A Tale of Two Kazakhstans: Sources of Political Cleavage and Conflict in the Post-Soviet Period

Abstract

Departing from some prominent scholarship on Kazakhstani politics, the author argues that competition between financial–industrial groups over scarce economic and political resources—rather than inter-clan or centre–periphery rivalries—largely determines who gets what, when and how. While clan politics and regional grievances may still influence struggles over the distribution of power and wealth, their importance has diminished in recent years. Instead, observable political conflict has centred around competing financial–industrial groups, which represent the diverse, and at times clashing, interests of Kazakhstan's business and political elites.

Notes

Research for this article was supported in part by a World Politics and Statecraft Dissertation Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Title VIII Research Scholar Program, which is funded by the US State Department, Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Title VIII) and administered by American Councils for International Education: ACTR/ACCELS. The opinions expressed therein are the author's own and do not necessarily express the views of the Smith Richardson Foundation, the US State Department, or American Councils. The author gratefully acknowledges Jack Bielasiak, William Fierman, Azamat Junisbai, Henry Hale, Brent Hierman, Regina Smyth, Regine Spector, and the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback and suggestions for strengthening this article. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

Elites are defined as those who indirectly or directly play a regular and substantial part in national political outcomes, such as political, government and economic actors (Higley & Burton 1989; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935, 1966; Putnam 1976).

Nazarbaev belongs to the senior horde. Kazakhs are traditionally grouped into three hordes: the senior (or elder) horde, the middle horde and the junior (or younger) horde.

Unlike Collins, Schatz does not argue that clan conflict is the primary force behind political outcomes. Schatz does, however, argue that clans ‘matter’ and suggests that clans have a significant impact on political life. See Schatz (2004), especially pp. 109–12.

For a recent example of clan-based grievances, see Kyrbasov (2007).

As is true of the literature on clan politics, the research questions and approaches guiding studies of centre–periphery relations are diverse, as are their findings. Despite any divergence or disagreement among the authors, I include them under a common approach because they investigate and extrapolate upon the state of power relations between the regions and the centre.

Kazakhstan is divided into 14 administrative units, called oblasti. Each oblast' is headed by an akim (governor), who is directly appointed by the president.

According to the leader of a Russian cultural centre, which represents ethnic Russians residing in Kazakhstan under the International Council of Russians Abroad, a majority of Russians support President Nazarbaev precisely because of the economic and political stability he has brought the country. Author's interview with anonymous civil society activist, 13 March 2007, Almaty.

See the Appendix for a description of the methodology, interview questions and types of individuals questioned.

While Cummings (2000) analyses Kazakhstan's center–periphery relations, Cummings (2005) shows how, in addition to the regional dimension, family and business interests have also shaped the contemporary elite. In Cummings (2005), financial–industrial groups are referred to as ‘state economic groups’. Among Kazakhstani political observers, FPGs have also been called influence or pressure groups (gruppy vliyanie) and, simply, groupings (gruppirovki). I refrain from referring to FPGs as business clans (or ‘klans’) that represent corporate or strategic interests to avoid confusion with the anthropological (or kinship-based) definition of clan.

See also Dilevskaya (2001) and Institut aktual'nykh issledovanii (1999). For a detailed account of Russia's financial–industrial groups and their political impact, see Hale (2005) and Barnes (2006).

This characterisation also applies to the Nur Otan presidential party, whose status, most observers agree, rests solely on its leader, President Nazarbaev.

Author's interview with then Mazhilis deputy Serik Abdurakhmanov, 8 April 2007, Astana.

Additional sources include Dzhanibekov (2004); Epitsentr evraziiskii tsentr politicheskikh issledovanii i agentsvo sotsial'nykh tekhnologii (2005); Institut aktual'nykh issledovanii (1999); Profil', 2 April 2007, available at: http://www.profile.ru/items/?item=22527, accessed 20 January 2008; Satov (2007); and Yuritsyn (2007).

See also Epitsentr evraziiskii tsentr politicheskikh issledovanii i agentsvo sotsial'nykh tekhnologii (2005) and Yuritsyn (2007).

For example, Nurlan Balgimbaev was associated with the Kulibaev FPG in the late 1990s, but may have been the subject of a smear campaign in the Russian and Kazakhstani press as a result of some conflict that arose between Balgimbaev and other Kulibaev associates. Nurlan Kapparov, also mentioned as a member of the Kulibaev FPG in the late 1990s, resigned from his post as deputy minister of energy and mineral resources in 2001. After finishing graduate school at Harvard University, he served on the board of directors of a Canadian oil company operating in Kazakhstan and later co-founded a company called the Lancaster Group.

As former entrepreneur and current opposition leader Asylbek Kozhakhmetov explains, Kazakhstan's economy is based on the principles of the free market only up to a point: ‘We have free markets at the level of small businesses and perhaps at the level of medium-sized businesses, as well. But you can only get into high-stakes big business if you openly and constantly pronounce your loyalty to the regime’ (interview with the author, 6 April 2007, Almaty). The director of a Kazakhstani media NGO agrees: ‘Our economic system is harshly authoritarian at the top, when it comes to big business, but at the lower level there is competition and the laws regulating economic interactions are for the most part liberal’ (author's interview with anonymous NGO leader, 17 May 2007, Almaty).

Author's interview with an anonymous political observer who was public relations coordinator of an opposition party, 24 April 2007, Almaty.

For more on Burkitbaev see Pannier (2008). Institut aktual'nykh issledovanii (1999) lists Burkitbaev as a leader of the Kazkommerts group and Li as a FPG leader with apparent connections to other FPGs headed by Nurtai Abykaev (inner circle) and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin (second tier). Cummings (2005, p. 42) includes Li among Kazakhstan's six or eight state economic groups, and Aliev (2009) mentions Li once in connection with a group of three business elite members who gained control of the Pavlodar oil refinery in the late 1990s and later had a falling out with one another. Contemporary accounts, however, make no mention of Li; nor is he included in Kto est' kto v Kazakhstane (2006, 2008). Yuritsyn (2007) includes Dzhaksybek Kulekeev, a former minister and head of the Temir Zholy state railroad company, among the second tier. Kulekeev was arrested on corruption charges (bribe-taking) in 2008.

Institut aktual'nykh issledovanii (1999) lists among Nurkadilov's businesses a company called Dostyk Interavto, construction companies and agricultural processing plants. Based on these assets, Nurkadilov seems to have been among the second tier FPGs, rather than in the inner circle.

Subkhanberdin remained the head of Kazkommertsbank after quickly rescinding his signature to the DVK's founding document. In retribution for his initial hard-line stance against the president, Mukhtar Ablyazov was jailed on corruption charges in 2002 and served almost a year of his six-year sentence before being pardoned and allowed to resume his business activities outside the country. A number of Ablyazov's original businesses were, however, taken over by other FPGs. Ablyazov spent two years investing outside of Kazakhstan before returning in 2005. In spring 2009, apparently as a result of the financial crisis, the government of Kazakhstan confiscated Ablyazov's remaining assets in conjunction with the nationalisation of Bank Turan Alem, a prominent Kazakhstani bank that had borrowed heavily from abroad. Facing criminal charges, Ablyazov fled Kazakhstan, as did some of his key associates and family members. Those close to Ablyazov who stayed in the country have been subject to government pressure.

Author's interviews with Petr Svoik, NGO leader, former parliamentarian and minister, co-founder of the Azamat opposition party in 1996, 31 January 2007, Almaty; and Bulat Abilov, then co-chair of the Naghyz Ak Zhol opposition party, former member of parliament under the presidential party ticket, former owner of the Butya company, co-founder of the DVK, and formerly one of the wealthiest businessmen in Kazakhstan, 19 December 2006, Almaty.

I would like to thank Dr Rustem Kadyrzhanov of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan for emphasising the practice of reiderstvo in the world of Kazakhstan's business.

Author's interview with Bulat Abilov, 19 December 2006, Almaty.

As a sign of its success in recent years, in 2007 Fitch Ratings and the Russian journal Itogi named Turan Alem Bank the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) bank of the year.

Author's interview with Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, 28 February 2007, Almaty.

Author's interview with Rozlana Taukina, director of the media NGO Zhurnalisty v Bede, 6 March 2007, Almaty.

Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, 24 February 2007, Almaty.

Author's interview with Bulat Abilov, 19 December 2006, Almaty.

President Nazarbaev's press secretary initially announced that ‘the president thinks that the movement's initiators acted in accordance with the law. Its declaration is fully in accord with the economic and political goals of the president’. See Kazakhstan Today, 21 November 2001, available at: http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=10256, accessed 3 January 2008.

Author's interview with anonymous expert working at a private foundation, 11 April 2007, Almaty. This view was echoed by interviews with anonymous (non-opposition) civil society activists, 29 and 30 April 2007.

Author's interview with Rozlana Taukina, 6 March 2007, Almaty.

Author's interview with Peter Svoik, 31 January 2007, Almaty.

Schatz refers to these two figures as examples of clan clientelism in Kazakhstan (2004, p. 99, 2005, p. 240).

Author's interview with Dosym Satpaev, 24 February 2007, Almaty.

Author's interview with Petr Svoik, 31 January 2007.

Author's interview with anonymous expert working at a private foundation, 11 April 2007, Almaty.

Author's interview with Petr Svoik, 31 January 2007, Almaty.

Agenstvo nezavisimykh rassledovanii, ‘Kak kazakhstanskie vlasti fabrikuyut delo protiv Rakhata Alieva’, 21 November 2007, available at: http://www.kub.info/article.php?sid=19763, accessed 22 November 2007.

Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov, civil society activist, independent journalist and founder of Radio Inkar internet radio station, 8 February 2007, Almaty. See also Trend Information Agency, 25 June 2007, available at: http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/readnews2.pl?newsId=933388&lang=RU, and Interfax-Kazakhstan, 25 June 2007, available at: http://www.kub.kz/print.php?sid=17739, both accessed 30 June 2007.

For one interpretation of the reasons for and significance of Kulibaev's removal, see Zubkov (2007).

Author's interview, 28 February 2007, Almaty. The view that akims' autonomy and freedom of action are constrained by the presidential vertical was reiterated in interviews with Evgenii Zhovtis, civil society activist and director of the Kazakhstan International Human Rights Bureau, 6 February 2007, Almaty; Tamara Kaleeva, director of the Adil Soz International Foundation for Freedom of Speech (independent media watchdog organisation), 5 February 2007, Almaty; anonymous independent (non-opposition) Mazhilis deputy, 25 April 2007, Astana; anonymous academics, 12 February, 2 March and 3 March 2007, Almaty; and anonymous journalists and political commentators, 5 February, 8 February, 5 April and 12 April 2007, Almaty.

As Cummings (2000) and Jones Luong (2004) point out, this centralised system is, however, plagued with inefficiency and lack of accountability. In early 2007, the president announced a new administrative reform, which applies corporate management principles to government, creating an additional layer of administrators at the local level who are accountable only to the president. For criticism of this line of reform, see Bekturganova (2007) and Erimbetov (2007).

Due to constitutional amendments adopted in 2007 the appointment of akims is now subject to the approval of local councils (maslikhats). For an analysis of this and other changes to the electoral system, see Yermukanov (2007).

Author's interview with Evgenii Zhovtis, 6 February 2007, Almaty. For anecdotal evidence of this dynamic, see Khlyupin (1998, p. 12) and Schatz (2004, pp. 105–6).

Baltash Tursumbaev also publicly criticised the president while serving as akim (Kostanai oblast', 1993–1995) and, during his term as Ambassador to Turkey, was courted by the political opposition to run for president in 1999. In response, President Nazarbaev appointed Tursumbaev to the short-lived position of deputy prime minister. Three months later, the president dissolved the government. Not only was Tursumbaev removed from office, he also never again served in any official capacity. Author's interviews with Baltash Tursumbaev, 14 March 2007; anonymous political scientist, 12 February 2007, Almaty; Rozlana Taukina, 5 February 2007, Almaty; and anonymous journalists, 2 March 2007, Almaty. For more on co-optation of elite contenders to the president, see also Cummings (2005, p. 108).

Author's interview with anonymous political scientist, 12 February 2007, Almaty.

For a similar argument, see Cummings (2005, pp. 106–7).

Biographical information was gathered from Ashimbaev (2006, 2008).

Author's interviews with Tamara Kaleeva, 5 February 2007, Almaty; anonymous NGO leader, 17 May 2007, Almaty; and Evgenii Zhovtis, 6 February 2007, Almaty. This is not to say, however, that akims have no interest in public goods or in improving the life of those in their oblast'. Those akims who are active proponents of the needs of their oblast' can still be concerned with their own personal interests, including material enrichment. In other words, these two goals are not mutually exclusive.

Kazakhstan's parliament does not even quite fulfil this role, since the executive branch initiates an overwhelming percentage of laws that are passed by the legislature. According to the estimates of Mazhilis deputy and Nur Otan member Nurbakh Rustemov (interview with author, 19 February 2007, Almaty), 90–95% of the laws are initiated not by parliament, but by the government (pravitel'stvo), which, along with the prime minister, was a technical organ subordinate to the president until 2007. In 2007, changes to the constitution transferred the power to appoint the prime minister to the Mazhilis.

Author's interviews with anonymous former akim, 16 March 2007, Almaty, and with Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, 8 February 2007, Almaty; see also Cummings (2000, pp. 41–42, 2005, p. 105).

Rather than ‘chosen’, as is used here, Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Law on Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of its Deputies states that ‘nine deputies of the Mazhilis are elected (izbrannykh) by the People's Assembly of Kazakhstan’ (see http://www.parlam.kz/Informa tion.aspx?doc=4&lan=ru-RU, accessed 14 July 2009).

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 50, paragraph 2, available at: http://www.parlam.kz/Information.aspx?doc=2&lan=ru-RU, and the Law on Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of its Deputies, Article 4, paragraph 3, available at: http://www.parlam.kz/Information.aspx?doc=4&lan=ru-RU, both accessed 23 June 2009.

Data for the 12th and 13th Supreme Soviets, which preceded the Mazhilis, were not available.

Maslikhats, while popularly elected, are often dependent of the akim. As a sign of dependence, Mazhilis deputy Serik Abdrakhmanov explains, ‘Not one maslikhat in Kazakhstan has ever come out against the akim in the entire 12 year period of its existence as an elected body’ (interview with author, 8 April 2007, Astana).

Author's interview with Sergei Duvanov, 8 February 2007, Almaty.

Collins, however, has been criticised in both Schatz (2005) and Radnitz (2007) for defining clans too broadly to be analytically useful.

Author's interview with Evgenii Zhovtis, 6 February 2007, Almaty.

In an interview with the author (19 February 2007, Almaty), Mazhilis deputy Nurbakh Rustemov explained, ‘We have a presidential form of governance, and this gives us the opportunity to do exactly that: support the president. On the other hand, it is not necessary just because we have a presidential form of government, but because the president is the guarantor of stability in our country. And in reality he does guarantee stability because he has great authority in the country. No one else can be said to claim this position’.

The economy's overwhelming dependence on natural resource extraction, however, makes it vulnerable to changes in the world market. As the current financial crisis demonstrates, Kazakhstan's boom could come to an end without much advanced notice.

Author's interviews with Petr Svoik, 31 January 2007, Almaty; anonymous media NGO leader, 17 May 2007, Almaty; and then Mazhilis deputy Amalbek Tshanov, 14 April 2007, Astana.