Russia and its Western Neighbours: A Comparative Study of the Security Situation in the Black, Baltic and Barents Sea Regions

Abstract

Since Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the security situation of Europe’s eastern ‘frontline states’ has undergone significant changes. In and around the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea, the scope and scale of military activity has grown, as has the frequency of Russian–Western military encounters. Despite the many similarities between the three regions, and despite the increased risk of negative spillover from one region to another, there are also noteworthy regional differences. As of today, the security challenges appear to be more severe and pressing in the southern and central part of the ‘frontline’ than in the northern.

Notes

1 ‘GenShtab: Chernomorskii flot Rossii mozhet unichtozhit' desant protivnika eshchë v portakh’, TASS, 14 September 2016, available at: http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3619937, accessed 11 October 2019.

2 ‘Gruppirovka rossiiskikh voisk v Krymu sostavlyaet na segodnya okolo 60 tysyach' chelovek—eksperty’, Zerkalo Nedeli, 3 June 2017, available at: https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/gruppirovka-rossiyskih-voysk-v-krymu-na-segodnya-sostavlyaet-okolo-60-tysyach-chelovek-eksperty-250339_.html, accessed 11 October 2019.

3 ‘Morskaya pekhota v Krymu perevooruzhena novymi bronetransporterami’, Parlamentskaya gazeta, 20 May 2017, available at: https://www.pnp.ru/politics/morskaya-pekhota-v-krymu-perevooruzhena-novymi-bronetransportyorami.html, accessed 11 October 2019; ‘Tri armeiskikh korpusa beregovykh voisk sozdany na SF, BF and ChF’, TASS, 24 May 2017, available at: http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4276282, accessed 11 October 2019.

4 ‘V Krymu Rossiya razvernula raketnyi kompleks S-400 “Triumf”’, InfoResist, 7 October 2017, available at: https://inforesist.org/v-kryimu-rossiya-razvernula-raketnyiy-kompleks-s-400-triumf/; ‘Rossiya perebrosila v Krym aviapolk bombarderovshchikov i sovremennykh istrebiteley’, Fakty, 4 May 2014, available at: http://fakty.ua/181079-rossiya-perebrosila-v-krym-aviapolk-bombardirovcshikov-i-sovremennyh-istrebitelej-video, accessed 11 October 2019.

5 ‘Lavrov zayavil, chto RF imeet pravo razmestit' v Krymu yadernoe oruzhie’, Nezavisimoe byuro novostei, 15 December 2014, available at: http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/138856/, accessed 11 October 2019.

6 In the summer of 2019, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Olena Zerkal, reported to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that Russia has extracted nine billion cubic metres of gas from the Ukrainian shelf in the Black Sea since the start of the occupation of Crimea, see ‘Over 9 bcm of Gas Stolen from Ukraine by Russia: Zerkal in The Hague’, UNIAN, 11 June 2019, available at: https://www.unian.info/economics/10582614-over-9-bcm-of-gas-stolen-from-ukraine-by-russia-zerkal-in-the-hague.html, accessed 11 October 2019.

7 See for instance ‘Raketnye strel'by proshli v Chernom more’, Gazeta.ru, 5 April 2019, available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2019/04/05/12830011.shtml, accessed 11 October 2019.

8 ‘V rayone provedeniya “Si Briz-2016” obnauzheny rossiiskie korabli-razvedchiki’, 112.ua, 27 June 2016, available at: https://112.ua/obshchestvo/v-rayone-provedeniya-si-briz-2016-obnaruzheny-rossiyskie-korabli-razvedchiki-327694.html, accessed 11 October 2019; ‘Za ucheniyami “Si Briz” v Chernom more sledyat korabli-razvedchiki Rossii’, Gordonua.com, 28 July 2016, available at: http://gordonua.com/news/politics/za-ucheniyami-si-briz-2016-v-chernom-more-sledyat-korabli-razvedchiki-rossii-142932.html, accessed 11 October 2019.

9 ‘Shoigu rasskazal, chto Rossiya sledaet s flotom NATO y Kryma’, Pravda.ru, 6 February 2017, available at: https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/06-02-2017/1324015-nato-0/, accessed 11 October 2019.

10 The bridge is scheduled to be opened for railroad traffic in December 2019, see ‘Zh/d soobshchenie po Krymskomu mostu startuet 9–10 dekabrya’, TASS, 9 June, available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6532571, accessed 11 October 2019.

11 See ‘Kilkist zatrymanikh RF suden dlya oglyadu vzhe 148 odynyts,—Yuri Lavreniuk’, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine, 16 July 2018, available at: https://mtu.gov.ua/news/29974.html, accessed 18 July 2018.

12 See for instance, ‘US Army Commander Warns of Russian Blocking of Baltic Defence’, The Baltic Times, 9 November 2015.

13 ‘Denmark to Permit Nord Stream 2 Construction under Guarantee of Gas Transit through Ukraine’, UAWire, 13 April 2018, available at: https://uawire.org/denmark-to-permit-nord-stream-2-construction-under-guarantee-of-gas-transit-through-ukraine, accessed 11 October 2019.

14 For details, see Lavrov (2016, pp. 7–8).

15 For further details, see Moberg et al. (2015b).

16 For details, see Nicholson (2016, p. 31) and Lanoszka and Hunzeker (2016, p. 15).

17 The only major exception was that Norway did not have a direct land border with the Soviet Union in the period between 1920 and 1944, when the Petsamo corridor was controlled by Finland.

18 Svalbard’s inclusion in NATO’s command area was confirmed in 1951.

19 ‘Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean’, signed in Murmansk 15 September 2010, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/2010/avtale_engelsk.pdf, accessed 18 July 2018.

20 ‘Norway Suspends All Planned Military Activities with Russia’, Press Release, Ministry of Defence of Norway, 25 March 2014, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/Norway-suspends-all-planned-military-activities-with-Russia-/id753887/, accessed 18 July 2018.

21 ‘Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers’, Press Release, NATO, 1 April 2014, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_108501.htm, accessed 18 July 2018.

22 See, for instance, Bø (2017).

23 For details, see ‘Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces’, updated 20 June 2017, available at: http://russianforces.org/, accessed 18 July 2018.

24 ‘Russia Deployed Two S-400 Air Defense Missile Regiments in Arctic in 2015—General Staff’, TASS, 8 December 2015, available at: http://tass.com/defense/842201, accessed 11 October 2019.

25 This is a military term which is used to describe the behaviour of an aircraft, or a tactical formation of two or more aircraft, based on characteristics such as altitude, speed and trajectory.

26 ‘Perspektivnyi esminets “lider” budet yadernym’, RIA Novosti, 31 August 2017, available at: https://ria.ru/20170831/1501443365.html, accessed 11 October 2019.

27 ‘Norwegian Joint Headquarters: We Talk to Russia over Skype’, High North News, 17 June 2016, available at: http://www.highnorthnews.com/norwegian-joint-headquartes-we-talk-to-russia-over-skype/, accessed 11 October 2019.

28 See for instance Khrolenko (2015).

29 ‘Trident Juncture 2018 Press Conference’, Press Release, NATO Headquarters, 9 October 2018, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_159119.htm, accessed 11 October 2019.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kristian Åtland

Kristian Åtland, PhD, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Strategic Analysis and Joint Systems Division, P.O. Box 25, Kjeller 2027, Norway. Email: [email protected]

Ihor Kabanenko

Ihor Kabanenko, Admiral (ret.), PhD, Centre for Russian Studies, Solomyanska str. 3-B, Kyiv 03110, Ukraine. Email: [email protected]