Conflict Transformation and Civil Society: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh

This article has been prepared as a part of the grant project De Facto States in Northern Eurasia in the Context of Russian Foreign Policy (GACR 15-09249S), financed by the Czech Science Foundation. We would also like to thank the editors of the journal for their patience and the two anonymous reviewers for their positive and useful comments.

Abstract

If Armenian and Azerbaijani negotiators ever agree on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, it will not necessarily resolve the long-running conflict, because any peace treaty would require the consent of the Karabakh Armenians, whose political representatives are currently excluded from peace negotiations. It is difficult to imagine the Karabakh Armenians consenting to such a treaty without a change in their perception of the Azerbaijanis. According to the theory of conflict transformation/peacebuilding, Nagorno-Karabakh’s civil society should be able to make a contribution to this change. Using the example of four Nagorno-Karabakh civil society organisations, this study shows how they positively or negatively influence conflict transformation.

Notes

This article has been prepared as a part of the grant project De Facto States in Northern Eurasia in the Context of Russian Foreign Policy (GACR 15-09249S), financed by the Czech Science Foundation. We would also like to thank the editors of the journal for their patience and the two anonymous reviewers for their positive and useful comments.

¹ Lernayin Gharabaghi Hanrapetut’yun in Armenian. The name ‘Artsakh Republic’ (Arts’akhi Hanrapetut’yun), which reflects the historical Armenian name of the region, is also used.

² For more about the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see O’Ballance (1997), Croissant (1998), Goltz (1998), Cornell (2001, pp. 61–141), de Waal (2003), Cheterian (2012), Geukjian (2012), Souleimanov (2013).

³ For a recent overview of the Karabakh peace process, see Ditrych (2006), de Waal (2010), Harutunian (2010), Huseynov (2010), Ismailzade (2011).

⁴ As a result of the planned land swap, Azerbaijan was to give up the Lachin corridor, connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with the Armenian Republic, while Armenia was to cede a strip of land in the Aras River valley, thus providing Azerbaijan with a land connection to its Nakhchivan enclave.

⁵ Interview with a leading NKR politician, Stepanakert, 19 October 2009.

⁶ The World Bank considers NGOs to be ‘private organisations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development’ (Aall 2000, p. 124).

⁷ For a discussion of de facto states, see for example Pegg (1998), Lynch (2004).

⁸ The number of inhabitants of NKR may, however, be considerably smaller due to high emigration (ICG 2005, p. 4; Kaldor 2007, p. 177).

⁹ Discussion with three members of the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of the ‘Helsinki Initiative-92’ (NKC HI-92), Stepanakert, 16 October 2009; see also Simão (2010, p. 20).

¹⁰ ʻNon-Governmental Organizations in Artsakhʼ, Office of the NKR in the USA, not dated, available at: http://www.nkrusa.org/country_profile/ngo.shtml, accessed 20 October 2014.

¹¹ Interview with a member of NKC HI-92, Stepanakert, 15 October 2009 and discussion with three members of NKC HI-92, Stepanakert, 16 October 2009.

¹² Interview with a member of NKC HI-92, Stepanakert, 15 October 2009. See also the website of NKC HI-92, available at: http://www.hca.nk.am/, accessed 5 December 2014.

¹³ Interview with a member of NKC HI-92, Stepanakert, 15 October 2009.

¹⁴ ‘Azerbaijanis Protest Karabakh Armenian Delegation’s Baku Visit’, Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 6 September 2001, available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/605, accessed 18 August 2009.

¹⁵ ‘Our Work’, NKC HI-92, 2013, available at: http://www.hca.nk.am/index.php?do=static&page=our_work, accessed 10 February 2013.

¹⁶ Discussion with three members of NKC HI-92, Stepanakert, 16 October 2009. See also HART (2014, p. 15).

¹⁷ ‘Our Work’, NKC HI-92, 2013, available at: http://www.hca.nk.am/index.php?do=static&page=our_work, accessed 10 February 2013, and discussion with three members of NKC HI-92, Stepanakert, 16 October 2009.

¹⁸ For instance, a small part of the former NKAO is controlled by Azerbaijani forces.

¹⁹ Interview with a leader of an NGO protecting the interests of refugees, Nagorno-Karabakh, 2 November 2009; interview with a refugee family, Nagorno-Karabakh, 2 November 2009.

²⁰ Interview with a leader of an NGO protecting the interests of refugees, Nagorno-Karabakh, 2 November 2009; interview with a refugee family, Nagorno-Karabakh, 2 November 2009.

²¹ Informal discussion platform, Stepanakert, 20 October 2009.

²² ‘Armenia & Azerbaijan: Karabakh Vets Share Similar Problems’, Eurasianet, 12 July 2012, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67235, accessed 24 October 2014.

²³ ‘Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya 1989 g. Chislennost’ gorodskogo naseleniya soyuznykh respublik, ikh territorial’nykh edinits, gorodskikh poselenii i gorodskikh raionov po polu’, Demoskop Weekly, no date, available at: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng89_reg2.php, accessed 16 February 2013.

²⁴ Interview with NAI staff, Shushi, 18 October 2009. See also the NAI website, available at: http://www.naregatsi.org, accessed 5 December 2014.

²⁵ For example, discussion with students of MMU, Stepanakert, 20 October 2009.

²⁶ Interview with the representative of an Armenian NGO, Yerevan, 13 October 2009; online communication with the same person, 20 September 2014.

²⁷ Interview with the senior manager of MMU, Stepanakert, 19 October 2009. See also the website of the university, available at: http://www.mashtots.nk.am/, accessed 5 December 2014.

²⁸ Interview with the senior manager of MMU, Stepanakert, 19 October 2009.

²⁹ Discussion with students of MMU, Stepanakert, 20 October 2009.

³⁰ The accord between Armenia and Turkey, which was to normalise mutual relations, was signed in October 2009. Because the accord did not include any recognition by Turkey of the Armenian genocide, ethnic Armenians organised worldwide protests, accusing the Armenian government of treason. Moreover, Turkish President Erdogan stated that the ratification of the protocol was dependent on the solution of the Karabakh conflict. In 2010, the ratification process of the accord was suspended (Kardas 2010).

³¹ This was, however, a widespread concern, expressed also by a leading NKR politician interviewed by the authors in Stepanakert, 19 October 2009.

³² Discussion with an informal group, Stepanakert, 20 October 2009.