Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.

KEYWORDS:

• Shaftesbury
• liberty
• positive liberty
• self-mastery
• self-control
• personal development

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the UK-Japan Conference on Aspects of Early Modern British Philosophy in Oxford in September 2019. I thank the audience for helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Enrico Galvagni, Katherine O’Donnell, and Rowland Stout for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. For further discussion see Gill (2018) and Sellars (2016).

2. References are to Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (2001 [1711]), Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. D. den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund), 3 vols., hereafter ‘Characteristicks.’ The individual works in the three volumes of this edition are ordered as in the original 1711 and 1714 editions. Additionally references to the passages in (Shaftesbury 1999), Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions Times, ed. L. E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) will be given. Characteristicks is a collection of Shaftesbury’s mature works. Individual works of the collection will be abbreviated and cited as follows:

• LE: A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (in vol. 1 of the 1711 ed.)

• SC: Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend (in vol. 1 of the 1711 ed.)

• S: Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author (in vol. 1 of the 1711 ed.)

• I: An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit (in vol. 2 of the 1711 ed.)

• M: The Moralists: A Philosophical Rhapsody (in vol. 2 of the 1711 ed.)

• MR: Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other critical Subjects (in vol. 3 of the 1711 ed.)

• JH: A Notion of the Historical Draught of Tablulature of the Judgment of Hercules (in vol. 3 of the 1714 ed.)

• C: Klein’s edition of Characteristics.

3. Shaftesbury intended Second Characters to include A Letter concerning Design, The Judgment of Hercules, Appendix concerning the Embleme of Cebes, and the unfinished Plasticks, or the Original, Progress, & Power of Designatory Art. See Shaftesbury (1981–, vol. I, 5). For further discussion, see Dehrmann (2014).

4. The Greek name ‘Heracles’ is translated into Latin as ‘Hercules’.

5. Gribelin was tasked by Shaftesbury to compose engravings for the second edition of Characteristicks. Shaftesbury intended to publish Judgement of Hercules in a separate work on aesthetics, but after his death in 1713 it was included in volume 3 of the second edition of Characteristicks, published in 1714. Gribelin’s engraving of The Choice of Hercules was reproduced in the second edition below the title. For further details, see Paknadel (1974).

6. For further discussion, see Boeker (2018), Gill (2018), Jaffro (2014).

7. Further analysis of de Matteis’ painting can be found in Woldt (2014, 140–143).

8. According to Jaffro (2014), the story is an adaption of a story from Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. See Xenophon, Cyropaedia, V.i.1–18, VI.i.31–41. Shaftesbury modernises the story and neither uses the names found in the ancient version nor includes a reference to Xenophon. Yet there is no doubt that Shaftesbury was an admirer of Xenophon and he wrote detailed notes on Xenophon’s works. See Shaftesbury (1981–, vol. II, 5). See also Stuart-Buttle (2019, 89, 117).

9. For helpful further discussion, see Heyd (1995, 44–71, 214–219).

10. Since Shaftesbury intended to publish Judgement of Hercules in a work on aesthetics rather than in Charactertisticks, I will not say much about it in this section and rather focus on the works that are included in the first edition of Characteristicks. Nevertheless, I believe that Judgement of Hercules offers additional support for this reading, as mentioned in Section 4, and I return to it at the end of this section.

11. For further discussion regarding Shaftesbury’s focus on the will in his account of selfhood, see Winkler (2000). See also Darwall (1995, 205–206).

12. I thank Peter Kail for drawing my attention to this issue.

13. For further discussion, see Boeker (2018).

14. Shaftesbury reflects on these issues in Soliloquy I.3 in the contexts of remarks regarding different genres that authors can choose. He contrasts memoirs, in which the author is at the centre of the work, with the genre of dialogue: ‘For here the Author is annihilated; and the Reader being in no way apply’d to, stands for Nobody. The self-interesting Partys both vanish at once’ (S I.3, 1:125; C 90). In that respect The Moralists, which is a work written in dialogue form supplements Soliloquy.

15. See also M III.2, 2:223; C 320 and Gill (2018).

16. For excellent further discussion, see Gill (2018).

17. Other passages where Shaftesbury invokes the metaphor of architecture include SC IV.2, 1:85; C 62–63; S I.3, 1:129; C 93; S III.3, 1:217–218; C 157–158; I II.i.1, 2:78; C 215; M III.2, 2:228; C 323–324; MR III.1, 3:82–83; C 395–396.

18. Of course, not all human beings of Shaftesbury’s day were literate, let alone had the time to read Shaftesbury’s work. However, the reason why some human beings were prevented from pursuing self-improvement in the way Shaftesbury recommends it lies in external social, political, and/or economic circumstances.

19. These ideas are further developed in an entry on improvement in Shaftesbury’s Askêmata (Shaftesbury 1981–, II,6:314–319). Askêmata is a collection of Shaftesbury’s private notebooks, which document his own soliloquies.

20. In the following, I use the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ interchangeably.

21. Shaftesbury uses these expressions interchangeably.

22. See S I.3, 129–130; C 93; M II.4, 2:159–164, III.1, 2:200–201, III.3, 2:242; C 273–276, 303–304, 334. For further discussion, see Grean (1967, 89).

23. Shaftesbury argues that ‘there is a strange Simplicity in this You and Me’ (M III.1, 2:197; C 301) and that a self or human mind is a substance (M III.1, 2:198; C 302). On this basis, Thiel (2011, 241–242) claims that Shaftesbury accepts that minds are immaterial. Although I am less confident than Thiel that Shaftesbury is committed to the view that minds are immaterial, his works are consistent with it. Such an immaterialist interpretation provides resources for arguing that human minds are not governed by the laws of nature.

24. See M II.2, 2:142–144; C 260–261.

25. Benjamin Whichcote argues in his Select Sermons, which Shaftesbury edited, for distinguishing between natural principles and moral duties (Whichcote 1698, 214–217). According to Whichcote, anything that happens on the basis of natural principles is necessary and does not leave room for liberty. ‘Whereas, on the other hand, those Rules, or Means, which are most proper for the attaining of this End, about which we have a Liberty of Acting; to which, Men are to be induc’d in a Moral Way, by such kind of Motives or Arguments as are in themselves sufficient to convince the Reason; these I call Moral Duties: DUTIES, as deriving their Obligation from their Conducibility to their promoting of our chief End; and, MORAL as depending upon Moral Motives’ (1698, 216). This shows that Shaftesbury through Whichcote’s work was familiar with a distinction between natural necessity and another kind of necessity that stems from moral obligation. Thus, we should take the interpretation outlined above seriously as an alternative to Woldt’s compatibilist interpretation. For further helpful discussion on how Shaftesbury builds on ideas from Whichcote’s sermons, see Uehlein (2017).

26. Although I believe the distinction is helpful for illuminating Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty, I do not want to suggest that the distinction between positive and negative liberty is exhaustive. Indeed Pettit (1997) offers convincing arguments that there is scope for a third concept of liberty, which understands liberty as non-domination. Pettit calls this third concept ‘republican liberty’. Additionally, Broad and Detlefsen (2017) argue that the distinction between positive and negative liberty does not properly capture the concerns of women and the practical constraints that often diminish their liberty. Broad and Detlefsen show that female perspectives offer alternative approaches to liberty that can be empowering for women.

27. See M I.3 2:120–121; C 243–244; II.1, 2:135–138; C254–257; II.4, 2:174–180; C 283–288; III.2, 2:237; C 331. Sociability is also an important theme in Shaftesbury’s Inquiry.

28. For further discussion, including background on an engraving, entitled ‘The Triumph of Liberty,’ that Shaftesbury commissioned as frontispiece for the second volume of the second edition of Characteristicks, see Paknadel (1974), Woldt (2014, 134–140).