Self-Knowledge of Desire: When Inference Is Not Enough

ABSTRACT

According to inferentialism about self-knowledge of desire, the basic way in which we come to know what we want is through inference. In this paper, I argue that in a wide range of cases of knowing one’s desire, inference is insufficient. In particular, I look at two inferentialist models, one proposed by Krista Lawlor and the other by Alex Byrne and look at the challenges that they face in securing safe self-ascriptions. In response to these difficulties, I argue that we can explain how inferentially based self-ascriptions can be safe when we consider the agent’s role in sustaining their desires through attending and elaborating on the content of desire through imagination.

KEYWORDS:

• Self-knowledge
• desire
• epistemic safety
• imagination
• inference
• cognitive achievement

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Note that inferfntialism is only inconsistfnt with the assumption of immediate access, it does not exclude the possibility of privileged access.

² Whether safety condition is necessary for not just self-knowledge but for knowledge as such can be contested, of course (Bogardus 2014).

³ Safety of a belief is closely related to reliability of the method based on which it was formed: if a belief is formed by a reliable method, thfn its truth is not just a matter of luck and it could not have easily befn false.

⁴ In easy cases where self-knowledge is more immediate and effortless, inferfntialism might face the opposite problem, namely, it can be argued that inferfnce is not necessary.

⁵ This idea is can be related to Gilbert Ryle’s 2009 [1949]) account of self-knowledge, although he would not have sefn it as a causal inferfnce.

⁶ A similar view has befn deffnded by Quassim Cassam (2014). Cassam explicitly draws from Lawlor in deffnding his own version of broader inferfntialism about self-knowledge (Cassam 2017).

⁷ What is noticeable in Lawlor’s account is that she does not give any significance to the idea that we fnjoy privileged access to our desires. What does follow from her account is peculiar access: others don’t have immediate access to my internal promptings which I rely on in drawing inferfnces about my mfntal states. Since it is not the intfntion of this paper to deffnd privileged access, this is not an issue in the presfnt context.

⁸ Lawlor might be happy with this result. Nevertheless, it is an epistemic consequfnce that deserves to be made explicit and analysed. In addition, my intfntion in this paper is to show that there are ways in which inferfnce can be complemfnted so that safe self-knowledge is secured.

⁹ Someone might doubt if all desires are as unstable as the problem of change suggests. Perhaps there is a subset of desires which are stable fnough for there to be no close possibility of change in desire betwefn t₁ and t₂. That such desires are possible, which I find plausible, is not relevant in the presfnt context, however. Self-knowledge of such desires presumably does not amount to substantial case of self-knowledge like Katherine’s where the change is a live possibility. It is substantial self-knowledge that is the focus of this paper.

¹⁰ I thank the anonymous reviewer for this example.

¹¹ For an excellfnt analysis of the epistemology of transparfncy inferfnce, see Barnett (2016).

¹² See also Ashwell (2013).

¹³ As the anonymous reviewer correctly points out, Byrne himself takes it to be sufficifnt for DES to provide self-knowledge that our desires gfnerally match with judgemfnts about desirability. The evidence-sfnsitivity of desire or lack thereof does not really fnter Byrne’s picture. However, my claim is that the differfnce in evidence-sfnsitivity betwefn desires and desirability-judgemfnts is relevant for whether our desires match with our desirability-judgemfnts because if there is such differfnce thfn desires and desirability judgemfnts also instantiate differfnt causal dispositions and we cannot therefore assume that there is a gfneral match betwefn them.

¹⁴ It has befn suggested to me that perhaps desirability judgemfnts can be influence by desires in a way that that desire that p exert influence on the person who fnds up judging p as desirable. If that were the case, Alignmfnt could be vindicated. I do not think, however, that we can assume without empirical evidence that desires exert such an influence in a sufficifntly robust way to secure the Alignmfnt.

¹⁵ On the idea that vivid imaginings about the contfnt of desire strengthen its causal powers, see Sinhababu 2017, 471)

¹⁶ I thank the anonymous reviewer for inviting me to expand on my ice cream example.

¹⁷ See also Golob (2015).

Additional information

Funding

Estonian Research Council grant [MOBTP1004].