Prospects for Managed Democracy in Russia

Abstract

The 2003 Duma election resulted in the victory of the party of power, thereby strengthening managed democracy in Russia. Since then, political trends in Russia's regions and rural politics provide considerable evidence of the increasing ability of pro-Kremlin forces to maximise their electoral fortunes in national contests. These political trends make it likely that United Russia will not only emerge as the dominant party in the 2007 Duma election, but will provide the Kremlin and Putin's successor with a compliant lower house. The outcome is that Putin's successor will find the political infrastructure to continue managed democracy.

Notes

¹‘Federal'nyi zakon Rossiskoi Federatsii ot 21 iyulya 2005 g. N 93-F3 O vnesenii izmenenii v zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii o vyborakh i referendumakh i inye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, adopted 21 July 2005, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 July 2005.

²‘Federal'nyi zakon o vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v chasti otmeny formy golosovaniya protiv vsekh kandidatov (protiv vsekh spiskov kandidatov) Prinyat Gosudarstvennoi Dumoi 30 iyunya 2006 goda Odobren Sovetom Federatsii 7 iyulya 2006 goda’, adopted 7 July 2006, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 July 2006.

³‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal'nyi zakon ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii i grazhdanskii protsessual'nyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, adopted 5 December 2006, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 December 2006.

⁴In the present article, we focus on the expansion of central government control in the regions and see United Russia as an instrument of this expansion. This begs the question as to why this particular party has been a successful instrument where others [Our Home is Russia (Nash dom Rossiya) for instance] have previously failed. The authors have focused on this question in a different article (see Konitzer & Wegren 2006).

⁵For a review of election law reforms by the federal centre during 2002 – 03, see Hale (2005, pp. 185 – 91).

⁶A. Kynev, ‘Vybory regional'nykh zakonodatel'nyk sobranii v 2003 – 2004 godakh, in Grazhdanskaya initsiativa proekta, ‘Informatika dlya demokratii—2000+’ (ed.), Internet-monitoring vyborov 2003 – 2004 godov v Rossii (Moscow, Fond INDEM), 2004, available at: http://www.indem.ru/IDD2000/itog2003-4/tom1/Bo2T1.htm, accessed 25 March 2007; A. Kynev, ‘Vybory regional'nykh zakonodatel'nykh sobranii kontsa 2004—nachala 2005 goda’, 2005, unpublished report available at: http://www.frip.ru/newfrip/cnt/analitic/sel?cid=22, accessed 5 May 2007.

⁷The full text of the law can be found at: http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/way/1406493, accessed 1 May 2007.

⁸A. Kynev, ‘Vybory regional'nykh zakonodatel'nykh sobranii kontsa 2004—nachala 2005 goda’, 2005, p. 2—unpublished report available at: http://www.frip.ru/newfrip/cnt/analitic/sel?cid=22, accessed 5 May 2007.

⁹A. Kynev, ‘Vybory regional'nykh zakonodatel'nykh sobranii kontsa 2004—nachala 2005 goda’, 2005, p. 2—unpublished report available at: http://www.frip.ru/newfrip/cnt/analitic/sel?cid=22, accessed 5 May 2007.

¹⁰These were the 2004 elections in Altaiskii Krai, Koryakskii AO, and Sakhalinskaya Oblast' where the party came in second to the KPRF (Altaiskii Krai and Koryakskii AO) and a coalition of the Agrarian Party, Peoples Will (Narodnaya volya), and the Eurasian Party (Partiya ‘Evraziya’) (Sakhalinskaya Oblast') and the 2005 elections in Nenetskii AO and Amurskaya Oblast' where the party came in second to a local pro-gubernatorial block (Amurskaya Oblast') and the KPRF (Nenetskii AO).

¹¹‘Edinaya Rossiya budet borot'sya za bolshinstvo na osennikh vyborakh v regional'nye parlamenty’, Newsru.com, 17 June 2006, available at: http://www.newsru.com/russia/17jun2006/poil.html, accessed 25 March 2007. While some readers may be sceptical about citing party officials for such data, we would restate that the presence of SMD candidates and the ability to switch fractions during a term in office (all since eliminated by recent changes in election laws) mean that more reliable and objective outside sources for this information are difficult to come by. However, Volodin's statement is backed by other party and press sources indicating that between 62 and 69 regions featured United Russia majorities.

¹²It should, however be noted that during the first set of regional elections to occur without turnout requirements (the 10 elections in the 11 March 2007 round), turnout levels remained similar to, or in some cases even slightly above those from previous elections (2002 – 03). The longer-term effect of these laws remains to be seen, and the Kremlin may simply have these laws ‘in reserve’ for specific elections where lower turnout rates would be necessary to ensure a pro-presidential party win.

¹³‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal'nyi zakon ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ i Grazhdanskii protsessual'nyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, adopted 5 December 2006, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 December 2006.

¹⁴While Yabloko's disqualification from the St. Petersburg contest perhaps received the most publicity, a total of 17 party lists were either disqualified or were blocked from registering for the 14 regional election contests (see Guseva 2007).

¹⁵It is important to note that we are not making an argument regarding the specific interests driving any given member of the regional political elite to align with United Russia party organs, or assessing whether the increase of regional elites within the ranks of United Russia will necessarily impose a single set of policies, dictated by the Kremlin, on regional political systems. For our purposes, the outcome of these decisions, particularly as they relate to national election outcomes, is more important than the underlying factors behind the decision. As noted, in our own past work and in the work of other analysts, the decision to align with United Russia is very often more one of expedience than of any particular ideological or policy preference. Taking on the label of United Russia provides a means to protect oneself from the central government while still essentially conducting ‘business as usual’ at the regional level.

¹⁶Unity later merged with Fatherland – All Russia and became United Russia in 2001.

¹⁷Data come from the Russian Central Election Commission Website, available at: http://www.cikrf.ru, accessed 25 March 2007.

¹⁸However, as Wilson has argued, Russian elections are often replete with ‘projects’ designed to steer voters in a particular direction, split votes for opposition parties or even give the impression of greater political competition than is actually present. This leaves the possibility that regional political actors will be called upon to ‘get out the vote’ for parties other than United Russia, but with the ultimate goal of supporting Moscow's programmes (Wilson 2005).

¹⁹In the 14 regional legislature contests that occurred on 11 March 2007, A Just Russia took first place in the party list vote in one region (Stavropolskii Krai), second place in five regions, third place in six regions and fourth place in two regions. Data source: Kommersant Daily, 13 March 2007.

²⁰ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 19 August 1999. Among the signatories of this declaration was Vladimir Plotnikov.

²¹‘Treshchinu mozhno zalatat’, Sel'skaya zhizn’, 26 August 1999.

²²‘Treshchinu mozhno zalatat’, Sel'skaya zhizn’, 26 August 1999.

²³ Krest'yanskie vedomosti, 38, 1999.

²⁴ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 13 – 19 April 2000.

²⁵ Krest'yanskie vedomosti, 1, 2001.

²⁶ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 26 November 2002.

²⁷ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 3 March 2003.

²⁸ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 3 March 2003.

²⁹ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 16 March 2004.

³⁰ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 6 April 2004.

³¹ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 13 April 2004. In late April 2004, following the removal of Lapshin and the election of Plotnikov, the APR's press service announced that Lapshin and his deputy Ruchkinov had filed inaccurate financial accounting documents with the Central Electoral Commission and tried to blame Chepa by spreading ‘disinformation’ for their own narrow interests, thereby causing ‘the most real threat for the liquidation of the party’. It was reported that the new leadership was preparing new financial documents for the commission and would submit them by the 15 June deadline (Sel'skaya zhizn’, 13 May 2004).

³²For the rebuke to Kharitonov and Gordeev, see Sel'skaya zhizn’, 6 May 2003; and see Rossiiskaya zemlya, 21, 2004 for a list of members in the central leadership council.

³³‘Za nas etogo ne sdelaet nikto’, Rossiiskaya zemlya 23, 2004, p. 2.

³⁴See ‘Programma i ustav prinyaty’, Rossiiskaya zemlya, 39 – 40, 2004. The new party rules were published in Rossiiskaya zemlya, 25, 2004, and the party programme was published in Rossiiskaya zemlya, 2, 2005.

³⁵ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 36, 2005; and Rossiiskaya zemlya, 18, 2006.

³⁶ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 40, 2005.

³⁷ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 12, 2006. One analyst has argued that in certain places, regional authorities removed leftist parties from the ballot if they would threaten the Communist party (Vinogradov 2006, p. 23).

³⁸ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 11, 2006.

³⁹ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 44, 2005.

⁴⁰‘Profsoyuz’ sel'skikh optimistov’ 2004, Rossiiskaya zemlya, 23, 2004, p. 3.

⁴¹‘Skola politicheskogo vzrosleniya’, Rossiiskaya zemlya, 5, 2005, p. 3.

⁴² Rossiiskaya zemlya, 7, 2005.

⁴³ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 12, 2005.

⁴⁴ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 13, 2005.

⁴⁵ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 18, 2005.

⁴⁶ Rossiiskaya zemlya, 20, 2005.

⁴⁷ Krest'yanskie vedomosti, 48 – 49, 2005. The article noted that Plotnikov would have ‘executive duties’ while Bashmachnikov would continue to have ‘legislative’ functions.

⁴⁸The 2004 party programme was published as ‘Programma politicheskoi partii “Agrarnaya partiia Rossii”’, Rossiiskaya zemlya, 2, 2005.

⁴⁹ Sel'skaya zhizn’, 27 September 2005. RAD held its founding congress in May 2002, electing Minister of Agriculture Aleksei Gordeev as its chairman. Upon its creation, the deputy chairman of RAD, Valentin Denisov, described RAD as neither a leftist nor rightist organisation, but centrist. While seldom critical of the Kremlin or its rural policies, that centrism appears to have evolved into an overtly pro-Kremlin position.

⁵⁰ Krest'yanskie vedomosti, 48 – 49, 2005.

⁵¹‘Kurs—na splocheniye i organizatsionuyu stoikost’, Rossiiskaya zemlya, 13, 2006, p. 3.

⁵² Sel'skaya zhizn’, 14 February 2006.

⁵³ Krest'yanskie vedomosti, 7, 2006.