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Abstract
This essay asks how Central Asian states have responded to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and salvos against the West, as a means to assess how Russia and the Central Asian states understand their national interests and exercise state power. It argues that the post-Soviet region shares a cynical and geopolitically driven view of the exercise of global power. Yet Russia has sometimes deployed its resources to advance short-term ideological objectives, whereas Central Asian foreign policy is pragmatic and opportunistic. The Ukraine crisis threatened to coerce the Central Asian states into conformity with Russia’s interests; ironically, their dependence on Russia has enabled their freedom of action in foreign policy, within limits. The essay highlights the ways that geography enables and constrains the execution of foreign policy, and considers the ambiguous role ideology plays in the formulation of national interests and the prospects for international cooperation.
Notes
1 The same cannot be said of China’s actions on its Pacific side.
2 For an explanation of why Russia privileges geopolitics, see Toal (Citation2017).
3 See Putin’s 2007 Munich Conference speech: ‘Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy’, Washington Post, 12 February 2007, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html, accessed 4 October 2018.
4 This is articulated clearly in Putin’s speech announcing Crimea’s annexation: ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March 2014, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, accessed 30 August 2018.
5 The application of nominally objective criteria for joining NATO’s membership action plan also has a political component, as Russia often points out.
6 ‘Russia Bans Meat Imports from Moldova’, Moscow Times, 27 October 2014.
7 ‘Russia Blamed for “Gas Sabotage”’, BBC News, 26 January 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4637034.stm, accessed 31 October 2018.
8 See Putin’s Crimea speech for a distillation of objections: ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March 2014, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, accessed 30 August 2018.
9 McDermott et al. (Citation2008) offer an evolutionary account for prospect theory and risk aversion. Conditions of environmental scarcity shape preferred trade-offs of risk and volatility. Actors whose survival is not guaranteed, and who operate in the realm of losses, are more prone to take greater risks for higher rewards, since the downside expectation of a low-risk strategy is no more favourable for survival. By contrast, individuals who begin at a decent if minimal level of sustenance should select a ‘low mean, low variance’ portfolio of outcomes. In international relations, threats to survival result in gambling behaviour, whereas lower-stakes contexts lead to avoidance of risky actions.
10 With some exceptions, including the presidents of Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon since around 2010.
11 The exception here is Kyrgyzstan, where the opposition did embrace a majoritarian ethnic nationalism. See Radnitz (Citation2017).
12 ‘Karimov in Korea: Foreign Investment Good, but Western-Style Democracy Violates Our Moral Purity’, Wikileaks Cable, 11 April 2006, available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06TASHKENT699_a.html, accessed 29 August 2018.
13 Toleration of the more subtly pro-West governments in Moldova and Azerbaijan illustrates this policy.
14 ‘Putin Eyes Single Currency for Eurasian Union Trade Bloc’, Moscow Times, 10 March 2015, available at: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/putin-eyes-single-currency-for-eurasian-union-trade-bloc-44613, accessed 4 October 2018.
15 ‘Discussing the Eurasian Customs Union and its Impact on Central Asia’, Central Asia Policy Forum, No. 4, 2013, George Washington University, available at: http://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/7521, accessed 4 October 2018.
16 ‘Moscow, Minsk Spar Over Bans On Belarusian Imports’, RFE/RL, 4 December 2014, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-russia-eu-food-imports/26724908.html, accessed 4 October 2018.
17 Some have argued that his primary motivation is to secure his regime. A definitive explanation for Putin’s actions would require more discussion, and is not necessary here. For differing views, see Marten (Citation2015), Gunitsky and Tsygankov (Citation2018).
18 ‘UN Passes Resolution Calling Crimean Referendum Invalid’, RFE/RL, 27 March 2014, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-un-passes-crimea-resolution/25312158.html, accessed 4 October 2018.
19 ‘Kyrgyzstan Protests over U.S. Human Rights Award to Dissident’, Reuters, 17 July 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-usa-rights-idUSKCN0PR11620150717, accessed 30 August 2018.
20 ‘Capital Flight from Russia Soars to $31.3 Bln in 2017’, Moscow Times, 18 January 2018, available at: https://themoscowtimes.com/news/capital-flight-from-russia-soars-to-313-bln-in-2017-60209, accessed 4 October 2018.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Scott Radnitz
Scott Radnitz, Associate Professor, Jackson School of International Studies and Director and Chair, Herbert J. Ellison Center for Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3340, USA. Email: [email protected]