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Abstract
Stalin's purge of his military elite during 1937–1938 is one of the most unusual events of the Great Terror. Why would Stalin execute his most qualified officers at the same time as defence spending was rising and a world war was approaching? This article argues that a long history of the Red Army being perceived as vulnerable to subversion is central to understanding this military purge. When faced with perceived plots in the military Stalin tended to lean towards restraint, but by 1937 he felt he could no longer hesitate, and finally cracked down on what he saw as a compromised army.
Notes
1 The other defendants included Iona Yakir, Ieronim Uborevich, Boris Feldman, Avgust Kork, Robert Eideman, Vitovt Putna and Vasily Primakov.
2 That Stalin purged the Red Army in order to consolidate his power is an argument that dominated the post-war literature on the Soviet military and the Great Terror. For instance, in his influential work on the Red Army, John Erickson argued that by purging the military Stalin ‘rid himself of the last potential source of leadership that could rival his own’ (Erickson Citation1962, p. 465). Similarly, Robert Conquest argued that Stalin attacked the army to remove any possibility of a military coup (Conquest Citation1968, pp. 201–35). This explanation of the military purge can still be seen in more recent work (Tucker Citation1990; Nichols Citation1990; Ziemke Citation2004).
3 During 1918, 75% of Red Army officers were from the former Imperial Army (Reese Citation1990, p. 40).
4 For Stalin's view of military specialists, see Benvenuti (Citation1988, p. 46). For the Eighth Party Congress, see Vosmoi s'ezd RKP(b), Mart 1919 goda, prokoli (Moscow, 1959).
5 For more on military specialist betrayal in the army, see Voitikov (Citation2010, pp. 4, 346–47).
6 Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter RGASPI), fond 17, opis 109, delo 90, line 1.
7 For espionage cases in the army, see Voitikov (Citation2010, pp. 71–77, 164, 176, 313, 362). For political police suspicions that foreign governments were financing White groups, see Voitikov (Citation2010, pp. 176, 289, 396; Kantor Citation2005, p. 147).
8 The Cheka was succeeded by the State Political Directorate in 1922, Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie (GPU).
9 For more on Tukhachevskii and the growth of the Napoleon legend, see Minakov (Citation2005, pp. 71–98).
10 The GPU became the Joint State Political Directorate, Ob'edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie (OGPU) in 1923.
11 For other espionage cases see Viktorov (Citation1990, p. 66); Tynchenko (Citation2000, p. 100); Zdanovich (Citation2008, pp. 606–13); and Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (hereafter RGVA), f. 4, op. 14, d. 84, l. 111.
12 RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 70, l. 1.
13 RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 70, l. 1.
14 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 19, l. 110.
15 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 295, l. 75.
16 Trotsky's military supporters included Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, the head of PUR, N. Muralov, commander of the Moscow Military District (MVO) and S. Mrachkovskii, the commander of the Volga Military District (PriVO). A number of other officers also joined the opposition, notably Vitaly Primakov and Vitovt Putna.
17 RGVA, f. 33988, op. 3, d. 69, l. 133; RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 51, ll. 21–24.
18 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 227, ll. 190–91. The report does note that a few military districts are absent from the figures, see RGVA, f. 9, op. 26, d. 446, ll. 12–25.
19 Voroshilov became Peoples' Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs in 1925 following the death of Mikhail Frunze.
20 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 186, ll. 1–18.
21 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 778, l. 34.
22 Estimates vary on the number of military specialists removed during the operation. Typically historians estimate approximately 3,000, however Tynchenko has argued a possible 10,000 (Tynchenko Citation2000, p. 3).
23 For more on the Cultural Revolution see Fitzpatrick (Citation1978).
24 For Trotskyist cases, see RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 16, l. 1; f. 37837, op. 10, d. 20, ll. 131–32; f. 37837, op. 21, d. 52, ll. 46, 48; d. 39, l. 32.
25 For OGPU suspicions of other former army Trotskyists, see Zdanovich (Citation2008, p. 326).
26 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 281, l. 144; f. 37837, op. 21, d. 107, ll. 14, 16.
27 RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 1684, ll. 33–36.
28 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 872, l. 85.
29 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 15, l. 39.
30 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 15, l. 39.
31 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 263, l. 42.
32 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 263, l. 83.
33 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 263, l. 81.
34 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 178, ll. 2–4.
35 RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 18, ll. 176, 179.
36 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 93, l. 43.
37 RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 16, ll. 262, 265.
38 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 107, l. 14.
39 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 99, l. 16; f. 33987, op. 3, d. 851, ll. 39–40, 134.
40 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 851, l. 50.
41 ‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK, 4 (1989), p. 61.
42 The OGPU was subsumed into a reformed all-Union People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in 1936, Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennykh del (NKVD).
43 For Molotov's comments, see ‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK, 4 (1989), p. 45.
44 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, ll. 42, 47.
45 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, l. 51.
46 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, l. 58.
47 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, ll. 448–49.
48 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, l. 485.
49 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 319, ll. 2–4.
50 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 319, ll. 74–75, 84.
51 In a further sign that the espionage threat was becoming more threatening, throughout the first half of 1937 there were a number of articles in Krasnaya Zvezda about espionage, see 28 March 1937; 20 April 1937; 23 April 1937; 24 April 1937; 28 April 1937; 14 May 1937; 28 May 1937.
52 ‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK, (1989), p. 45.
53 ‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK, (1989), pp. 47–48.
54 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 88.
55 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 101.
56 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 110.
57 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 65.
58 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 65.
59 Yakir even visited Gamarnik the day before his arrest, see RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 313, l. 1.
60 For the view that Ezhov was carefully directed by Stalin, see Jansen and Petrov (Citation2002) and Khaustov and Samuelson (Citation2009). For an alternative argument that Ezhov had more independence from Stalin see Getty and Naumov (Citation2008).