The Polish – Soviet confrontation in 1956 and the attempted Soviet military intervention in Poland

Abstract

In 1956, a deep political crisis developed in Poland. The power elite was paralysed by internal conflicts and public feelings were strongly anti-Soviet. The Kremlin viewed this situation with concern. On 19 October, the Soviet leadership sent a top-level delegation to Warsaw to prevent changes in the Politburo which they feared might lead to Poland's secession from the Soviet bloc. Simultaneously, Soviet troops located in Poland started an advance towards Warsaw. After the dramatic talks between Khrushchev and Gomułka Soviet intervention was ceased but it took several more days before the Kremlin gave up an armed-intervention solution in Poland. It was China's firm objection to it and the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution that made Soviet military engagement in Poland impossible.

Notes

¹For the most recent detailed account of the 1956 crisis in Poland, see Codogni (2006).

²This department was responsible for the internal security of the PUWP (Communist Party).

³ Trybuna Ludu, 22 July 1956.

⁴For an excellent study of public feelings and the mass movements of the Polish October 1956, see Machcewicz (1993).

⁵For detailed analysis of the debates of the CC PUWP Politburo before the Eighth Plenum see Friszke (1996, pp. 188 – 212; 2003, pp. 167 – 213).

⁶As of 1 May 1956, in the Polish military forces there were 76 Russian officers on duty (including 28 generals, 32 colonels, 13 lieutenant-colonels, two majors and one captain) and about 50 military advisers (see Nalepa 1995, pp. 86, 134).

⁷Jakub Andrzejewski is a pseudonym used by Andrzej Paczkowski.

⁸Candidatures for the Politburo and the CC Secretariat were agreed upon by an ad hoc commission set up on 17 October consisting of Gomułka, Ochab, Cyrankiewicz and Zawadzki. In the voting the Natolinians objected to the candidatures of the ‘young secretaries’ of the CC, Morawski, Matwin and Albrecht.

⁹ Trybuna Ludu, 16 October 1956.

¹⁰There were rumours circulating at the time—noticed by Western diplomats—that the arrival of the Soviet delegation had followed a refusal by the Polish leaders to go to Moscow ‘for consultations’. However there is no confirmation of this in the accessible sources (see Kula 1992, pp. 123, 132).

¹¹Konev arrived in Warsaw a couple of hours ahead of Khrushchev. Some Polish accounts mention also the arrival of Marshal Georgii Zhukov, minister of defence of the USSR. Rumours of his presence in Warsaw were recorded by Western diplomats (Kula 1992, p. 122). However, according to Aleksandr Orekhov, Zhukov was taking part in Soviet – Japanese negotiations in Moscow together with Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin on 19 October 1956 so he could not have been in Warsaw on that day (Orekhov 2005a, p. 208, note 21).

¹³Speech delivered by Władysław Gomułka at the meeting with editors of the press on 29 October 1956 (see Mond 1962, p. 61).

¹²Such a supposition is confirmed in works of A. Orekhov in which the author uses (although to a narrow extent) documents from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive (see Orekhov 1995; 2005a, pp. 169 – 171; 2005b, pp. 265 – 266).

¹⁴SSSR i Polsha (1996, p. 181). This telegram was sent to the central committees of the communist parties of China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and the GDR, and its content was conveyed (orally, through Soviet ambassadors) to leaders of the communist parties of France, Italy and Yugoslavia.

¹⁵During the discussion the following were against postponing the Eighth Plenum: Gomułka, Gierek, Roman Nowak, Rapacki, Stawiński, Jędrychowski, Ochab and, surprisingly, Zenon Nowak. In favour of concessions were Rokossovskii, Jóźwiak, Dworakowski and Chełchowski. Zawadzki, basically supporting Gomułka's standpoint, expressed himself in favour of moderate concessions. In the minutes of the Politburo meeting Cyrankiewicz's opinion was not mentioned.

¹⁶An official report of the talks was submitted by Aleksander Zawadzki on 20 October at the CC Plenum (Nowe Drogi, 10, 1956, pp. 17 – 18). The published version of that account is different from the record in the verbatim minutes of the Plenum, although it does not seem that the speaker's thoughts were misrepresented on purpose (however, one should note that other ‘sensitive’ speeches—including Gomułka's final speech—were censored in the published materials from the Plenum). Zawadzki's speech was simply discordant to such an extent that it required thorough editing. Notes taken by Gomułka and Zawadzki were published in Werblan (1995, pp. 105 – 111). For their English translation see: Gluchowski (1995, pp. 41 – 43). The most comprehensive account of the talks in the Belvedere Palace was given by Gomułka in his conversation with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in January 1957 (Paczkowski 1998, pp. 5 – 12). This was published in English by Gluchowski (1995, pp. 43 – 45). In this article I refer to another, more detailed version of this document, which was authorised by Gomułka (Werblan 1997, pp. 119 – 144). Moreover, Gomułka referred to the content of his talks with Khrushchev during the meeting with higher officers of the Army on 27 October 1956 (see note 17) and two days later at the meeting with press editors (see note 13). Another important account of the Belvedere Palace talks can be found in Roman Zambrowski's recollections (1996, pp. 137 – 143). Minutes of the talks drawn by the Soviet side are believed to be kept in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. They have not been released to researchers so far.

¹⁷‘Przemówienie Tow. Władysława Gomułki—Wiesława wygłoszone w dniu 27 października 1956 r. na ogólnokrajowej naradzie aktywu partyjnego Wojska Polskiego’ Warsaw, 1956, (mimeographed). Khrushchev in his memoirs used almost the same expression as Gomułka: ‘a harsh conversation was going on, without diplomacy’ (Khrushchev 1999, p. 236).

¹⁸‘Przemówienie Tow. Władysława Gomułki …’, p. 5.

¹⁹It is symptomatic that Polish Minister of Defence Marshal Rokossovskii took orders directly from Khrushchev. According to the latter's memoirs: ‘at that time Rokossovskii was more obedient to us than to his own [Polish] government’ (Khrushchev 1999, p. 582).

²⁰Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMSZ), Collection 7, fascicle 6, file 51. Registers of road damages were prepared in Spring 1957 by regional offices for public roads management in order to submit damage claims to the Soviet Union. The amount of losses in connection with the necessary repair of roads and bridges was assessed at 36.8 million zlotys, while the damages caused by the Soviet ‘caterpillar vehicles’ in private and state owned properties at 15.3 million zlotys. The first to locate and cite these road damages registers was Robert Łoś in his unpublished doctoral thesis ‘Październik 1956 r. w perspektywie stosunków polsko-radzieckich’[‘October 1956 from the Perspective of Polish – Soviet Relations’] (University of Lódź, 1993). Beside tabular lists of the damaged stretches of roads, maps of damages were also prepared in the scale of 1:300,000. However, my search for these maps in the archives was unsuccessful.

²¹Włodzimierz Muś, ‘Wspomnienia dowódcy KBW’[‘Memoirs of Commander of Internal Security Corps’], unpublished manuscript, Military History Institute, Warsaw, IV/102/39, p. 426.

²²Aleksandr Orekhov writes that Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Georgii Zhukov ordered the increased readiness in the Soviet military forces in Poland, as well as the Baltic Fleet and troops in the Baltic Military District not later than on 18 October 1956. However, he does not cite any archival source of this information (see Orekhov 2005a, pp. 173 – 174).

²³Włodzimierz Muś, ‘Wspomnienia dowódcy KBW’, p. 417.

²⁴Such information was conveyed by Mao Zedong to Stanisław Kiryluk, the Polish ambassador in Beijing, in a conversation held on 3 December 1956 (Werblan 1996, p. 127). In the aforementioned telegram from the Presidium of the CC CPSU to the ‘fraternal parties’ of 18 October no intention of an armed intervention was mentioned, but they did inform them about sending a delegation to Warsaw. One cannot exclude the possibility that they informed the leaderships of the CCP, CzCP and SED about the decision to start up military actions by a separate telegram.

²⁵According to General Włodzimierz Muś, the commander of the Soviet detachment that arrived in the suburbs of Warsaw early on 20 October, ‘explained that in compliance with the order he came to Warsaw, where, as he was told, a counter-revolution broke out in which several dozen Soviet soldiers were killed. They had to hurry to rescue the workers of Warsaw’ (Muś, ‘Wspomnienia dowódcy KBW’, p. 426).

²⁶I am grateful to Lorenz Lüthi for sharing with me his working translation of Wu Lengxi's memoirs.

²⁷It is interesting to note that four years later, during the acute conflict with the CPSU, the Chinese made out a ‘bill’ to Polish communists for the assistance granted in 1956. During the meeting of the communist parties in Moscow in November 1960 Liu Shaoqui said talking to Gomułka: ‘today similar kind of difficulties as those of 1956 between Poland and the Soviet Union arose between the Soviet Union and China, and also Albania. As we helped you in 1956, you should help us now to eliminate these difficulties. […] Just think what would have happened if the Chinese Communist Party had supported the Soviet Union in 1956 against Poland?’ (Michnik, 1978, p. 122).

²⁸In the talk with Zhou Enlai on 11 January 1957 Gomułka openly admitted: ‘we did not want to present to society, and even to party organisations, the full and real course of the Soviet intervention in our home affairs, because that would have promoted anti-Soviet and anti-Russian feelings which were already very inflamed in Polish society. That could have only been done in favour of the reactionary movement and would have done harm to the interests of Poland. Therefore our public and intra-party presentation of that intervention verged almost on a justification of it. We presented the unwanted “visit” of the Soviet delegation as a step dictated by the best will of the leadership of the CPSU, and by their concern for the mutual security of our countries and all the countries of the Warsaw Pact’ (Werblan 1997, p. 127).

²⁹In another version of the minutes of the Gomułka – Zhou Enlai talks Khrushchev's statement was recorded in a version quoted by Gomułka: ‘Whether you want it or not, our opinion is that we will have to start an intervention at yours’[Modern Records Archive (hereafter: AAN), CC PUWP, XIA/30, p. 55].

³⁰Note also Mark Kramer's translation of this sentence: ‘there's only one way out—put an end to what is in Poland’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388). According to the account of the trip to Poland that Mikoyan dictated in 1960, immediately after the delegation's arrival to Moscow Khrushchev decided that Soviet troops would enter Warsaw. This decision was subsequently reversed at the CC CPSU Presidium meeting. Mikoyan's account, however, does not sound plausible at this point (see Taubman 2003, p. 294).

³¹In Mark Kramer's translation: ‘if Rokossovskii is kept, we won't have to press things for a while’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388).

³²In Mark Kramer's translation: ‘the ambassador, Cde. Ponomarenko, was grossly mistaken in his assessment of Ochab and Gomułka’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388).

³³In Mark Kramer's translation: ‘we should invite to Moscow representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria. Perhaps we should send CC officials to China for informational purposes’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388).

³⁴The relevant point of this meeting's agenda bore a heading: ‘Briefing of the CPSU Delegation about the Trip to Warsaw’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388).

³⁵In Mark Kramer's translation: ‘take notice of information. Think through the questions that have been raised’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388).

³⁶In Mark Kramer's translation: ‘taking account of the circumstances we should refrain from military intervention. We need to display patience. (Everyone agrees with this)’ (Kramer 1996/1997a, p. 388).

³⁷The telegram sent to other ‘fraternal’ parties had the following content: ‘in connection with the situation in Poland we would like to exchange our views. We submit a proposal to organise a top level meeting in Moscow on Tuesday, or on Wednesday at the latest. Such proposal was also submitted to other fraternal parties. Please notify us of your opinion’.

³⁸During the talks on 11 January 1957, Zhou Enlai told Gomułka that the CCP supported the PUWP's stance on 21 October 1956. This may indicate that Mao's conversation with Ambassador Yudin took place rather on 20 or 21 October (see Werblan 1997, p. 132).

³⁹In a recently published article, Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua argues that the Chinese factor played no role whatsoever in solving the crisis in Polish – Soviet relations, as Gomułka and Khrushchev did not know about China's standpoint during their talks at the Belvedere Palace, nor did the CCP have information about Soviet military intervention in Poland at that time. Although Shen Zihua may be right that Khrushchev might not have known about Beijing's veto yet when he ordered Soviet tanks to stop their march towards Warsaw during the night of 19 October 1956, he does not take into account that the ultimate decision to give up the armed intervention in Poland was taken at the Kremlin as late as on 21 October, and that by that time the Soviet leaders most probably had learned about the Chinese position. The ‘Malin notes’ strongly indicate that Beijing's veto against intervention did influence Soviet decision-making vis-à-vis Poland in October 1956 (see Zhihua 2005, pp. 59 – 61).

⁴⁰AAN, CC PUWP, XIA/71, p. 177. On the letter there is a handwritten note by Gomułka ‘Delivered in person by comrade Ponomarenko’; see SSSR i Polsha (1996, pp. 185 – 186) and Gluchowski (1995, p. 46).

⁴¹A ciphered telegram from the Polish embassy in Moscow on 1 December confirms that this decision was implemented: ‘we received information in the embassy that for some time comrade Wiesław's [Gomułka's] speech at the Eighth Plenum and resolutions are being read in regional committees of the CPSU for narrow groups of activists, without any comment nor discussion’ (AMSZ, Telegrams Collection, fascicle 50, file 638, p. 50).

⁴²These are notes from the meeting taken by Antonin Novotny's secretary, Jan Svoboda.

⁴³As early as at the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on 21 October Malin recorded the statement—probably by Khrushchev: ‘the sooner we give up the Polish coal the better’. It is not known, however, whether it pertained to current imports, or ‘reparatory’ coal supplies in the past (SSSR i Polsha 1996, p. 183).

⁴⁴The decision of the Soviet leadership to wait for the result of elections for the CC PUWP Politburo means that in the Kremlin it was expected that Rokossovskii would be included in the list of candidates after all.

⁴⁵ Nowe Drogi, 10, 1956, p. 157.

⁴⁶‘Kostek’ is a diminutive of ‘Konstantin’ in Polish.

⁴⁷‘Przemówienie Tow. Władysława Gomułki …’, pp. 10 – 11.