The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991–2009)

Abstract

This article attempts to analyse the political discourse of some of the Azerbaijani elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the lens of the views of leading members of Azerbaijani society. The information is based on personal interviews conducted with some influential members of the Azerbaijani political society in Baku in December 2001 and April 2009. The focus of the study was to analyse how Azerbaijanis (re)construct their ideas about Armenian identity and community. The Azerbaijani narration of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reveals how they have isolated themselves from their neighbours and from Western powers and how they legitimise their isolation.

Notes

¹I wish to thank to Sabina Strasser and two anonymous referees for their very useful comments and critical insights.For a schematic overview of the Armenian and Azerbaijani versions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see Kurkchiyan (2005, pp. 150–53).

²The years 1905, 1918 and 1920 are important for the history of the clashes between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Armed clashes between the two sides first took place in Baku and later in other parts of the Caucasus in 1905. This was the first armed clash. Others broke out between the two sides in 1918, again in Baku and in other parts of the Caucasus, and in 1920 (in Shusha). As a result of killings on both sides, hundreds of people from both sides died during these undeclared wars. For additional information about the history of these disputes see Altstadt (1988, p. 66; 1994, pp. 108–10), Cornell (1998, p. 53; 2001, pp. 73–74), Curtis (1995, p. 92), Goldenberg (1994, pp. 27–38), Herzig (1999, pp. 52–53), Hunter (1994, p. 98) and van der Leeuw (2000, p. 155).

³See Yamskov (1991, pp. 639–42) who argues that socioeconomic factors, i.e. Karabakh Armenians' low standard of living and dissatisfaction with their economic situation, played a major role in the development of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis during the mid-1980s. See also Goldenberg (1994, pp. 160–61) and de Waal (2003, p. 139). Moreover, the Armenians were also complaining about the way Nagorno-Karabakh was being administered from Baku (de Waal 2003, p. 138). Besides, they had some cultural complaints like not having an Armenian-language television station in Nagorno-Karabakh and the history of Armenia not being taught in Armenian-language schools (de Waal 2003, p. 141).

⁴See Cornell (1997, pp. 18–19) for details of the USSR Constitution of 1977 regarding the rights of peoples to self-determination and border changes.

⁵For detailed information about the clashes and armed conflicts between the two communities and the political developments that took place in Azerbaijan after 1988, see Cornell (1998, pp. 54–57; 2001), Croissant (1998), de Waal (2003), Dragadze (1996), Goldenberg (1994, pp. 162–68), Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (1994), van der Leeuw (2000), Saroyan (1990), Vaserman and Ginat (1994) and Zinin and Maleshenko (1994, pp. 105–9). See also Laitin and Suny (1999) who discuss the international dimension of the conflict and the attempts toward a solution with reference to both Armenian and Azerbaijani national politics during the 1990s.

⁶For detailed information and discussion about the history of Caucasian Albania, the inhabitants of the area, and the historical dimensions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see Croissant (1998), de Waal (2003, pp. 152–58), Dragadze (1996), Goldenberg (1994), van der Leeuw (2000), Shnirelman (2001), Tchilingirian (1999) and Walker (1991, 1996). See also Bournoutian (1994, p. ix), who writes that, ‘in order to present a fair and balanced view of the history of the region, one must rely not only on Russian, Armenian, and European primary sources but on the work of Iranian and local Turkic chroniclers as well’. See Chorbajian et al. (1994) for an Armenian perspective and Alijarly (1996), Yunusov (2005) and Mehdiyev (2010) for an Azerbaijani perspective.

⁷See also de Waal (2003, pp. 152–57).

⁸Shnirelman (2001, pp. 149–50) argues that the struggle between Armenians, who discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in terms of a ‘liberation movement’ or a ‘struggle for survival’, and Azerbaijanis, who discuss the issue in terms of ‘aggression’ and ‘occupation’, had started in the 1950s.

⁹Hunter (1994, p. 62) claims that although Azerbaijani scholars are aware of the ‘inconsistencies and the falseness’ of Azerbaijani theories of myths of origin (ethnogenesis) and myths of history, ‘they argue that they are needed in order to foster a sense of Azerbaijan national identity and a sense of Turkishness in the society’.

¹⁰Smith et al. (1998, pp. 50–51) write that according to the Armenian migration theory, proto-Armenian speakers first arrived in the Tigris valley in the twelfth century BC and shortly afterwards merged with the local inhabitants.

¹¹For a detailed discussion of the two schools, see Shnirelman (2001, chapters 9–12). See also Astourian (1994) and Smith et al. (1998, pp. 50–53).

¹²For detailed information about the population distribution in Nagorno-Karabakh in a historical context, see Altstadt (1988, p. 76, endnote 18), Anderson and Silver (1996, pp. 502–5), Bournoutian (1996, pp. 69–70, 77, 79–80), Cornell (1999, p. 190; 2001, p. 68), de Waal (2003, pp. 131, 133, 140, 149), Goldenberg (1994, p. 158), Henze (1991), Herzig (1999, p. 66), Joffé (1996, p. 25), Laitin and Suny (1999, p. 175, endnote 8), White (1993, p. 163), Suny (1996a, p. 386), Tchilingirian (1999, p. 457, endnote 2), Vaserman and Ginat (1994, p. 347), Yamskov (1991, pp. 644–47, 650) and Yunusov (2001, p. 2). For additional information and analysis of the 1989 Soviet census data, see Henze (1991). For additional information about the population change in Nagorno-Karabakh and the population distribution and movements in Transcaucasia after 1989, see Anderson and Silver (1996, pp. 502–5). For the Armenian claims about the population distribution in Nagorno-Karabakh, see Walker (1991, 1996). See also Walker (2000, pp. 170–71) for more information about the displaced Azerbaijanis and Armenians due to the Karabakh conflict.

¹³Interview with a vice president of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Interviewee 16). See Appendix for details of interviewees here and in further references below.

¹⁴Interview with a historian and Member of Parliament (52). Another historian (49) also made the same claim.

¹⁵Interview with a historian (10).

¹⁶As discussed in the previous section, the Azerbaijanis and Armenians refute each other's claims about where they came from, and why, and in which part of the Caucasus they were settled. It appears to be difficult to verify any historical claims made by both sides. Azerbaijanis believe that the Azerbaijani historian Feride Mamedova, who studied the historical Armenian documents written in the Armenian language, proved that the Armenians had never lived in the Caucasus. Thus, it was argued that Nakhichevan and Karabakh are not the historical Armenian lands, as claimed by Armenians. It was also argued that in the above mentioned historical Armenian documents it was written that the Armenians migrated to the area from Asia Minor (interview with (1), academician. For a discussion of Mamedova's works, including her Doctor of History thesis defended in 1986, see Shnirelman (2001, pp. 164–74, 177–78). Shnirelman (2001, p. 165) argues that Mamedova's thesis was about the political borders of the Albanian state and this work was a ‘landmark in the long project of revising Albanian history and culture’. Mamedova developed the idea that there had been a distinct ‘Albanian ethnos’ in the medieval period and that the Armenians ‘arrived in the territory of Azerbaijan only in the very late 18th–very early 19th centuries’ (Shnirelman 2001, p. 165). Overall, Mamedova's work found much support among the Azerbaijani scholars and added further to the intense ideological struggle between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Mamedova was the Azerbaijani historian Bunyatov's student and Bunyatov was among the first historians who studied the history of Caucasian Albania. Bunyatov argues that Karabakh (Artsakh) has never been the centre of Armenian culture. For a brief summary of his ideas, see de Waal (2003, pp. 151–53). See also de Waal (2003, pp. 153–55) for more information about Mamedova's works and for the author's personal communication with Mamedova herself. For the Armenian response to the above mentioned claims, which is beyond the scope of this study, see Shnirelman (2001, pp. 173–80). Another claim about former Armenian homelands was provided by one of the interviewees, a historian (10). According to this view, the first homeland of the Armenians was the Balkan Peninsula (i.e. Thrace). Their second homeland was the area around the Van Lake (in Eastern Anatolia). In their second homeland they developed as an ethnic group. Their third homeland was the South Caucasus, the present-day Armenia. According to this respondent, ‘This is why the Armenians do not write about the history of Armenia; they write about the history of Armenian people since their real homeland is in the Balkans’.

¹⁷Interviews with Samil Mehdiyev, vice chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (5); and a historian (49).

¹⁸Interview with an academician (3).

¹⁹Interviews with an academician (46), and two historians (48, 49). Almost all interviewees referred to these monuments when the topic of discussion was their arrival to the region.

²⁰Interviews with Akif Nagi, chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (47); Samil Mehdiyev, vice chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (5); and one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (15).

²¹Interview with one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (41). This view is shared by all of the interviewees. However, there were various discussions about how to minimise Russia's power and influence in the region. This topic is beyond the scope of this article.

²²Interview with one of the leaders of the Musavat Party (30). This view, too, is shared by all of the interviewees. They believe that the key to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is in the hands of the Russians. There were again different views about which countries can exert pressure on Russia and how they can do this so that Russia resolves the conflict. This issue is also beyond the scope of this article.

²³Interviews with a historian (10) and a journalist (33).

²⁴Interview with Akif Nagi, chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (47).

²⁵Interviews with a historian (10); a journalist (33); a leader of the Musavat Party (30); a policy analyst, Caucasus University–Caucasus Research Centre (34); a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technolgoy (35); Akif Nagi, chair of the Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (47); two historians (48, 49); two academicians (32, 46); a Musavat Party leader (51); and a historian and Member of Parliament (52).

²⁶Interviews with a Musavat Party leader (30); an academician (46); a historian and Member of Parliament (52); and two academicians (32, 37).

²⁷Interview with a historian (48).

²⁸Interview with an academician (32).

²⁹Interview with a Musavat Party leader (51).

³⁰Interview with a journalist (33).

³¹Interview with an academician (32). Also interviews with a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38); a historian (49); an academician (46); a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35); a Musavat Party leader (51); two academicians (54, 37); and a historian and Member of Parliament (52).

³²Interview with a Musavat Party leader (51).

³³Interview with an academician (37).

³⁴Interview with an academician (46). Also interviews with a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35); a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38); a policy analyst, Peace and Conflict Resolution Center (39); one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (41); an academician (46); Akif Nagi, chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (47); an academician (37); and with a historian and Member of Parliament (52). This is also a widely shared opinion of the general population. Any personal conversation with people other than the interviewees ended with an emphasis on the disloyalty of the Armenians.

³⁵The Armenians were relocated to the Ottoman province of Damascus, what is now Syria, by the Ottoman government in 1915. This was accompanied by the loss of many lives.

³⁶Interviews with a journalist (33); an academician (46); a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38); a historian and Member of Parliament (52); Akif Nagi, chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (47); policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35); Ali Kerimli, leader of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (53) and a Musavat Party leader (51).

³⁷Interview with policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38).

³⁸Interview with an academician (46).

³⁹Interview with an academician (32).

⁴⁰Interview with an academician and opposition Member of Parliament (50).

⁴¹Interview with an academician (3).

⁴²Interview with an editor of Musavat Newspaper (8).

⁴³Interview with an academician (3).

⁴⁴Interviews with a vice president of the Foreign Affairs ministry (16) and a member of the General Executive Board of the Musavat Party (28).

⁴⁵Interview with Ali Kerimli, party leader, chair, Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, the reformist wing (29).

⁴⁶For example, an interview with an academician in International Relations (32).

⁴⁷For example, an interview with one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (9).

⁴⁸For example, an interview with a board member of the Musavat Party (28).

⁴⁹Interview with a vice president of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (16). These opinions were shared by almost all of the 2001 and 2009 interviewees, as discussed in the previous section.

⁵⁰Interviews with a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38); Musavat Party leaders (30, 51); a journalist (33); a policy analyst, Caucasus University–Caucasus Research Centre (34); a journalist (31); and with an academician and opposition Member of Parliament (50). This view was shared by almost all interviewees. A few argued that Russia would not want to create more conflict in its periphery after the 2008 Georgian events.

⁵¹Interviews with a journalist (31); an academician (32); a Musavat Party leader (51); and with an academician (36). This opinion, too, was shared by all of the interviewees.

⁵²Interviews with one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (41); an academician (36); Akif Nagi, chair, Organisation for the Liberation of Karabakh (47); and with a journalist (31).

⁵³Interview with one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (41).

⁵⁴Interview with a journalist (33).

⁵⁵For example, interviews with a journalist (31); a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35); a vice president of the Foreign Affairs ministry (42); a Musavat Party leader (30); and with an academician (36).

⁵⁶Interview with an academician (32). In this context, the interviewees referred to Robert Kocharyan, Serj Sarkisyan and to many ministers in Armenia who were and are from Nagorno-Karabakh.

⁵⁷For example, interview with a journalist (31).

⁵⁸Interviews with a historian (49) and with a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38).

⁵⁹The OSCE–Minsk group was formed in January 1992 as the main international vehicle for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia acquired permanent co-chairmanship of the group in December 1994. The United States and France joined Russia as co-chairs in 1997. The Minsk Group also includes Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. For more information about the international efforts to solve the conflict, see Matveeva (2002, pp. 450–51).

⁶⁰Interviews with one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (41); an academician (37); a historian (49); and a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38).

⁶¹For example, interviews with a Musavat Party leader (30), and a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38).

⁶²Interviews with a historian (48); similar points were made by an academician (11); a Musavat Party leader (51); a policy analyst (40); and a Musavat Party leader (30). Respondent (9), who was a former senior adviser of Heydar Aliyev, also said: ‘Armenians are dispersed all over the world. If they were a nation who loves the land, they would live on those lands …. They always live together, gregariously …. This is how their nature is. Where ever there is a good, profitable place, they go and live there. They present themselves as a suffering and modest nation so that people accept them, pity them and respect them. This way, they can live anywhere. Still, they have another very strange character; these people do not have an understanding, belief and sense of justice. It's as if they are serving the ideas formulated by the devil. They talk about these ideas everywhere. Their propaganda rests on lies and fake ideas. All experts can prove that these are all lies. Everything they say, including the Armenian genocide or the things they say about their own past or history, is all based on lies. Their ideologues create these lies and after a months time, they make these appear as real …. They are masters of hypocrisy’.

⁶³Interview with one of Heydar Aliyev's former senior advisers (41).

⁶⁴Interviews with a Musavat Party leader (51); a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38); an academician (54); and a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35).

⁶⁵Interviews with an academician (46); a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35); and with a policy analyst Center for National and International Studies (38).

⁶⁶Interviews with a policy analyst, Center for Political Innovation and Technology (35); a policy analyst, Center for National and International Studies (38); and with an academician (46).

⁶⁷Interview with a policy analyst (40). This idea was expressed by all interviewees except by those in the government.

⁶⁸Interviews with Musavat Party leader (30) and with a journalist (33). The demographic factor was referred to in different contexts by more than half of the interviewees. These ranged from the fear of extinction to Azerbaijan's advantegous position in case of renewed warfare.