 at the KP(b)U congress that the “our road to aid the workers of the Central Powers lies precisely over Ukraine, over Romania, over Eastern Galicia and over Hungary” (Borys Sovietization of Ukraine 205).

¹³⁷ Its critical articles on the great disagreement in the international communist family caused some consternation with Soviet Russia; as a result one Russian and one Pole were imposed on the editorial staff (Halahan Z Moїkh spomyniv 455).

¹³⁸ Halahan Z Moїkh spomyniv 445–6.

¹³⁹ Mykola Halahan, Z Moïkh spomyniv, 1880 ti 1920r, Tempora, Kyiv, 2005, pp. 445–46.

¹⁴⁰ Cable sent 8 July 1919 (Rudolf Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Stanford 1967, p.201).

¹⁴¹ Memorandum TsK KP(b)U Vikonkomu Kominternu, November 1924, M. Skypnik, A. Shumsky N. Popov (Mazurenko 551–2).

¹⁴² Adams 266.

¹⁴³ Tcherikover 373.

¹⁴⁴ The cause of the breach between Zeleny and the Bolshevik authorities was their decision to refuse the redistribution of the land of large sugar factories sought by the peasants. This fed into disagreements over the unit's status as a regiment of the Red Army, Chervony Prapor reporting that: “Zeleny stood and stands on the Soviet platform. The reason for the misunderstanding is Zeleny's unwillingness to meld into one with the Red Army, and Antonov knows why he is unwilling” (Khrystiuk IV).

¹⁴⁵ Mazurenko 248–53.

¹⁴⁶ Khrystiuk IV.

¹⁴⁷ Mazurenko 248–53.

¹⁴⁸ They split forming the “USDRP(Independents) Left” and began publishing the legal daily Chervonyi Styah. Along with the Borotbisty and the KP(b)U they later signed a joint statement charging Otaman Hryhoriiv's rebellion in the South as “betraying the revolution” (Bilshovyk 13 May 1919; Mazurenko 137–9).

¹⁴⁹ Signed by Drahomyretsky, Dybichenko, Selyanskyi, Vlasivskyi, Syrotenko, Secretary: Didych (Mazurenko 125–6).

¹⁵⁰ Richytsky “Memorandum” 45–66.

¹⁵¹ Indeed many of the Kronstadt rebels were Ukrainian recruits enrolled in autumn 1920 influenced by the very ideas of the insurgency of 1919.

¹⁵² Tcherikover 250.

¹⁵³ Mazurenko, List Chlena Tsk USDRP (Nezalezhnyky) Yury Mazurenko Khr. Rakovskomu pro Yoho Stavkennya do polityky Idiyalnosti KP(b)U, 27 December 1999, Dokumenti Trahichnoii Istorii Ukraini (1917–1927) P. Bachinskyi ed, Kyiv 1999, pp. 248–53.

¹⁵⁴ It appears the more moderate leaders of the UPSR and USDRP still aligned with Petlyura did not know about the agreements made by their emissaries in Kyiv with the Nezalezhnyky. They then subsequently refused to back the pro-soviet positions of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee. In a joint letter to the insurgent groups by, they stated: “Any party in Ukraine that stands for soviet power is liable to the same fate as the party of the Bolsheviks. Bolshevism in Russia is collapsing mainly because of internal disorder, because of the dissatisfaction of the peasants with soviet power. To model Ukrainian Soviet power on Russian Soviet power is absurd, because in principle these Bolshevisms do not differ from one another.” Khrystiuk. Zamitky i materiialy, Tom. IV, pp. 134–9.

¹⁵⁵ Khrystiuk IV.

¹⁵⁶ Mazurenko 248–53.

¹⁵⁷ Chervony Prapor No. 63, 25 December 1919.

¹⁵⁸ The moderate USDRP declared: “We did not believe what seemed to us absurd, that the peasants wanted to exchange strong Russian Bolsheviks for a sickly ‘Ukrainian bolshevism’ of those, who began ad hoc to call themselves left SRs or Nezalezhnyky … We declared to the Chief Staff and to the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee that they had become the victims of self-deception. The peasants rose up not for any Ukrainian soviet power, but in their own interests, both social and national”. The Nezalezhnyky were accused of threatening to execute “those who agitated for the people's government and Otaman Petlyura” (Vyzvolennia 25 July 1919, p.124; Khrystiuk IV).

¹⁵⁹ Robitnycha Hazeta 25 August 1919.

¹⁶⁰ The central organ of the USDRP reported: “the growth of uncertainty about the difference between our government, our system of rule and that of Denikin” (Robitnycha Hazeta 5 October 1919).

¹⁶¹ Chervony Prapor 23 December 1919. The August conference and the spring efforts of the Nezalezhnyky contradict the assertion of James Mace that the Nezalezhnyky in founding the UKP had “imitated the Borotbisty” (Mace 76).

¹⁶² Hrushevsky writes that, “under the slogan of a Ukrainian Republic that would be independent yet Soviet and friendly toward the Bolsheviks and Soviet Russia, the masses flocked to their banner” (Mace 59).

¹⁶³ The Federalists were based with the Twelfth Red Army left behind during the retreat. The federalists convened a conference in Homel on 25–26 November 1919. Despite declaring it illegal the RKP(B) sent Zatonsky, Manuilsky and Kosoir who secured reconstitution of the KP(b)U and no unity until the others dropped calls for a Ukrainian Red Army, and independence.

¹⁶⁴ Vynnychenko Vidrodzhennia natsii Vol. 3 491.

¹⁶⁵ Mazurenko 248–53.

¹⁶⁶ Chervony Prapor 21 December 1919.

¹⁶⁷“Orghanizatsihoho Komitety Ukrayins’ka Komunistychna Partiya” (USDRP Nezalezhnyk), Chervony Prapor 21 December 1919.

¹⁶⁸“Orghanizatsihoho Komitety Ukrayins’ka Komunistychna Partiya” (USDRP Nezalezhnyk), Chervony Prapor 21 December 1919.

¹⁶⁹ Chumak was Kyiv editor of the reaunched paper, Chervony Prapar, 23 December 1919.

¹⁷⁰ The Nezalezhnyky had sent Tkachenko to negotiate with the RKP(B) Central Committee, but on his way to Moscow he was taken ill with typhus and died; he was replaced by Yu. Mazurenko (Chyrko 24–35).

¹⁷¹Representatives attended from organisations in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav and Poltava (Chervony Prapor 27 January 1920).

¹⁷² Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 162.

¹⁷³Chyrko 24–35.

¹⁷⁴Prohrama Ukrainskoi Kommunistychnoi Partii, Mikh Tkachenko i And Richytsky. It was published in Russian and Ukrainian editions by the UKP, all citations are the Nova Doba edition (Tkachenko and Richytsky).

¹⁷⁵ “Prohrama Ukrainskai Kommunistychnoi Partii”, Nova Doba, no. 18, 1920, p.3.

¹⁷⁶Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 162. This is an unexplored aspect of Ukrainian Communism; Matvi Yavorsky for example drew heavily on Lukacs and Gramsci in his disputes at a time when Zinoviev was denouncing Lukacs.

¹⁷⁷This programme was adopted on 23 March 1919 at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party Bolsheviks (Mazurenko 248–53).

¹⁷⁸Anndiy Richytsky, Dvi Prohramy, Kyiv March 1919.

¹⁷⁹ Tkachenko and Richytsky 8.

¹⁸⁰ I have refrained from the using the term “national communism” which has been used by some scholars to define dissident Ukrainian Marxism which defended the national liberation of Ukraine. This was not a term used by such individuals or organisations to define themselves. Volodymyr Levynsky of the UKP Foreign Group wrote an article in 1920 explicitly rejecting the term which was identified with chauvinism within the communist party of dominant nations such as Russia and Germany (Levynsky “Sotsiialistychna revolutsiia i Ukraina”).

¹⁸¹ Tkachenko and Richytsky 16.

¹⁸² Chervony Prapor 26 March 1920.

¹⁸³ Tkachenko and Richytsky 29.

¹⁸⁴Tkachenko and Richytsky 23.

¹⁸⁵Tkachenko and Richytsky 4–46.

¹⁸⁶ Tkachenko and Richytsky 36.

¹⁸⁷ Chervony Prapor 12 February 1920.

¹⁸⁸ With 4000 being admitted to the KP(b)U (Maistrenko Borotbism 206).

¹⁸⁹ Chervony Prapor 29 January 1920.

¹⁹⁰ Chervony Prapor 29 January 1920.

¹⁹¹ Maistrenko Borotbism 195–6.

¹⁹² Of the 4000 Borotbisty who were admitted to the KP(b)U in 1920 only 118 remained after the purge of the following year; this contrasted with 1932 former Russian Mensheviks and 771 Russian SRs (Borys “Who Ruled” 219).

¹⁹³ Chervony Prapor 20 March 1920.

¹⁹⁴ Krawchenko 62.

¹⁹⁵ Chervony Prapor 29 January 1920.

¹⁹⁶ Chervony Prapor 29 January 1920.

¹⁹⁷ The “Bureau of the Central Committee of the USDRP” was party to the debacle. The government of Prime Minister Mazepa had not met since late 1919, then twelve days into the occupation these Social Democrats attempted to disassociate themselves from events. On 19 May the leaders of the USDRP decided that Mazepa should resign. This still did not extricate them from identification with the “Polish orientation” as it was dubbed, for Mazepa remained in the new Cabinet headed by the Socialist Federalist Vyacheslav Prokopovych (Vynnychenko Schodennyk 432).

¹⁹⁸ Krawchenko 274 n.103.

¹⁹⁹ Krawchenko has argued that as regards the KP(b)U the longer it existed on Ukrainian soil the more it came to identify with particularistic demands of the republic; this was expressed in the various oppositions that emerged within the RKP(B) (Krawchenko 102). This would appear to be the case with the Democratic Centralists in Ukraine and Russia. During the debates over the role of Communist Party members in the Trade Unions the “democratic centralists” proposed a resolution, passed by the Moscow Party, to the effect that “Party discipline in every case takes precedence over trade union discipline”. On the other hand the Southern Bureau, (Ukrainian) of the all Russian Congress of Trade Unions passed a resolution on autonomy for Party trade unionists and got it passed by the Fourth KP(b)U Conference.

²⁰⁰ Chervony Prapor 9 May 1920.

²⁰¹ Deklyaratsiya Ukrainskoii Kommunistychnoii Parti na IV V se Ukrainskomu Zizdi Rad, Nova Doba, 14 August 1920.

²⁰² Deklyaratsiy. Nova Doba 14 August 1920.

²⁰³ Deklyaratsiy. Nova Doba 14 August 1920.

²⁰⁴ A further split in the KP(b)U occurred after the Congress when the “Kobelyaki Communists” who had joined with the Borotbisty also joined the UKP. They issued a declaration stating that as the KP(b)U was “fighting for the preservation of the Russian state the Ukrainian Communists would betray the Revolution and the Ukrainian people if they remained in the party”. The declaration included the KP(b)U District Committee leaders, some older Bolsheviks and five Jewish party activists (Maistrenko Borotbism 240–245).

²⁰⁵ This was published by the UKP in Chervony Prapor, 25 July 1920, and also abroad by the Foreign Group in a pamphlet, Revevoliutsiia v nebezpetsi! Lyst zakorionoi hrupy UKP do komunistiy i revoliutsiynykh soismlnishv Evmpy ta Ameryky [Revolution in Danger! Letter to Communists and Revolutionary Socialists in Europe and America], Biblioteka Novy Doba, Vienna-Kyiv, 1920.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Radek characterised the war as a “national struggle of liberation against foreign invasion”, in which they were “defending Mother Russia”, and their goat was to “reunite all the Russian lands and defend Russia from colonial exploitation” (Pravda 12 May 1920; Figes 699).

²¹⁰ Figes 699.

²¹¹ Nova Doba 6 March 1920, republished as a pamphlet, Sotsiyalistichna revolyutsiya i Ukraina, Biblioteka Nova Doba, No. 3 1920 p.12.

²¹² Vynnychenko Schodennyk 431–2.

²¹³ Vynnychenko Schodennyk 432–3.

²¹⁴ Mazurenko 298.

²¹⁵ Nova Doba No.40 1920.

²¹⁶ Mazurenko 301.

²¹⁷ Hirniak.

²¹⁸ In May 1920 the Foreign Group of the UKP sought to intervene directly in the politics of Soviet Ukraine through a mission by Vynnychenko to Moscow and Kharkiv. On 5 May they decided that among the aims of the mission was the unity of the UKP and KP(b)U. While Vynnychenko seemed to have an idea of his objectives he was erratic in his approach, he did not act in consultation or unison with the UKP before or after he arrived but negotiated either from a personal standpoint or in the name of the ZG.UKP. These factors were to prove cause for friction. On Vynnychenko's mission see: Czajkowskyj; Gilley.

²¹⁹ Second Congress of the Communist International Minutes of the Proceedings, ed. R.A. Archer, London, 1977, Vol. 2, p.151.

²²⁰ In fact a string of critical groups were allowed to attend the congress as “Consultative Delegates” with no voice and no vote. This included from the Germany the Independent Social Democratic Party, and from Russia the Party of Revolutionary Communism and the Jewish Kombund (Archer Vol. 11).

²²¹ Richytsky “Memorandum”.

²²² Shakhrai was a USDRP organiser and then leader of the Poltava Bolsheviks. He published Revoliutsiia na Ukraïni [Revolution in Ukraine] in 1918, and with his Ukrainian Jewish comrade Serhii Maslakh, published Do khvyli: Shcho diiet'sia na Ukraïni i z Ukraïnoiu [Concerning the Moment: What Is Happening in and to Ukraine]. They helped lay the theoretical foundations of pro-independence Ukrainian communism. They argued for an independent communist party and that the tendency of the revolution was an independent Soviet Republic.

²²³ Richytsky “Memorandum” 54.

²²⁴ Richytsky “Memorandum” 55.

²²⁵ Richytsky “Memorandum” 59.

²²⁶ Richytsky “Memorandum” 60.

²²⁷ Scorpions is how one statement by the UKP wrote of those harassing them (Nova Doba No. 41 1920; Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 147).

²²⁸ Nova Doba No. 41 1920.

²²⁹ Nova Doba No. 41 1920.

²³⁰ Nova Doba No. 41 1920.

²³¹ II Konferentsily UKP v Kharhovi, Nova Doba No. 41, Vienna 11 December 1920.

²³² Nova Dova 11 December 1920.

²³³ Nova Dova 11 December 1920.

²³⁴ Nova Dova 11 December 1920.

²³⁵ Vynnychenko “Revoliutsia v nebezpetsi!” pp. 13–14.

²³⁶ Vynnychenko “Revoliutsia v nebezpetsi!” pp. 13–14.

²³⁷ Ending the possibility of sobornist, unity of Ukrainian territory with the founding of the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic on 8 July 1920. See Solchanyk “The Comintern”; Solchanyk “Foundation of the Communist Movement”; Davies.

²³⁸ Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 160.

²³⁹ Holubnychy 80; Bojcun “Working Class” 475.

²⁴⁰ Nova Doba 29 January 1921.

²⁴¹ Nova Doba 29 January 1921.

²⁴² Chyrko 32.

²⁴³ Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 171.

²⁴⁴ Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 157.

²⁴⁵ Chyrko 34–5.

²⁴⁶ Maistrenko Istoriia Moho Pokolinnya 163.

²⁴⁷ TsDAHO, F.8, O.1, D.89—Ukrainian Communist Party. A letter of Kyiv province committee to the members and sympathisers, Kyiv, September 1922.

²⁴⁸ TsDAHO, This was reaffirmed at the 3rd Kyiv province conference of the UKP. Fond 8, O.1, D.96.

²⁴⁹ TsDAHO, F.8, O.1, D.96.

²⁵⁰ TsDAHO, F.8, O.1, D.96.

²⁵¹ Cited in Mykola Halahan “Likvidatsiia UKP”, Nova Ukraina, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1925, pp. 33–34.

²⁵² Katernynoslav Protesty robitnikiv—TsDAHO, F.8, O.1, D.117.

²⁵³ TsDAHO, F.8, O.1, D.118.

²⁵⁴ Mace 82.

²⁵⁵ Appeal of CC UKP to workers and peasants of Ukraine, January 1924, Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obednan Ukrainy, TsDAHO F.8, O.1, D.1.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸“Is the Joint Front with the UKP Possible?” Komunist 20 July 1924.

²⁵⁹ Lyst TsK Vikonkomu Kominternu Pro Vzayemovidnosyny misch UKP IKP(b)U [Letter from CC of UCP to Comintern regarding relation between UKP and CP(b)U 27 August 1924, Dokumenti Trahichnoii Istorii Ukraini (1917–1927), P. Bachinskyi, ed., Kyiv 1999, pp. 522–25.

²⁶⁰ Memorandum Tsk KP(b) U Vikonkomu Kominternu (Mazurenko 547–58).

²⁶¹ Chyrko 34.

²⁶² Borys Sovietization of Ukraine 432–3 n.57.

²⁶³ The KP(b)U Central Committee members who attended the UKP conference included Petrovsky, Kviring, V.Ya. Chubar, I.E. Klimenko, M.O. Skrypnyk, M.M. Popov, O.I. Butsenko, K.O. Kirkizh (Chyrko 35).

²⁶⁴ Chyrko 24.

²⁶⁵ Mace 83.