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Abstract
The European Union (EU) and Azerbaijan have negotiated three different agreements for a new legal basis underpinning their relationship since 2010. Whereas the EU tries to adhere to a more unilateral approach, Azerbaijan wants cooperation to take place on a more inclusive, dialogical, basis. The essay will present a model of ‘bargaining power’ to analyse how the Azerbaijani government has tried to enforce this, and to what degree it has been successful. It finds that the bargaining power model can explain some of the changing power dynamics in EU–Azerbaijan relations, and that these might speak to the broader Eurasian region too.
Notes
1 For this case study, the ‘EU’ refers to the EU actors involved in the negotiations with Azerbaijan, namely the European External Action Service and its delegation in Baku, and the EU Council. Member states, their embassies in Baku, the European Commission and the European Parliament are included in the analysis to the extent that their bilateral contacts with Azerbaijan are relevant to the overall EU-led negotiations on this subject. ‘Azerbaijan’, in turn, refers to the elements of the Azerbaijani government conducting negotiations with the EU. These are often the highest-level officials, including the president, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and members of the presidential administration. There are naturally more actors involved; however, for the sake of clarity this essay only examines bilateral relations at the executive level.
2 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014. For reasons of confidentiality, all names and positions of interviewees have been omitted. Interviewees will only be referred to by their broad affiliation (‘European’, referring to EU institutions as well as national member states; Azerbaijani establishment; or independent expert) in addition to the date of the interview.
3 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
4 ‘Georgia Ratifies EU Association Agreement’, RFE/RL, 18 July 2014, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-eu-association-agreement-ratification-parliament/25461441.html, accessed 2 October 2014. The AAs would at a later stage be complemented by a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) (European Commission Citation2008, p. 4). In the case of relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, only the negotiations over the AA are relevant, since the country is not eligible to start DCFTA negotiations until it becomes a WTO member (ECFR Citation2013; Gstöhl Citation2015, p. 863).
5 This is a crucial difference between Belarus and Azerbaijan: both Minsk and Baku disagree with the EU’s one-sided view on relations, and both countries resist EU pressure to comply with its policy framework and conditions. However, in the case of Belarus the result is that the EU has excluded the country from the bilateral track of the EaP, while Azerbaijan is included as a full partner. The Union has even expressed its wish for further economic and political cooperation with Baku in official documents and on the occasion of numerous official visits (European Commission Citation2007, Citation2010a). This scenario leaves space for Azerbaijan to actively resist the status quo and to try to influence the policy-making process.
6 Interview with expert 1, July 2014.
7 The analysis is based on the investigation of a range of sources, including policy documents, newspaper archives and other secondary literature. Secondary sources were integrated by a total of 25 interviews, conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2017 in both Baku and Brussels. Twelve respondents were representatives of or affiliated with the different EU institutions and national member states; six were representatives of or affiliated with the government of Azerbaijan; and seven interviewees were independent experts. While the number of interviews is rather limited, they provided comprehensive information, as demonstrated by the fact that a point of data saturation was reached whereby the interviews turned up the same or similar information.
8 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
9 The EU refers to the OSCE Minsk Group as having the official mandate for the conflict resolution process, and therefore does not wish to become engaged in the process itself, other than through an indirect role as a supporter of the Minsk Group’s efforts. The Azerbaijani government, however, wants the EU to take on a more active role, as it has no confidence that the OSCE Minsk Group has the will or capacity to solve the conflict in a manner beneficial to Azerbaijan’s interests. The EU’s position in this regard conflicts somewhat with its stated desire to become a regional security actor and its commitment to regional security cooperation recorded in the ENP and EaP (Simão & Freire Citation2013, p. 465). While resolving the conflict would benefit the EU, as regional stability is in its immediate interest (Nuriyev Citation2008), involvement would also be a delicate matter considering that both Azerbaijan and Armenia are partners of the EU, and Russia would likely not approve of the EU’s involvement.
10 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 5, May 2014.
11 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 5, May 2014.
12 ‘EU–Azerbaijan: The Game in Modernization’, Turan Information Agency, 17 June 2014, available at: http://www.contact.az/docs/2014/Analytics/061700081652en.htm#.VClu3mOx3YU, accessed 29 September 2014.
13 Interview with European affiliate 7, May 2014.
14 Interview with European affiliate 5, May 2014.
15 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
16 Interview with European affiliate 5, May 2014.
17 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
18 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
19 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
20 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
21 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
22 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
23 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
24 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
25 ‘Azerbaijan, EU to Hold Another Meeting on Strategic Partnership Agreement’, AzerTac, 25 August 2017, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1088555, accessed 6 September 2018; ‘Baku Hosts Azerbaijan–EU Negotiations’, News.az, 25 April 2017, available at: http://news.az/articles/politics/121064, accessed 16 June 2017.
26 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
27 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 1, May 2017.
28 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 1, May 2017.
29 ‘Baku Hosts 15th Meeting of EU–Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee’, AzerTac, 8 May 2018, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1160813; ‘Azerbaijan, EU Discuss Bilateral Cooperation’, AzerTac, 20 February 2018, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1138634, accessed 6 September 2018.
30 The importance attached to the conflict is reflected in the fact that the overall majority of official statements, comments and speeches released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between January and November 2018 focused in one way or the other on Nagorno-Karabakh (MFA Citation2018).
31 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
32 This definition is the author’s, constructed on the basis of a range of literature on bargaining power (Zartman Citation1978; Doron & Sened Citation2001).
33 Many studies apply bargaining power in light of rational choice theory or game theory, with fixed stages and ‘purposeful action’ of agents (Doron & Sened Citation2001, p. 19). This essay does not adhere to this interpretation of the negotiation process.
34 The concept defines a form of relationship between the EU and third countries in which the EU can exert a certain influence in a non-accession framework (Lavenex Citation2004, p. 680). Different modes of external governance have been conceptualised, including ‘hierarchical governance’, when relations are top-down and mostly determined by the EU rather than based on equal input from both sides (Börzel Citation2010, pp. 191, 198); and ‘network governance’, whereby views of all actors involved are taken into account (Pierre & Peters Citation2000, p. 19). Korosteleva argues that genuine partnership should go even a step further, and not be based on governance but on genuinely equal cooperation (Korosteleva Citation2011).
35 See also Iklé (Citation1985, p. 122).
36 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
37 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
38 ‘How Azerbaijan is Coping with Crisis’, Stratfor, 20 February 2015, available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-azerbaijan-coping-crisis, accessed 6 December 2015.
39 ‘Arrests as Azerbaijani Police Use Water Cannons, Tear Gas against Protesters’, RFE/RL, 15 January 2016, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-protests-increased-security-popular-discontent/27489831.html, accessed 7 September 2018.
40 Interview with European affiliate 5, May 2014; interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
41 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 1, May 2017.
42 The AA and SMP had not been discussed in the Cooperation Council of Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, since those meetings had been called off between 2013 and 2016, following EU criticism over Azerbaijan’s human rights record (interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014; European Parliament 2017).
43 Interview with European affiliate 2, July 2014; interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
45 ‘EU Refused to Enter into the Strategic Modernization Partnership with Azerbaijan until the Association Agreement is Concluded’, Abc.az, 31 August 2013, available at: http://abc.az/eng/news/75788.html, accessed 8 September 2014.
46 ‘EU Refused to Enter into the Strategic Modernization Partnership with Azerbaijan until the Association Agreement is Concluded’, Abc.az, 31 August 2013, available at: http://abc.az/eng/news/75788.html, accessed 8 September 2014.
47 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014; interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
48 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 4, May 2015; ‘Azerbaijan, EU Unlikely to Sign Any Document at Riga Summit’, News.az, 19 May 2015, available at: http://www.news.az/articles/politics/98094, accessed 7 September 2018.
49 ‘Ali Hasanov: Azerbaijani President Will Not Participate in Riga Summit’, Azeri Press Agency, 20 May 2015, available at: http://en.apa.az/xeber_ali_hasanov__azerbaijani_president_will__227319.html, accessed 1 November 2015.
50 ‘Ali Hasanov: Azerbaijani President Will Not Participate in Riga Summit’, Azeri Press Agency, 20 May 2015, available at: http://en.apa.az/xeber_ali_hasanov__azerbaijani_president_will__227319.html, accessed 1 November 2015.
51 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 2, May 2015. The fire in the apartment block was a major incident which left 15 people dead, and led to protests in the country against cheap but unsafe infrastructural adjustments to make the city look more presentable.
52 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
53 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
54 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
55 ‘Azerbaijan Continues Independent, Multidimensional, Balanced and Active Foreign Policy in 2017’, AzerTac, 28 December 2017, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1125089, accessed 7 September 2018.
56 See for instance the group’s event calendar: https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/o/the-european-azerbaijan-society-teas-1348104131, accessed 7 November 2018.
57 Offensive power is power in which A can chose to make B do something; defensive power is possessed by B and refers to the situation in which A cannot succeed in making B do something (Goldmann Citation1979, pp. 13–4).
58 ‘Azerbaijan’s Aliyev Cancels Brussels Meeting with EU Parliament President’, RFE/RL, 6 February 2017, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-eu-aliyev-partnership-talks-human-rights-pressure/28281494.html, accessed 16 June 2017.
59 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
60 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
61 Interview with independent expert 1, July 2014; interview with European affiliate 6, May 2014; and interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
62 Interview with expert 1, July 2014.
63 ‘Democratic Processes Taking Place in Azerbaijan are Highly Appreciated by the World Community, President’, AzerTac, 10 July 2018, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1178670, accessed 17 September 2018; ‘President Ilham Aliyev Received Delegation of European Commission’, AzerTac, 29 January 2018, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1132224, accessed 17 September 2018.
64 ‘President Ilham Aliyev: Azerbaijan has Asserted Itself as a Dignified and Reliable Partner in the World’, AzerTac, 1 January 2018, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1125637, accessed 17 September 2018.
65 Interview with expert 1, July 2014.
66 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
67 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 3, July 2014.
68 Interview with European affiliate 5, May 2014. It this sense Azerbaijan’s reasoning is very similar to that of Russia at the time, when Moscow demanded individual treatment rather than being included in the ENP, because it felt more important to the EU than the other states that are currently included in the Eastern Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy.
69 Interview with European affiliate 2, July 2014.
70 Interview with European affiliate 4, April 2014.
71 Interview with European affiliate 5, May 2014.
72 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015; see also Korosteleva et al. (2015).
73 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
74 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 1, May 2017.
75 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
76 Interview with European affiliate 1, October 2015.
77 Interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 5, May 2014.
78 Two interviews with European affiliates 6 and 7, May 2014.
79 Interview with expert 3, May 2014.
80 Interview with expert 2, May 2014; interview with Azerbaijani affiliate 5, May 2014.
81 Interview with expert 3, May 2014.
82 ‘Azerbaijan, Turkey Define Scope of Preferential Trade Deal’, AzerNews, 6 May 2017, available at: https://www.azernews.az/business/112577.html, accessed 17 June 2017; ‘Iran and Azerbaijan to Join Railways as Part of Freight Route’, Reuters, 5 March 2017, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-azerbaijan-railways-idUSKBN16C0MW?il=0, accessed 17 June 2017.
83 Similarly clear objectives do not receive the same weight in relations with, for example, the Central Asian states. While they do play a key role in the EU’s agenda vis-à-vis Russia, we cannot compare Russia and Azerbaijan in this regard, because of their differing economic and political power.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Eske van Gils
Eske van Gils, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Rutherford College, Canterbury, CT2 7NX, UK. Email: e.van-[email protected]