The fog of Hungary's negotiated revolution

Abstract

This contribution uses the question of the presidency of the republic, the most divisive and consequential issue of Hungary's round table negotiations of 1989, to explore the process rather than the outcome of ‘negotiated revolution’. Political debate is necessarily something other than the exchange of reasoned argument. But the clear contrast between the bi-polar political divide within the Opposition Round Table (ORT) and their multifaceted and sometimes inconsistent lines of argument over policy suggests that, on this contentious issue at least, politicking was at least as important as politics.

Notes

¹‘Party’ will henceforth refer to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the ‘Communist’ party.

²The classic statement of ‘negotiated revolution’ is in László Bruszt (1990). The fullest discussion is by Rudolf L. Tőkés (1996).

³See Clausewitz (1976). For the simplicity of war aims and literal fog, see Book One, Chapter Seven on ‘Friction in War’; for the figurative fog of uncertainty, see Book Two, Chapter Two ‘On the Theory of War’.

⁴The focus chosen here is the issue of the presidency, perhaps the most contested issue in the whole process. As readers who follow Hungarian events will be aware, much of Hungary's ‘negotiated revolution’ was recorded on videotape, giving a more or less verbatim record of the ‘how’. Thanks to the commitment of a team of scholars led by András Bozóki, these have been made available to the general public in the form of eight printed volumes in Hungarian, a summary volume in English, and a Hungarian CD-ROM which covers volumes one to six and eight of the printed version. I have used the CD-ROM version (Bozóki et al.2000a) because of ease of access. For more background on the project, see, Bozóki et al. (2000e, pp. 1 – 10).

⁵Unfortunately this sentence is mistranslated in Bozóki's English-language publication. Paragraph 1.a) of the agreement on 21 June refers to the ‘timing of the amendment of the Constitution, and questions relating to the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court’. But the original Hungarian is ‘időszerű’ which simply means ‘timely’ or ‘of the moment’. The timing of the presidential elections was not an issue at this point. The presidency was simply a question of the moment, something in the air. The timing issue came onto the agenda much later. Compare Bozóki (2002, p. 311) and the Hungarian text of the 21 June agreement (accessible via the Kronológia index) of the CD-ROM (Bozóki et al.2000a, p. 1).

⁶Tőkés (1996, p. 497) notes that Pozsgay should have known. He was privy to secret service briefings which warned this would happen.

⁷The League had observer status only and did not sign, the Social Democrats signed but noted their objection to the presidency.

⁸Whenever a new character is introduced his full name and affiliation is given. Thereafter s/he is referred to by her/his family name. A dramatis personae is given in Appendix 1 to ease identification.

⁹There are no page numbers on Bozóki et al. (2000a), neither for the collection as a whole, nor for individual articles or documents. Documents and articles are accessed by clicking on the title in the various indices. Within articles and documents, page numbers given in this article refer to the number of clicks in the right-hand paging column needed to reach the reference.

¹⁰ Magyar Nemzet, 29 September 1989.

¹¹ Magyar Nemzet, 17 – 20 October 1989.

¹² Magyar Nemzet, 30 November 1989.

¹³ORT, 7/6, in Bozóki et al. (2000a, pp. 40 – 41). For details of the abbreviations used in references to ORT, please see the explanation provided in Appendix 2.

¹⁴ORT, 9/6, pp. 29 – 30.

¹⁵ORT, 20/6, pp. 27, 38 and 48.

¹⁶Mid pol, 6/7, in Bozóki et al. (2000a, p. 26). For details of the abbreviations used in references to Mid pol, please see the explanation provided in Appendix 2.

¹⁷ORT, 28/6, p. 21.

¹⁸ORT, 28/6, suggestion is made on p. 25, it is finally agreed on p. 33.

¹⁹ORT, 28/6, p. 30.

²⁰ORT, 28/6, p. 31.

²¹ORT, 6/7, pp. 25 – 27.

²²ORT, 6/7, pp. 29 – 30.

²³ORT, 6/7, p. 40.

²⁴ORT, 6/7, pp. 30 – 32.

²⁵ORT, 6/7, p. 32.

²⁶ORT, 6/7, p. 34.

²⁷I/1, 17/7, in Bozóki et al. (2000a, p. 7). For details of the abbreviations used in references to I/1, please see the explanation provided in Appendix 2.

²⁸I/1, 17/7, p. 8.

²⁹I/1, 17/7, p. 8.

³⁰I/1, 27/7, p. 3.

³¹I/1, 31/7, p. 4.

³²I/1, 22/8, p. 2.

³³ORT, 21/7, pp. 36 – 37.

³⁴ORT, 21/7, pp. 42 – 44.

³⁵ORT, 21/7, p. 60.

³⁶ORT, 21/7, p. 65.

³⁷ORT, 27/7, pp. 32 – 36.

³⁸ORT, 27/7, p. 54.

³⁹ORT, 27/7, p. 61.

⁴⁰ORT, 27/7, pp. 66 – 67.

⁴¹ORT, 27/7, p. 53.

⁴²For arguments about publicity and disagreements within the ORT, see ORT, 3/8, pp. 57 – 58 and footnote 25 and ORT, 23/8, footnote 5. For the young communist initiative and reactions to it, see ORT, 17/8, footnote 8 and Bozóki et al. (2000c, p. 33).

⁴³ORT, 17/8, p. 10.

⁴⁴ORT, 17/8, pp. 41 – 42.

⁴⁵ORT, 23/8, pp. 12 – 13.

⁴⁶ORT, 23/8, p. 14.

⁴⁷ORT, 23/8, p. 24.

⁴⁸ORT, 23/8, pp. 27 – 28.

⁴⁹ORT, 23/8, p. 29.

⁵⁰ORT, 23/8, pp. 30 – 31.

⁵¹ORT, 23/8, p. 47 and footnote 32.

⁵²ORT, 24/8, p. 6.

⁵³ORT, 24/8, p. 18.

⁵⁴Mid pol, 30/8, pp. 10, 12 – 13.

⁵⁵Mid pol, 4/9, pp. 16 – 20.

⁵⁶I/1, 7/9, p. 2.

⁵⁷Mid pol, 4/9, pp. 22 – 24; 15/9, pp. 6 – 8.

⁵⁸ORT, 11/9, pp. 4 – 7.

⁵⁹ORT, 11/9, pp. 7 – 8.

⁶⁰ORT, 11/9, pp. 9 – 10.

⁶¹ORT, 11/9, p. 13.

⁶²ORT, 11/9, pp. 30 – 31.

⁶³ORT, 11/9, pp. 33 – 34.

⁶⁴Mid pol, 11/9, pp. 17 – 28; 15/9, pp. 54 – 57; 18/9, pp. 8 – 10.

⁶⁵ORT, 15/9, p. 64.

⁶⁶ORT, 15/9, p. 74.

⁶⁷ORT, 15/9, p. 66.

⁶⁸ORT, 15/9, p. 68.

⁶⁹ORT, 15/9, p. 69.

⁷⁰ORT, 15/9, p. 71.

⁷¹ORT, 15/9, p. 72. He suggested the participation of two thirds of the electorate and receipt of 50% plus one of the vote.

⁷²ORT, 15/9, pp. 77 – 78.

⁷³ORT, 15/9, p. 79.

⁷⁴ORT, 15/9, p. 79.

⁷⁵ORT, 18/9, p. 6.

⁷⁶ORT, 18/9, p. 7.

⁷⁷ORT, 18/9, pp. 7 – 8.

⁷⁸ORT, 18/9, p. 9.

⁷⁹ORT, 18/9, pp. 9 – 10.

⁸⁰ORT, 29/8, p. 65.

⁸¹ORT, 29/8, pp. 2 – 18.

⁸²ORT, 29/8, pp. 19 – 48.

⁸³ORT, 29/8, pp. 48 – 62.

⁸⁴ORT, 29/8, pp. 63 – 64.

⁸⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 68.

⁸⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 65 – 70. For Tamás's comments, see Mid pol, 24/8, footnote 25. For the original positions, see I/6, 12/7, in Bozóki et al. (2000a, p. 10); and I/6, 26/7, p. 5. For details of the abbreviations used in references to I/6, please see the explanation provided in Appendix 2.

⁸⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 70 – 72.

⁸⁸ORT, 29/8, p. 73.

⁸⁹ORT, 29/8, p. 72.

⁹⁰ORT, 29/8, pp. 75 – 76.

⁹¹ORT, 29/8, p. 76.

⁹²ORT, 29/8, p. 78.

⁹³ORT, 29/8, p. 79.

⁹⁴ORT, 29/8, p. 80.

⁹⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 76.

⁹⁶ORT, 29/8, p. 81.

⁹⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 81 – 83.

⁹⁸ORT, 29/8, pp. 83 – 85.

⁹⁹ORT, 29/8, pp. 85 – 86.

¹⁰⁰ORT, 29/8, pp. 86 – 93.

¹⁰¹ORT, 29/8, pp. 93 – 95.

¹⁰²ORT, 29/8, pp. 95 – 97.

¹⁰³ORT, 29/8, pp. 97 – 99.

¹⁰⁴ORT, 29/8, p. 99.

¹⁰⁵ORT, 29/8, pp. 101 – 103.

¹⁰⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 103 – 104.

¹⁰⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 104 – 106.

¹⁰⁸ORT, 29/8, pp. 107 – 108.

¹⁰⁹ORT, 29/8, pp. 109 – 111.

¹¹⁰ORT, 29/8, pp. 111 – 112.

¹¹¹ORT, 29/8, pp. 113 – 114.

¹¹²ORT, 29/8, pp. 114 – 117.

¹¹³ORT, 29/8, pp. 120 – 121.

¹¹⁴ORT, 29/8, p. 121.

¹¹⁵ORT, 29/8, pp. 122 – 124.

¹¹⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 124 – 126.

¹¹⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 126 – 128.

¹¹⁸ORT, 28/6, p. 26; 29/8, footnote 71.

¹¹⁹ORT, 29/8, p. 133.

¹²⁰ORT, 29/8, p. 134.

¹²¹ORT, 29/8, p. 134.

¹²²ORT, 29/8, p. 135.

¹²³ORT, 29/8, p. 135.

¹²⁴ORT, 29/8, pp. 136 – 137.

¹²⁵ORT, 29/8, pp. 137 – 139.

¹²⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 139 – 140.

¹²⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 140 – 141.

¹²⁸ORT, 29/8, pp. 141 – 143.

¹²⁹ORT, 29/8, p. 143.

¹³⁰ORT, 29/8, p. 143.

¹³¹ORT, 29/8, p. 144.

¹³²ORT, 29/8, p. 144.

¹³³ORT, 29/8, p. 145.

¹³⁴ORT, 29/8, p. 145.

¹³⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 146.

¹³⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 146 – 147.

¹³⁷ORT, 29/8, p. 146.

¹³⁸ORT, 29/8, p. 147.

¹³⁹ORT, 29/8, footnote 78. Fidesz members were conducting continuous demonstrations and hunger strikes in front of the Czechoslovak embassy in Budapest demanding the release of party members Tamás Deutsch and György Kerényi who had been arrested after participating in the 21 August demonstrations in Prague commemorating the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet invasion.

¹⁴⁰ORT, 29/8, pp. 147 – 148.

¹⁴¹ORT, 29/8, p. 149.

¹⁴²ORT, 29/8, p. 149.

¹⁴³ORT, 29/8, p. 150.

¹⁴⁴ORT, 29/8, pp. 149 – 150.

¹⁴⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 151.

¹⁴⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 150 – 154.

¹⁴⁷Antall clarified that the issue of the commander-in-chief related to the fact that in 1946 the Allied Control Commission did not allow the president to be commander-in-chief and the legislation was rather confused.

¹⁴⁸ORT, 29/8, p. 155.

¹⁴⁹ORT, 29/8, p. 155.

¹⁵⁰ORT, 29/8, p. 156.

¹⁵¹ORT, 29/8, p. 156.

¹⁵²ORT, 29/8, p. 157.

¹⁵³ORT, 29/8, pp. 157 – 158.

¹⁵⁴ORT, 29/8, pp. 158 – 159.

¹⁵⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 159.

¹⁵⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 159 – 160.

¹⁵⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 159 – 161.

¹⁵⁸ORT, 29/8, p. 161.

¹⁵⁹ORT, 29/8, p. 161.

¹⁶⁰ORT, 29/8, p. 161.

¹⁶¹ORT, 29/8, p. 162.

¹⁶²ORT, 29/8, p. 162.

¹⁶³ORT, 29/8, pp. 162 – 163.

¹⁶⁴ORT, 29/8, pp. 164 – 165.

¹⁶⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 165.

¹⁶⁶ORT, 29/8, p. 167.

¹⁶⁷ORT, 29/8, pp. 168 – 169.

¹⁶⁸ORT, 29/8, p. 169.

¹⁶⁹ORT, 29/8, pp. 170 – 171.

¹⁷⁰ORT, 29/8, p. 171.

¹⁷¹ORT, 29/8, p. 171.

¹⁷²ORT, 29/8, p. 172.

¹⁷³ORT, 29/8, pp. 172 – 173.

¹⁷⁴ORT, 29/8, p. 173.

¹⁷⁵ORT, 29/8, p. 174.

¹⁷⁶ORT, 29/8, pp. 175 – 176.

¹⁷⁷Mid pol, 11/9, p. 20.