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Abstract
In recent years, Azerbaijan has positioned itself on the international scene as an increasingly important and assertive actor. This essay focuses on Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union (EU). It will identify the policy strategies used by Azerbaijan to engage with the EU in two areas where their interests and objectives do not align, namely democracy and human rights promotion policies, and agenda-setting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The essay highlights, first, the relevance of national independence, ‘balancing’ and regime legitimacy in explaining Azerbaijan’s foreign policy strategies, and second, the mixed track record of Azerbaijan’s assertiveness, with different outcomes depending on whether the policy strategies are reactive or proactive.
The author is greatly indebted to the reviewers as well as the editors who provided very helpful advice on the different drafts of this essay.
Notes
1 Approximately 5% of the EU’s energy import currently originates from Azerbaijan (Eurostat Citation2018).
2 See also Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (Citation2005).
3 For reasons of confidentiality, interviewees have been anonymised. This essay is based on 23 different interviews, for a total of 37 hours of conversation. Interviewees were affiliated with EU institutions (11), Azerbaijani authorities (seven), or were independent experts employed by think tanks and CSOs (five). Not all interviewees have been directly referenced in this essay.
4 For the EU, this refers mainly to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Delegation in Baku, as well as the European Commission. For Azerbaijan, it is more difficult to decipher who exactly is in charge of formulating foreign policy strategies; however, given the more centralised decision-making structures, it can be presumed that the country’s foreign policy reflects the view of the government as a whole.
5 In this context, Diez has proposed to replace the term ‘normative power’ by ‘hegemony’, since according to the author, hegemony can be interpreted as ‘the power of ideas and consensus’ (Diez Citation2013, p. 195).
6 Heydar Aliyev also made references to the pre-Soviet independent republic—the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic—that existed from 1918 to 1920 and much of Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet foreign policy is said to have similarities with that of the ADR (Yusifzade Citation2008, p. 6).
7 Interview with independent expert 2, Baku, May 2014.
8 Interview with EU representative 2, Baku, May 2014.
9 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014. As part of the strategy, the government builds expensive infrastructure to bring international events to Baku, such as the Eurovision Song Contest in 2012, the Davos Economic Forum in 2013, the European Games in 2015, and Formula 1 in 2016 (interview with independent expert 2, Baku, May 2014).
10 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014.
11 Some observers see similarities between Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates regarding national identity-building (interview with EU representative 1, Baku, April 2014). Both have similar ways of identity-building through prestige projects and architecture, with a focus on appearance rather than on content, and a strong modernisation discourse. As such, Azerbaijan could be analysed as a young oil-producing nation rather than as a post-Soviet state per se.
12 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014; interviews with EU representatives 1 and 3, Baku, May 2014; interview with independent expert 1, Baku, May 2014.
13 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, April 2014; interviews with independent experts 1 and 2, Baku, May 2014.
14 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 1, Baku, May 2014.
15 Interview with independent expert 2, Baku, May 2014.
16 Interview with independent expert 1, Baku, May 2014.
17 Interview with EU representative 2, Baku, May 2014.
18 Interviews with EU representatives 1 and 2, Baku, May 2014. Technical and economic areas encompass trade, economic regulations and other de-politicised areas of cooperation; ‘political issues’ refers to security, Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs and values.
19 Interview with EU representative 4, Brussels, July 2014.
20 Interview with EU representative 4, Brussels, July 2014.
21 ‘World Report 2015: Azerbaijan’, Human Rights Watch, 2015, available at: http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/azerbaijan?page=3, accessed 14 February 2015; ‘Freedom in the World. Azerbaijan’, Freedom House, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/azerbaijan#.VN-RnSYfyM8, accessed 14 February 2015; ‘Azerbaijan: Human Rights Record Still Not Roadworthy as Formula 1 Hits Baku’, Amnesty International, 16 June 2016, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/azerbaijan-formula-1/, accessed 22 January 2018; ‘Harassed, Imprisoned, Exiled: Azerbaijan’s Continuing Crackdown on Government Critics, Lawyers and Civil Society’, Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2016, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/20/harassed-imprisoned-exiled/azerbaijans-continuing-crackdown-government-critics, accessed 8 May 2018.
22 ‘Report Azerbaijan 2017/2018’, Amnesty International, 2018, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/azerbaijan/report-azerbaijan/, accessed 8 May 2018.
23 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014.
24 See for example, EEAS (Citation2014) regarding journalist Khadija Ismayilova; and EP (Citation2017a) concerning the case of Afghan Mukhtarli.
25 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014; interview with EU representative 3, Brussels, July 2014.
26 ‘Azerbaijan Cancels EU Delegation Visit after Criticism of Rights Record’, Reuters, 11 September 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-azerbaijan-europe/azerbaijan-cancels-eu-delegation-visit-after-criticism-of-rights-record-idUSKCN0RB1U920150911, accessed 22 January 2018.
27 Interview with EU representative 5, Brussels, October 2015.
28 See for instance the statement by Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Belgium regarding criticism from the EU (‘Criticism against Azerbaijan Artificial, Orchestrated—Envoy’, Azernews, 4 October 2017, available at: https://www.azernews.az/nation/119946.html, accessed 22 January 2018) or the government’s response to the OOCRP report on the so-called ‘Laundromat’ scheme, accusing the report to be financed by George Soros and Armenia (‘Who is Behind Attacks against Azerbaijani President’, news.az, 25 September 2017, available at: http://news.az/articles/politics/125560, accessed 22 January 2018).
29 Interview with EU representative 6, Baku, July 2017.
30 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 3, Baku, May 2015.
31 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 6, Baku, July 2017.
32 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, April 2014; see also Cornell (Citation2011, p. 401).
33 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014.
34 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014; interview with EU representative 4, Brussels, July 2014; see also Van Gils (Citation2017).
35 Interview with EU representative 4, Brussels, July 2014.
36 Interview with EU representative 3, Brussels, July 2014; interview with independent expert 3, Brussels, July 2014.
37 ‘The Azerbaijan Laundromat’, OCCRP, 2017, available at: https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/, accessed 20 October 2017.
38 Interview with EU representative 4, Brussels, July 2014.
39 Interview with EU representatives 2, Baku, May 2014.
40 Interview with independent expert 1, Baku, May 2014.
41 See also Franke et al. (Citation2010), Böttger and Falkenhain (Citation2011).
42 ‘EU–Azerbaijan: The Game in Modernization’, Contact.az, 17 June 2014. Also, interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014.
43 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 6, Baku, May 2017.
44 The EU has therefore focused on financial aid and technical assistance; ‘rehabilitation of territories damaged during the conflict’ (German Citation2007, p. 367; EC Citation1992, p. 263); contributing to the creation of supportive conditions to resolve the conflict, predominantly confidence-building measures (EU Council Citation2000, p. 10; see also EU Council Citation2002, p. 15); and support to civil society organisations in Armenia and Azerbaijan (EC Citation2006, 2014). Also: Interview with EU representative 3, Brussels, July 2014; EC (Citation2006, p. 9; Citation2013, p. 3); German (Citation2007); EU Council President (Citation2012, p. 3).
45 See also Nuriyev (Citation2008, p. 165).
46 Interview with EU representative 4, Brussels, July 2014; interview with Azerbaijani representative 3, Baku, May 2015.
47 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014; interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014.
48 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014; interview with independent expert 4, Baku, May 2015; see also Kaufman (Citation2003, p. 52).
49 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014.
50 Interview with independent expert 2, Baku, May 2014; interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014; interview with Azerbaijani representative 6, Baku, July 2017.
51 Also interview with EU representative 5, Brussels, October 2015.
52 Interview with EU representative 1, May 2014, Baku.
53 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 1, Baku, May 2014; interview with EU representative 2, Baku, May 2014.
54 Interview with independent expert 2, May 2015; see also İbrahimov (Citation2013a, p. 82). Estimations of the total territory over which Azerbaijan has no control vary between 15% and 20% (Jahn Citation2009, p. 262).
55 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014; interview with Azerbaijani representative 5, Baku, May 2015; interview with Azerbaijani representative 6, Baku, July 2017; interview with independent expert 2, Baku, May 2014; see also Pashayeva (Citation2015, p. 42); interview with EU representative 5, Brussels, October 2015. What these Azerbaijani representatives do not acknowledge here is that in the case of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova it is a non-EaP actor (Russia) responsible for the violations; and that this makes it more delicate for the EU to take a position on Nagorno-Karabakh.
56 Interviews with Azerbaijani representative 5, Baku, May 2015; interview with Azerbaijani representative 6, Baku, July 2017. This negative discourse could be perceived as contradicting the fact that Azerbaijan wants the EU to act more in the country’s favour. Perhaps confusingly, at times, Azerbaijan expresses ‘gratitude’ for the EU for its involvement (see for example, EU Council Citation2007, p. 2; Citation2008, p. 4).
57 Interview with EU representative 5, Brussels, October 2015.
58 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, April 2014.
59 Interview with EU representative 1, Baku, May 2014.
60 ‘EU Shows Disrespect for Azerbaijan’s Territorial Integrity—First Deputy Speaker’, Trend.az, 22 May 2015, available at: http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/karabakh/2398120.html, accessed 22 January 2018.
61 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 5, Baku, May 2015.
62 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 5, Baku, May 2015.
63 ‘Protest Action Held in Front of Chatham House Building’, AzerTac, 8 July 2015, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/869990, accessed 8 May 2018; ‘British Foreign Office: Official London doesn’t Recognize a Regime Created in the Nagorno-Karabakh and this Stance will Remain Unchanged’, AzerTac, 2 July 2015, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/868696, accessed 8 May 2018.
64 ‘European Azerbaijan Society Addresses Open Letter to Chatham House’, News.az, 8 July 2015, available at: http://www.news.az/articles/politics/99437, accessed 23 August 2015.
65 ‘British Ambassador Summoned to Foreign Ministry’, Contact.az, 2 July 2015, available at: http://www.contact.az/docs/2015/Politics/070200121881en.htm#.VdobaH0UNqw, accessed 23 August 2015.
66 ‘UK Says Has No Ties With Separatist Nagorno-Karabakh’s Representatives’, Azernews, 1 July 2015, available at: http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/84835.html, accessed 1 July 2015.
67 ‘Chatham House Rules Out Recognition of Separatist NKR Regime’, Azernews, 6 July 2015, available at http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/85006.html, accessed 23 August 2015. No references to this incident could be found on the UK Embassy’s website or in UK media outlets at the time. See also, ‘Robin Niblett: Chatham House Respects Azerbaijan’s Sovereignty, Independence and Territorial Integrity’, AzerTac, 21 August 2015, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/878932, accessed 8 May 2018.
68 ‘President Ilham Aliev: “My v lyuboi moment smozhem vosstanovit’ territorial’nuyu tselostnost’ strany voennym putem”’, Day.Az, 8 November 2010, available at: https://news.day.az/politics/237353.html, accessed 10 May 2018.
69 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 4, Baku, May 2015.
70 ‘Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group Following their Meetings with the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia’, OSCE, 11 February 2018, available at: https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/371396, accessed 8 May 2018.
71 Military expenditure has been increasing ever since the 1994 ceasefire; the military budget for 2017 was a 5.9% increase compared to 2016; 62.2% compared to 2010; and even an increase of 780.4% in comparison to 2000 (based on data from SIPRI Citation2018).
72 The Pact was extended in 2016 with a joint military unit (Gotev Citation2016).
73 Interview with independent expert 4, Baku, May 2015; interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014.
74 See also İbrahimov (Citation2013a, p. 80).
75 A non-binding agreement that was negotiated alongside the Association Agreement in 2013.
76 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 2, Brussels, July 2014; interview with Azerbaijani representative 3, Baku, May 2015.
77 Interview with independent expert 5, Baku, May 2015.
78 Interview with independent expert 5, Baku, May 2015.
79 ‘Nagorno-Karabakh—Our Mission’, TEAS, available at: http://teas.eu/nagorno-karabakh, accessed 25 June 2015.
80 There were also links between TEAS and several members of the EP Delegation to the South Caucasus 2009–2014 (See, ‘European Parliament’s Friends of Azerbaijan Group Discusses Azerbaijan’s Religious Tolerance’, TEAS, 15 May 2013, available at: http://teas.eu/press-release-european-parliament-s-friends-azerbaijan-group-discusses-azerbaijan-s-religious, accessed 2 December 2015).
81 Interview with EU representative 5, Brussels, October 2015.
82 ‘How Azerbaijan is Coping with Crisis’, Stratfor, 20 February 2015, available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-azerbaijan-coping-crisis, accessed 6 December 2015.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Eske Van Gils
Eske Van Gils, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Rutherford College Canterbury, CT2 7NX, UK. Email: [email protected]