https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2406-3797
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Abstract
This article analyses the nature and the evolution of state capture in Serbia. I approach this process from a micro-level perspective, utilising interview data and rich case studies, focusing on the interaction between political parties and business. In the context of high political uncertainty and underdeveloped institutions in the period 2000–2012, oligarchs benefited from the privatisation process and resource extraction, while political parties were after short-term extraction. After 2012, amid low political uncertainty, a top-down political colonisation by the ruling party can be observed, manifesting through the involvement of businesses directly owned by political officeholders or their families in the state-capture dynamic.
Notes
1 See, Schoenman (Citation2005), Yakovlev (Citation2006), Barnes (Citation2007), Grzymala-Busse (Citation2008), Stark and Vedres (Citation2012), Innes (Citation2014, Citation2016), Tudoroiu (Citation2015), Fazekas and Tóth (Citation2016).
2 ‘Privedeni Marko i Miroslav Mišković’, B92, 13 December 2012, available at: https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=12&dd=13&nav_category=16&nav_id=668222, accessed 2 April 2020.
3 A process that is normally invoked only in extraordinary circumstances, as it limits the opportunities for parliamentary debate regarding the legislative proposals (Csaky Citation2020, p. 8).
4 The data contain information on the timing of privatisation, names of buyers and reasons for contract annulment in cases of renationalisation.
5 ‘Zakon o privatizaciji’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, No. 38/2001, 18/2003, 45/2005, 123/2007, 30/2010, 93/2012, 119/2012, 51/2014, available at: http://www.priv.rs/Arhiva-propisa/321/Zakon-o-privatizaciji.shtml, accessed 20 December 2019.
6 ‘Zakon o Agenciji za Privatizaciju’, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, No. 38/2001, 135/2004 and 30/2010, available at: http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/Storage/Global/Documents/zakoni_pdf/Zakon%20o%20Agenciji%20za%20privatizaciju.pdf, accessed 2 September 2019.
7 Interview 6, a former PA official, Belgrade, 28 March 2018.
8 Interview 2, a former adviser in the Ministry of Economy, Belgrade, 27 March 2018.
9 Interview 2, a former adviser in the Ministry of Economy, Belgrade, 27 March 2018.
10 ‘Insajder o Azotari: Pravila Pljačke’, B92, 27 November 2012, available at: http://www.b92.net/insajder/aktuelno-vesti.php?yyyy=2012&mm=11&dd=27&nav_id=663962, accessed 2 March 2019.
11 After renationalisation, the ministry in charge of privatisation names one person to be a temporary representative of a firm’s capital, who manages the firm until its re-privatisation.
12 Allegations of Ranković’s ties with SPS as its financier began to emerge in the early 2000s, around the time of the adoption of a new Law on Excise Tax, which would have negatively affected his cigarette brand Fast to the benefit of foreign multinational corporations. This law was changed through an amendment, initiated by one SPS MP, which ensured that the price of cheaper cigarette brands remained at the previous level (Anastasijević & dokumentacioni centar ‘Vreme’ Citation2017).
13 Interview 2, a former adviser in the Ministry of Economy, Belgrade, 27 March 2018.
14 In 2016, SIEPA was replaced by the Development Agency of Serbia (Razvojna Agencija Srbije—RAS), established under the Law on Investments.
15 ‘Procurele informacije: Ovako su Dinkić i SIEPA krali naše pare’, Na Dlanu, 15 November 2013, available at: https://nadlanu.com/191481/procurele-informacije-ovako-su-dinkic-i-siepa-krali-nase-pare/, accessed 10 August 2019.
16 ‘Finansijska GIM-nastika’, NIN, 31 October 2019, available at: http://www.nin.co.rs/pages/article.php?id=102350557, accessed 16 May 2020.
17 If a firm is licensed to trade in weapons and military equipment, it is by law only allowed to sign a so-called commission contract with an arms producer. This defines the amount, the delivery timeline and the price at which weapons and military equipment are to be sold to the end user (Cvijić & Ćulibrk Citation2020).
18 The term refers to firms connected to DS, as yellow is one of the colours of its logo.
19 Interview 2, a former adviser at the Ministry of Economy, Belgrade, 27 March 2018.
20 ‘Rača: Vraćaju fabriku radnicima’, B92, 2 September 2009, available at: https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=09&dd=02&nav_category=9&nav_id=379257, accessed 2 February 2019.
21 Interview 1, a former employee of the Anti-Corruption Council, Belgrade, 26 March 2018.
22 ‘Zastava Elektro’, CINS, available at: https://24slucaja.cins.rs/sr/slucajevi/zastavaelektro, accessed 10 May 2020.
23 Data obtained from the Ministry of Economy of Serbia upon request.
24 Interview 2, a former adviser at the Ministry of Economy, Belgrade, 27 March 2018.
25 Ekonomska kriza i zloupotreba državne pomoći—slučaj Prva banka, 1 March 2010 (Podgorica, MANS), available at: http://www.mans.co.me/ekonomska-kriza-i-zloupotreba-drzavne-pomoci-slucaj-prva-banka/#, accessed 21 May 2020.
26 Uprava za imovinu kupuje nove nekretnine, evidencija postojeće kasni više od deceniju, 18 May 2020 (Podgorica, MANS), available at: http://www.mans.co.me/uprava-za-imovinu-kupuje-nove-nekretnine-evidencija-postojece-kasni-vise-od-deceniju/, accessed 21 May 2020.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Miloš Resimić
Miloš Resimić, Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Institutions and Development, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 18 Myasnitskaya Str., 101000 Moscow, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]