Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare Onto the Global Arena

Abstract

This chapter examines how Al Qaeda, an asymmetric power, was able to become a global challenger to the existing international structure. Neither regional insurgency theories nor grand-scale global theories alone are adequate to explain Al Qaeda's ability. Rather, a modification of the seven dimensions of the Manwaring paradigm for successful insurgency combined with key concepts of global revolutionary or imperial powers formerly applied to states gives insight to this fundamental question. Al Qaeda's asymmetric global challenge is unique, and understanding the nature of the threat is key to finally defeating it.

Notes

 1. For an online transcript of this fatwa, ‘Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,’ see ⟨http://www.Pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html⟩. This fatwa was originally published in a London based newspaper, Al Quds Al Arabi, in August 1996.

 2. See Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, ‘Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol.3, No.3 (Winter 1992) pp.272–310.

 3. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw Hill-Publishing Company, 1985).

 4. Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

 5. The dimensions of the Manwaring paradigm or Sword model were created by factor analysis. Variables in the analysis ended up in seven clusters or factors. Those factors were then called dimensions and given specific names. In John T. Fishel's work, The Savage Wars of Peace, those dimensions were applied to peace operations and were renamed accordingly to better fit the circumstances of peace operations, but the variables making up each dimension remained the same. I have done the same here, changing the names of some of the dimensions to better fit the circumstances, but the variables making up the dimensions remain unchanged.

 6. There is a wealth of information regarding statements made by Al Qaeda available to the public. See ⟨http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/99129502.htm⟩ for government documents relating to statements by Al Qaeda and its war against the United States. This site from the US Department of State International information Programs refers to FBI websites documenting evidence against bin Laden and illustrates US knowledge of the Al Qaeda threat even in 1999.

 7. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst & Co., 2002), p.89.

 8. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Insider the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001).

 9. Gunaratna, p.89.

10. See Walter Lacquer, No End To War Terrorism in the Twenty-First century (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003).

11. Gunaratna, p.54.

12. Gunaratna, p.54.

13. See Peter Bergen, ‘The Dense Web of Al Qaeda’, The Washington Post, 25 December 2003, p.A29. Bergen describes Al Qaeda and its supporters as a structure of concentric rings in which different parts or different rings may take place in different operations.

14. Bergen.

15. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p.47.

16. For a full discussion of terrorist tactics and strategies see Kimbra L. Thompson Krueger, ‘The Destabilization of Republican Regimes: The Effects of Terrorism On Democratic Societies’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol.5, No.2 (Autumn 1996), pp.253–77.

17. Falkenrath.

18. Brian M. Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?, RAND Report P-5521 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND: 1975), p.4. Also quoted in Falkenrath.

19. Although what are known as apocalyptic groups have always been willing to die for their chosen cause, and take everyone with them, they have not as yet acquired the means to do so.

20. See William F. Wechsler, ‘Strangling the Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda's Finances’, in James F. Hoge, Jr and Gideon Rose (eds), How Did This Happen: Terrorism and the New War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).

21. See William F. Wechsler, ‘Strangling the Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda's Finances’, in James F. Hoge, Jr and Gideon Rose (eds), How Did This Happen: Terrorism and the New War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).

22. See Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, Unholy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003), p.137.