Was Bentham a primitive rational choice theory predecessor?

Abstract

This paper challenges the view of Jeremy Bentham as a primitive predecessor of rational choice theory and welfare economics. The psychological hedonism in Bentham is of a rather weak form – net pleasure motivates behaviour, but we are not always capable of its maximisation. Thus, the outcome of our choices is not necessarily in our best interest and the aggregation of our revealed preferences is not necessarily a good indicator of general happiness. The bottom line is that the underpinnings of Bentham's utilitarianism are better aligned with contemporary psychological theory than previously thought, which puts his ethical thinking on firmer ground.

Keywords:

• Utility
• Bentham
• rational choice
• utilitarianism
• psychological hedonism

Subject classification codes:

• B31
• D01
• D60

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank N. Vallois and other participants in the 2010 History of Economics Society Annual Conference in Syracuse and two anonymous referees of the European Journal of the History of Economic Thought for useful comments and suggestions. As this paper is based on material from my PhD thesis, I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of A. Papandreou, S. Hargreaves-Heap, H. Polemarchakis, and M. Psalidopoulos. I would also like to thank R. Sugden, N. Theocharakis, Y. Varoufakis, and participants in a University of Athens seminar for their comments and suggestions on a very early draft. All usual caveats apply.

Additional information

Funding

I would also like to acknowledge the financial support during my PhD studies from the Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY) [grant number 1043/2006].