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Abstract
As General Secretary, Gorbachev evolved from a Communist reformer to a socialist of the social democratic type. The most important programmatic documents of the CPSU in 1990–1991, on which Gorbachev had the predominant influence, were essentially social democratic. (Many in the Party apparatus had no intention of implementing them.) From 1988, Gorbachev was advocating fundamental change of the Soviet system, although there were zig-zags in his public pronouncements under the pressure of events. Ill-understood both at home and abroad, Gorbachev's social democratic ideas were ‘outflanked’ by the market fundamentalism and political impatience of his radical opponents and frustrated by the implacable enmity of conservative defenders of the vanishing Communist party-state.
Notes
1 Yegor Ligachev noted that during the period of Chernenko's general secretaryship, ‘Andropov's protégés were in what I would call an unstable position’ (Ligachev Citation1993, p. 53). For a discussion of the obstacles placed in Gorbachev's way as second secretary, and his gradual strengthening of his position, see Brown (Citation1996, pp. 69–82).
2 Since three general secretaries had died within the space of three years, it was fresh in the memory of the Soviet political elite that Andropov had chaired Brezhnev's funeral commission and Chernenko had chaired Andropov's. In that sense, as Viktor Grishin noted at the Politburo meeting on 11 March 1985, Gorbachev had been pre-selected as General Secretary the evening before. Grishin himself had proposed Gorbachev for that role, hoping thereby to improve his own chances of political survival. Before the year ended, however, Gorbachev had him removed from his first secretaryship of the Moscow party city committee and from the top leadership team. For Grishin's attempt to ingratiate himself and for the transcript of the Politburo meeting that formally selected Gorbachev see Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 11 marta 1985 goda, Fond 89, 1.001, opis 36, file 16 (Palo Alto, CA, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University).
3 If that was part of Gorbachev's intention, it was borne out by experience. Geoffrey (later Lord) Howe (British Foreign Secretary 1983–1989) once told me that when he was speaking with Shevardnadze, he always felt he was talking with a fellow politician, something he had never felt with Gromyko.
4 Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS, 29 iyunya 1985 goda (Washington, DC, Volkogonov Collection, National Security Archive), pp. 2–4.
5 Gorbachev and Mlynář established a firm friendship in the years 1950–1955, when they studied together in the Law Faculty of Moscow State University. The next time they met was in 1967 when, on the eve of the Prague Spring, Mlynář spent two days as the guest of Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev in Stavropol. Mlynář spoke in those conversations about some of the reforms he and like-minded Party intellectuals in Prague hoped they would be able to introduce soon in Czechoslovakia.
6 This remark was in answer to a question from me. I first met Mlynář in Prague in 1965, and had got to know him better over the intervening years (Brown Citation2002, p. xiv).
7 Diary of Anatolii Chernyaev, entry of 5 July 1987 (National Security Archive, Washington, DC).
8 The Soviet convention that this was the primary responsibility of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers continued, for the most part, to be observed. Nikolai Ryzhkov, who was a technocratic reformer at best, was a useful political ally for Gorbachev in the early years of perestroika, but had ceased to be an asset long before he was replaced. His successor, Valentin Pavlov—appointed in January 1991—was, however, a worse choice. He even threw in his lot with the putschists who tried to overthrow Gorbachev in August of that year. They partially succeeded, but in a way they had not intended, speeding up the hand-over of power in Russia from Gorbachev to Yel'tsin and hastening the breakup of the Soviet Union.
9 For a discussion of the provenance of different records of Politburo proceedings, see Brown (Citation2007, pp. x–xv).
10 Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS, 15 oktyabrya 1987 goda (Washington, DC, Volkogonov Collection, National Security Archive), pp. 149–50.
11 Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS, 15 oktyabrya 1987 goda (Washington, DC, Volkogonov Collection, National Security Archive), p. 176.
12 Pravda, 6 February 1990, pp. 1–2.
13 The text that Yakovlev prepared for the Politburo meeting that Gorbachev convened to discuss the Andreeva letter is published in full as ‘Tezisy k vystupleniyu A.N. Yakovleva na Politbyuro TsK KPSS po povodu stat'i N. A. Andreevoi v gazete “Sovetskaya Rossiya”, 25 marta 1988 g.’ (in Yakovlev Citation2008, pp. 192–200). For Chernyaev's account of the Politburo discussion of the ‘Andreeva letter’, see Chernyaev et al. (Citation2008, pp. 299–307).
14 See Shakhnazarov (Citation1991). The publication had been carefully planned for a time when Gorbachev and Yakovlev were about to depart on separate trips abroad, in Yakovlev's case to Mongolia, leaving Yegor Ligachev in sole charge of the Party apparatus and of ideology.
15 For other objections by Politburo members to the theses, see Chernyaev's notes of the Politburo meeting on 19 May 1988 in Chernyaev et al. (Citation2008, pp. 376–78).
16 Gorbachev, speaking in Central Hall, London, on 29 October 1996. I was present on that occasion and am quoting Gorbachev from my own notes.
17 Criticising Anthony Giddens's ‘New Labour’ conception of the ‘third way’, Sheri Berman has observed: ‘Even though its very name is designed to indicate continuity with traditional social democratic politics, its proponents appear not to understand that one of the core principles of social democracy has always been a belief in the primacy of politics and a commitment to using democratically acquired power to direct economic forces in the service of the collective good’ (Berman Citation2006, p. 211).
18 I have written about them extensively elsewhere (Brown Citation1996, Citation2007).
19 It was in March 1990 that the CPSU's guaranteed ‘leading role’ was removed from the Soviet Constitution and the way opened to legal competition from other parties, some of which in embryonic form had already come into existence.
20 As early as June 1987, Anatolii Chernyaev noted that Gorbachev agreed with Vadim Medvedev, who was arguing with Ryzhkov that the economic changes thus far had achieved nothing, but observed that Gorbachev showed great restraint, taking care not to offend Ryzhkov (Chernyaev Citation2008, p. 711).
21 Nevertheless, this party document retained more suspicion of social democracy than Gorbachev himself did. It noted that ‘social democratic currents of diverse hues have become a noticeable phenomenon in the country's socio-political life’ but expressed concern that this often involves ‘mechanical imitation of contemporary socio-economic structures in developed industrial states without consideration of our country's specific features’ and, moreover, that ‘many of its representatives refuse to consider Marxism as their ideological base’ (CPSU Citation1990, pp. C2/1–C2/2). Even these ideological reservations reflect considerable movement within five years; all that is now asked for is respect for ‘Marxism’ rather than Marxism–Leninism.
22 ‘Slovo k narodu’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 July 1991, p. 1.
23 Shakhnazarov, however, later concluded that Gorbachev was probably correct in thinking that the time for a split was not ripe in the early summer of 1990 and that, by surrendering the post of General Secretary, ‘he would have left the Party in the hands of people who would have pushed it back, resulting in the emergence of dual power’ (Shakhnazarov Citation1994, p. 230).