Judicial Disagreement need not be Political: Dissent on the Estonian Supreme Court

Abstract

I investigate the non-unanimous decisions of judges on the Estonian Supreme Court. I argue that since judges on the court enjoy high de jure independence, dissent frequently, and are integrated in the normal judicial hierarchy, the Estonian Supreme Court is a crucial case for the presumption that judicial disagreement reveals policy preferences. I analyse dissenting opinions using an ideal point response model. Examining the characteristics of cases which discriminated with respect to the recovered dimension, I show that this dimension cannot be interpreted as a meaningful policy dimension, but instead reflects disagreement about the proper scope of constitutional redress.

Notes

This research was funded by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation, which I gratefully acknowledge. I should like to thank the participants at ‘The Judiciary and the Quality of Democracy in Comparative Perspective’ workshop at the 2013 ECPR Joint Sessions in Mainz. My thanks also go to Koit Rikson, who gathered much of the data upon which this article is based. Any errors, of course, remain my own.

¹ On this point, see Iaryczower et al. (2002) and, to some extent, Basabe-Serrano (2012).

² See, The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide, accessed 18 May 2015.

³ See, for example, the questions on the nominations of Jüri Ilvest and Hari Salmann (Riigikogu stenogram of 25 February 1993).

⁴ See, The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide, accessed 1 May 2015.

⁵ The latest (consolidated) version of the Court Act is available at: http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc = text&dok = X30065K6&keel = en&pg = 1&ptyyp = RT&tyyp = X&query = Kohtute+seadus+%28seisuga+01%2E01%2E2012%29, accessed 18 May 2015.

⁶ For Ratsep, see the stenogram of Riigikogu proceedings for 14 February 2002; see Kōve's biography at the website of Juridica International, available at: http://www.juridicainternational.eu/?id = 14158, accessed 15 May 2015.

⁷ Calculated on the basis of biographies of the judges available on the Constitutional Court website, available at: http://www.constcourt.bg, accessed 15 May 2015.

⁸ The procedure for cases is distinct from disputes concerning the status of members of the Riigikogu or the Riigikogu's rules of procedure.

⁹ That is, to predict the decisions after the fact on the basis of all the available information, rather than to forecast.

¹⁰ Data for the left–right positions of legislators and presidents are taken from www.ParlGov.org, accessed 2 March 2014. Individual presidents are given the left–right position of the party which supported their presidential bid. Thus, Lennart Meri is ascribed the position of Pro Patria; Arnold Rüütel the position of the Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond).

¹¹ The CODICES database is a database which collects notable constitutional jurisprudence from constitutional courts of Council of Europe member states, available at: http://www.codices.coe.int/, accessed 2 March 2014.

¹² See Supreme Court case number RK 3-3-1-5-09, available at: http://www.riigikohus.ee, accessed 19 May 2015.

¹³ See, The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide, accessed 18 May 2015.

¹⁴ See Supreme Court case numbers RK 3-2-1-59-04 and RK 3-3-2-1-04 respectively, available at: http://www.riigikohus.ee, accessed 19 May 2015.

¹⁵ Something similar has been noted in the European Court of Justice when plaintiffs allege violation of rights granted under European Union legislation; see Martinsen (2011).

¹⁶ See Supreme Court, available at: http://www.riigikohus.ee, accessed 19 May 2015.