Framing ethnic minority mobilisation in Central Asia: The cases of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Abstract

This article seeks to understand why, although widely predicted, very little ethnically motivated political mobilisation has occurred in post-Soviet Central Asia. Building on the contribution of frame analysis, the article examines the case of Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Different frames have been articulated by the elites and have been used to mobilise and demobilise the community. The more successful ones (those that resonated) were less confrontational, and ultimately led the Uzbek communities towards a non-confrontational path with the authorities. The article concludes that frame analysis sheds important insights on the process of the mobilisation of ethnic minorities in Central Asia, and also contributes to the literature on ethnic mobilisation.

Notes

¹‘Riot’ here is meant as a kind of conflict involving ‘no structured armed forces and organised long term fighting’ (Tishkov 1995, p. 148, fn. 1).

²I follow the international spelling of all names of locations indicated in the article.

³For a discussion of the causes of the Tajik conflict see Abdullaev and Barnes (2001).

⁴This is of course a simplification. The conflict ran through the country's multiple cleavages.

⁵Unlike most definitions of mobilisation that focus on claims and protests, my understanding of mobilisation follows Nedelman's definition which refers to ‘the actors’ attempt to influence the existing distribution of power' (1987, p. 181). This allows me not to assume a predetermined outcome (the movement from passivity to activity), or focus only on the ‘noisy’ part of mobilisation (claims and protests), but to gain an understanding of a ‘quiet’ phase too (e.g. electoral support for the authorities).

⁶I am not implying that the Uzbek communities have recently settled there. In fact, Uzbeks have lived in that part of the Ferghana Valley even during Soviet times, but the absence of ‘real’ borders made their being formally resident in Soviet Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan immaterial, given their physical proximity to Uzbekistan. The establishment of new interstate borders changed all this.

⁷For the purpose of this article I rely on Charles Tilly's definition of demobilisation as ‘the process by which a group of active participants in public life becomes a passive collection of individuals’ (Tilly 1978, p. 54). Unlike mobilisation, demobilisation remains an unexplored process both empirically and theoretically. In most cases it refers to the process following a violent conflict through which former combatants relinquish the use of violence and are integrated in the political process (see Walter 1999 for example). To capture the dynamics at play in Central Asia I find it more appropriate to follow the way the concept is used by Gagnon (2004), Remmer (1980) and Hipsher (1996) with regard to the strategy adopted by political elites in authoritarian systems to demobilise the population to prevent possible challenges and consolidate their position.

⁸Askar Akaev's appearance on the Kyrgyz political scene is due to the fact that in October 1990 the two candidates running for the country's presidency (Apas Jumagulov and Absamat Masaliev) did not obtain sufficient votes in the first round of voting in the Supreme Soviet and were thus prevented from re-running. He was then selected as a compromise candidate between the competing factions. Originally from the northern region of Chuy, Akaev spent some considerable time abroad, in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad), where he trained as a physicist and began his academic career. He returned to his native country in 1977. On the origins and implications of the so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’ see E. Marat, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After (Washington, Jamestown Foundation), 2006, available at: http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/Jamestown-TulipRevolution.pdf, accessed 15 April 2006.

⁹For examples of approaches emphasising the salience of context as enabling and/or constraining opportunities for mobilisation, see Gurr (1993), Kitschelt (1986), Koopmans (2000) and McAdam (1982). For a critical review of mobilisation studies see Kriesi (2004) and McAdam et al. (2001).

¹⁰See also Tarrow (1991, p. 14).

¹¹In his recent work Tarrow has expanded the concept of POS to incorporate the influence of transnational processes within the study of the mechanisms of contention (2005).

¹²I am not assuming that mobilisation, demobilisation, or even inertia may be a natural condition of a community. The community's condition and the shift of condition are products of social (elite) construction.

¹³Uzbekistan has not conducted a census. One reason for this could arguably lie in the purpose the post-independence censuses served in the other republics, namely officially signalling the demographic dominance of the titular group; in countries like Kazakhstan, and to a minor extent Kyrgyzstan, these constituted either a plurality or a bare majority. Uzbekistan's situation was remarkably different because Uzbeks have never faced the possibility of being outnumbered by other ethnic groups. Data are taken from Alisher Ilkhamov's Etnicheskii Atlas Uzbekistana (Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan), published in 2003. It is based on empirical work conducted by him and other Uzbekistan-based scholars and I consider it to be a reliable source of information, accurate, though unofficial.

¹⁴ Perepis Naseleniya Turkmenistana 1995 (1997), Kratkie Itogi Perepisi naseleniya 1999 (1999), Naselenie Kirgizskoi Respubliki 1999 (1999), and Naselenie Respubliki Tadzhikistan 2000 (2002).

¹⁵There is an established consensus in the literature on ethnic mobilisation on the importance that ethnic institutions played as resources for minority mobilisation in the late Soviet and post-Soviet era (Beissinger 2002; Gorenburg 2003; Hirsch 2005; Roeder 1991; Slezkine 1994).

¹⁶The possible triggering factors indicated as causes of the riot are several, including the KGB's covert role and links between political factions and mafia-like economic groups.

¹⁷This depends on which census is considered: censuses conducted before the latest showed a large Uzbek population (greater than 20%), whereas in the most recent (2000) the Uzbek share of the overall population had shrunk to about 15%.

¹⁸The Leninabad elite's hegemonic role in Soviet Tajikistan can be ascribed to economic, socio-cultural and geographic reasons, including the fact that the region was the only industrialised area in an otherwise rural or inhospitable land. Its geographical location, integrated in the Ferghana Valley region and with Uzbekistan, made Tajikistan's economic system viable, though in the end the country depended on Moscow's subsidies. The north was also culturally more exposed to contacts with Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union, compared to the more provincial areas in the south. It should be pointed out nonetheless that ‘regions’ should not be reified as if they were discrete units and that internal differences and competition existed (e.g. between Khujand, Leninabad's administrative province and the areas around Istaravshan and Penjikent).

¹⁹This was the case in Isfara (southern Kyrgyzstan) where Kyrgyz and Tajiks clashed over water allocation, and in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), where protests against alleged favourable housing allocation to Armenian refugees took place.

²⁰This view was also confirmed by the Khujand-based researcher Fatimakhon Ahmedova (Centre of Democratic Transformation, August 2003).

²¹Emomali Rakhmonov, originally head of a state farm (sovkhoz) in the province in Kulyab, was little known until 1992 when he was first named Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Kulob province, and later named Chairman of the country's Supreme Soviet in 1992. He was elected president in 1994 (the presidency had been abolished between 1992 and 1994) (Nourzhanov 2005, p. 129, fn. 57). Though he owed his sudden rise in national politics to his patron, Sanjak Safarov, he later tried to consolidate his grip on power by curtailing the influence of local warlords on Tajikistan's politics. To be sure, there were Uzbeks among the ranks of the opposition, particularly within the ranks of the exiled Islamic opposition that had found refuge and some degree of support when fleeing Uzbekistan in the early 1990s. Elements of the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) closely co-operated with factions of the Tajik opposition, though this tactical alliance (anti-government and anti-Uzbekistani) between them waned in the aftermath of the 1997 Peace Accords, leading to power sharing between government and opposition. For an analysis of Uzbekistan's role in the Tajik civil war see Horsman (1999).

²²For various studies on this complex process of societal re-organisation and its consequences see Hirsch (2005), Martin (2002), and Suny and Martin (2001).

²³Interviews and surveys were carried out in the areas of greater Uzbek settlement. The sample included 71 respondents from the Osh province, 56 from Jalabat and Batken, and nine from Chuy and the city of Bishkek. Interviews were held in Osh (44), Jalalabad (seven), Bishkek (eight) and Tokmok (one). In Tajikistan the survey sample included 39 respondents from Khujand, 63 from the surrounding Sughd province and 35 from Dushanbe. Twenty-three interviews were held in Khujand and seven in Dushanbe. Sampling was purposive. This was done to overcome the political sensitivity of the topic. Potential respondents were identified by asking any respondent, at the end of an interview or completion of the questionnaire, to indicate additional persons who may have been interested in participating in this research. I was aware of the risk of obtaining a skewed sample, as respondents might have been inclined to refer to others with similar views. However, given the variety of the responses it seems safe to argue that this was rarely the case.

²⁴Interview with Mr Abildov (Osh, July 2003). The party had very little impact in the subsequent electoral campaigns and remained marginal in Kyrgyzstani politics.

²⁵Interview held with local activists at the Osh UNCC (Osh, 2 July 2003).

²⁶Interviews with members of the local Uzbek community (Jalalabad, 10 July 2003).

²⁷Not his real name (Osh, 25 June 2003).

²⁸On this see also Khamidov (2000).

²⁹Not his real name. Where indicated, the interviewees' names have been changed to preserve their anonymity. On particular occasions, the informants insisted that their real name be published.

³⁰Interview conducted in Khujand on 11 August 2003. This is a broadly shared view, also acknowledged in the scholarship (Akiner 2001).

³¹Kulyabisation refers to the fact that the near totality of the members of the power structure in Tajikistan come from Kulyab, a region in south-western Tajikistan. In reality, however, this grossly neglects the fact that except for the areas around the villages of Farkhad and Dunghara, even the rest of Kulyab is under-represented.

³²Often the same person serves as a representative of the organisation and as a journalist or even editor for the publication.

³⁴In March 2002 demonstrations were organised in the southern town of Aksy by the local population to protest against the arrest of the local deputy Azimbek Beknazarov, and they were viewed as politically motivated. State authorities reacted by firing against the demonstrators killing at least five of them and arresting hundreds. For more on the ‘Asky events’, as they have become known, see Radnitz (2005).

³⁵Interviews held with member of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan (June and July 2003; July and August 2005).

³³Interview held in Jalalabad on 12 July 2003.

³⁶This account was confirmed by a large number of interviews with local Uzbeks in both Osh and Jalalabad (June and July 2003).

³⁷Interview with Tohirjon, an Uzbek postgraduate student at Osh State University and local journalist (Osh, 8 July 2003).

³⁸For a more detailed discussion of Uzbek grievances and state response see Fumagalli (2005).

³⁹These and the following data derive from the survey the author conducted in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2003, unless otherwise acknowledged.

⁴⁰Interview with Alisher Sabirov, deputy at the national parliament and one of the most well known figures in the local Uzbek community (Bishkek, 14 June 2003).

⁴¹Interview with local Uzbek politician (Osh, 26 June 2003).

⁴²Interviews held at the Osh branch of the UNCC (Osh, 25 June 2003).

⁴³The term historical nation is understood in similar ways in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

⁴⁴Interviews held with academic staff and postgraduate students at the Department of Uzbek Philology at Osh State University (Osh, 28 June 2003).

⁴⁵Interview with Kadyrjan Batyrov and other members of the Jalalabad UNCC, held at the Katyrov University (Jalalabad, 12 July 2003).

⁴⁶For an insightful study of locality and space, and how these have been affected by post-Soviet transformations, see Liu (2005).

⁴⁷Interviews held with members of the Uzbek community in southern Kyrgyzstan (June – July 2003 and August 2005).

⁴⁸An Uzbek businessman, Sabirov was head of the Osh-based ‘Society of Uzbeks’.

⁴⁹This is an important distinction. The latest population census aside (2000), Lokays, as well as other Uzbek-speaking communities in Tajikistan, were grouped within the larger Uzbek category. The 2000 census disaggregated the category into smaller ones, thereby leaving Uzbeks with a far smaller share of the overall population.

⁵⁰Not his real name (Centre for Democratic Transformations, Khujand, 16 August 2003).

⁵¹Interview held in Khujand on 20 August 2003.

⁵²‘You yourselves are right, you yourselves are the people, you yourselves are the scales—my people!’

⁵³The broadcast was very controversial at the time and local Uzbeks and Kyrgyz perceived it in radically opposite ways. I am grateful to Nick Megoran for pointing out this aspect to me.

⁵⁴The Uzbek language is written using the Cyrillic script in the countries neighbouring Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, however, switched to the Latin alphabet in 1993 in a move that emphasised the state leadership's will to depart from Russian influence.

⁵⁵Interview with the editor of Jalalobod Tongi (Jalalabad, 12 July 2003).

⁵⁶See Khamidov (2000), and N. S. Megoran, ‘Elections and ethnicity in the south of Kyrgyzstan’, Eurasianet, 29 March 2000, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032900.shtml, accessed 12 February 2007.

⁵⁷Interview with Davron Sabirov (Osh, 17 July 2003).

⁵⁸Though he did not own the newspaper and the TV station officially, his being in charge was one of the worst-kept secrets in Osh. In 2004 Mezon TV was sold and the close link with Sabirov was severed. Mezon newspaper started to be published again in the run up to the controversial 2005 parliamentary elections where it promoted a pro-Sabirov agenda.

⁵⁹ O'zbeklar Jamiyati.

⁶⁰ Milliy Madaniyat Markazi (or Natsional'nyi Kul'turnyi Tsentr' in Russian, as it is more commonly referred to).

⁶¹The half-finished building close to the city library in Osh is testimony to this (I am thankful to Nick Megoran for reminding me of this).

⁶²For contrasting views see Saipjanov (2005) and Saipov (2005).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Matteo Fumagalli

The author would like to thank Laura Adams, Allan Craigie, Nick Megoran, Paolo Sartori and Tommaso Trevisani, and the anonymous reviewers of the journal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author is also grateful to the British Academy Committee for Central and Inner Asia, the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies, and the British International Studies Association for their generous support of this research.