144
Views
1
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Book Symposium

Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy

Pages 591-596 | Published online: 29 Aug 2019
 

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Machery (Citation2017).

2. The views he has in mind are Elga’s ‘Equal Weight’ view (Citation2007), Sosa’s ‘Partial Steadfastness’ view (Citation2010), and Kelly’s ‘Total-Evidence’ view (Citation2010). He also remarks that ‘Whilst some other views about disagreement may lead to another conclusion, it one accepts any of these leading views, one should concede premise 4.’ (131).

3. They’re not the only options, but there is no space here to cover all the possibilities.

4. He writes: ‘It is true that some philosophers do not purport to identify metaphysical necessities. In particular, some ethicists and political philosophers have explicitly rejected the need to identify principles that would determine, e.g. the permissible or the mandatory in every possible situation; instead they settle for principles applying to choices and situations occurring in the actual world … Such philosophical projects, which do not require knowing metaphysical necessities, are not the target of the present argument.’ (189).

5. Note that this is slightly different from the dogmatic thesis mentioned earlier – the condition of appropriate dogmatism here is knowledge rather than correctness.

Log in via your institution

Log in to Taylor & Francis Online

PDF download + Online access

  • 48 hours access to article PDF & online version
  • Article PDF can be downloaded
  • Article PDF can be printed
USD 53.00 Add to cart

Issue Purchase

  • 30 days online access to complete issue
  • Article PDFs can be downloaded
  • Article PDFs can be printed
USD 384.00 Add to cart

* Local tax will be added as applicable

Related Research

People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read.

Recommended articles lists articles that we recommend and is powered by our AI driven recommendation engine.

Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citations.
Articles with the Crossref icon will open in a new tab.