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Articles

Exploring the boundaries of a new moral order for tourism's global code of ethics: an opinion piece on the position of animals in the tourism industry

Pages 983-996 | Received 06 Dec 2013, Accepted 13 Apr 2014, Published online: 23 Jun 2014

Abstract

This opinion piece reviews the claim by the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) that its Global Code of Ethics “is an important frame of reference for the responsible…development of world tourism”. Most of the prescriptions contained within the Code's 10 Articles and accompanying sections focus on human rights, freedoms and benefits and much less on specific aspects of the environment. The Code's overriding anthropocentric tone denies any chance for it to be a truly responsible creed. Being responsible should mean taking care of human needs, and the needs of the millions of animals used in the tourism industry for human enjoyment and benefit. The code fails to be truly responsible: the “frame of reference” is not inclusive or protective of the welfare of those beings who, by their involvement as workers, entertainers and competitors, are an important part of the tourism industry's operations whether acknowledged or not. Animal ethics is an area of scholarship that is virtually terra incognita in tourism studies. The paper recommends that the UNWTO reconvene to amend the Code. Good practice is illustrated, and a draft Article 11 for a revised UNWTO Code is provided. Respect and animal welfare is advocated, but not the more extreme position of animal rights.

探索全球旅游新的道德秩序界限的全球伦理代码:动物在旅游业中的位置

这篇观点论文回归了世界旅游组织对于伦理代码的呼吁“对于全球旅游发展来说,责任是重要的观点”。大多数文章中包含了对于人权,自由和利益的10个代码,而忽略了环保方面。承载了太多人类主义中心说基调的代码不能够真正的实现责任。责任代码应当关注人类的需求和成千上万的被旅游业所用来娱乐人类的动物的需求。现有的这些代码并不是真正负责任的:“坐标”并不包含或者保护那些工人、娱乐者和竞争者的福利。是否被承认对于旅游业的运作来说是重要的一部分。动物伦理是学术的一个领域,对旅游研究来说几乎是未知领域。 本文提议联合国世界旅游组织再次召开会议修改代码。 本文说明了具体的操作,并且提供了对于第11条草案的修订代码。本文提出尊重和动物福利的主张,但不是对于动物权益的极端保护。

The Global Code of Ethics for Tourism sets a frame of reference for the responsible and sustainable development of world tourism. It draws inspiration from many similar declarations and industry codes that have come before and it adds new thinking that reflects our changing society at the beginning of the 21st century. (Frangialli, Citation2011)

Introduction

The World Tourism Organization's (WTO) Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (United Nations World Tourism Organization [UNWTO], Citation1999) was adopted at the thirteenth WTO General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, in 1999 and later ratified by the UN General Assembly in 2001. It represents two years of effort on the part of the UNWTO to develop a set of guidelines that would, in the words of Francesco Frangialli, then UNWTO Secretary-General, act as “a frame of reference for the responsible and sustainable development of world tourism”.

The Code's preamble explains that the initiative was designed to recognise tourism as a vital force in “economic development, international understanding, peace, prosperity and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and foundational freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”. Beyond the promotion of responsible and sustainable tourism, the document contends that it is the right of all people to engage in travel and leisure and that this right is not to be denied on the basis of culture.

The Code's 10 Articles (see UNWTO, Citation1999, for these Articles) cover a wide range of issues pertaining to individual rights and freedoms, and to the sociocultural, economic and environmental impacts that are so familiar to tourism students and scholars. For example, Section 1 of Article 7 entitles tourists to “direct and personal access to the discovery and enjoyment of the planet's resources”, also proclaimed as a right of all the planet's human inhabitants. This right to travel is complemented with open access to the world's attractions free of discrimination. The exploitation of people (children, women or men) is said to conflict “with the fundamental aims of tourism” (Article 2, Section 3). Section 2 of Article 1 on mutual understanding and respect between peoples and societies states that “Tourism activities should be conducted in harmony with the attributes and traditions of the host regions and countries and in respect for their laws, practices and customs”. Section 1 of Article 5 on the benefits of tourism to host regions suggests that “Local populations should be associated with tourism activities and share equitably in the economic, social and cultural benefits they generate, and particularly in the creation of direct and indirect jobs resulting from them”.

The focus on people and their movement between places is, not surprisingly, a central thrust of the Code. Of lesser importance, however, are guidelines that pertain to the environment. Section 1 of Article 3 suggests that the environment should be safeguarded for present and future sustainable human use. Rare and precious resources like water and energy are to be saved (Article 3, Section 2), and acts felt to be injurious to local people and local environments are not to be committed (Article 1, Section 5). Section 4 of Article 3 suggests that “Tourism infrastructure should be designed and tourism activities programmed in such a way as to protect the natural heritage composed of ecosystems and biodiversity and to preserve endangered species of wildlife”. (References to the challenges inherent in moving the Code from theory to practice, especially with reference to sustainable tourism, can be found at Ryan (Citation2002), Kazimierczak (Citation2006), Hall and Brown (Citation2008), Gössling, Hall, Ekström, Engeset, and Aall (Citation2012), and more specifically on sustainable tourism policies and child sex tourism, Tepelus (Citation2008).)

Missing almost entirely from the discussion on environment is any specific reference to animals, apart from the need to preserve endangered species of wildlife (as above). Millions of animals, annually, play a pivotal role as facilitators of often tourism-related human entertainment and pleasure. Animals are made to compete against each other in racing and fighting contests (among other events). As sources of food, animals provide not only sustenance, but also value in pleasure (as in food tourism). Animal workers perform a wide range of duties that help facilitate the needs of tourists in search of novel experiences in unique settings (e.g., carriers). And nature-based tourists pursue an enormous number and variety of species as hunters, anglers and viewers. It is indeed unfortunate that a tradition of moral enquiry over the use of animals in so many different contexts has escaped tourism scholars and practitioners (Cohen, Citation2009; Fennell, Citation2012a; see also the special issue on ethics and ecotourism in the Journal of Ecotourism, 2011, 10(3), for recent work on animals and ethics), a fact sustained in the articles and guidelines of the UNWTO's Global Code of Ethics.

In view of the important role that animals play in facilitating tourist experiences, what should the Code say about the interests of animals not endangered? What about the welfare requirements of animals that support tourism? What is the position of the UNWTO on animal captives? How important is culture in deciding whether it is morally justifiable to use animals for tourism purposes? Should only certain segments of the population, e.g., the poor, be allowed to use animals in earning a living? Under what conditions should this use be allowed? Have species-specific standards of care been developed for such use? Based on these exclusions, the aim of this opinion piece is to expand the moral boundaries of the UNWTO Global Code of Ethics by incorporating an 11th Article that is based on respect and welfare of animals used in the tourism industry. Discourse on anthropocentrism frames this argument, as well as how responsible tourism (RT), positioned as a central component of the Code, could be made more inclusive and thus more effective as an agent of positive change.

Anthropocentrism

Anthropocentrism is derived from the concept of the Great Chain of Being or scala naturae (scale of nature), established in classical Greece and used consistently until the latter part of the nineteenth century for the purpose of ranking species on the basis of worthiness and superiority in comparison to others (Preece, Citation2005). The top position of the scale of nature is held by God, followed by angels, humans (in various sub-classes), animals (in various sub-classes), plants, and minerals. Each class of being had its place according to a divinely planned hierarchical order. The Chain has been a convenient ontological tool used to elevate humans over other species according to characteristics such as language, consciousness, sentience, the possession of a soul and so on. The absence of any or all of these characteristics provided the impetus to place animals lower on the scale, and the justification to use them as objects to satisfy human needs, ranging from sport to experimentation (Machan, Citation2002; see also Cohen, Citation1986). We can do this because of our advanced cognitive capacities that allow for higher order reasoning over animals, which gives humans usufructuary rightsFootnote1. over less complex beings. Even the Darwinists have been unable to break free of the scala naturae. Although evolution by natural selection replaced the Great Chain in theory, i.e., as a biological explanation for the relationships that exist between humans and animals, the Chain lives on as a template for these relationships (Preece, Citation2005).

Anthropocentrism, or human-centredness, “gives either exclusive or primary consideration to human interest above the good of other species” (Noske, Citation2008; Taylor, Citation1983, p. 240). This attitude is said to be the chief reason for most, if not all, of our past and current environmental problems. Deforestation, overpopulation, habitat loss, species extinction, pollution and climate change, for example, stem from the notion that humans are to be accorded intrinsic value while all other entities in the natural world are assigned only instrumental value (Kortencamp & Moore, Citation2001). That is, other beings are secondary to the needs of humans, and this makes it acceptable to use them as resources for human benefit. For example, if the options were to either save a wetland for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of a small ecological system, or build a hotel complex that would create jobs and enhance human pleasure and recreation, the anthropocentrist would choose the latter. The attitude of supremacy is illustrated by Lynn (Citation1998), who shows that humans are separated from the rest of nature by a moral boundary that keeps humans in and nature out on the basis of an intrinsic/instrumental divide.

Minteer (Citation2009) makes reference to three different forms of anthropocentrism: ontological, ethical and epistemological (the first two relate to the discussion that follows). An example of anthropocentrism structured from the ontological position can be seen in the work of White Jr. (Citation1967), who argued that humans must maintain a higher status over other objects of the natural world because such was ordained by God himself. The domination of nature, at least in Christian doctrine, was established in Genesis where God commands humans to have sovereignty over the animals (Derrida, Citation2002).

26: Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.”

28: And God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.” (The Bible, Citation1976)

An example of ethical anthropocentrism is found in Waldau (Citation2006; see also Routley, Citation1973 and Passmore, Citation1974). Waldau contends that ethical anthropocentrism is the dominant paradigm of most if not all of our major institutions. Anthropocentrism is a defining feature of “contemporary legal systems, business values, mainline economic theory, government policy decisions, and educational philosophies and curricula” (p. 78). It comes as no surprise that religion maintains the same narrow perspective. As Waldau observes, there is a serious cultural and religious dislocation when “Brutal treatment of cattle in the daily world outside a temple where worshippers pay homage to an idol in the shape of a bull or cow would suggest that, on the whole, the religion does not respect the harmed animals” (p. 79).

The prominence of ethical anthropocentrism can also been seen in conservation science, where the challenge of weighing benefits of an economic order against those of the environment has been a topic of sustained debate. During the 1990s, a new conservation model emerged based on the belief that human needs must take precedence over the needs of animals, especially in regard to those people living in or adjacent to protected areas. The old protectionist or fortress mentality stance, i.e., the emphasis on keeping people out and the animals in, generated widespread dissatisfaction among local people who were denied access to the resources of these protected areas (land, food, building supplies and so on). Part of this debate branched off into the discussion of how wildlife contained within these protected areas could in essence be made to pay their own way – to help pay for services provided for their protection. Conservation theorists reasoned that using wildlife in ecotourism, sport hunting, ranching and game cropping could offset the costs of state funding. And because protected areas yield very little in the way of an economic return against other land uses, like agriculture, the use of animals in these ways could be justified, especially if they alleviated poverty (Adams & Infield, Citation2003; Eltringham, Citation1994; Holdgate, Citation1993).

What is not obvious in the complexity of how we ought to conserve and whose interests are at stake in the political, economic and participatory struggles that emerge from these issues is the intrinsic value of animals. When we argue that animals must pay their way as part of the conservation mandate we presume that they are stakeholders in political and economic dialogue, when, more appropriately, they are like pawns in this arena. It can be convincingly argued that animals owe us nothing. They do not need to pay their way because they are not contributing factors to the conservation problem. These are strictly human issues.

Anthropocentrism has attracted a modest level of interest by tourism researchers to date, and most of this work corresponds to the polarity between anthropocentric and ecocentric viewpoints (see Burns, Macbeth, & Moore, Citation2011 in reference to ecocentric ethics and wildlife tourism). Important contributions include Hunter's (Citation1997) paper on sustainable tourism as an adaptive paradigm, and Holden's (Citation2003) call for a new environmental ethics for tourism. In the former case, Hunter, modifying work by Turner, Pierce, and Bateman (Citation1994), built a spectrum of sustainable development according to very weak, weak, strong and very strong positions, with the first two emphasising anthropocentrism and the second two corresponding to non-anthropocentric theories (ecosystem and ecocentric positions). In the latter, Holden remarks that although a shift in perspective from pure instrumentalism to one of a conservation-oriented ethic has taken place, it is still grounded in anthropocentrism. And this conclusion – that most of what we do in tourism is premised on a perspective grounded in anthropocentrism – seems to be one shared by many commentators on the subject. Macbeth (Citation2005) supports this position when he argues that “Clearly the political economy of tourism is anthropocentric” (p. 968). And it is not just in the Western world that these anthropocentric values may be found. Hashimoto (Citation2000) explains that:

Although such a human-centred, market approach to environmental issues can be found anywhere in the world, the issue here is that managerial staff or the elite in the tourism industry in Mainland China, Taiwan and Japan have a tendency to hold this anthropocentric approach. (p. 143)

Decision-making grounded in anthropocentrist values and attitudes was the focus of other work by Holden (Citation1999). He found that even though the Cairngorms were susceptible to significant ecological impacts from downhill ski developments, human economic priorities still carried far more weight than consideration of the fragile and unique nature of this region. Dobson (Citation2006) arrived at a similar conclusion in his investigation of anthropocentric and biocentric concerns over the development and management of shark tourism in Florida and South Africa. In an effort to balance competing concerns about safety, conservation and economic benefits, Dobson found that attempts to introduce state legislation in the management of the industry resulted in anthropocentric issues being maximised (economic benefits) and conservation issues being minimised. (See Fennell (Citation2013a), who has discussed at length the differences that exist between deep green ecocentric ethics and other theories of environmental ethics like animal liberation.)

The term speciesism is closely connected to anthropocentrism, where the latter is generally thought to be an umbrella term encompassing the former. Speciesism relates more to practice in reference to animal–human issues and interactions, whereas anthropocentrism relates more to attitude (Noske, Citation2008). Richard Ryder coined speciesism in 1970, to denote a precisely similar negative sentiment directed to animals that has been directed to specific human groups like females (sexism) and minorities (racism). In sexism, females are oppressed, marginalised, or otherwise discriminated against by males who possess an attitude of superiority and who feel that certain rights and freedoms apply to them and not to women. Those who support racism extend rights and freedoms to one group over another on the basis of physical characteristics such as skin colour and, because of this, believe that one group is superior to another. In speciesism, it is not intra-group considerations, qualities or characteristics that separate one group from another, but rather inter-group differences based on species membership. Those who practice speciesism argue that humans deserve or are entitled to higher value or consideration than all other species on the basis of the qualities they deem important (e.g., intelligence, reason, communication and so on). Peter Singer, who was heavily influenced by Ryder, defines speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in the favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species” (2009, p. 6).

If we believe that humans would experience a higher quality of life through the use of new medicines, and these new products were derived in part through experimentation on animals, the speciesist would justify the sacrifice of animals to guarantee these benefits. It is just that we would not use human beings for these experiments because such would violate the rights of those made to participate. Consequently, those who oppose speciesism would argue that if it is acceptable to use animals in experimentation we should be prepared to use humans for these same experiments (Singer, Citation2009). We should not discriminate on the basis of species membership in protecting the interests of one species over others. There is also the argument that neither animals nor humans should be used at all in medical experimentation, sparing all the suffering or even death that might come from such use.Footnote2.

Unlike anthropocentrism, speciesism is a term that has attracted little attention from tourism researchers to date. Examples of the few works that have explored this concept include Hughes (Citation2001), but only indirectly as it relates to social sciences and humanities research; Lemelin (Citation2013) in the context of bee and insect tourism; and Fennell (Citation2012a) more widely.

What has not been the focus of tourism research in name (in reference to anthropocentric attitudes and speciesist practices) is discernible in innumerable cases where the tourism industry places the interests of people over the interests of animals. For example, Shackley (Citation1996) notes that there are benefits to integrating animals with visitors in the form of “environmentally sensitive transport” (p. 39). Horses, elephants or camels may be used instead of cars – the latter form of transportation being viewed as more intrusive. This statement begs the following question: Where do we draw the line in reference to what constitutes an environmental insensitivity? The substitution of animals in place of cars means that we could limit our carbon footprint, i.e., the burning of fossil fuels and pollution from emissions, and possibly that we could reduce the amount of noise in these wildlife tourism spaces so as to more effectively access animals for viewing or shooting. It goes without saying that those who have a stake in the industry, like tourists and tourism operators, realise the benefits Shackley speaks of rather than the animals used in these endeavours that somehow exist independent of concern. As such, there seems to be no recognition that animal workers exist in and as part of this environment, and there could be no possible reason why their use might constitute an environmental insensitivity. We seem to be more concerned about what we are disturbing in the environment rather than who we are disturbing. By ignoring the fact that animals suffer as workers in tourism we imply that they have no interests: interests in not suffering, interests in being with their own kind, interests in expressing what would be normal behaviour for the species in question. This corresponds to work by Singer (Citation2009; see also Fennell, Citation2012b on tourism and utilitarianism) who writes that people are not concerned about the welfare of animals because of a deep-seated belief that animals (1) are incapable of suffering and, as a result, (2) have no interests. (See Cohen (Citation1986) and Carruthers (Citation1992) who feel that animals reside outside the realm of moral concern because they lack the capacity for moral judgment and because they do not experience pains and pleasures in the same way as humans.)

Cohen (Citation2013) has documented the placement of human interests over the interests of animals in the case of tiger temple tourism in Thailand. In this practice, there is a strong counter narrative between Buddhist compassion on one hand and the abuse of tigers on the other. Elephants are another species in Thailand where there is documentation of abuse. Even in cases where humans alleviate the suffering of elephants in one industry, they are still used instrumentally in others. Thailand's ban on logging in 1989 led to 70% of the elephant population classified as “unemployed” (Tipprasert, Citation2002). The option for these animals and their mahouts was to earn a living in cities, with higher chances of injury from traffic incidents along with insufficient water and food supplies. To some analysts, the better employment option for these animals is ecotourism. In northern Thailand alone, there are 14 elephant camps using over 500 elephants in four provinces for shows (circus), trekking, elephant nursery, elephant painting, pulling carts and logging demonstrations (Tipprasert, Citation2002). Kontogeorgopoulos (Citation2009; see also Duffy & Moore, Citation2011) has investigated this issue and observes that because elephants have economic value the tourism industry recognises their importance as income earners and thus affords them higher welfare standards than they would otherwise receive in alternative uses like logging. Tourism, it would appear, is the lesser of two evils. However, Lohanan (Citation2011) contends that elephants used in tourism are subject to the same harsh training, punishment, use of drugs and lack of proper care discovered in other industries like illegal logging. And all of these elephants have likely endured the Phajaan, which is a process designed to break the will of an elephant and induce fear so that human handlers may better train and control these animals:

The Phajaan process originated in hill tribe communities in India and South East Asia, located in areas where elephants naturally occur. The ‘ceremony’ of Phajaan is said to have originated from the belief that the tribe's shaman can separate the spirit of an elephant from its body, in effect driving the willful and wild spirit out of an elephant and leaving it under the control of its handlers, or mahouts.

In reality, however, the Phajaan has nothing to do with the separation of spirit, and everything to do with torturing an elephant until it is so fearful of its human captors that it will do anything to avoid being hurt again. (Graham, Citation2010)

The fact that animals do suffer is a position that is rarely, at least in the present day, called into question. This belief is supported by an expanding volume of research too broad to mention here (see Allen, Citation2004; Allen & Bekoff, Citation2007; Bradshaw & Lindner, Citation2009; Masson & McCarthy, Citation1995; Varner, Citation2008, Citation2012; many of these in reference to elephants), and based on theories of animal rights, animal welfare and utilitarianism. In accepting this view, a key question that tourism agents must face, is whether tourism can use the “responsible” label if it is a cause of so much psychological, social and physiological suffering in the lives of animals who work in innumerable ways to achieve a better quality of life for those who enlist them?

Responsible tourism's vacant niche

A tool that has been used over the course of the last two decades for the development of more sensitive forms of tourism is responsible tourism. RT builds on many of the same principles advocated in sustainable tourism, ecotourism and other related forms in efforts to find harmony along sociocultural and ecological lines. RT has been used in tourism not as a product or brand, but rather as an applied tool – as a way of doing tourism planning, development and policy (Husbands & Harrison, Citation1996). RT also induces tourism stakeholders to structure a climate of participatory decision-making to ensure that those in power and those in marginal positions have their needs understood and met (Haywood, Citation1988).

Recent expressions of the RT model include fair trade in tourism and pro-poor tourism. Fair trade is a social movement that is based on respect of producers, or partners, in lesser developed countries. It is a market-based initiative that attempts to pay fairer prices and wages to those producers of a whole range of exports like tea, coffee, bananas, sugar and tourism. Transparency is a key feature of the fair trade initiative. There is a move towards a better understanding of who benefits and how these benefits are distributed within the system (see for example Boyd, Citation1999; Cleverdon & Kalisch, Citation2000). In pro-poor tourism, change is instituted through efforts that tackle the conditions that lead to poverty. Strategies are developed to unlock opportunities for those who have not been given access to the benefits of tourism. There is not a move to expand the market, but rather to find ways to spread benefits more evenly (Roe & Urquhart, Citation2002). Accordingly, pro-poor tourism emphasises more the social issues side of RT than the ecological standpoint. In fact, a case can be made that RT as it relates to fair trade and pro-poor tourism weighs more heavily on social concerns (individuals and communities) than ecological ones: people first, the environment second.

The foregoing discussion on fair trade, pro-poor tourism, and the UNWTO Code of Ethics as a responsible tourism document, serves to underscore the belief that RT is not a unified ethical position; it encompasses a wide range of ethical perspectives subsumed under the same label. We need to consciously and consistently interrogate our ethics; therefore, if RT is going to have real-world value (see Fennell, Citation2006; Macbeth, Citation2005). As such, there is the expectation that new moral perspectives will be useful in challenging the orthodox terrain of RT in opening up new avenues of research and practice.

Singer (Citation2011) is one who has challenged the ethical status quo at a broader scale by arguing that humanity continues to make moral progress through the expansion of our moral horizons. We have not only moved beyond our immediate family to our neighbours and community in reference to our ethics, but have extended further outwards to encompass nation, race and humanity in general. But this extension also moves across the species boundary to include most non-human animals, and there has been much progress made in this over the last few decades. All sentient beings should be included within the circle, according to Singer.

An example of an organisation that is starting to stretch the boundaries of acceptable human–animal interactions in tourism is the Brooke (Citation2011a). This non-governmental organisation, based in the UK, has the following mission:

The Brooke works directly and through partners to do whatever will most improve the welfare of working horses, donkeys and mules through the alleviation of existing suffering and the development of equine welfare practices and facilities to prevent and reduce suffering in the future.

The Brooke has identified a number of key issues that influence the welfare of working equines in the tourism industry, and include:

  • Overloading: allowing large tourists to ride small donkeys so that handlers can make more money;

  • Beatings: in addition to the fear brought on by beatings, these acts cause painful wounds, which often become infected;

  • Traditional remedies: some practices are successful, but many of these often exacerbate the problem and further the pain and suffering of animals;

  • Dehydration and stress: working animals are often not provided with enough water to drink or sufficient shade in order to offset the loss of essential minerals and salts lost due to this work.

The Brooke has developed a Code of Ethics (Appendix 1) which (1) allows tourists to assess the welfare conditions of animals used in the tourism trade and (2) educates handlers on how to provide better working conditions for the animals under their care. It is important to recognise that the Brooke is an organisation that promotes proper welfare in the use of animals for tourism. This perspective advocates the use of animals in tourism as long as the welfare of these animals is properly taken into consideration (Fennell, Citation2013b). Welfare considerations as determined by the UK Farm Animal Welfare Council include: freedom from thirst and hunger; freedom from discomfort; freedom from pain, injury and disease; freedom to express normal behaviour; and freedom from fear and distress (Farm Animal Welfare Council, Citation2009). One of the more prominent organisations to openly endorse the Brooke's responsible tourism initiative is Thomas Cooke UK and Ireland (The Brooke, Citation2010). Although the UNWTO has not thought to include animals in its community of ethics, it is important to recognise that other tourism organisations have.

Conclusion: pushing the boundaries

That tourism is a global initiative of massive proportions is without question. That it pulls into its sphere of influence much more than the sum of its many human parts is far less obvious. This unfortunate reality is reinforced in the UNWTO Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, which, in its current form, may be viewed as decidedly anthropocentric. This is not because of any intentional, outward bias or prejudice against animals in the Code that might be suggestive of a speciesist approach, but simply because of what it lacks – a clear position on animal welfare and respect. There is primary and almost exclusive consideration given to human interest above the good of other species that supports this conclusion (Taylor, Citation1983). And this finding endorses, clearly, what other tourism theorists have concluded about the nature of the tourism industry as being overly anthropocentric in its practices (see Dobson, Citation2006; Hashimoto, Citation2000; Holden, Citation1999; Holden, Citation2003; Hunter, Citation1997; Macbeth, Citation2005).

As an industry we support anthropocentrism, and even speciesism, when we choose not to recognise the interests of animals made to work for us in the pursuit of our own personal interests. As a field of inquiry, tourism studies supports anthropocentrism and speciesism when we fail to offer knowledge on animal ethics issues in our classes, and fail further when this body of literature remains almost non-existent in our periodicals and books (Fennell, Citation2012a). We fail as a field when our “frame of reference”, our touchstone of who we are and how we are seen by those inside and outside the field, is not inclusive – or protective – of those beings who, by virtue of their involvement as workers (unwilling as they may be), are an important part of the fabric of the tourism industry whether we choose to acknowledge it or not. Is this representative of new thinking reflective of changing values at the dawn of the new millennium? If responsible tourism is really about how to amend power imbalances between the haves and have-nots, should it not have inter-species relevance in the same way it works to minimise intra-species disparities?

Two recommendations follow from the foregoing discussion. First, the UNWTO's committee on the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism should revisit its view on what responsible means in the context of an inclusive global tourism industry. A review of the UNWTO's website shows three main focal areas: gender and tourism, protection of children, and accessible tourism. These are all important issues that need our attention. However, it is suggested that a fourth focal area, the ethical treatment of animals, be added, building on our received ideas of what is and what is not responsible tourism. The absence of such represents a vacant niche, which until filled, leaves the tourism industry in a position of vulnerability to those who would argue that the use of animals on such a grand scale represents the price that must be paid in doing business. Second, and following from the first recommendation, the UNWTO Global Code of Ethics should be revised to include an Article 11 concerning the welfare needs of animals used in tourism. In an effort to move the agenda forward, a draft Article 11 is included here, entitled “Respect and welfare of animals used in the tourism industry”, which takes into consideration the welfare needs of wild and domesticated animals according to seven guidelines ().

Table 1. Proposed Article 11 for the UNWTO Global Code of Ethics for Tourism.

There is a more extreme position that argues that we ought to take into consideration the rights of animals (Regan, Citation2004; see also Fennell, Citation2012c), but this view is not advocated here. The animal rights position is based on the concept of inherent value – that individual animals (human and non-human) exist as ends-in-themselves, i.e., they have value in their own right, and that most categories of animals (humans, mammals, fish and birds) deserve the same moral regard equally. Such a view would signal the almost total abolishment of the use of animals in tourism, and is therefore thought to be unfeasible and unpractical at this point in time. However, further theoretical and practical advancements in the interests of animals used in tourism may catalyse more discussion on the value of the animal rights perspective. We therefore need to be mindful of the fact that although the rights of people hold value in the UNWTO Code of Ethics, the rights of animals are perhaps a matter for the distant future.

Schmidtz (Citation1998) argues that it matters not whether animals are equal to humans along cognitive lines (or a series of other metrics). Instead, what matters is that “We can have reasons to treat nonhuman species with respect, regardless of whether we consider them to be on a moral par with homo sapiens” (p. 62). This means that there are non-instrumental reasons for caring about animals that have more to do with respect than with animals seen only as means to our personal and organisational ends. Assigning respect to other species provides us with the opportunity to express values that are not just tied to our own entertainment and enjoyment, but rather those of a different nature and scale. We validate respect by doing as much as we can to secure the welfare needs of animals in our sphere of influence, and responsible tourism ought to be about others and not just ourselves when we travel (Fennell, Citation2008). Until tourism scholars and practitioners are prepared to accept this different mode of thinking, tourism in general and the UNWTO Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, more specifically, will not be responsible in a way that is inclusive of the entire tourism industry.

Editors’ note

Opinion Pieces allow substantive and important arguments to be put forward concerning debates about tourism and sustainable development including ethical issues and social responsibility. They are intended to encourage reflective thought and constructive discussion that furthers understanding and practice. Opinion Pieces are subject to normal blind review processes, are only published on an occasional basis and only by invitation of the Editors.

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Notes on contributors

David A. Fennell

David Fennell teaches and researches in the Department of Tourism Management, Brock University. His main research interests include tourism ethics, tourism and animal ethics and ecotourism.

Notes

1. A right to use and benefit from something belonging to another so long as it is not damaged or changed.

2. Singer (Citation2009); (see also Singer, Citation1987) has argued that in order to reject speciesism we need to recognise that being a member of the human species should not be enough to make it morally wrong to use human individuals in the way we use animals (e.g., experimentation). He argues that there may be special cases where an animal has characteristics of self-awareness, intelligence, communication and so forth, which exceed the abilities of a severely mentally disabled human. The decision to save an animal over the disabled human being is based on these characteristics, i.e., his preference utilitarianism means that we cannot always say that the lives of human beings are to be preferred over the lives of animals, if the former have lesser cognitive capacities than the latter.

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Appendix 1.

The happy horse holiday code

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