From semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism: Regime change and presidential power in Moldova

Abstract

This article examines Moldova's constitutional change in 2000 from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary regime and analyses what the Moldovan case tells us about the nature of executive power. One of the interesting issues that this case raises is whether our definition of regime really captures the locus of political power. While Moldova has evolved from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary regime, the president is more powerful under the current regime than previous presidents were in a semi-presidential regime. The consolidation of the president's party in the parliament explains the concentration of executive power more than constitutional prerogatives.

Notes

¹Giovanni Sartori is one of the few political scientists to advocate semi-presidentialism over a presidential or parliamentary regime; see Sartori (1997).

²There is no consensus in the literature on how to categorise semi-presidential states. The lack of consensus is due to how the powers of the president vis-à-vis the parliament and the prime minister are conceptualised as well as the accountability of the prime minister to the parliament. That said, numerous post-communist states have adopted some form of semi-presidentialism. For example, Siaroff (2003) lists 14 post-communist states as having adopted a dual executive at some point since 1990.

³Russia was also a premier – presidential regime during the period from 1991 to 1993.

⁴At this time, members of the government were proposed by the president and confirmed by the parliament.

⁵Gagauzia is a southern region of the country composed of significant ethnic minorities including ethnic Gagauzi (a Christian Turkic group) and ethnic Bulgarians.

⁶The election was held a year before the term of the 1990 parliament was due to expire.

⁷A few of these powers were eliminated from the office of the president following the constitutional regime change in 2000.

⁸For example in 1999, Lucinschi nominated four individuals to the post of prime minister before one was finally confirmed by the parliament.

⁹Lucinschi hoped to use the outcome of this referendum to put pressure on the parliament either to call for a binding referendum or to pass a constitutional amendment.

¹⁰Because the Moldovan president would still nominate a prime minister subject to a vote of confidence, the proposed change was actually for a president – parliamentary regime.

¹¹The number of parliamentary seats was reduced from 104 to 101 beginning with the 1998 parliamentary elections.

¹²Author's interview with Andrei Neguţa, MP and member of the PCM faction, Chişinău, July 2000.

¹³Author's interview with Andrei Neguţa, MP and member of the PCM faction, Chişinău, July 2000.

¹⁴Author's interview with Sergiu Burca, MP and member of the Popular Front Christian Democratic faction, Chişinău, July 2000.

¹⁵ Infotag, 5 July 2000, p. 1.

¹⁶Author's interview with Mircea Snegur, MP and former president of Moldova, Chişinău, July 2000.

¹⁷Author's interview with Ion Morei, independent MP, Chişinău, July 2000.

¹⁸The 1 December 2000 vote was declared nullified by the Constitutional Court because several PCM MPs violated the secrecy of the ballot by checking members' ballots in an attempt to ensure party discipline.

¹⁹ Reuters, 4 April 2001.

²⁰ Infotag, 1 August 2001, p. 2.

²¹The principal – agent model of semi-presidentialism of Schleiter and Morgan-Jones is based on the direct election of the president; see Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2006).

²² Infotag, 17 August 2001, p. 1.