Authoritarian Cooptation of Civil Society: The Case of Belarus

Abstract

In Belarus, a vibrant civil society coexisted for the better part of the past decade with a firmly entrenched autocracy in a depoliticised cooptation mode. Through cooptation, the energy of civil society was channelled from representing a threat to the regime into being its resource. However, the capacity developed by civil society during this period of political inactivity was quickly redeployed for political purposes at the junction of economic crisis, the regime’s failure to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2020 presidential election. After the 2020 mass protests, in which civil society played a pivotal role, the regime’s attitude to civil society turned to suppression and hostility.

Notes

1 See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2014).

2 See also Polishchuk et al. (2021).

3 See for example, Halpern (2005); ‘Belarus 2011’, World Values Survey, available at: https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp?COUNTRY=867&COUNTRY=867, accessed 16 October 2021.

4 Republic of Belarus Statistical Yearbook (Minsk, National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 2018).

5 ‘GDP per capita (current US$)—Belarus, Poland and Lithuania’, World Bank, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=BY-PL-LT, accessed 16 October 2021.

6 ‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2019’, Economist Intelligence Unit, available at: https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index/, accessed 16 October 2021.

7 Systematic Country Diagnostic: Towards a Competitive, Inclusive, and Dynamic Belarus (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2018).

8 Human Development Report 2019, UNDP, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf, accessed 4 January 2020.

9 Measuring the Information Society Report 2016, International Telecommunication Union, available at: itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/misr2016/MISR2016-w4.pdf, accessed 4 January 2020.

10 ‘SMM v Belarusi’, ratingbynet, 2 February 2018, available at: https://ratingbynet.by/smm-v-belarusi-aktualnaya-statistika-ot-servisa-hootsuite/, accessed 11 November 2021.

11 ‘EU–Belarus People-to-People Contacts’, European Parliament, April 2017, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/599430/EPRS_ATA(2017)599430_EN.pdf, accessed 16 October 2021.

12 Treisman (2012) puts Belarus together with Central Asian states in a group of countries that experienced a short-lived period of democracy and reverted to authoritarianism, although in Belarus the ‘spike’ of democracy was more pronounced and hence its subsequent decline sharper than in Central Asia.

13 Belarus in Figures (Minsk, National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 2018).

14 The pre-emptive strategy included constitutional and legislative amendments eliminating checks and balances and political competition, electoral manipulations and fraud, and further suppression of media freedoms (Silitski 2006; Bedford 2017; Hall 2017).

15 Life in Transition. A Survey of People’s Experiences and Attitudes (London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2006).

16 Life in Transition. A Decade of Measuring Transition (London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2016).

17 According to a 2015 survey, 14.1% of respondents trusted national level institutions, whereas 82% trusted relatives and friends. See ‘Belarusian Society’s Solidarity Potential’, Centre of European Transformation, available at: http://cet.eurobelarus.info/files/userfiles/5/CET/2015_Solidarity-National-Belarus-EN.pdf, accessed 6 January 2020.

18 ‘Although no postcommunist state seeks to ban all activity by autonomous civil society groups, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan come close’ (Ekiert & Kubik 2014, p. 50).

19 The Soviet regime suppressed non-sanctioned collective action and associations autonomous from the state, even in fields that are not political per se, such as arts and education, regional studies, sports and social welfare (Evans 2006).

20 The tightening legal and regulatory environment for Belarusian civil society was in sharp contrast with Belarus’s western neighbours, who had ‘[made] room for an active civil society’ (Ekiert & Kubik 2014, p. 48). This reflected a broader ‘institutional bifurcation’ in the transition region (Gaber et al. 2019), including the divergence of postcommunist civil societies (Ekiert & Kubik 2014; Gaber et al. 2019).

21 See also, ‘Civil Society, Secrecy and Surveillance in Belarus’, Amnesty International, 2016, available at: https://www.amnesty.at/media/1119/amnesty-surveillance-in-belarus.pdf, accessed 12 January 2020.

22 Support for democracy in Belarus declined between the 2010 and 2016 Life in Transition surveys from 59% to 36% of respondents, with 35% indifferent as to what political system should be in the country (see, Life in Transition. A Decade of Measuring Transition (London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2016)). Such an attitude reflected scepticism about the ability of the political opposition to overcome multiple divides and present a consolidated political platform (Shraibman 2018). At the 2019 parliamentary election, which according to the OSCE, showed disregard for key political freedoms (‘Republic of Belarus—Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 November 2019’, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/b/439355_1.pdf, accessed 22 October 2021), no opposition candidates were elected (‘Belarus Election: No Seats for Opposition as Lukashenko Maintains Power’, dw.com, 18 November 2019, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-election-no-seats-for-opposition-as-lukashenko-maintains-power/a-51290419, accessed 22 October 2021).

23 When asked in 2016 how best to counter corruption, Belarusians were second from the top among post-Soviet nations in selecting the answer ‘ordinary people cannot do anything [about it]’, and second from the bottom in selecting the answer ‘Report corruption when you experience it’ (see, Life in Transition. A Decade of Measuring Transition (London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2016)).

24 According to a 2017 survey, 48% of respondents expressed trust in civil society associations, twice as high as in politicians and public servants (see, 2017 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Washington, DC, US Agency for International Development, 2018)).

25 See, for example, Shraibman (2018), Moshes and Nizhnikau (2019).

26 As detailed later in the article, in the 2010s Belarusian nationalism was oriented on reviving Belarusian culture and language and establishing Belarusian identity. Such reorientation was nevertheless not intrinsically directed against Russia. Until that period, there were two competing Belarusian nationalist projects. The first one was pursued by the Belarusian Popular Front, a mass movement for independence from the Soviet Union, which by extension was also anti-Russian (Bekus 2010). However, the Belarusian Popular Front ‘got nationalism wrong’ (Wilson 2011, p. 258)—its anti-Soviet and anti-Russian nation-building project was widely rejected in the society, where it maintains only marginal support. Another, more pragmatic, version of Belarusian nationalism, prevalent in the last two decades, fully relied on the Russian language and acknowledged special relations with Russia (Fabrykant 2019).

27 CSO Meter. Assessing the Civil Society Environment in the Eastern Partnership Countries. Belarus (Minsk, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2019, p. 3).

28 2017 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Washington, DC, US Agency for International Development, 2018, p. 38).

29 For example, Alpha Bank supports the popular ‘Imena’ platform for charitable welfare programmes; ‘Takogo eshche ne bylo!’, Imena, 2018, available at: imenamag.by/posts/alfabank-imena, accessed 21 January 2020.

30 ‘What is not Permitted is Prohibited: Silencing Civil Society in Belarus’, Amnesty International, 24 April 2013, available at: amnestyusa.org/reports/what-is-not-permitted-is-prohibited-silencing-civil-society-in-belarus, accessed 4 January 2020.

31 ‘Top 10 of Belarus Civil Society in 2018’, PACT, 28 December 2018, available at: pactworld.org/news/top-10-belarus-civil-society-2018, accessed 4 January 2020.

32 CSO Meter. Assessing the Civil Society Environment in the Eastern Partnership Countries. Belarus (Minsk, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2019).

33 ‘Hundreds of Protesters Arrested in Belarus’, BBC, 20 December 2010, available at: bbc.com/news/world-europe-12037486, accessed 4 January 2020.

34 ‘Belarus: Silent Protests Frighten Regime’, BBC, 30 June 2011, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13975788, accessed 16 October 2021.

35 ‘Belarusians Organize Flash Mob Protests’, The World, 2 July 2011, available at: https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-02/belarusians-organize-flash-mob-protests, accessed 16 October 2021.

36 ‘Belorusskie avtolyubiteli vystupili protiv rosta benzinovykh tsen’, Deutsche Welle, 24 April 2011, available at: https://www.dw.com/ru/белорусские-автолюбители-выступили-против-роста-бензиновых-цен/a-15038988, accessed 16 October 2021; ‘Zabastovki 1991 i 2011’, Gazetaby, 8 November 2011, available at: https://govorim.by/strana-belarus/26715-zabastovki-1991-i-2011.html, accessed 16 October 2021.

37 ‘Den’ Voli 2011’, Gazeta.by, 25 March 2011, available at: http://gazetaby.com/index.php?sn_nid=35334&⁞sn_cat=32, accessed 16 October 2021.

38 ‘Law N427-3 “On Mass Media”’, National Legal Portal, 17 July 2008, available at: https://pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=h10800427, accessed 12 October 2021.

39 ‘Law No241-3 “On Libel”’, National Legal Portal, 5 January 2015, available at: http://www.pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=12551&p0=H11500241&p1=1&p5=0, accessed 12 October 2020.

40 ‘Backlash as Belarus Imposes “Social Parasite” Law to Fine Unemployed’, The Guardian, 16 April 2015, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/16/belarus-fine-unemployed-social-parasite-law, accessed 16 October 2021. Lukashenka publicly justified the tax on moral grounds, presenting it as a tool to make everyone pay their fair share: a likely hidden motive behind the introduction of the law was to retain economic and political control over the society through formal employment, predominantly in state-owned or controlled enterprises (Erikson 2017).

41 ‘Protestnaya Vesna’, Tut.by, 16 March 2017, available at: news.tut.by/society/535509.html, accessed 4 January 2020.

42 Several opposition leaders who announced their participation in the protests, were simply abducted or jailed. ‘Missing Belarusian Opposition Leader Freed After Three-Day Detention’, Radio Free Europe, 27 March 2017, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-statkevich-freed-detention/28393028.html, accessed 16 October 2021.

43 ‘Softness’ indicates limited space allowed for policy implementation, which was subjected to restrictions for practical, ideological and geopolitical reasons.

44 ‘Poslanie prezidenta narodu i natsional’nomu sobraniyu’, President.go.by, 22 April 2014, available at: https://president.gov.by/ru/events/aleksandr-lukashenko-obraschaetsja-s-ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-8549, accessed 12 October 2020.

45 ‘Kolkasts’ gadzin pavyalichana’, BelTA, 19 February 2016, available at: https://blr.belta.by/society/view/kolkasts-gadzin-na-belaruskuju-movu-pavjalichytstsa-za-kosht-skarachennja-fakultatyvau-43858-2016/, accessed 17 October 2021; ‘30% na TV’, Radio Svaboda, 29 January 2019, available at: https://www.svaboda.org/a/29739777.html, accessed 12 October 2020.

46 See, for example, ‘Pra kursy’, Mova Nanova, 1 June 2016, available at: movananova.by/znizki/, accessed 5 November 2019. Online platforms such as say.by offer special incentives to businesses and their clients who are willing to communicate in Belarusian.

47 ‘Natsional’nyi universitet. Lukashenko ne skazal “net”’, Naviny.by, 2 March 2017, available at: naviny.by/article/20170203/1486143526-nacionalnyy-universitet-lukashenko-ne-skazal-net, accessed 12 January 2020.

48 ‘7 interesnykh faktov’, Belaruskiy Partizan, 1 March 2019, available at: https://belaruspartisan.by/life/456652/, accessed 16 October 2021.

49 ‘Art Siadziba i Symbal.by spynili supratsu z BFF’, Radio Svaboda, 10 January 2019, available at: https://www.svaboda.org/a/29699921.html, accessed 12 October 2021.

50 Statisticheskiy Ezhegodnik 2018 (Minsk, Belstat, p. 35).

51 ‘Krama padarunkau’, Symbal, 9 November 2018, available at: symbal.by/about, accessed 4 January 2020.

52 ‘Studentskae Etnagrafichnae Tavarystva’, Ethno.by, available at: set.ethno.by, accessed 4 January 2020.

53 ‘Nasha Pamyats’, Our Memory, available at: nashapamiac.org, accessed 4 January 2020.

54 ‘Bal vo dvortse Potemkina’, Mogilev Regional Government, 11 October 2016, available at: https://mogilev-region.gov.by/news/shlyahetskiy-bal-vo-dvorce-potemkina, accessed 12 October 2021.

55 ‘Menya ubili v Kurapatah’, Current Time, 7 November 2019, available at: currenttime.tv/a/kuropaty-varta/30258006.html, accessed 4 January 2020.

56 ‘Zakon “Ob obrashcheniyakh grazhdan i yuridicheskikh lits”’, National Legal Portal, 18 July 2011, available at: https://pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=h11100300, accessed 12 October 2021.

57 For various cases see, for example, ‘Zhil’tsy minskogo doma vzbuntovalis’, Charter97, 10 October 2017, available at: charter97.org/be/news/2017/10/10/265525/, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘Zhil’tsy doma srazhayutsya s ZHKKH v sude’, Tut.by, 10 October 2017, available at: realty.tut.by/news/offtop-realty/563846.html, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘Chego dobilis’ zhil’tsy, podavshiye v sud na ZHKKH iz-za kapremonta’, Onliner, 9 November 2017, available at: realt.onliner.by/2017/11/09/kapremont-36, accessed 4 January 2020.

58 See, for example, ‘Uplotnenie Chizhovki’, Onliner, July 2015, available at: forum.onliner.by/viewtopic.php?t=7179614&start=20, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘V Mogileve zhil’tsy domov po Pushkinskomu prospektu prodolzhayut borot’sya protiv namereniya vlastey uplotnit’ zastroyku’, Mogilev Online, 5 February 2018, available at: mogilev.online/rus/news/mogilev-3107, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘Uplotneniye dostalo. Zhiteli Mogileva gotovy perekryt’ ulitsy’, Belsat, 1 October 2018, available at: belsat.eu/ru/in-focus/uplotnenie-dostalo-zhiteli-mogileva-gotovy-perekryt-ulitsy, accessed 4 January 2020.

59 ‘Khimicheskuyu laboratoriyu vblizi Sevastopol’skogo parka v Minske razmeshchat’ ne budut’, Naviny, 23 April 2018, available at: naviny.by/new/20180423/1524501518-himicheskuyu-laboratoriyu-vblizi-sevastopolskogo-parka-v-minske-razmeshchat, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘Paślya masavai petycyi ŭ menskim mikraraene Zyaleny Luh peradumali budavats khimzavod’, Radio Svaboda, 19 April 2018, available at: www.svaboda.org/a/pieramahli-zavod/29176861.html, accessed 4 January 2020.

60 ‘U Ivacevitskim raene patrabuyuts likvidavats zvalku śvincovykh adkidau’, Radio Svaboda, 12 April 2018, available at: svaboda.org/a/29161375.html, accessed 14 January 2020; vk.com/brestprotivzavoda, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘Lukashenko poobeshchal obyavit’ v Breste referendum po povodu sud’by akkumulyatornogo zavoda’, Brest City, 22 June 2018, available at: brestcity.com/blog/lukashenko-poobeshhal-obyavit-v-breste-referendum-po-povodu-sudby-akkumulyatornogo-zavoda, accessed 23 December 2019.

61 ‘V Minske otkroetsya shkola supergeroev’, Citydog, 10 December 2014, available at: citydog.by/post/shkola-supergeroev, accessed 5 December 2019.

62 ‘Shkola gorodskih Izmeneniy’, Zmena, 2018, available at: zmena.city/#about, accessed 3 December 2019.

63 ‘A New Life in Exchange for Bottle Caps’, ODB Brussels, 13 March 2018, available at: odb-office.eu/expertise_/social-entrepreneurship/%C2%ABa-new-life-exchange-bottle-caps%C2%BB, accessed 4 January 2020; ‘Blagotvoritel’nyi magazin’, Kali Laska, 2019, available at: kalilaska.org/, accessed 7 December 2019.

64 ‘Poiskovo-spasatel’nyi otryad’, Angel, available at: angel-search.by, accessed 4 January 2020.

65 Deputy Prime Minister Marianna Shchetkina has advocated such an approach alongside other policy initiatives, such as the infamous ‘Parasite Tax’. See ‘Shchetkina abaranila disertacyyu’, Nasha Niva, 24 February 2016, available at: https://nashaniva.com/?c=ar&i=165739, accessed 18 October 2021.

66 ‘V Belarusi predlagayetsya zakonodatel’no zakrepit’ ponyatiye volonterstva: ko vtoromu chteniyu gotovitsya proyekt zakona “O sotsial’nom obsluzhivanii”’, National Legal Portal, 13 March 2017, available at: pravo.by/novosti/obshchestvenno-politicheskie-i-v-oblasti-prava/2017/march/23269/, accessed 4 January 2020.

67 ‘Lukashenko khochet i dal’she ispol’zovat’ volonterov’, Reformation, 1 July 2019, available at: reform.by/lukashenko-hochet-i-dalshe-ispolzovat-volonterov-ii-evropejskih-igr, accessed 4 January 2020.

68 ‘Samaya strashnaya epidemiya—eto panika’, Belta, 19 March 2020, available at: https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-sobral-soveschanie-po-epidemiologicheskoj-situatsii-v-belarusi-383883-2020/, accessed 11 November 2021.

69 ‘Karantsin znizu’, Nasha Niva, 9 April 2020, available at: nn.by/?c=ar&i=249702, accessed 4 May 2020.

70 ‘Malo spali i zabyvali poyest’, IMENA, 30 June 2020, available at: https://imenamag.by/posts/bycovid19-story, accessed 4 July 2020.

71 See, for example, ‘EPAM razrabotala meditsinskiye maski’, tut.by, 1 April 2020, available at: 42.tut.by/678740, accessed 5 May 2020; ‘Minskim medikam besplatno vydelili tseluyu gostinitsu’, Tut.by, 9 April 2020, available at: realty.tut.by/news/offtop-realty/679898.html, accessed 4 May 2020.

72 Such a metamorphosis supports the idea that entrepreneurship is fungible and allows various applications in response to the available opportunities and reward structures (Baumol 1990), which is also true for ‘not-for-profit’ entrepreneurs who strive to resolve social problems and initiate social movements (Glaeser & Shleifer 2001).

73 ‘Belorusy otsenili, kak stali zhit’ vo vremya epidemii’, Belsat, 29 April 2020, available at: belsat.eu/ru/news/belorusy-otsenili-kak-stali-zhit-vo-vremya-epidemii-novoe-issledovanie-vardomatskogo/, accessed 4 May 2020.

74 ‘Prezidentskie vybory v Belarusi idut sovsem ne po stsenariyu Lukashenko’, BBC, 19 June 2020, available at: bbc.com/russian/features-53100438, accessed 4 July 2020.

75 ‘Veyshnoria’, an adversary of Russian and Belarusian forces in the war game scenario, had common features with western parts of Belarus. Continuing its virtual existence in online civil society communities long after the war games ended, Veyshnoria developed a sophisticated political system, conferred citizenship, had a crypto-currency and held elections; these and other ‘policy affairs’ were actively discussed in Belarus’s social media, satisfying the craving for political participation and debate, and offering an Aesopian language for real-life political issues (Astapova & Navumau 2018).

76 ‘[After Covid-19] the regime lost its ground, and civil society stepped in. Bonds of solidarity were formed’ (Sierakowski 2020, p. 10). In the assessment of opposition candidate Viktar Babarika, arrested prior to the election, ‘[during the Covid-19 pandemic] the government showed incredible neglect. This is where something happened that no one expected—civil society worked. Belarusians began to unite [and] understood that they could handle it themselves’ (‘Belarusy perestali terpet’’, Meduza, 18 June 2020, available at: https://meduza.io/feature/2020/06/18/belorusy-perestali-terpet, accessed 16 October 2021). According to another source, ‘as Belarusians have increasingly realized the power of their own agency, civic society has emerged as something of a parallel structure to a state bureaucracy that’s bloated and ineffective at best, and predatory at worst’ (Peleschuk 2020).

77 Lukashenka instructed police and security services to make sure that ‘signature collection is not turned into unauthorised rallies … breaking … laws and moral norms’ (‘Lukashenko o provedenii kampanii’, Belta, 9 June 2020, available at: belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-o-provedenii-izbiratelnoj-kampanii-demokratija-demokratiej-no-bespredela-byt-ne-dolzhno-393998-2020/, accessed 4 July 2020).

78 Such signals help unlock political collective action in societies heretofore doubtful about the extent of political participation (Kuran 1991).

79 Earlier, Lukashenka successfully used various tools to ensure the desired election results, such as repression, fraud, manipulation of election rules, and control over issues and actors (Bedford 2017).

80 Social media has been a key driver of the 2020 political mobilisation in Belarus. Social media and IT resources of civil society became ready-made political campaign tools, demonstrating social media’s role as a ‘liberation technology’ (Diamond & Plattner 2012). An important feature of Belarus’s social media was its greater focus on issues of national, rather than local, significance (Pospieszna & Galus 2019).

81 ‘Tikho po-partizanski’, BBC, 17 September 2020, available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-54167154, accessed 12 October 2020.

82 ‘Belorusy pokazyvayut kak nuzhno kulturno protestovat’, Meduza, 14 August 2020, available at: https://meduza.io/shapito/2020/08/14/belorusy-pokazyvayut-kak-nuzhno-kulturno-protestovat-oni-ubirayut-za-soboy-musor-daryat-tsvety-i-snimayut-obuv-chtoby-ne-zapachkat-lavki, accessed 12 October 2020.

83 These included ‘solidarity chains’ (a type of protest, when participants form a chain), women’s ‘marches of peace and solidarity’ and marches by retirees who were formerly part of Lukashenka’s core support base (Furlong 2020).

84 The white and red flag was outlawed by the regime de facto, and its de jure criminalisation is pending, as allegedly a symbol of extremism and World War II collaboration with the Nazi occupiers (‘Genprokuratura gotovitsya zapretit’ belo-krasno-belyi flag. K chemu eto privedet’, BG Delovaya Gazeta, 30 January 2021, available at: https://bdg.by/news/politics/genprokuratura-gotovitsya-zapretit-belo-krasno-belyy-flag-k-chemu-eto-privedet, accessed 22 October 2021).

85 See for example, Way (2020).

86 ‘The Situation in Belarus After One Year of Protests and their Violent Repression’, European Parliament, 7 October 2021, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0420_EN.html, accessed 25 October 2021. For further details, including a timeline and scale of repression, see Ilyash (2021).

87 ‘NKO, NPO i zapadnyye SMI nasazhdali v Belarusi terror’, Smart Press, 13 July 2021, available at: https://smartpress.by/news/10436/, accessed 25 October 2021.

88 ‘Likvidatsiya grazhdanskogo obshchestva’, Vesna, 2 October 2021, available at: http://spring96.org/ru/news/104540, accessed 25 October 2021.

89 On 8 July 2021, dubbed ‘Black Thursday’, the remnants of the independent media, foreign funded or politicised organisations were purged. The following week, ‘Black Wednesday’ (14 July) witnessed the destruction of numerous human rights, humanitarian, education and cultural organisations (‘Lukashenka unichtozhaet natsional’nuyu elitu’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 July 2021, available at: https://www.ng.ru/cis/2021-07-14/5_8198_belorussia.html, accessed 25 October 2021). On 22 July over 50 NGOs were liquidated. The total number of hostile NGOs was estimated by Lukashenka at 1,500 (‘NKO, NPO i zapadnyye SMI nasazhdali v Belarusi terror’, Smart Press, 13 July 2021, available at: https://smartpress.by/news/10436/, accessed 25 October 2021).

90 ‘Zakrytie NKO, belorusskie partii i popravki v zakon. Zadali samye aktual'nye voprosy novomy ministru yustitsii’, STV, 5 December 2021, available at: http://www.ctv.by/zakrytie-nko-belorusskie-partii-i-popravki-v-zakon-pervoe-bolshoe-intervyu-novogo-ministra-yusticii, accessed 6 December 2021.

91 ‘Lukashenko predlagaet opredelit’ grazhdanskoe obshchestvo’, Belta, 1 October 2021, available at: https://www.belta.by/president/view/ne-npo-nko-i-prochaja-drjan-lukashenko-predlagaet-zakonodatelno-opredelit-grazhdanskoe-obschestvo-462482-2021/, accessed 25 October 2021.

92 See, for example, Peleschuk (2020) and Vasilevich (2020); ‘Belarus Protests Turning into a Quest for National Identity, Webinar Speakers Say’, New Pathway, 15 September 2020, available at: newpathway.ca/belarus-protests-turning-into-a-quest-for-national-identity-webinar-speakers-say/, accessed 12 October 2020.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anastasiya Astapova

Anastasiya Astapova, Department of Estonian and Comparative Folklore, Tartu University, Ülikooli 16, 51003 Tartu, Estonia. Email: [email protected]

Vasil Navumau

Vasil Navumau, Center for Advanced Internet Studies, Universitätsstraße 104, 44799 Bochum, Germany. Email: [email protected]

Ryhor Nizhnikau

Ryhor Nizhnikau, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Arkadiankatu 23B I-00100 Helsinki, Finland. Email: [email protected]

Leonid Polishchuk

Leonid Polishchuk, Economics Department, HSE University, 11 Pokrovsky Boulevard, 109028 Moscow, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]