Perception Management: IO's Stepchild?

Abstract

Over the past decade, information operations (IO) have become a central feature of America's way of war. The Department of Defense's (DOD) focus on technology has left perception management (PM), defined as actions taken to influence foreign audiences’ perceptions and behaviors, as IO's second-class citizen. This article postulates that in today's media environment and with adversaries skillfully using propaganda to skirt America's will, perception management is key to military success. The author offers possible improvements for strengthening Dodd's PM capabilities and approaches.

Notes

 1. Department of Defense, Joint-Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Washington, DC: 9 October 1998 (on web at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf).

 2. Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (As amended through 17 December 2003), online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html.

 3. In this vein, for example, one could look to the US Institute for Peace's Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project for examinations of other nations’ diplomatic approaches as a tool toward understanding how ‘others’ perceive differently than what might be expected from an ‘American’ point-of-view. See, for example, Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, Washington, DC, USIP, 1998; and, Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World, Washington, DC, USIP, 1997. (For other publications, see www.usip.org).

 4. The inclusion of public affairs as a ‘perception management’ tool is controversial. PA is designed to gain and maintain public support by achieving a high degree of credibility through the timely, accurate, and complete release of information. Many Public Affairs Officers consider that a close association between PA and PSYOP, Intelligence and deception weakens their credibility and therefore hinders their ability to contribute effectively to mission accomplishment.

 5. For more details, see stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effect of US Air Operations in Four Wars: 1941–1991: Lessons for US Commanders, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Study, Project Air Force, 1996. See also, Stephen T. Hosmer, Effects of the Coalition Air Campaign Against Iraqi Ground Forces in the Gulf War, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Study, Project Air Force, 2002, pp. 119–37.

 6. Two days before 9/11, Osama bin Laden arranged to have Commandant Massoud (one of the Northern Alliance's leaders quite respected in the West) killed. His calculation might have been that the only way the US would retaliate to the massive attacks on 9/11 would be by using local surrogates to engage al Qaeda and the Taliban. By eliminating Massoud, he might have hoped to take out the most likely candidate ally of the United States. His calculation proved wrong as the United States did not respond by anything less than total war against the Taliban and al Qaeda.

 7. Rick Brennan and R. Evan Ellis, Information Warfare in Multilateral Peace Operations – A case study of Somalia, SAIC, April 1996.

 8. Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, US public attitudes on involvement in Somalia, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 26 October 1993.

 9. Dusan Basic, deputy director of Media Development. Media Development is a Bosnian non-governmental organization monitoring local media and encouraging journalistic professionalism. It is sponsored by the European Commission and the School of Journalism in Lille, France. Interview with the author, Sarajevo, July 1998.

10. Rapport spécial sur les médias, rapporteur spécial désigné par la résolution 1994/72 de la commission des droits de l'homme des Nations-Unies, E/CN4/1995/54, 13 December 1994, p. 35.

11. Interview with Alex Ivanko, former UNPROFOR spokesman, UNMIBH headquarters, Sarajevo, October 1996. Bosnia is certainly not the only place where the international media has been accused of being an instigator of violence simply by its presence. In Haitian and Cuban refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay, the refugees regularly staged demonstrations and became unruly when media appeared. In 2000, the UN asked the international media in Sierra Leone to pledge that they not broadcast ’executions’ manufactured for their benefit.

12. Material from Bill Arkin of Human Rights Watch, who has conducted an on-the-ground survey of collateral damage claims in Afghanistan. He has numerous examples (with photos and other documentation) of instances where intelligence information could have supported more robust public affairs, public diplomacy, and psychological operations activities. For an interesting discussion of the journalistic problems related to reporting Afghanistan collateral damage cases, see Lucinda Fleeson, ‘The Civilian Casualty Challenge’, American Journalism Review, April 2002.

13. Since autumn 2001, Al Jazeera has gained much fame in the United States through its broadcast of bin Laden tapes. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Al Jazeera's infamy skyrocketed through its broadcast of images of US casualties. For this author's views on this, see: ‘Is US Casualty Reporting Suffering From Double Standards?’ Foreign Policy in Focus, 15 April 2003, http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2003/0304media.html.

14. See A New Antisemitic Myth in the Arab Press: The September 11 Attacks Were Perpetrated by the Jews, The Middle-East Media Research Institute, Special Report No. 6, 8 January 2002. Available at www.memri.org.

15. In the winter of 2003, anti-war protests in London and Rome were some of the largest demonstrations since Vietnam. Note that the UK and Italy were two of the strongest members of the ‘coalition’ going to war with the United States.

16. According to Aaron Brown, CCN was inundated by letters of protest when it showed pictures of casualties. The network therefore decided to curtail such coverage. Instead, and to retain its credibility with different audiences in the world, CNN international kept covering the issue. However, the discrepancy was not lost on international audiences.

17. After the Cold war, Congress decided to cut back funding for USIA (the United States Information Agency), then to reintegrate it into the State Department. As a result, programs and broadcasting operations have been cut back.

18. On OSI, see for example: Rachel Coen, ‘Behind the Pentagon's Propaganda Plan’, Fairness & Accuracy in Media, Extra! Update, April 2002 (http://www.fair.org/extra/0204/osi.html).

19. In 1950, the Department of State sponsored Project Troy with the charter to determine how best to ‘get the truth’ behind the Iron Curtain. See Allan A. Needell, ‘Truth is our weapon’: Project TROY, Political Warfare and Government–Academic Relations in the National Security State’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 399–420.