Identity in Transformation: Russian-speakers in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Abstract

This essay examines the transformation of identity of Russian-speakers in independent Ukraine. Based on survey, focus groups and public discourse data, it explores the hierarchy of identities of those people who use predominantly Russian in their everyday lives and the meaning they attach to their perceived belonging to the Ukrainian nation. Although many scholars argued after the breakup of the USSR that Ukraine’s Russian-speakers would form into a community distinguished by its preferred language, the present analysis shows that they have instead been transformed from Soviet people into Ukrainians—and that without drastic changes in their language practice.

The 2006 survey and focus group discussions were conducted within the framework of a collaborative project supported by the International Association for the promotion of cooperation with scientists from the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (INTAS). The 2012 survey was funded by a grant awarded to me by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the US from the Natalia Danylchenko Endowment Fund. The 2014 survey and 2015 focus groups were made possible by a grant awarded by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the University of Alberta, from the Stasiuk Family Endowment Fund. I am grateful to all these institutions for their generous support. I would also like to thank the editors of this special issue and the anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of the text.

Notes

¹ On the responses of residents of the eastern and southern regions to the Russian intervention in Ukraine in the spring of 2014, see ‘Mneniia i vzgliady zhitelei Iugo-Vostoka Ukrainy: Aprel’ 2014’, 18 April 2014, available at: http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mneniya-i-vzglyady-zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html, accessed 20 April 2014. In the Donbas, a considerable share of the population was strongly opposed to the post-Euromaidan government in Kyiv and thus supportive of autonomist or even separatist ideas, but the transformation of that support into military action under separatist slogans only became possible due to intervention of the Russian Federation (Wilson 2016).

² The relative salience of a certain identity vis-à-vis other identities people may have can be conceptualised as one of the dimensions of identity, alongside its particular content and the degree of contestation within a community (Kulyk 2011b).

³ The respondents could characterise their everyday use as being ‘only’ in Ukrainian/Russian, ‘in most situations’ in Ukrainian/Russian or ‘equally’ in the two languages (as well as in an unspecified ‘other language’, an option whose frequency turned out to be within the margin of error). People who said they were using only or predominantly one of the two main languages will henceforth be referred to as Ukrainian- or Russian-speakers, while those claiming equal use of the two will be called ‘symmetrical’ bilinguals.

⁴ This nationwide trend corresponds to the findings of an earlier local-level study comparing the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking Lviv and the predominantly Russian-speaking Donetsk. In the early 1990s, Soviet identity was as salient for Donetsk residents as Ukrainian identity, even if not as important as the local one. Although the attachment to the bygone Soviet homeland drastically decreased over the following decade, this did not result in a greater salience of Ukrainian identity, strengthening instead the self-designation in local terms. For the Lviv population, in contrast, Ukrainian and local identities were equally strong and the Soviet one rather marginal already in the first years of independence (Hrytsak 2007, p. 50).

⁵ The decreasing identification of south-eastern Russian-speakers with the Ukrainian state in 2014 was partly due to the Russian aggression in the Donbas which resulted in the establishment of two separatist ‘republics’ not recognising Ukrainian sovereignty over their respective territories. Although by September 2014 the Donbas was affected by an intense military conflict, the survey encompassed both Ukrainian- and separatist-controlled territories. Not surprisingly, it was on the separatist side of the frontline that the identification with the Ukrainian state turned out to be particularly low.

⁶ However, on the separatist-controlled territories in the Donbas Ukrainian identity was much less salient than Russian and Russian-speaking ones, another manifestation of their residents’ unwillingness (perhaps partly because of fear) to identify with the state/country their ‘republics’ were breaking away from.

⁷ Facebook, 6 October 2014, in Russian, available at: https://www.facebook.com/matvii.nikitin/posts/782164605179708, accessed 20 August 2017.

⁸ Facebook, 1 March 2014, in Russian, available at: https://www.facebook.com/aleksander.babich/posts/688714287834526, accessed 20 August 2017.

⁹ Focus group discussions were conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in the capital of Kyiv and eastern metropolis of Kharkiv (February 2015) as well as in two medium-sized provincial capitals, Kropyvnytskyi (then called Kirovohrad) in the centre of the country and Chernivtsi in the south-west (March 2015). In each city, one group included people of 20–35 years who participated in the Maidan or supported it, and the other people of 35–50 years who reported a negative or rather negative attitude toward the Maidan. Separate groups for people with opposing positions on the Maidan were created to avoid overt confrontation and promote openness; the division by age was used to allow young people to speak freely and not feel uneasy in contradicting their older compatriots. This design seemed to work well as many participants expressed views contradicting those apparently shared by the majority of the group and such dissenting views were never attacked as aggressively as to intimidate their holders. However, as with all focus groups, one cannot exclude that some participants’ limited contribution to the discussion at least partly resulted from a fear of expressing views with which others were likely to disagree.

¹⁰ Respondent 2, in Russian, focus group Kharkiv 2, with participants of 35–50 years who viewed the Maidan critically, 22 February 2015.

¹¹ Respondent 3, in Russian, focus group Kharkiv 2, with participants of 35–50 years who viewed the Maidan critically, 22 February 2015.

¹² Facebook, 28 March 2014, available at: https://www.facebook.com/roman.shrike/posts/773091879382260, accessed 20 August 2017.

¹³ ‘Formuvannia spil’noї identychnosti hromadian Ukraїny: perspektyvy i vyklyky’, Natsional’na bezpeka i oborona, 9, 2007, p. 8, available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD93_ukr.pdf, accessed 30 December 2016.

¹⁴ ‘All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001’, no date, available at: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/, accessed 12 October 2016.

¹⁵ At the same time, these responses reflect changing perceptions of appropriate behaviour in the respective practice which may lead the respondents to deviate from the true in favour of the appropriate. The fact that the share of Russian-speakers according to the 2014 survey did not decrease in comparison with the 2012 data indicates that most respondents did not feel an urge to hide their reliance on Russian, that is, they had not come to see it as inappropriate.

¹⁶ Respondent 4, in Russian, focus group Kharkiv 1, with participants of 20–35 years who viewed the Maidan positively, 22 February 2015.

¹⁷ This resentment of the perceived erosion of their accustomed linguistic environment was clearly demonstrated in focus group discussions conducted by the Hromadska Dumka centre in November 2006 in five Ukrainian cities in different parts of Ukraine, including the predominantly Russian-speaking Donetsk and Odesa. Many participants in these two cities complained not only about having to fill in various forms in the state language which they could not write well enough but also the school instruction of their children in Ukrainian and even the requirement to use that language as employees in state establishments. Many Russian-speakers seemed to consider any need to use that language a manifestation of discrimination (Kulyk 2013).

¹⁸ In the words of Paul D’Anieri: ‘the combination of the number of ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians, their concentration, and the electoral law, guaranteed that there would be no legislative basis for repression of ethnic Russians’ (2007, p. 19). Although D’Anieri focused on the role of ethnic Russians, his argument becomes even more valid if applied to the greater constituency of Russian-speakers.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Volodymyr Kulyk

Volodymyr Kulyk, Head Research Fellow, Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kutuzova St. 8, Kyiv 01011, Ukraine. Email: [email protected]