Postmodernism, Quietism, and Philosophy

ABSTRACT

In my 1993 IJPS paper it was suggested that postmodernist verdicts on ‘the death of philosophy’ relied on a rejection of any ‘substantive’ or ‘metaphysical’ notion of truth. The present paper relates these verdicts to Wittgenstein’s alleged ‘philosophical quietism’. In both cases, for example, there is a rejection of ‘depth’. Various characterisations of Wittgenstein’s position are questioned, including the idea that his quietism consists in showing the impossibility of sceptical challenges to our ‘hinge’ propositions and beliefs. It is then argued, however, that recognition of the groundlessness of beliefs (and practices), far from curing ‘vertigo’ or ‘Angst’, is apt to inspire it. In a final section, I propose that the ‘metaphysical horror’ at the impossibility of articulating grounds for our beliefs can be allayed only by the thought that these answer to a reality that cannot be articulated and must therefore remain a mystery. One role for philosophy might be to cultivate a sense of this mystery and trace its implications for how we should live.

KEYWORDS:

• Postmodernism
• Quietism
• Wittgenstein
• Truth
• Mystery

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Ian James Kidd for his helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. For a fuller account by Pritchard of ‘vertigo’, ‘Angst’ and so on, see his Epistemic Angst (Pritchard 2015).