Introduction: What Does it Mean to be a Patriot?

The accession to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000 was followed by a policy of national revival that crystallised under the banner of patriotism. Several government-sponsored programmes of ‘patriotic education for the citizens of the Russian Federation’ were adopted to promote the glorification of the fatherland, its greatness, and its distinctiveness (Pravitel'stvo 2001). This policy has been conveyed by official institutions such as the educational system, the military, and the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as by United Russia and pro-presidential youth movements such as Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya. Patriotic symbols have emerged in public space—the tricolour flag, St. George's ribbons—and historical commemorations now set the agenda. Television and cinema, the most influential media outlets, have been significant in staging this revival of Russia's national identity. Reference to the fatherland is used as a means of mobilising a detached public around the state and giving renewed prestige to a country whose international status has been questioned. This widespread discursive and symbolic patriotic turn has been extensively addressed by scholars, especially in the fields of history, culture, and consumption (Zvereva 2005; Gillespie 2005; Roberts 2008; Laruelle 2009; Norris 2012).

Nevertheless, nearly 15 years after the first patriotic education programme, the question remains of how this Kremlin-backed patriotism has impacted on Russian society. The ‘patriotism’ argument is often presented by scholars as a tool to explain Moscow's foreign policy objectives, especially since the Ukrainian crisis, and the regime's popularity in relation to its liberal opposition. However, we know little about how patriotism has transformed individual and collective practices. Observing from diverse points of departure, the essays presented in this collection provide sociological insight into the practices that have developed in Russia in the 2000s and 2010s under the patriotic umbrella. More than the designs and designers of the patriotic programmes, we are interested here in the users of patriotism—those who on a daily basis engage in collective ‘patriotic’ actions or claim to translate patriotism into deeds. Based on empirical studies carried out in several Russian regions, this collection highlights the diversity of the social practices that qualify as patriotism. It demonstrates the individual and collective appropriation of patriotism and contributes to the examination of the relationship of social actors and the state, showing the limits of the political loyalty driven by patriotism.

Patriotism as a state-sponsored project

The Russian state has defined categories of patriotic action in three governmental programmes of ‘patriotic education for the citizens of the Russian Federation’ that have run from 2001 to 2015, as well as a framework text entitled ‘Concept for Patriotic Education for the Citizens of the Russian Federation’, which was adopted in 2003. In this text, patriotism was defined as ‘love for motherland (rodina), devotion to fatherland (otechestvo1), willingness to serve its interests and defend it, up to and including self-sacrifice (samopozhertvovanie)’ (Pravitel'stvo 2001). The stated objective of patriotic education programmes was thus to give a ‘new impetus to the spiritual rebirth of the people of Russia’, to ‘maintain social stability, restore the national economy, and strengthen the defensive capability of the country’ (Pravitel'stvo 2001). Each federal subject must implement the patriotic programme, the ultimate practical aim of which is three-fold: to prepare citizens for military service, to revive the spiritual values of the country, and ‘to weaken ideological opposition to the state’ (Pravitel'stvo 2001).

Although the military angle was present, it was only one element among others. The list as it appears above demonstrates how patriotism functioned as a catch-all category. The ideological references were varied, ranging from the Soviet era to the principles of pre-revolutionary government and to the ‘sovereign democracy’ that Vladislav Surkov promoted in 2006–2007. For example, it was with Soviet style that the introduction to the first programme (2001–2005) drew out a negative assessment of ‘the state of the patriotic consciousness’ of Russian citizens (Pravitel'stvo 2001). It lamented their lost sense of internationalism, condemned the development of negative characteristics such as selfishness, individualism, cynicism, and a lack of respect for institutions, and expressed regret that ‘patriotism has started to turn into nationalism’ (Pravitel'stvo 2001). As with Soviet rhetoric, so-called healthy patriotism was seen as compatible with ‘internationalism’, while ‘nationalism’ is constructed in terms of aggression toward other nations. At the same time, one sees in this programme the accents of a timeless Russia, with highlights on Orthodoxy and spiritual values, and to a lesser extent on the imperial past. The programme had an objective of ‘making the patriotic consciousness of Russian citizens one of the most important values, one of the foundations of spiritual and moral unity’ (Pravitel'stvo 2001).

The second programme (2006–2010) suggested a change in the lexical field in line with the evolution of political discourse during Putin's second term in office. It claimed to be based on ‘the principles of the democratic state and civil society, open to the participation of all state institutions, social organisations, and scientific and artistic unions based on their own initiative’ (Pravitel'stvo 2005). More ambitiously, given its funding was three times larger than for the first programme, it made provisions for about $20 million to be distributed among more than 200 projects, detailed in some 60 pages of annexes. Half of these projects related to developing patriotic education: conferences to promote patriotism among youth, workshops of experts on patriotic education, funding for textbooks and videogames on patriotism, exhibitions in museums, music contests, poetry and folk art, sports and motoring events, and activities inspired by Bolshevik traditions such as sending ‘propaganda trains’ (agitpoezd) across the country (Pravitel'stvo 2005). The second programme was also intended to promote among youth ‘appropriate reproductive behaviour and a willingness to create a family, which is the foundation of any revival of moral values’ (Pravitel'stvo 2005). The other half of the proposed initiatives were directly linked to the military, including historical commemorations of great battles and the 65th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, the promotion of Cossack traditions, worshipping the war dead, and invitations to participate in various army corps.

The third programme (2011–2015) is a continuation of the second, insofar as it stresses the significance of results that have already been achieved: ‘Because of the work done, the level of patriotic consciousness of the citizens of the Russian Federation has increased’ (Pravitel'stvo 2010). However, procedures to evaluate this patriotic consciousness are not specified. The programme strongly insists on the key role of the state in the ‘high patriotic consciousness of citizens’ (Pravitel'stvo 2010). With a budget of $24 million, it provides for the mobilisation of media and internet use, and contains elements of economic patriotism, for example the ‘Made in Russia’ contest, which promotes goods produced in Russia. It also aims to better systematise methods for teaching patriotism through the production of textbooks and by establishing such methods more firmly in the scholarly field. The Ministry of Education therefore has been given a primary role, coming second only to the Ministry of Culture in terms of associated budgetary allocations.

Is this patriotism as defined in Russia's state programmes distinguishable from certain forms of nationalism? Western scholarship often explains the Putin regime's actions abroad and at home by its nationalism, which often implies a value judgment and underlying policy choices. The relationship between the two concepts is a complex issue that would require devoted research. It is largely marked by national contexts (Daucé et al.2013), and the Russian context is specific given the tabooisation of nationalism during Soviet times, which only now begins to fade. Some researchers argue that nationalism and patriotism are two sides of the same coin, the former having a negative connotation and the latter a positive one. The Russian authorities have largely made this distinction in their patriotic education programme. Other scholars see a dividing line structured around the relationship to the state.2 According to James Baker,

For a number of scholars, a key difference between patriotism and nationalism is that the former does not demand a political expression. Individuals can be patriotic without being nationalistic. While patriotism results from the feelings of the individual directed toward the group, nationalism results from the feelings of the group directed toward the state. (Baker 2012, p. 369)

In authoritarian contexts, patriotism undoubtedly has a political dimension different from in democratic contexts, but it does not limit itself to be a purely top-down dynamic. As this study shows, society is not a passive recipient of the authorities' ideological storylines, and participates in a complex manner in shaping the agenda or reorienting it towards specific goals.

Appropriating patriotism in Russian society

Russian state patriotic education programmes provide a range of events, activities, and structures intended to strengthen patriotism: exhibitions in museums, the creation of historical and sports clubs, associations for military equipment enthusiasts, collaboration with veterans and religious institutions, re-enactments of famous historical battles, research on fallen Soviet soldiers, and festive occasions and artistic contests of all sorts. This official catalogue of patriotic activities has to be implemented in each administrative subject in Russia, with slight regional variations. However, because of their popularity, references to patriotism go far beyond this catalogue. The qualifier ‘patriotic’ is now widely used, and is a consensus-oriented term. It has become a quasi-mandatory label for all public demonstrations, which largely obscures the contours of the subject.

The essays collected here demonstrate this catch-all nature of patriotism. Marlene Laruelle's essay on patriotic youth clubs shows that extremely diverse activities are practised under this patriotic umbrella, from leadership training to historical re-enactments, from combat sports to military archaeology. Anne Le Huérou's essay on schools and youth organisations in the Omsk region shows the multiplicity of narratives displayed for young people around the patriotic theme. Kathy Rousselet focuses on patriotic references used in the activities of Orthodox Christians, inside or beyond the church walls. In the case of ethno-cultural organisations, patriotism helps to articulate ethnic specificities to the national norm and give an ethnic colour to patriotic activities, such as those studied by Françoise Daucé. In the economic realm discussed by Caroline Dufy, references to patriotism are present as well, even if the dominant view is that of market autonomy from the state. But patriotism can sometimes be articulated with market strategies and commercial labelling, and founded on the defence of national interests that are seemingly under threat.

This research shows social actors' extensive use of patriotism. The patriotic label is often instrumentalised for non-political ends, and motivations to engage in so-called patriotic activities may have little to do with what the state or an external actor would qualify as patriotism. In some areas such as the economy, patriotism is not an immediately legitimate category for actors, while it is a kind of obvious one for educators used to working with children and teenagers. The essays collected in this volume thus analyse the practices described as patriotic by social actors in order to show their differing objectives. Motivations vary from one field to the next, and even within the same field, from pragmatic concern for career to the quest for personal fulfilment and the satisfaction of action with one's friends and family. Actors' points of view are often separate from the perspective of military patriotism and the vertical of state command.

This study of patriotic activities in Russia shows their great adaptability to individual needs, but also their collective uses. This finding is paradoxical because, as Svetlana Barsukova writes, ‘There is a conventional belief that patriotism is the opposite of pragmatism, as the first refers to a public interest domain, whereas the latter is reflective of individual interests’ (Barsukova & Dufy 2013, p. 54). However, we highlight here original modalities of overlapping patriotic references and individual interests. The youth patriotic clubs that Marlene Laruelle studies appear as professional and social niches that allow for the social advancement of their leaders as well as the disadvantaged youth they help. Patriotism is often experienced primarily as a personal commitment, even as it is expressed as a part of larger representations of the national community. Kathy Rousselet shows that believers pursue personal salvation in addition to that of the entire country. In the case of the ethno-cultural movements investigated by Françoise Daucé, members of the community join together for folkloric, religious, and linguistic activities during patriotic festivals and celebrations. In the economic realm, Caroline Dufy shows that the state patriotic demands on the economy, even if far from enjoying a consensus, can be accepted by certain entrepreneurs to confer titles on personnel and citizens.

Official patriotism and its possible alternates

The development of patriotism in Russia allows for the renewal of many collective and professional practices. More than an application by society of state commands, it appears as a bottom-up instrument for reconstructing solidarities that were badly undermined during the post-Soviet transition. As such, it helps legitimise practices inherited from the Soviet period, incorporate activities authorised by the market economy, and invent new principles for communal action, transcending the ruptures that came from the reforms of the 1990s. As Serguei Oushakine (2009) has shown, patriotic references help to strengthen the social communities strained by post-Soviet economic and social changes.

But this patriotism does not necessarily lead to increased engagement in support of the authorities. Many activities and perceptions are very far from state directives and the Kremlin's narrative. As Anne Le Huérou shows in her investigation of regional movements such as the White Guards, the official patriotic programme is often presented as ‘[being] only words, it is official and not interesting (because) we are the only patriots’.3 In the Tatar community in Moscow studied by Françoise Daucé, patriotism allows for the reinforcement of community affiliations founded on a primordialist definition of identity, which ultimately can contribute to a critique of Russia's nationality policy. The anchorage in family and community links is often accompanied by a detachment from the state. While the state claims to be the conductor of a patriotic orchestra, it frequently finds itself devalued by those who, as Marlene Laruelle has analysed, define themselves as patriots, and who see in it only a synonym for bureaucracy, red tape, and corruption. Many economic actors denounce the ‘pseudo-patriotism’ of Russian bureaucrats too, as opposed to their own authentic patriotism, which consists of creating jobs, ensuring prosperity, and expanding the economy abroad—so long as bureaucrats do not interfere.

Patriotism therefore does not guarantee blind faith in the state. Can it encourage the politicisation of critical engagement against the authorities or is it a tool to depoliticise the society? The evolution of the domestic political landscape in Russia since this fieldwork was done offers a contrasted response to this question. The anti-Putin protest in the winter of 2011–2012 did mark the re-emergence of a critical public space, and references to patriotism were obligatory for all those seeking political legitimacy. In this respect, the example of Aleksei Naval'nyi is emblematic, as his denunciation of corruption at the highest level of the state apparatus is made in the name of patriotism. In response, Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in May 2012 was followed by a hardening of the official patriotic line. More clearly than was previously the case, it restored the old clichés of Soviet propaganda such as anti-Americanism and the idea that Western liberalism opposes Russian values. Official patriotism transformed itself into a more coercive tool that tries to disarm all forms of criticism, whether this means fighting against associations and civil society with the ‘foreign agents’ law, controlling media and internet blogs, or developing stigmatisation discourse toward migrants and sexual minorities.

The difficulties the independent television network Dozhd faced in February 2014 are an example of these complex uses of patriotism. A programme dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the end of the Leningrad Siege asked viewers whether, in order to save millions of lives, surrendering the city might have been preferable to resistance (Englund 2014). The authorities seized on this opportunity to declare that the channel had crossed a line into blasphemy by daring to question such a sacred episode of Soviet history. In response, Dozhd journalists, known for being critical of the government, organised a televised ‘patriotic marathon’, Lyubit' Rodinu.4 It showed the diverse range of possible expressions for love of country by men and women across Russian politics, media, and culture. This initiative highlighted the tension between the authorities-backed definition of patriotism and the multiple configurations that this patriotism can take in Russian society.

The 2014 Ukrainian crisis accentuated the weakening of any alternate patriotism. The crisis has given rise to an unprecedented wave of patriotism, which seems to succeed in grasping together strong state-driven components and genuine attitudes from the society. It has contributed to re-focussing patriotism on a classical definition of Russia's moral duty to defend those who belong to its ‘cultural body’ abroad. The strong state–society consensus that appeared in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis lies beyond the scope of the essays in this collection but opens the way to explore and analyse further the complex relations between diverse meanings of patriotism in Russian society.

By studying the appropriation of patriotism in Russian society and how it shapes some social practices, it is hoped that this collection will offer new tools to interpret citizens' engagement in Russia. It invites a more nuanced approach, moving away from the focus on the official newspeak and looking at societal practices, taking into account the complexity of motivations, the interweaving of narratives and the multiplicity of individual, family, community, and national identities. Although patriotism seems everywhere in Russia, the relationship between the citizen and the state, and between individual trajectories and the narrative of the nation, is moving and uncertain, as in European or North American societies.

Notes

This special section is the result of a French–Russian collective research project on ‘Patriotic practices in contemporary Russia’ undertaken between 2008 and 2010. This project was financed by an International Scientific Cooperation Programme of the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and supported by the Center for the Study of the Russian, Caucasian and Central-European Worlds (CERCEC), the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI), the Fondation-Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (MSH), and the Russian State Fund for Fundamental Research (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Nauchnyi Fond—RGNF).

¹ Russian has three words for country (rodina, otechestvo, otchizna), which are used interchangeably.

² See Deutsch (1966) and Bar-Tel and Staub (1997).

³ Author's interview with Oleg P. T., Omsk, 29 October 2008.

⁴ ‘Marafon lyubit’ rodina', Dozhd' TV, available at: http://tvrain.ru/teleshow/marafon_ljubit_rodinu/, accessed 22 October 2014.