Malthus on causality

Abstract

Allegations of inconsistency and self-contradiction have regularly been levied against Malthus, but some of the allegations might be the result of inadequate appreciation of his use of a distinctive methodology involving a complex structure of causal relations. After an introductory summary of his general statements on causality, this paper analyses 26 selected topics that show how he deployed this methodology.

Keywords:

• T.R. Malthus
• methodology
• causation

JEL Codes:

• BO KII

Notes

1 A notable exception in recent commentaries would be Cremaschi and Dascal (1966), dealing with various aspects of Malthus’ methodology, including causation.

2 It is not clear why he chose the terms “necessary” and “incidental”. The term “incidental” suggests something of lesser importance, but he had admitted that the incidental causes “are much more powerful and prominent than those which take place necessarily in the progress of society” (Malthus, II, 359). His choice of the term “necessary” in this context was perhaps unfortunate. As noted below, he later in the Principles, in dealing with the causes of profits, introduced a distinction between “necessary” causes and “incidental” causes. He argued that the incidental must be admitted along with the necessary, and that their influence sometimes overwhelms that of the necessary causes.

3 Altered from “essentially” in the first edition of the Principles to “to a considerable extent” in the second (see Malthus 1989b, I, p. 22; II, p. 14).

4 See Malthus (1989b, I, pp. 92–4); see II, p. 76 for alterations in ed. 2 of Principles; and II, pp. 339–40, for details of the method used by Ricardo and Malthus in calculating the effect on prices of a fall in profits used.

5 As quoted by Malthus (1989b, I, p. 94). The quoted statement occurs in the first and second editions of Ricardo's Principles where it reads “absolute price” rather than “exchangeable value” (see Ricardo 1953–71, I, p. 63).

6 The paragraph in which this argument occurs in the first edition of the Principles was omitted from the second edition, but there is nothing in it that is inconsistent with his views expressed elsewhere in either edition.

7 Some of these statements in the first edition of the Principles were omitted from the second edition, but their sense seems to remain in the second edition. Omission does not necessarily mean recantation (see Malthus 1989b, II, pp. 312, 317, 421, 503).

8 See Malthus (1989b, I, pp. 300–301); “other causes” was altered to “the regulating principle” in ed. 2 (see Malthus 1989b, II, p. 229).

9 In the second edition of the Principles, this quoted statement was altered to “in the actual state of many countries, or in their probable state for some centuries to come” (Malthus 1989b, II, p. 238).

10 See Bloomfield (1981) for further exposition of this point.