Belgrade, Pale, Knin: Kin-state Control over rebellious puppets?

Abstract

The importance of kin-state involvement in ethnic conflicts and wars is often recognised in the literature, yet little theorising exists. This article analyses the links between the Serbian regime and the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia during the Yugoslav war. Contrary to widespread assumptions, it finds that Slobodan Milošević was not always able to control local developments; the local Serb leaders became increasingly rebellious and possessed means for limiting Belgrade's influence. Instead of assuming static ethnic solidarities, the analysis focuses on intra-ethnic divisions and the supply of resources and is thereby able to capture the fluidity of kin-state relations and the potentially limited longevity of such ties. It shows that links between a kin-state and its ethnic brethren may be weakened despite the existence of extreme insecurity.

Notes

¹This is contrary to the argument, made by e.g. Gagnon (1995, p. 89), that issues other than the conflict itself are unlikely to become salient following the outbreak of violence.

²See also Caspersen (2006, pp. 51 – 69).

³Author's interview with Vojislav Vukćević, SDS vice-president (1990 – 91) and one of the party's founders, Belgrade, 7 August 2003.

⁴ICTY, ‘Transcripts: Prosecutor vs. Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54)’, Transcripts from Milan Babić's testimony, 18 November – 9 December 2002, p. 13565, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/021126IT.htm, accessed 10 October 2003.

⁵Transcript published in ‘Čija je Hrvatska’, Danas, 31 July 1991, pp. 12 – 15. See also Lovrić (1990).

⁶Author's interview with Dušan Ećimović, one of the founders of the SDS and RSK information minister (1992 – 93), Belgrade, 29 August 2003.

⁷Until the spring of 1991 when the Yugoslav People's Army began interfering (Švarm 1993a). Knin was the main stronghold of radical Serb forces in Krajina.

⁸In December 1990, only 54% of the Serbs had a positive view of Babić compared with Rašković's 86% (Jović1991, pp. 28 – 31).

⁹In February 1991, 38 out of 42 members of the SDS main board supported Rašković against Babić (Radulović1991b). Author's interview with Vojislav Vukćević, Belgrade, 7 August 2003; see also Caspersen (2003).

¹⁰‘Milan Babić: Hrvatska nema suverenitet’, Danas, 26 March 1991, p. 24; Radulović (1991a, p. 11).

¹¹Bosnian Serb politicians from that time frequently argue that the radicalisation of the Serb position was a reaction to the co-operation between the Bosniak and the Croat leaders. For example, this view was expressed in the author's interviews with Predrag Lazarević, pre-war member of SDS's political council, Banja Luka, 12 November 2003, and with Vladimir Lukić, Republika Srpska prime minister (1993 – 94), Banja Luka, 2 December 2003.

¹²ICTY, ‘Transcripts: Prosecutor vs. Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54)’, p. 14,074, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/021126IT.htm, accessed 10 October 2003.

¹³ICTY, ‘Transcripts: Prosecutor vs. Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54)’, p. 13,625, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/021126IT.htm, accessed 10 October 2003.

¹⁴Also available at: http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/16/t16-3.htm, accessed 15 October 2003.

¹⁵Author's interview, Belgrade, 29 August 2003.

¹⁶Author's interview, Belgrade, 29 August 2003.

¹⁷The RSK consisted of three regions: Krajina, Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia. The latter was centred on the town of Pakrac through which the frontline ran.

¹⁸Author's interview with Goran Hadžić, Belgrade, 30 October 2003; author's interview with Vojislav Stanimirović, the president of Eastern Slavonia's executive council, Vukovar, 25 September 2003; Holbrooke (1999, p. 267).

¹⁹Author's interview with Goran Hadžić, Belgrade, 30 October 2003.

²⁰Author's interview with Rade Leskovac, founder of the Serb Radicals in Croatia, Vukovar, 26 September 2003.

²¹Author's interview with Filip Švarm, journalist with Vreme, Belgrade, 13 September 2004.

²²Author's interview with Vladimir Lukić, RS prime minister (1993 – 94), Banja Luka, 2 December 2003.

²³Author's interview with Rajko Kasagić, RS prime minister (1995 – 96), Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.

²⁴Also available at: http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/85/t85-1.htm, accessed 3 November 2003.

²⁵But according to Rajko Kasagić, then Mayor of Banja Luka, Milošević began to set plans in motion to replace Karadžić (author's interview, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003).

²⁶Author's interview with Nikola Poplašen, founder of the SRS in Bosnia, Banja Luka, 3 December 2003.

²⁷Also available at: http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/151/t151-5.htm, accessed 3 November 2003.

²⁸‘A Message from Pale’, Vreme News Digest, 150, 8 August 1994, available at: http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/150/t150-2.htm, accessed 3 November 2003.

²⁹‘A Message from Pale’, Vreme News Digest, 150, 8 August 1994, available at: http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/150/t150-2.htm, accessed 3 November 2003.

³⁰Author's interview with Dragutin Ilić, Banja Luka, 23 October 2003.

³¹For example, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the local leaders were able to take over the leadership of the kin-state when they became dissatisfied with the Armenian President's more accommodative position.

³²Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nina Caspersen

An earlier version of this article was presented at the First Global International Studies Conference, Bilgi University, Istanbul, 24 – 27 August 2005. Thanks to Sumantra Bose, Dejan Jović, Jasna Dragović-Soso and the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.