Frank H. Knight, pragmatism, and American institutionalism: A note

Abstract

This note deals with the debated question of whether, and to what extent, Frank Knight's epistemology was consistent with the general philosophy of American pragmatism. First, in accord with recent interpretations, I provide new evidence illustrating that Knight's views on science, knowledge and related philosophical topics present some important similarities with the pragmatic tradition. Second, I attempt to demonstrate that Knight's unsympathetic reading of Dewy and pragmatism was, to a relevant extent, a consequence of his aversion to the so-called scientific wing of American interwar institutionalism.

Keywords:

• Frank H. Knight
• behaviourism
• American institutionalism
• positivism
• empiricism
• John Dewey

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Tisiana Foresti, Tiziano Raffaelli and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments. The errors that remain are the author's own.

Notes

1 Letter from Frank H. Knight to Jacob Viner, Iowa City, 9 September 1925, from Jacob Viner Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University. The letter is reproduced in Asso and Fiorito (2003b).

2 Consider, for instance, the following passage taken from Risk, uncertainty, and profit: ‘Economists generally have been coming to recognize that the psychology of the subject is properly behavioristic; that an economist need not to be an hedonist (Jevons and Edgeworth notwithstanding), and that he does not even need to consider the issues between rival psychologies of choice’ (Knight 1921: 64).

3 Knight's remarks appear to be more appropriate to Poincaré's conventionalism than to Mach's general philosophy of science. For a discussion see Asso and Fiorito (2003b).

4 See also Garrison (1995).

5 Knight also referred with approval to William James on the use of metaphors and figurative language (Knight 1922: 479–80).

6 As stated above, I mainly refer here to the so-called scientistic wing of institutionalism. Jon Roger Commons' embracing of pragmatism – as I have argued elsewhere (Fiorito 2010) – was of a different nature and more consistent with the approach outlined by Dewey and Peirce.

7 As I have argued in another paper (Asso and Fiorito 20004b), it is my contention that Watson's behavioristic approach to human conduct substantially differs from Dewey's. While they both admit that human conduct is primarily habitual, Dewey's insistence on intelligence as the only way to find a solution to the problem of disrupted conduct distances him from the strictly behavioristic adherence to the mechanistic stimulus–response explanations. In fact, unlike Watson and many of his followers, Dewey argued that whenever we have conflicting habits, or whenever someone or something disturbs the environment in such a way that habitual practice is blocked, the individual seeks impulsively to restore the routinized behavior. However, neither habit nor impulse is capable of finding a reasoned solution. For this intelligence was required. For Dewey, intelligence was clearly a teleological and purposive category of thought and provided a means to ‘adapt customs to conditions, and thereby remake them’ (Dewey 19221988: 54). For an insightful criticism of Dewey as an exponent of a social engineering conception of social control, see Kaufman-Osborn (1985).

8 ‘Prospect of economic theory.’ Informal talk at University of Chicago, 14 March 1925, from W. C. Mitchell papers, box 2. See also Mitchell (1930, 73; 1931, 410).

9 Adolph J. Snow, psychologist, wrote extensively on the application of behaviorism to economics and business. See Snow (1924).

10 See Emmett (1999) for a complete bibliography of Knight's writings.

11 Letter from Frank H. Knight to Morris A. Copeland, 25 January 1927, from Copeland Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University. The letter is reproduced in Asso and Fiorito (2003a).

12 The expression ‘behaviorist institutionalists’ was used in contemporary textbooks of economic doctrines to describe this new strand within American institutionalism. See, for example, Suranyi Unger (1931) and Haney (1936).