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Abstract
I consider the rule of assertion according to which knowledge is sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. I examine a counterexample to this rule recently proposed by Jennifer Lackey. I present three responses to this counterexample. The first two, I argue, highlight some flaws in the counterexample. But the third response fails. The lessons I draw from examining these three responses allow me to propose two counterexamples to the sufficiency rule that are similar to Lackey’s but avoid its problems.
Notes
1. See, for instance DeRose (Citation2009, 92–106), Hawthorne (Citation2004, 87) and Williamson (Citation2000, Ch. 11).
2. Lackey (Citation2011, 272) points out that it may well be epistemically acceptable for Matilda to assert that Derek has pancreatic cancer in another context, say, while having dinner with her husband.
3. See Simion Citation2016 for similar remarks. It is worth noting that pancreatic cancer is extremely difficult to diagnose, and misdiagnoses are common.
4. The same could be said regarding other alleged counterexamples to the sufficiency rule: Brown Citation2010, 555; Reed Citation2010, 228–229.
5. See Cohen Citation2004, 486 and DeRose Citation2009, 98–102. Subject-sensitive invariantists such as Hawthorne (Citation2004, 160) and McGrath (Citation2010) have also emphasized this point. Several classical invariantists, such as Brown (Citation2010), Gerken (Citation2011), Goldberg (Citation2015) and McKinnon (Citation2013), hold that the rule for epistemically proper assertion is context-sensitive, and can be stricter in contexts with high stakes.
6. Simion (Citation2016) makes this kind of point.
7. See also DeRose Citation2009, 93–95.
8. This example is inspired by DeRose Citation2009, 3–6.
9. I say ‘roughly’, because the hearsay rule also typically prohibits assertions of the form ‘S told me that p’. Strictly speaking, such assertions would report not second-hand, but first-hand knowledge, namely, what the witness heard S say. Moreover, the prohibition against second-hand knowledge is not interpreted in the same way everywhere, and has many exceptions. For example, a witness may report an excited utterance, that is, an utterance made by someone else in immediate response to a shocking or startling event.