Why is Hegel still relevant: contract and value in the Philosophy of Right

Abstract

This article offers a reading of the theories of contract and value developed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. We show how the circular shape emblematic of Hegel’s philosophy allows both to make sense of the ambiguous stance of Hegel towards liberalism and to clarify the relationship between the Hegelian conception of value and that developed by Marx and some of his continuators. The article then studies how Hegel’s analyses of contract and value shed light on the dynamics of neoliberalism. These analyses are shown to anticipate both early descriptions of neoliberal capitalism (Bourdieu, Foucault) and contemporary works (Fraser, Honneth, Jaeggi).

Keywords:

• Hegel
• contract
• value
• neoliberalism

JEL CODES:

• B14
• B19
• B24
• B51
• P16

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Richard Sturn, the editor, and to three reviewers for the very useful comments they made on my paper. I also want to thank Julia Brown for her very useful proofreading.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 While Smith is known for advocating laissez-faire, Steuart on the contrary argues that economic activities need to be overseen by a benevolent “statesman.” For instance, in the context of the grain debate in the 18th century, Steuart argues for controlling the price of grains to avoid excessive fluctuations (Augier and Théré 1999). As a consequence, even if this may seem a bit rough, in the remaining of the paper Smith is understood as epitomizing liberalism, whereas Steuart as epitomizing state intervention.

2 By translating Verstand by “the Understanding” with a capital letter, I follow Miller: “I have been sparing in the use of capitals and, in general, have only used them for terms which have a peculiarly Hegelian connotation. The German Verstand I have translated by ‘the Understanding’. Where the capital is omitted, the word has the usual English meaning” (Hegel [1807] 2013, xxxi). This is also how Nisbet decided to translate Verstand in the translation of the Philosophy of Right I am referring to in this article. As a consequence, he decided to translate the expression Not-und Verstandesstaat found in paragraph 183 by “the state of necessity and of the Understanding” (Hegel [1820] 2012, 221).

3 Hegel’s analysis of contract can be related to that of Durkheim since both authors insist on the idea that contract is by essence abstract and thus requires to be realised against a background that cannot rest on the abstract rationality of contract. Indeed, Durkheim famously noted, in the Division of Labour in Society, that “in a contract not everything is contractual” (Durkheim [1893] 1984, 158).

4 “[…] value depends on sociality as a necessary condition of its possibility” (Deranty 2005, 329).

5 “Through value, entities that were at first irreducibly isolated become comparable. They become social, so to speak” (Deranty 2005, 216).

6 Such a circularity between sociality and value lies at the heart of Simmel’s theory of money. For instance: “Exchange presupposes an objective measurement of subjective valuations, not in the sense of being chronologically prior, but in the sense that both phenomena arise from the same act” (Simmel [1900] 2011, 85) or “The profound connection between value and exchange, as a result of which they are mutually conditioning, is illustrated by the fact that they are in equal measure the basis of practical life” (Simmel [1900] 2011, 88).

7 The reinterpretation does not only characterise the regulation of banks, but more generally that of economic activities as shown by Boltanski and Chiapello ([1999] 2007). For instance: “’Controlling the uncontrollable’ is not something with an infinite number of solutions: in fact, the only solution is for people to control themselves” (Boltanski and Chiapello [1999] 2007, 80).

8 In 2007, BNP Paribas indeed froze 1.6 billion euros worth of funds arguing that it was unable to determine the value of the assets held by these funds.

9 “In these opposites and their complexity, civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both” (Hegel [1820] 2012, 222).