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Notes
1. Machery (Citation2017).
2. The views he has in mind are Elga’s ‘Equal Weight’ view (Citation2007), Sosa’s ‘Partial Steadfastness’ view (Citation2010), and Kelly’s ‘Total-Evidence’ view (Citation2010). He also remarks that ‘Whilst some other views about disagreement may lead to another conclusion, it one accepts any of these leading views, one should concede premise 4.’ (131).
3. They’re not the only options, but there is no space here to cover all the possibilities.
4. He writes: ‘It is true that some philosophers do not purport to identify metaphysical necessities. In particular, some ethicists and political philosophers have explicitly rejected the need to identify principles that would determine, e.g. the permissible or the mandatory in every possible situation; instead they settle for principles applying to choices and situations occurring in the actual world … Such philosophical projects, which do not require knowing metaphysical necessities, are not the target of the present argument.’ (189).
5. Note that this is slightly different from the dogmatic thesis mentioned earlier – the condition of appropriate dogmatism here is knowledge rather than correctness.