Managed Regional Rivalry Between Russia and Turkey After the Annexation of Crimea

Abstract

This essay explores the regional rivalry between Russia and Turkey from the former’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The main argument is that Russia and Turkey have maintained a managed regional rivalry. The two have continuously supported opposing sides in regional conflict theatres. At the same time, Russia and Turkey have learned to accommodate the interests and spheres of influence of each other and cooperate through various bilateral mechanisms. The essay concludes that a form of managed regional rivalry will continue to shape Russian–Turkish relations in Eurasia in the foreseeable future.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 This essay does not discuss the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Russian–Turkish relations because it was accepted for publication before the invasion.

2 For a recent article addressing eclectic approaches to Russian foreign policy, see Götz and MacFarlane (2019).

3 Bazoglu Sezer also referred to a ‘managed competition’ between Russia and Turkey without defining the concept.

4 See also Götz (2016, pp. 302–6).

5 For a discussion, see Copeland (2015).

6 In the case of Russian–Turkish rivalry, Turkey’s NATO membership complicates the picture and plays the role of an irritant for Russia (Baev 2019). This is because one of the main foreign policy priorities of the Kremlin has been to prevent NATO expansion in the post-Cold War period (Marten 2018). The fact that Turkey is a NATO member and a staunch supporter of the transatlantic alliance creates a multilayered context that goes beyond bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey.

7 Zoom interview with Professor Emil Avdaliani, European University, Tbilisi, 12 January 2022.

8 The Montreux Convention restricts the passage of naval ships of non-Black Sea states through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. On disagreements between Turkey and the US on the increasing presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea from 2006 to 2008, see Aydin (2009).

9 ‘Trabzon Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Turkey’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Türkiye, 8 June 2012, available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/trabzon--declaration-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan_-georgia-and-the-republic-of-turkey_-08-june-2012_-trabzon.en.mfa, accessed 10 January 2021.

10 ‘Turkish Foreign Minister Calls for Enlarged NATO, Georgia Membership’, Reuters, 23 January 2020, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meeting-turkey-georgia/turkish-foreign-minister-calls-for-enlarged-nato-georgia-membership-idUSKBN1ZM1HB, accessed 8 January 2021.

11 ‘Turkey, Strategic Partner of Georgia’, Azernews, 24 October 2014, available at: https://www.azernews.az/region/72362.html, accessed 25 December 2020.

12 ‘Within the Official Visit to Turkey, Minister of Defence of Georgia Meets his Turkish Counterpart’, Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 25 December 2019, available at: https://mod.gov.ge/en/news/read/7676/-within-the-official-visit-to-turkey-minister-of-defence-of-georgia-meets-his-turkish-counterpart-, accessed 8 September 2022.

13 ‘Kafkas Kartali-21 Tatbikati’, M5 Savunma Strateji, 12 August 2021, available at: https://m5dergi.com/savunma-haberleri/kafkas-kartali-21-tatbikati-tamamlandi/, accessed 15 September 2022.

14 ‘Turkey Signs Defense Deal with Georgia, Azerbaijan’, Anadolu Agency, 17 October 2017, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkey-signs-defense-deal-with-georgia-azerbaijan/940225, accessed 8 September 2022.

15 Turkey’s defence exports to Georgia have been growing but remain relatively small compared to its exports to Azerbaijan and Ukraine. According to estimates, in 2019, Turkey sold to Georgia defence products worth around US$4 million (Avdaliani 2020).

16 ‘Establishment of Bilateral Relations between Ukraine and Turkey’, Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Turkey, 26 August 2012, available at: https://turkey.mfa.gov.ua/en/embassy/564-politichni-vidnosini-mizh-ukrajinoju-i-turechchinoju, accessed 8 September 2022.

17 ‘BLACKSEAFOR’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/blackseafor.en.mfa, accessed 8 September 2022.

18 ‘Operation Black Sea Harmony’, Turkish Naval Forces, available at: https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Harekat/icerik/operation-black-sea-harmony, accessed 13 September 2022.

19 The other two are Armenia and Crimea.

20 ‘Press Release Regarding the Referendum Held in Crimea in 2014’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 16 March 2016, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-63_-16-march-2016_-press-release-regarding-the-referendum-held-in-crimea-in-2014.en.mfa, accessed 23 November 2020.

21 Zoom interview with Crimean Tatar activist, 6 January 2021.

22 ‘Umerov, Chiygoz Arrive in Turkey, To Go to Ukraine’, Kyiv Post, 25 October 2017, available at: https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/umerov-chiygoz-arrive-turkey-go-ukraine.html?cn-reloaded=1, accessed 23 November 2020.

23 In August 2020, Dzheppar announced that Ukraine would like observer status at the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (then Turkic Council, now Organization for Turkic Cooperation) (‘Ukraine Seeks to Obtain Observer Status in Turkic Council’, Ukrinform, 7 August 2020, available at: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3077509-ukraine-seeks-to-obtain-observer-status-in-turkic-council.html, accessed 15 December 2020).

24 ‘The Agreement on a Free Trade Area between Ukraine and Turkey is the Result of Three Decades of Cooperation and Friendship between the Two Countries—Volodymyr Zelenskyy’, President of Ukraine, 3 February 2022, available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ugoda-pro-zonu-vilnoyi-torgivli-mizh-ukrayinoyu-j-turechchin-72705, accessed 8 September 2022.

25 ‘Foreign Trade’, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK), 2022, available at: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=dis-ticaret-104&dil=1, accessed 8 September 2022.

26 Zoom interview with Andriy Sybiha, Ukraine’s former ambassador to Turkey, 14 January 2021.

27 ‘Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny No 393 2020’, Prezydent Ukrayiny, 14 September 2020, available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3922020-35037, accessed 23 December 2020.

28 Skype interview with anonymous Ukrainian diplomat, 10 October 2020.

29 ‘Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements’, VOA, 16 October 2020, available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_turkey-ukraine-sign-military-cooperation-agreements/6197240.html, accessed 15 December 2020.

30 See, ‘Foundation History’, Black Sea Shield, available at: https://blackseashield.com/foundation-history.html, accessed 13 September 2022.

31 ‘Turkey’s Leading Defense Firm ASELSAN Forms Company in Ukraine to Boost Cooperation’, Daily Sabah, 3 September 2020, available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkeys-leading-defense-firm-aselsan-forms-company-in-ukraine-to-boost-cooperation, accessed 15 December 2020.

32 ‘Ukraine Eyes More Joint Defense Projects with Turkey’, Anadolu Agency, 3 February 2020, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/ukraine-eyes-more-joint-defense-projects-with-turkey/2132853, accessed 20 December 2020.

33 Presidency of Defence Industries is affiliated with the Turkish Presidency and is the Turkish government’s main bureaucratic agency that manages procurement and coordinates relations between various defence industry actors.

34 See, ‘Russian Share of Turkish Gas Imports Falls as LNG Rises’, Anadolu Agency, 5 June 2020, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-share-of-turkish-gas-imports-falls-as-lng-rises/1866403, accessed 20 December 2020. In response to the growing Ukrainian–Turkish defence ties and strategic partnership, in November 2020, Russia for the first time conducted a naval exercise with Egypt, one of Turkey’s main rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Black Sea (‘Korabli v Oborone: V Chernom more vpervye proidut ucheniya s VMS Egipta’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 November 2020, available at: https://rg.ru/2020/11/16/reg-ufo/rossijskie-moriaki-vpervye-provedut-ucheniia-v-chernom-more-s-vms-egipta.html, accessed 7 January 2021). Both Egypt and Russia backed General Khalifa Haftar in Libya’s civil war, while Turkey offered active military and diplomatic support to the UN-recognised Government of National Accord; see, ‘Russia Backs Egyptian Peace Initiative for Warring Factions in Libya Conflict’, Reuters, 8 June 2020, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-russia-idUKKBN23F1CP, accessed 13 September 2022.

35 ‘Kremlin Says Turkish Drones Risk Destabilizing Situation in Eastern Ukraine’, Reuters, 27 October 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kremlin-says-turkish-drones-risk-destabilising-situation-east-ukraine-2021-10-27/, accessed 14 January 2022.

36 ‘In Ukraine’s 1st Combat Use, Bayraktar TB2 Destroys Russian Armament’, Daily Sabah, 27 October 2021, available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/in-ukraines-1st-combat-use-bayraktar-tb2-destroys-russian-armament, accessed 14 January 2022.

37 See, ‘Na Ukraine zapustil proizvodstvo bezpilotnikov Bayraktar’, RBK, 25 December 2021, available at: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/61c6571c9a79479875ae1306, accessed 14 January 2022. One month prior to this, Erdoğan had proposed a mediatory role for Turkey between Ukraine and Russia over the brewing confrontation in Donbas. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, clearly ruled out that possibility, arguing that Russia was not even a party to the conflict in the region (‘MID RF otsenil vozmozhnost’ Turtsii stat’ posrednikom mezhdu Rossiei i Ukrainoi po Donbassu’, TASS, 1 December 2021, available at: https://tass.ru/politika/13077035, accessed 14 January 2022).

38 ‘Ukraine Received 50 Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drones since Russian Invasion’, Middle East Eye, 8 September 2022, available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-ukraine-war-tb2-bayraktar-drones-fifty-received, accessed 8 September 2022.

39 ‘After Ukraine “Whole World” is a Customer for Turkish Drone, Maker Says’, Reuters, 30 May 2022, available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-ukraine-war-tb2-bayraktar-drones-fifty-received, accessed 8 September 2022.

40 See for instance, ‘Interview with Rossiya 24 Channel’, President of Russia, 7 October 2020, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/64171, accessed 7 July 2022.

41 ‘Interview with Rossiya 24 Channel’, President of Russia, 7 October 2020, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/64171, accessed 7 July 2022.

42 Skype interview with Azerbaijani security analyst, 9 January 2021.

43 Skype interview with Azerbaijani security analyst, 9 January 2021.

44 Despite the hype about Azerbaijan’s arms imports from Turkey, according to a recent SIPRI report, Azerbaijan only accounted for 5% of Turkey’s total arms exports between 2000 and 2019 (Béraud-Sudreau et al. 2020, p. 8). Between 2016 and 2020, Azerbaijan imported 69% of its arms from Israel (‘Arms Transfers to Conflict Zones: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh’, SIPRI, 30 April 2021, available at: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/arms-transfers-conflict-zones-case-nagorno-karabakh, accessed 12 September 2022).

45 ‘Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation’, President of Russia, 10 November 2020, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384, accessed 15 December 2020.

46 ‘Azerbaijani Forces Take Over Strategic Town Linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh’, RFE/RL, 26 August 2022, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-lacin-nagorno-karabakh-control-/32006090.html, accessed 13 September 2022.

47 ‘Zayavlenie Prezidenta Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki, Prem’er-Ministra Respubliki Armeniya i Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Prezident Rossii, 10 November 2020, available at: http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/64384, accessed 22 December 2020.

48 ‘Parliament Ratifies Motion to Send Turkish Troops to Azerbaijan’, Hurriyet Daily News, 18 November 2020, available at: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-gives-nod-to-karabakh-troop-deployment-160131, accessed 12 September 2022.

49 The Minsk Group was created in 1992 under the umbrella of the OCSE to facilitate a negotiated and peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The group is co-chaired by France, the United States and Russia.

50 ‘Russian Peacekeepers Deny Foreign Reporters Access to Nagorno-Karabakh’, RSF, 9 April 2021, available at: https://rsf.org/en/russian-peacekeepers-deny-foreign-reporters-access-nagorno-karabakh, accessed 12 September 2022.

51 For the text of the Shusha Declaration, see, ‘Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey’, Azertac, 17 June 2021, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Shusha_Declaration_on_Allied_Relations_between_the_Republic_of_Azerbaijan_and_the_Republic_of_Turkey-1809375, accessed 18 January 2022.

52 Similar to the conflict in Syria, Russia and Turkey have managed their regional rivalry in the South Caucasus without intervention by the United States or the European Union. One important reason behind this is the diminishing US and EU interest in the South Caucasus.

53 For instance, see Kubicek (2021).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Seçkin Köstem

Seçkin Köstem, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, FEASS, Bilkent, Çankaya, Ankara 06800, Turkey. Email: [email protected]