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Abstract
This paper is primarily a response to ‘analytically-minded’ philosophers, such as Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, who push for a ‘naturalistic’ interpretation of Nietzsche. In particular, this paper will consider Leiter’s (Citation2007) discussion of Nietzsche’s chapter in Twilight of the Idols, ‘The Four Great Errors’, and argue that Leiter has misinterpreted this chapter in at least four ways. I provide a superior interpretation of this chapter, which argues that Nietzsche is using a transcendental style of argument to argue against a common conception of causation. I argue that Nietzsche’s ultimate aim of this chapter is to argue for ‘the innocence of becoming’ rather than, as Leiter claims, the error of free will. I argue that this anti-naturalist methodology and conclusion are in tension with Leiter/Clark’s Nietzsche, and highlights the need to pay attention to the being/becoming distinction in Nietzsche.
Notes
1 One such proponent of this view is Peter Kail (Citation2009), who has used this Clark/Leiter point to argue for the similarities between Hume and Nietzsche.
2 The abbreviations of the titles of Nietzsche’s works (1967a; 1967b; 1990; 2003) are given in the References listings.
3 I am not alone in my dissension from Clark and Leiter. In this respect, my reading of Nietzsche has certain affinities with Michael Green’s quarrels with the aforementioned in his excellent book, Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition (2002).
4 Clark (Citation1990) explicitly downplays the importance of The Will to Power, but she does not appear alone in respect to this thought, although it is not always stated so boldly.
5 Cf. Clark, Citation1990: p. 25: ‘Some assume, following Heidegger, that the Nachlass is superior to the books Nietzsche published as a source of his final philosophy’.
6 Some examples of this sort of theory in the current literature are Bird (Citation2007) and Ladyman (Citation2007). (Whether Nietzsche should be seen as a process or dispositionalist theorist in the sense of one of these authors is a question that is beyond the scope of this paper.)
7 I consider religion and moralities to be the central targets of his critique (as Nietzsche himself admits) in respect to his ultimate conclusion. But, as I will argue, the errors, themselves, are more general ones, i.e. they relate to even our non-moral and non-religious reasoning and thinking.
8 See ‘Every proposition formulated by religion and morality contains it [viz. the error of confusing cause and effect]’ (TI, ‘The Four Great Errors’: s. 1).
9 While I ignore this point in the main text, I don’t think this is a very good articulation of Nietzsche’s position. I agree with the first premise (but I would state it differently), but the second premise is not accurate and does not supply the conclusion. On a natural reading of premise (2) it allows that certain types of persons do have the freedom to choose whether or not to act on these prescriptions, for ‘the ability and disposition to act on these prescriptions … are possible only for certain types of persons’. If this is right, then (3) should say only that ‘an exercise of free will plays no role in respect to whether or not one has the ability and disposition to act on these prescriptions’. But this is not the conclusion Leiter intends. Leiter intends the more general conclusion, stated in (3), at least in how it relates to morality. But there are further problems: (2) verges on a false reading of Nietzsche. Leiter’s articulation of (2) is ambiguous over whether or not certain moral prescriptions are the cause of these consequences and their enjoyment. Nietzsche is fairly clear about this. He thinks moral prescriptions are causally inert: ‘a “happy one”, must perform certain actions and instinctively shrinks from other actions’. Leiter would have to say, then, that there is no causal relation between the two conjuncts – ‘the ability and disposition to act on the prescriptions’ and ‘the enjoyment of the consequences’. These points do not alter the problems raised in the main text, however.
10 By quoting from BGE here I may be accused of begging the question against Clark, when she claims that there is ‘no claim that the human world is a falsification’ in the six books after BGE. Unfortunately, I cannot find any place where Nietzsche says something comparable to the BGE quote in his following six books. But this does not show that he is still not thinking in this way (the current paper argues that he is still thinking in this way independently of the BGE quote). For textual support, see WTP: s. 551 (March–June 1888): ‘[t]here is no such thing as “cause”; some cases in which it seemed to be given us, and in which we have projected it out of ourselves in order to understand an event, have been shown to be self-deceptions’ (my italics) (see also WTP: s. 569 (Spring–Fall 1887); 624 (1883–1888); 664 (1883–1888); 671 (1883–1888)).
11 This connection appears in other places, also. See, e.g. WTP: s. 554 (1885–1886): ‘In fact, the concept “cause and effect” derives, psychologically speaking, only from a mode of thought that believes that always and everywhere will operates upon will.’
12 See, also, WTP: s. 551: ‘[w]e believed that an effect was explained when a condition was detected in which the effect was already inherent. In fact, we invent all causes after the schema of the effect: the latter is known to us’.
13 This sounds very Humean. For a reference to Hume, see WTP: s. 550.
14 Perhaps the infant has felt causation in utero. But the fact that causation may be felt in utero has nothing to do with the general point of circularity that I advance in the main text.
15 One interpretive problem may be that Nietzsche’s talk of the error of imaginary causes appears to presuppose a comparison class of correct, non-erroneous, causes. There are three reasons to resist this: (1) there is no reason to think that it presupposes a comparison class (Nietzsche could be an error theorist about cause and effect – see under the first error); (2) if this were the case then the third error would collapse into the first, for it is consistent with confusing the cause (the canon firing) with the effect (the dream of joining the circus); (3) this is not to say these so-called causes cannot be used for understanding as opposed to explanation (cf. second error). So while we would be in error if we were to apply our common concept of cause and effect to the situation, the correct sequence of events (i.e., the canon firing and then our dream of the circus) is attainable through an understanding of the situation (abetted by our erroneous view of cause and effect). (Incidentally, Leiter holds (2). I argue against this interpretation in the main text.)
16 It is worth comparing sections 552 and 765 in The Will to Power, here. Also, Nietzsche’s use of ‘innocence’ in sections 377, 438 and 787 are instructive as well.
17 I would like to thank the audience at the La Trobe University Post-graduate seminar series, where a version of this paper was presented, for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Jack Reynolds, Norva Lo, Richard Sebold and George Vassilacopoulos for insightful discussions regarding the material in this paper. I am grateful to two anonymous referees from this journal for their helpful comments.