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Abstract
This article looks at Russia’s exercise of power politics in Ukraine and Syria as a way of improving its international status. Russia’s recent willingness to use power and coercion is theoretically counterintuitive as it appears to be in dissonance with the prevalent characterisation of the country as a status-overachieving inconsistent power. We argue that this behaviour is not the result of a consistent weighing of status against capabilities, but rather reflective of both internal and external dynamics. We analyse issues of identity, opportunity and costs as factors that influence Russian foreign action, showing that power politics will not solve Russia’s status-inconsistency problem in the long run.
Notes
1 According to Gilpin, ‘prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular. Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power’ (Gilpin Citation1981, p. 31).
2 See also Kakachia and Minesashvili (Citation2015, p. 178).
3 As he did in 2015, see declaration available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDyCWKcONHk, accessed 21 April 2017.
4 See also Monaghan (Citation2016b).
5 ‘New Russian Security Strategy Views Use of Military Force as “Extreme Measure”’, Interfax, 13 January 2016.
6 See also Nygren (Citation2007, ch. 10).
7 ‘20 Years of USAID Economic Growth Assistance in Europe and Eurasia’, USAID, 24 July 2013, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/EE_20_Year__Review.pdf, accessed 21 April 2017; ‘Eastern Partnership’, European Union External Action, 2018, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership_en?page=3, accessed 21 April 2017.
8 In the post-Soviet era, economic relations have mostly taken the form of Russian arms exports to Syria. For details see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database, available at: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php, accessed 21 April 2017.
9 On the current economic situation in Russia see, for instance, ‘Russia Statistics’, Helsinki, The Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 2018, available at: https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/statistics/russia-statistics/, accessed 13 August 2018.
10 As formulated in the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation for 2000 (Rossiiskaya Federatsiya Citation2000).
11 See also Monaghan (Citation2016a).
12 ‘Vladimir Putin: Nam nuzhna novaya ekonomika’’, Vedomosti, 30 January 2012, available at: http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2012/01/30/o_nashih_ekonomicheskih_zadachah, accessed 21 April 2017.
13 Alexei Ulyukaev was arrested for alleged bribery shortly after and charged in 2016: ‘Russian Economy Minister Ulyukayev Charged with $2m Bribe’, BBC News, 15 November 2016, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37983744, accessed 21 April 2017.
14 ‘Kudrin Urges Putin to Ease Geopolitical Tensions for Economy’, The Moscow Times, 30 May 2016, available at: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/kudrin-urges-putin-to-ease-geopolitical-tensions-for-economy-53063, accessed 21 April 2017.
15 ‘“Downshifter” Russia is Losing Global Competition, Warns State Bank Chief’, The Moscow Times, 15 January 2016, available at: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/downshifter-russia-is-losing-global-competition-warns-state-bank-chief-51474, accessed 21 April 2017.
16 ‘Russian Economist: The Kremlin’s “Military Spending Binge” is Completely Unsustainable’, Business Insider, 18 May 2015, available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-economist-kremlin-military-spending-is-indefensible-2015-5, accessed 15 February 2017.
17 ‘Sut’ voennykh reform v Rossii–plan Serdyukova’, RIA Novosti, 18 December 2008, available at: https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20081218/157554452.html, accessed 13 August 2018.
18 Zakrytyi Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No 15651 ot 31 dekabrya 2010 g. Gosudarstvennaya programma vooruzheniya na 2011–2020 gg, Kreml’, Moskva. See also ‘Dve voennykh pyatiletki. Minoborony rasskazalo o planakh perevooruzheniya’, Lenta.ru, 25 February 2011, available at: https://lenta.ru/articles/2011/02/25/prog/, accessed 13 August 2018.
19 See also ‘Russia to Spend $600 Billion on State Armaments Program by 2020’, TASS, 3 July 2014, available at: http://tass.com/russia/738863, accessed 21 April 2017.
20 ‘Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016, p. 4, available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EMBARGO%20FS1604%20Milex%202015.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018.
21 The 2017 draft federal budget submitted to the State Duma at the end of October 2016 indicated that the Russian government had decided to cut defence spending by R1,000 billion ($15.89 billion), or approximately 30%. See ‘Byudzhet mirnogo vremeni. Minfin otstoyal v pravitel’stve proekt konsolidatsii’, Kommersant’’, 27 October 2016, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3126798, accessed 14 August 2018. Expenditure on national defence was envisaged as R2.840 billion ($45.15 billion), or 3.3% of GDP in the federal budget for 2017. See ‘Russian Military Spending Cut Significantly’, Russia Beyond, 2 November 2016, available at: http://in.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/11/02/russian-military-spending-cut-significantly_644155, accessed 21 April 2017.
22 For further detail on the origins of the Ukraine crisis and its escalation see, for example, Cadier (Citation2014), Trenin (Citation2014).
23 ‘Full Text of the Minsk Agreement’, Financial Times, 12 February 2015, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de, accessed 27 July 2018.
24 ‘Ukraine and the Logic of Civil Resistance: Confronting Russian-Fueled Insurgency’, Atlantic Council, 1 June 2014, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/ukraine-and-the-logic-of-civil-resistance-confronting-russian-fueled-insurgency, accessed 15 July 2016.
25 ‘Ukrainskuyu voinu kvalifitsirovali po stat’e UK RF’, Kommersant’’, 31 May 2014, available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2484273, accessed 15 November 2016; see also ‘Slavyansk ozhidaet shturma ili osady’, Vedomosti, 2 May 2014, available at: http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2014/05/02/slavyansk-ozhidaet-shturma-ili-osady, accessed 15 November 2016.
26 In particular in the military doctrines issued since 2010 (Rossiiskaya Federatsiya Citation2010, Citation2014).
27 ‘NATO Promises Ukraine, Georgia Entry One Day’, Reuters, 3 April 2008, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato/nato-promises-ukraine-georgia-entry-one-day-idUSL0179714620080403, accessed 15 November 2017; ‘NATO Will Not Offer Georgia Membership Step, Avoiding Russia Clash’, Reuters, 25 June 2014, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-enlargement/nato-will-not-offer-georgia-membership-step-avoiding-russia-clash-idUSKBN0F00IJ20140625, accessed 15 November 2017.
28 ‘Putin says U.S. Stoked Russian Protests’, Reuters, 8 December 2011, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia/putin-says-u-s-stoked-russian-protests-idUSTRE7B610S20111208, accessed 15 November 2017.
29 For a detailed analysis of the implications of the Russian intervention in Ukraine at the light of the Budapest Memorandum see Yost (Citation2015).
30 The economic dimension is further developed below in ‘Cost considerations’.
31 ‘Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part’, Official Journal of the European Union, 29 May 2014, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf, accessed 15 November 2016.
32 ‘Russia Puts Losses from Sanctions, Cheaper Oil at up to $140 Billion per Year’, Reuters, 24 November 2016, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-siluanov-idUSKCN0J80GC20141124, accessed 20 March 2016.
33 For further detail see Gurvich and Prilepskiy (Citation2015).
34 ‘Russia, Despite Military Ventures, Cut Defense Spending by Most in Decades’, RFE/RL, 2 May 2018, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-despite-ventures-syria-ukraine-cut-military-spending-last-year-most-since-1998-economic-collapse-western-sanctions-recession/29203634.html, accessed 20 May 2018.
35 ‘Weak Crude and Sanctions Help Russia to Diversify Economy’, RT, 18 May 2016, available at: https://www.rt.com/business/343441-russian-economy-oil-agriculture/, accessed 20 May 2018.
36 ‘As Putin Looks East, China and Russia Sign $400-billion Gas Deal’, Reuters, 21 May 2014, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-russia-gas/as-putin-looks-east-china-and-russia-sign-400-billion-gas-deal-idUSBREA4K07K20140521, accessed 20 May 2018.
37 The ‘pivot to the East’ approach involves ‘a comprehensive restructuring and diversification of the entire system of Russia’s foreign policy and foreign economic relations toward Asia, with Siberia and the Far East playing the key role in this process’, including an institutional and an economic dimension. For example, in 2016 China was one of the largest investors in Russia with investment amounting up to US$33 billion. China is the second largest trading partner of Russia, after the EU, with US$68 billion in bilateral trade in 2015 (Bordachev Citation2016).
38 ‘Putin vstal na zashchitu liviiskogo diktatora Kaddafi’, Press Sluzhba Soyuza Pravykh Syl, 21 March 2011, available at: http://www.integrumworld.com/, accessed 20 May 2014.
39 ‘Soviet Federatsii razreshil ispol’zovanie rossiiskikh voisk v Sirii’, Lenta.ru, 30 September 2015, available at: https://lenta.ru/news/2015/09/30/za/, accessed 20 March 2016; ‘Syria Conflict: Putin Defends Russia’s Air Strikes’, BBC News, 12 October 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34502286, accessed 20 January 2016.
40 ‘SB OON odobril rezolyutsiyu po Livii. Rossiya i eshche chetyre strany vozderzhalis’ pri golosovanii’, News.ru, 18 March, available at: https://www.newsru.com/world/18mar2011/majorityrules.html, accessed 28 July 2018.
41 See also ‘Lavrov nadeetsya, chto v OON bol’she ne budet “neponyatnykh dokumentov, “opravdyvayushchikh”, v chastnosti, postavki oruzhiya liviiskim povstantsam’, ITAR TASS, 1 September 2011, available at: http://www.integrumworld.com/, accessed 22 October 2014.
42 See a timeline of Syrian chemical weapons activity on Arms Control Association, ‘Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–2018’, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity. In April 2017, new evidence of gas attacks was released. See ‘Syria Chemical “Attack”: What We Know’, BBC News, 26 April 2017, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500947, accessed 14 August 2018.
43 ‘Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 5 September 2014, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president-obama-nato-summit-press-conference, accessed 29 July 2018.
44 ‘Russia Warns of Recession in 2015’, BBC News, 2 December 2014, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-30288739, accessed 13 August 2018.
45 ‘Divisions Will Delay an EU Decision on Russia Sanctions’, Stratfor Worldview, 17 March 2015, available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/divisions-will-delay-eu-decision-russia-sanctions, accessed 13 August 2018.
46 ‘Gabriel schlägt Ende der Sanktionen gegen Russland vor’, Die Zeit, 25 September 2015, available at: http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-09/sigmar-gabriel-russland-sanktionen-syrien, accessed 4 March 2016.
47 For instance expressed in the following statement by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in January 2016: ‘Nashe aktivnoe uchastie v antiterroristicheskoi bor’be sposobstvovalo prinyatiyu tselogo ryada vazhnykh rezolyutsii SB OON, napravlennykh na presechenie finansirovaniya terrorizma i fenomena inostrannykh terroristov-boevikov–rezolyutsii 2199 i 2253’, see ‘Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v khode press-konferentsii po itogam deyatel’nosti rossiiskoi diplomatii v 2015 godu’, Moscow, 26 January 2016, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2032328, accessed 21 April 2017.
48 For instance, President Putin in May 2016, ‘Putin: VKS RF dobilis’ korennogo pereloma v bor’be s terroristami v Sirii’, NTV, 10 May 2016, available at: http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1627819/, accessed 21 April 2017.
49 See also Barrett (Citation2017).
50 ‘Moscow: Senior Military Advisor Killed in Syria’, Middle East Monitor, 4 February 2016, available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160204-moscow-senior-military-advisor-killed-in-syria/, accessed 15 March 2016.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Maria Raquel Freire
Maria Raquel Freire, Centre for Social Studies (CES) & International Relations Group, Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra (FEUC), FEUC—Av Dias da Silva 165, 3004-512 Coimbra, Portugal. Email: [email protected]
Regina Heller
Regina Heller, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Beim Schlump 83, 20144 Hamburg, Germany. Email: [email protected]