Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo

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Notes

The author conducted fieldwork in Kosovo and Macedonia in 2006. For the emergence and evolution of the UÇK, this study relies heavily on selected interviews with former protagonists, particularly an interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi in Tetovo in May 2006 on the preparatory phase of the rebellion. The author is aware of the possible pitfalls of such prioritised reliance on one selected key informant, especially given the specific post-war context of politicised memory constructions. In order to avoid such pitfalls, an attempt was made to verify the statements of the informant as much as possible by using the published materials and statements made by other people in Kosovo. Due to the clandestine nature of the early illegal movement however, such verification is often simply impossible. However, this prioritised reliance is justifiable in the present study, especially because Ibrahim Kelmendi is one of the rare survivors of the founders of the clandestine organisation, while other founders such as the Gërvalla brothers and Kadri Zeka were assassinated (see below). In addition, unlike those who are now politically active in Kosovo and Macedonia such as Hashim Thaçi and Ali Ahmeti, Kelmendi has not spoken publicly about his activities and has never been cited (as far as the author is aware) in the literature on the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, although he has been an influential figure behind the scenes in the Albanian society in ex-Yugoslavia, working as a political advisor to Ali Ahmeti in Macedonia as of May 2006.

See, for example, Lake and Rothchild (1998), Fearon (1998), Weingast (1998) and Öberg (2002).

For further discussion of the history, culture, religion and society in Kosovo, see for example Malcolm (1998); Duijzings (2000); and Schwandner-Sievers and Fischer (2002).

For discussion of the situation of Kosovo under the communist regime and the policies towards the Kosovar Albanians, see Vickers (1998, pp. 144–217) and Clark (2000, pp. 7–45).

For detailed documentation of the illegal movements in Kosovo, see Çeku (2004).

For example, Adem Demaçi was arrested several times by the Serbian authorities and served several lengthy prison sentences, he was released from prison for the last time in April 1990. Therefore, he could not be active during the 1980s while others were founding the illegal organisations in the West. Demaçi, however, became the political spokesman for the UÇK in August 1998, and his embrace of the UÇK ‘lent enormous respect to the organization because he was the uncompromising symbol of Kosovar Albanian militancy’ (Perritt 2008, p. 34).

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

‘In Yugoslavia’ was taken from its name in 1986. Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

According to Kelmendi, this group consisted of Ali Ahmeti, Xhavit Haliti, Sabri Kiçmari and Emrush Xhemaili. Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006. Judah cites different names for this four-man group: Kadri Veseli, Hashim Thaçi, Xhavit Haliti and Abaz Xhuka (Ali Ahmeti); see Judah (2000, pp. 115–16).

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006. Çeku filed a retirement request in 1998 to go to Kosovo and join the UÇK, though he was allowed to do so only in 1999.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

Now, 28 November is a date observed by Albanians everywhere as Flag Day, a holiday of great patriotic significance. See ICG (1998c, p. 3).

For a list of the dates and places of the attacks associated with the UÇK during this period, both on the Serbs and Albanian ‘collaborators’, see Kresovićet al. (1998, pp. 40–49).

‘Pyramid schemes’ are a non-sustainable form of investment with the promise of extremely high rates of return for the investor's deposit and for enrolling other people into the scheme, without any product or service actually being delivered. They emerged in Albania in the 1990s and expanded rapidly until they collapsed in 1997, prompting a general uprising against the government.

While the exact number of arms that flowed into Kosovo is unknown, it has been suggested that the amount was indeed huge. According to some reports about 750,000 weapons were stolen from military depots and many of them ended up in the hands of the UÇK (ICG 1998b, p. ii). According to General Obrad Stevanović of the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ), the number of weapons seized by the Serbian authorities by 20 June 1999 amounted to 1,045 hand-held rocket launchers, 8,320 machine-guns, semi-automatic, automatic and similar rifles, 360 pistols, 4,224 mines and other explosive devices, and 723,531 pieces of ammunition of different types. See, ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), p. 39574 (2005/05/17).

Interview with Edita Tahiri, Prishtina, 9 May 2006. Tahiri was the former Foreign Minister of the government in exile of the Republic of Kosova and a member of the presidency of the LDK, and is currently the president of the reformist party, the Democratic Alternative of Kosova (Alternativa Demokratike e Kosovës, ADK).

For the details of the agreement, see Simić (2000, pp. 99–100) and Troebst (1998, pp. 81–83).

Note, however, that the US maintained so-called ‘outer wall sanctions’ and blocked Yugoslavia's return to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, citing the issue of Kosovo as one reason.

Interview with a Kosovar Albanian who wished to remain anonymous, Prishtina, 12 May 2006.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 20 May 2006.

Interview with Edita Tahiri, Prishtina, 9 May 2006.

Interview with Edita Tahiri and Edi Shukriu, Prishtina, 9 May 2006. See also Clark (2000, pp. 84, 123).

For the list of all people killed in Prekaz during the Serbian police operations, see Tahiri (2006, pp. 86–88). This event was called the ‘Drenica Massacre’ by Albanians, and the site of the ‘massacre’, with ruined buildings of the former Jashari compound, was turned into a ‘memorial complex’. For pictures and descriptions of the complex, see Thaçi (2004).

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), p. 5428 (2002/05/23).

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), p. 3492 (2002/04/19).

Observer, 14 June 1998.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), pp. 6427–28 (2002/06/06).

AIM Press, 20 April 1999.

Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 30 May 2006.

Interview with Shemsi Syla, Prishtina, 10 May 2006. According to him, the UÇK had seven ‘operative zones (OZs)’ in Kosovo, each of which had its zone commander. These were as follows: OZ Drenica (zone commander: Sami Lushtaku), OZ Pashtrik (Musa Jashari, Ekrem Rexha and Tahir Sinani), OZ Dukagjini (Ramush Haradinaj), OZ Shala (Rahman Rama), OZ Llap (Rustem Mustafa), OZ Nerodime (Shukri Buja) and OZ Karadak (Ahmet Isufi). See also Republika Srbija (2003, map 1), for the territorial division of the operative zones of the UÇK.

Haradinaj also explains how he was elected as a zone commander in a meeting of representatives from all headquarters of villages in Gllogjan. See Hamzaj (2000, pp. 71–72).

He did so, of course, without admitting that the sharp increase in the number of UÇK attacks was a result of the excessive use of force by the Serbian security forces. Indeed, he denied any excessive use of force by the Serbian authorities. See ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), pp. 9327–29 (2005/06/22).

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), pp. 41242–43 (2005/06/21).

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), p. 7926 (2002/07/10).

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), p. 7927 (2002/07/10).

Hockenos argues that this was a result of the UÇK's strategy. He argues that ‘part of the UÇK strategy entailed provoking the Serbs, getting them to lash back with predictable ferocity and thus forcing a Western military response’ because ‘the more cruel the repression, the more vivid the message that Albanians could not live under Serb domination’ (Hockenos 2003, p. 250).

ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milošević), pp. 6966–67 (2002/06/13).

Bose described this dynamic as ‘the dialectic of state repression and nationalist resistance’ (1994, p. 89). For the further detail of this dialectic, see Bose (1994, pp. 92–116). LTTE membership grew from a mere 30-odd individuals in July 1983 to some 4,000 in July 1987 (Bose 1994, p. 87).