Russia and the Search for a Negotiated Solution in Afghanistan

Abstract

In early 2019, former Afghan mujahedeen leaders and key strongmen of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance met in Moscow to discuss matters of war and peace with their sworn enemy, the Taliban. For Russia, this was the culmination of a long evolution from being a marginal post-Soviet player into a major diplomatic actor on Afghanistan and a supporter of a negotiated settlement involving the Taliban. While secondary to the US–Taliban talks held since 2018 and to the official inter-Afghan talks that started in September 2020, Moscow-sponsored regional peace consultations and informal inter-Afghan dialogue merit attention in terms of how they contributed to the search for peace in Afghanistan and fit into Russia's broader foreign policy patterns.

Notes

1 In 2008–2017, Russia allocated over US$6 billion in aid to the Central Asian states, both bilaterally and through international organisations; Russian investments in the region did not exceed US$20 billion (Lavrov 2018a).

2 ‘Full Transcript and Video: Trump's Speech on Afghanistan’, New York Times, 21 August 2017, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-afghanistan.html, accessed 1 September 2020.

3 The Dushanbe Quartet (Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan), also known as ‘Central Asian’ or ‘Antinarcotics Quartet’, was established in Moscow in 2010. After Iran joined in 2014, it became a Quintet. In June 2017, Pakistan and India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the largest Eurasian macro-regional organisation, established in 2001 and led by China and Russia and involving all Central Asian states. A search for a regional solution in Afghanistan and an interest in SCO's Regional Antiterrorist Structure were among Islamabad's declared goals for joining the SCO (Zeb 2018). Afghanistan has had SCO observer status since 2012.

4 A term borrowed from Braithwaite (2011), who used it to describe the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

5 ‘Interv’yu spetsial’nogo predstavitelya prezidenta RF po Afganistanu Zamira Kabulova’, Kommersant’’, 25 April 2013.

6 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, quoted in ‘MID isklyuchil vozmozhnost’ vvoda rossiiskikh voisk v Afganistan’, RIA-Novosti, 9 January 2019, available at: https://ria.ru/20190109/1549121357.html, accessed 10 April 2019.

7 Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister on antiterrorism, Oleg Syromolotov, quoted in: ‘Sever Afganistana prevraschaetsya v opornuyu bazu terroristov, zayavili v MID’, RIA Novosti, 4 May 2018, available at: https://ria.ru/20180504/1519906689.html, accessed 10 April 2019.

8 Compare, for instance, Russia's early diplomatic statements suggesting considering accommodation with the Taliban (see, Russia's special envoy on Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov's interview with TASS agency, quoted in: ‘Russia may be “Flexible” on Easing of U.N. Sanctions against Taliban’, Today, 29 December 2015, available at: https://www.todayonline.com/world/russia-may-be-flexible-easing-un-sanctions-against-taliban-tass, accessed 30 April 2019) to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's acknowledgement, three years later, that it is only possible to achieve ‘a peaceful and independent Afghanistan, free from terrorism and the drug business’ and ‘true peace and stability by launching a constructive dialogue between the Afghan government and Taliban’ (MFA 2018).

9 ‘“Will I Be Next?”: US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, Amnesty International, 2013, available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/asa330132013en.pdf, accessed 30 April 2019.

10 GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Bomb (MOAB), also known as ‘Mother of All Bombs’.

11 Also reinforced by the growing role of military officials in US foreign policy decision-making, at the expense of diplomats, during the early stage of the Trump administration (Quainton 2018).

12 ‘Full Transcript and Video: Trump's Speech on Afghanistan’, New York Times, 21 August 2017, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-afghanistan.html, accessed 1 September 2020.

13 ‘Declaration of the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan: Peace Process, Security Cooperation and Regional Connectivity’, Uzbekistan National News Agency, 28 March 2018, available at: http://uza.uz/en/politics/declaration-of-the-tashkent-conference-on-afghanistan-peace--28-03-2018, accessed 10 February 2019.

14 And despite mutual trolling by the Pentagon and Russian officials, who repeatedly accused each other, in a publicly unverifiable way, of covertly supporting militant groups in Afghanistan against each other's interests (Gibbons-Neff 2017; MFA 2017a). See also, ‘Statement for the Record by John W. Nicholson, Commander US Forces-Afghanistan, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan’, 9 February 2017, p. 10, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf, accessed 30 April 2019; ‘Russia may be Supplying Taliban in Afghanistan: U.S. General’, Reuters, 24 March 2017.

15 ‘Press Review: Moscow to Mediate Talks with Taliban, US’, TASS, 5 March 2018, available at: http://tass.com/pressreview/992722, accessed 10 February 2019.

16 The High Peace Council was established in September 2010 as a loosely government-affiliated body to coordinate reconciliation efforts.

17 ‘Zamir Kabulov: “Interesy talibov po bor’be s IGIL v Afganistane obektivno sovpadayut s rossiiskimi”’, Interfax, 23 December 2015, available at: https://www.interfax.ru/interview/486757; ‘Viktor Vasiliev: “Schitaem, chto predprinimaemykh segodnya mer dostatochno dlya otrazheniya ugrozy IGIL iz Afganistana”’, Interfax, 28 March 2016, available at: https://www.interfax.ru/interview/500629; interview with Foreign Ministry's spokeswoman Maria Zakharova in Roth (2015); ‘Putin vstrechalsya s rukovodstvom “Taliban” v Dushanbe?’, Radio Ozodi, 28 December 2017, available at: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/27453272.html, all sources accessed 1 March 2019.

18 See also, ‘Taliby gotovy prinyat’ uchatiye v moskovskoi konferentsii po voprosam afganskogo uregulirovaniya’, Afghanistan.ru, 20 March 2017, available at: https://afghanistan.ru/doc/108369.html, accessed 30 April 2019.

19 ‘Round of US–Taliban Talks Ends with Progress on Draft Peace Deal: Taliban Officials’, Reuters, 26 January 2019.

20 Since late November 2018, Khalilzad significantly expanded the range of capitals he visited on his regional tours. See, ‘US Envoy for Afghan Peace in Pakistan for Talks on Taliban’, Voice of America, 4 December 2018, available at: https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/us-envoy-afghan-peace-pakistan-talks-taliban, accessed 10 September 2020.

21 Led by Mohammad Nadir Shakh, president of the Afghan Business Centre in Russia. According to Omar Nessar, one of the conference organisers and director, Center for the Study of Contemporary Afghanistan, it took several meetings of about 250 Afghan diaspora members to help arrange the dialogue (quoted in Krivosheyev 2019).

22 Dozens of mid-level Afghan politicians with no party affiliation also took part. The presence of civil society activists, including two women, was token.

23 The presidential administration provided the venue for the dialogue (the President Hotel), while the Foreign Ministry's information and press department handled journalist invitations for a press conference held before the meeting.

24 In January 2019, the Taliban assigned Abdul Ghani Baradar (co-founder of the movement in 1994) as head of their political office in Doha. See, ‘Taliban Names Cofounder as Head of Political Office in Qatar’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2019, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/taliban-names-cofounder-head-political-office-qatar-190125023603835.html, accessed 30 April 2019.

25 Full video transcript of the dialogue's opening session: ‘Neshast-e Moscow’, 5 February 2019, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_z8z6I0XOXU, accessed 1 April 2019.

26 ‘Zamir Kabulov: SShA pridyotsya uiti iz Afganistana’, TASS, 8 February 2019, available at: https://tass.ru/interviews/6093500, accessed 28 February 2019.

27 For the Russian translation of the Joint Resolution of the Moscow Meeting on the Inter-Afghan Settlement, see, ‘Polnyi tekst sovmestnoi resolyutsii Moskovskogo “mezhafganskogo dialoga”’, Afghanistan.ru, 7 February 2019, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/126648.html, accessed 1 March 2019. For a summary in English, see, ‘Joint Declaration Issued After Moscow Talks’, TOLO News, 6 February 2019, available at: https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/joint-declaration-issued-after-moscow-talksK, accessed 1 March 2019.

28 ‘Polnyi tekst sovmestnoi resolyutsii Moskovskogo “mezhafganskogo dialoga”’, Afghanistan.ru, 7 February 2019, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/126648.html, accessed 1 March 2019.

29 Northerners dominated the Afghan army under the Soviets and were over-represented in the Afghan national armed and security forces since 2001. Later, the ethnic balance improved as the ethnic quota system was introduced (Katzman & Klayton 2017).

30 ‘Polnyi tekst sovmestnoi resolyutsii Moskovskogo “mezhafganskogo dialoga”’, Afghanistan.ru, 7 February 2019, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/126648.html, accessed 1 March 2019.

31 ‘Polnyi tekst sovmestnoi resolyutsii Moskovskogo “mezhafganskogo dialoga”’, 6 February 2019, Afghanistan.ru, 7 February 2019, paragraph 7, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/126648.html, accessed 1 March 2019.

32 ‘Taliban Hold Rare Talks with Senior Afghan Politicians in Moscow’, PressTV [Iran], 6 February 2019, available at: https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/02/06/587796/Taliban-hold-rare-talks-with-senior-Afghan-politicians-in-Moscow, accessed 10 March 2019.

33 ‘Polnyi tekst sovmestnoi resolyutsii Moskovskogo “mezhafganskogo dialoga”’, Afghanistan.ru, 7 February 2019, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/126648.html, accessed 1 March 2019.

34 ‘Exclusive Interview with President Ghani on Afghan Peace’, TOLO News, 5 February 2019, in Dari and Pashtu, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsLtBTQF8kw, accessed 10 March 2019. For a summary in English, see Amiri (2019).

35 ‘Afganistan khotyat sdelat’ islamskim bez IGIL’, Kommersant’’, 6 February 2019.

36 For example, at the margins of the 2018 SCO summit in Dushanbe: ‘Abdullah Abdullah: Moskovskaya vstrecha po afganskomu uregulirovanuyu ne byla soglasovana s Kabulom’, Afghanistan.ru, 14 October 2018, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/124034.html, accessed 1 April 2019.

37 ‘Intra-Afghan Talks Under Way in Moscow Amid Continuing Violence’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 February 2019.

38 ‘Vysshii sovet mira obeschaet prinyat’ k rassmotreniyu itogovuyu deklaratsiyu moskovskoi vstrechi’, Afghanistan.ru, 7 February 2019, available at: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/126670.html, accessed 15 February 2019.

39 This was due to Kabul's insistence on its representation being ten times larger than that of the insurgency, in what would then become a large, inconclusive gathering (described by the Taliban as a ‘wedding or party’) instead of a focused, informal, substantive dialogue. ‘Afghanistan to Send 250 Delegates to Taliban Meeting in Qatar’, RFL/RL, 17 April 2019, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-qatar/29885384.html, accessed 1 May 2019.

40 The meeting took place at the margins of the official Russia–Afghan conference to mark the 100th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations.

41 ‘Moscow Hopes Inter-Afghan Meeting in Doha to Lay Basis for Peace Agreement’, TASS, 10 July 2019, available at: https://tass.com/world/1067837, accessed 23 July 2019.

42 ‘Resolution of Intra Afghan Peace Conference, Doha, July 2019 (unofficial English translation)’, Afghan Analysts Network, 8 July 2019, available at: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/resources/peace-process/resolution-of-intra-afghan-peace-conference-doha-july-2019-unofficial-english-translation/, accessed 30 July 2019.

43 In March 2019, Astana was renamed Nur-Sultan to honour Kazakhstan's first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

44 The Afghan government promoted the involvement of civil society in standard, Western-style forms (NGOs, women's and other human rights groups). The Taliban insisted on engaging representatives of the Afghan refugees and some émigré groups in inter-Afghan talks.

45 Presentations at the first meeting of the US–Russia Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan, EastWest Institute, Moscow, 30–31 October 2017.

46 ‘Remarks by President Trump before Marine One Departure’, White House, 9 September 2019, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-63/, accessed 1 September 2020.

47 ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not Recognized by the United States as a State and is Known as the Taliban and the United States of America’, 29 February 2020, available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Signed-Agreement-02292020.pdf, accessed 10 March 2020.

48 See also ‘Afghan, Taliban Negotiating Teams Hold Meeting in Doha’, TOLO News, 15 September 2020, available at: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-166345, accessed 16 September 2020.

49 ‘Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting on Afghan Peace Process’, 25 April 2019, available at: https://af.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-trilateral-meeting-on-afghan-peace-process/, accessed 15 May 2019.

50 ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not Recognized by the United States as a State and is Known as the Taliban and the United States of America’, 29 February 2020, available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Signed-Agreement-02292020.pdf, accessed 10 March 2020; ‘Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’, 29 February 2020, available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf, accessed 7 August 2020.

51 ‘Joint Statement on the Signing of the U.S.–Taliban Agreement’, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note, US Department of State, 6 March 2020, available at: https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-signing-of-the-u-s-taliban-agreement/, accessed 10 March 2020.

52 ‘Joint Statement on the Signing of the U.S.–Taliban Agreement’, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note, US Department of State, 6 March 2020, available at: https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-signing-of-the-u-s-taliban-agreement/, accessed 10 March 2020.

53 ‘Peace Deal Signed by US and Taliban Has Direct Significance for Russia, Diplomat Says’, TASS, 29 February 2020, available at: https://tass.com/politics/1125147, accessed 10 March 2020.

54 The two states were the main powers behind the SCO–Afghanistan road map adopted in June 2019.

55 ‘Four-Party Joint Statement on Afghan Peace Process’, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 12 July 2019, available at: https://www.state.gov/four-party-joint-statement-on-afghan-peace-process/, accessed 15 July 2019.

56 ‘Peace Deal Signed by US and Taliban Has Direct Significance for Russia, Diplomat Says’, TASS, 29 February 2020, available at: https://tass.com/politics/1125147, accessed 10 March 2020.

57 ‘Kabulov zayavil, chto soglashenie mezhdu SShA i Talibami imeet pryamoe snachenie dlya interesov RF’, TASS, 29 February 2020, available at: https://tass.ru/politika/7868903, accessed 10 March 2020.

58 ‘Security Council Resolution Endorses Moves Towards Long-sought Afghanistan Peace’, UN News, 10 March 2020.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ekaterina Stepanova

Ekaterina Stepanova, Lead Researcher and Head of Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), 23 Profsoyuznaya, Moscow 117997, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]; www.estepanova.net